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Religions of Doubt: Religion, Critique, and Modernity in Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Walter Benjamin 
Ajay Singh Chaudhary 
Religions of Doubt: Religion, Critique, and Modernity in Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Walter Benjamin 
is a work of comparative philosophy addressing selected works of the Iranian novelist and 
political thinker Jalal Al-e Ahmad and the German-Jewish critic and philosopher Walter 
Benjamin. I demonstrate that the perceived failure of utopian modern projects, particularly 
Marxism, led each of these twentieth century thinkers to re-engage with religious questions and 
concerns in a simultaneous critique of the corrosive, reductive, and catastrophic nature of the 
modern condition and the idea of traditional religion – static, irrational, regressive – that 
modernist thought had conjured. Furthermore, both Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin were compelled 
to move beyond the worlds of traditional philosophical inquiry or political action, into questions 
and practices of art, literature, science, technology, and ritual. I argue that reading these thinkers 
together allows a glimpse at ideas and modes in philosophical thought that were largely derailed 
by varying discourses of secularism, poststructuralism, naturalism, and fundamentalism. This 
reading suggests new synthetic possibilities for philosophy in the twenty-first century. 
Note on Transliteration: This dissertation primarily addresses bodies of literature originally 
written in Persian and German but it also draws on words and phrases in Hebrew, Arabic, 
French, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin. To address this vast array of languages, I have employed a 
transliteration method designed to be easily understandable to an English reader. I have 
transliterated words and phrases from Persian, Hebrew, Arabic, and Greek into a basic phonetic 
English approximation, free of diacritical marks. For words and phrases in German, French, and 
Latin, I have preserved accents and diacritical marks that are commonly employed in English 
 
 
writing. I have occasionally included words and phrases in their original Perso-Arabic, Hebrew, 
or Greek scripts where they might prove additionally beneficial to readers of those scripts but 
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Prologue: An Excursus on Ending before Beginning 
The fact that history has rolled over certain positions will be respected as a verdict on their truth content only by 
those who agree with Schiller that ‘world history is the world tribunal.’ What has been cast aside but not absorbed 
theoretically will often yield its truth content only later. It festers as a sore on the prevailing health; this will lead 
back to it in changed situations. 
- Theodor Adorno (Negative Dialectics, 1966) 
 
And I say to you: someone will remember us. In time to come…  
- Sappho (“Fragments, on the Muses” Verse III, circa 6th century BCE) 
 
Iran 1968 
On May 9, 1968, Ali Shariati delivered the last of a series of lectures at Tehran’s 
Husseiniyah Irshad, a center for Islamic learning that Shariati and several others were 
transforming into what they conceived as both a truly open and popular “Islamic University.”1 
Shariati and many of his colleagues actively hoped that the Husseiniyah Irshad would become 
both a center for the development and dissemination of the new “Islamic Ideology”2 that Shariati 
and his peers were developing as well as a model of the kind of new Islamic ideological and 
pedagogical apparatus that Shariati would describe in more detail in the introduction to the 
massive series of lectures that were later collected as Islamshenasi or “Islamology.” These 
lectures were a synthesis of his research on sociology, philosophy, and Islam. In Shariati’s 
newest formulations at the time, a brand of urgency and immediacy had overtaken both his 
ascetic-mystical interests (the kaviriyyat of his writings and thought) and his sociological 
reflections on Islam (the Islamiyyat) and he was focused more purposefully on social critique, 
                                                          
1
 Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian, 238. 
2





ideological dissemination (his ijtimayyat) and, put simply, mobilization and agitation.
3
 This is 
not to say that this latter set of speeches and writings did not contain major elements of the 
Islamiyyat and – in both the choice of philosophical references and Shariati’s often mystical 
orientation toward the world – a large amount of the kaviriyyat as well. Rather, it is to note that 
by the time of his lectures in the late sixties and early seventies, Shariati had moved into a phase 
in which the question was no longer one of analysis but of action. The question was, as 
succinctly put in the title to one of Shariati’s 1971 lectures, echoing Lenin and the need for the 
creation of a vanguard party for this new ideology, “What is to be Done?”4 Although exhortation 
and ideological dissemination had long been a central component of Shariati’s oratory in 
particular, this complete shift into an activist mode marked a distinct departure for him. Well 
past Khomeini’s first clerical insurrection in 1963 and during the increasing agitation of the 
Marxist fedayyin and left-Islamist mujahidin,
5
 Shariati had urged patience as the new Islamic 
                                                          
3
 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 104. It is tempting to merely call this “school of action and thought” (in 
Shariati’s words) “praxis” and that would not be entirely incorrect; it would just underemphasize the sense in which 
the practice and in fact pure valorization of action itself had overtaken any kind of dialectical relationship between 
theory and practice. As Dabashi puts it here, Shariati in this period of his life, “wished to change, not interpret; lead, 
not argue; move, not convince; achieve, not rationalize.” It may sound like Shariati is merely in line with Marx’s 
11
th
 thesis on Feuerbach. But after all, Marx never said to stop interpreting. Even granting the ways in which time 
was perceived in the early Soviet Union as a radical discord between what political conditions were and what  
economic conditions ought to be (please see Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe, 36-37), and that a 
notion of an urgent need to “catch-up” was especially present in Stalin’s day, it is nearly impossible to emphasize 
sufficiently just how much a sense of having to catch-up to events themselves, to the wave of radically diverging but 
also increasingly mass mobilization that was occurring in Iran (even as early as 1971) drove theoretical 
considerations completely off the table in favor of bringing political factions together, increasing agitation, and, 
above all, fomenting universal resistance to the Shah’s regime. These theoretical considerations include many that 
might traditionally even be considered praxiological. For example: Shariati, for all his social science training at the 
Sorbonne, never articulated anything approaching a detailed economic analysis. The left-leaning aspects of the 
“Islamic Ideology” movement had not even tried to craft an economic program of any kind to speak of until 
Ayatollah Taleghani’s Islam va Malikiyat was published in 1965.   
4
 Ali Shariati, “What is to be Done?” Lecture delivered at Husseiniyah Irsad, exact date unknown. Reproduced and 
translated in Shariati, What is to be Done? ed. Farhang Rajaee, 1986. 
5
 It is crucial to understand that although the contemporary Mujahidin-e-Khalq claim Shariati as an intellectual 
forbear and inspiration, Shariati was never part of the organization. Additionally, the organization itself had a 
radically different quality in the pre-Revolutionary period. Please see Ervand Abrhamian’s study Radical Islam 





program could be fully articulated. However, by this period, events were overtaking thought, and 
Shariati – who viewed the contemporary, socially-committed intellectual as a kind of modern 
day prophet – would not be left behind.6 
The lecture he delivered that May 9th was entitled Motemadden va Motejaded [Civilized 
and Modern]
7
 and it is a scathing polemic against modernization, existential anomie, capitalist 
production, and the conditions which give rise to alienation understood in an orthodox Marxist 
sense, but also in the later sociological accounts of Max Weber and Marcel Mauss (both of 
whom are directly reference in the speech). But it is also an adaptation and transformation of the 
the ideas proposed by Jalal Al-e Ahmad in Gharbzadegi ([West-strucken-ness], 1961).
8
 Al-e 
Ahmad shared many of the above concerns. In Gharbzadegi, he was particularly attuned to the 
ways in which modern industrial production produced a particular ‘modern-but-not-modernized’ 
condition in the periphery which was necessary to capital (and European powers) as both a 
source for raw materials and as a market to flood with cheap goods.
9
 Al-e Ahmad had also been 
in many ways the first to suggest – although in far more oblique ways – the revolutionary and 
resistive capacities in Shiism to this economic, political, and social crisis. But in Motemadden va 
Motejaded, Shariati was adapting many of Al-e Ahmad’s ideas: the colonial need for ideological 
                                                          
6
 For more information on Shariati’s history, please see Ali Rahnema’s excellent “political biography,” An Islamic 
Utopian: a Political Biography of Ali Shariati. The chapters on the Irshad as well as on “Insurrectionary Discourse,” 
provide a helpful narrative for the transformation of Shariati’s discourse from primarily analytic (albeit with an eye 
to laying the groundwork for activism) to primarily activist and exhortative.  
7
 Translated by Hamid Algar as “Civilization and Modernization” in the volume Reflections of Humanity (Shariati, 
1980).  
8
 Please see Ali Rahnema’s section “A Diversion: Shariati and Jalal Al-e Ahmad” in An Islamic Utopian (Rahnema, 
2000, 190-194) for a full discussion of the relationship between the two thinkers. It must be mentioned that 
Shariati’s engagement with Al-e Ahmad was also colored and influenced by his work translating and commenting 
on Frantz Fanon.  
9
 In regard to the history discussed in footnote 3, Al-e Ahmad had a surprisingly lucid economic analysis despite 





production of ‘civilization’ to sell goods; the uneven ‘machine economy’; the ‘loss of self’, and 
the modernization of economic conditions paired with stultification of the modernization of the 
individual and society.  Shariati says: 
There is another kind of “control by jinns” which posses humanity and alienates a person or an 
entire class from itself. This type of alienation is more real, more frightening, and more damaging, 
and it is this omnipresent form of alienation which affects us, the Iranians, Muslims, the Asians, 
and Africans. It is not an alienation caused by technology – we have not been alienated by 
machines… Rather what we are at grips with is something extremely unpleasant and dangerous – 
“cultural alienation.”10 
This is, in some ways, textbook Al-e Ahmad. Until this point in his speech, Shariati had been 
rehearsing theories of social alienation (Marx) and individual alienation (Weber, Mauss) that 
would be familiar to any first-year sociology student. Something different enters the 
conversation here, although it may initially be hard to discern given that Shariati’s answer to 
“cultural alienation” is in fact so close to the “return to self” which many contemporary scholars 
attribute to Al-e Ahmad himself.
11
 But what is different here is the possibility that subjectivities 
in the colonized world have something to say about the general condition of alienation, 
something “more real, more frightening, and more damaging.”12 For Al-e Ahmad, this was a 
deeply fraught question: the “true-self” was a gharbzadeh [west-struck] invention, and yet the 
universal subject of the Enlightenment was clearly an abstract ideal which not only promised in 
theory what it did not deliver in practice (particularly in Iran), but had already delivered its 
logical conclusions in the catastrophes of the Holocaust, the Stalinist purges, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and, of course, in the colonial project itself. Al-e Ahmad, over the course of his 
writings, viewed with increasing degrees of intensity, the power of Shiism in resisting the 
                                                          
10
 Ali Shariati, Reflections of Humanity, 23. 
11
 This is the primary topic of my second chapter, “How to read Gharbzadegi?” 
12





colonial project – from the Tobacco revolt of 1890, to the differing roles of the clergy in the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905, to the failure of a unified religious-secular front in the 
Mossadeq crisis in 1953. And yet, at the same time, he could celebrate the end of tradition itself 
in his own infertility and its allegorical possibilities, as he did in Sangi bar Guri (A Stone on a 
Grave, 1981).
13
 In what I hope will become a familiar argument in this work, I would claim that 
Al-e Ahmad held an unresolved, negative dialectic between the two logical contradictions.  
Shariati, in contrast, had already decided as early as his first lectures on Islamshenasi, to 
dissolve this dialectic: the new history, from the new starting point, was to proceed in a Hegelian 
manner but – in a strange inversion – toward an ahistorical fixed point of perfect revelation in the 
past, the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, when true “Being” was in the 
world.
14
 At that point, when the new history had achieved in material reality what the old history 
had achieved through revelation, the end of history would be reached. What had been a mass of 
necessary and simultaneous contradictions in Al-e Ahmad became a singular, driving theory of 
identity, history, and action by this point in Shariati.  
                                                          
13
 Originally composed in 1961, Sangi bar Guri was never meant for publication and only appeared posthumously. 
However, Al-e Ahmad’s actual ambivalence regarding tradition can be seen as early as Ghabzadegi and, as I will 
show, most fruitfully in Khassi dar Miqat.  
14
 Shariati was no ‘back-to-the-earther’ – he did not think that modernity could be undone – but the notion of an, at 
least, proper structural order at the time of the Prophet and proper self-knowledge at the time of the Prophet in 
Shariati’s writings are clear. It is fascinating to note that when he is talking in these idealized terms, Shariati speaks 
in much more, for lack of a better adjective, Sunni language – focusing on the times of the Prophet and his 
companions. When discussing protest and resistance, Shariati would attend much more specifically to the narratives 
of Shiism, of Karbala and Hussein. One gets the sense that Shariati had resolved the Sunni-Shii dynamic as mapping 
neatly onto one of theory/ideal (Sunni Islam) and practice/action (Shii Islam) – in place of the difficult work of 
thinking with contradictions upon which Al-e Ahmad had embarked. I have no wish in this study to rehash the 
extremely recent and deeply ahistorical notion that somehow Sunni Islam and Shii Islam have always been in 
martial conflict. Nor do I want to add fuel to the fire of Sunni polemicists who decry Shiism as a Judaized Islam. 
However, in moving past the intellectual strictures of mere liberal tolerance, I do want to attend to the actual 
differences between traditions that have been erased by the category of “religion”.  There are specific and unique 
characteristics within the wide variety of practices and discourses we call “Judaism” and “Shiism” that I believe 
deserve consideration in the never-complete iteration of a universalistic philosophy. I discuss all these issues in more 





But alongside these obvious influences from Al-e Ahmad, Shariati is drawing on the 
writings of Marx, Weber, Sartre, Fanon, and – most curiously for this study – Herbert Marcuse. 
In my readings of several figures who are later identified as key for the iteration and 
consolidation of an “Islamic Ideology” in Iran (Al-e Ahmad, Motahhari, Shariati, Khomeini, 
Talaqani)
15
 this is the only direct reference to a “Frankfurt School” author that I have found. 
Specifically, Shariati is drawing upon one of Marcuse’s later and most famous works, One-
Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1964). One-Dimensional Man marked, in some ways, a departure 
from the avowed ‘independence’ of critical theory into an activist mode which would be picked 
up and championed by the “New Left.” Although the conditions of society – economic, social, 
and cultural – are in play, and although Marcuse couches the arguments as in line with the mode 
of dialectical thought that he and his former colleagues at the Institute for Social Research in 
Frankfurt has been developing, the overall argument is singularly one of activism against 
bourgeois conformity in all forms. It is the transformation of a non-synthetic critical dialectic 
into a renewed recognizably positive Hegelian dialectic of progress: in this case, mass-
individualized liberation against the forces of domination, Marcuse’s “Great Refusal.”16 Shariati 
perceived an exciting possibility in Marcuse’s critique of society. The engine of class 
antagonism, the difficulty of class consciousness, the irresolvable dialectic of individual 
autonomy and mass collective consciousness – all of these could be resolved in individualized 
resistance to the mechanized, “one-dimensional society”:  
                                                          
15
 For more on the interplay of the thought of these figures in the creation of “Islamic Ideology” please see 
Dabashi’s Theology of Discontent (1993).  
16
 It is extraordinary that Marcuse closes his text with a quote from Walter Benjamin on “hope.” Marcuse reads 
Benjamin’s “hope” as entirely utopian, as the urging of struggle toward fruition. However, this is a mistaken view. 
Benjamin’s “hope,” as I demonstrate, is articulated in his writings on Kafka and Jewish messianism – and is 
precisely predicated not on overt, direct, planned, social struggle but on the fleeting possibility that in a 
contemplation, creation, politics, and sciences of Jetztzeit, of “now-time” or “the now,” hope remains that something 





Why does he twist? In order to eat! Why does he eat? In order to twist? A circular man. This man 
no longer perceives himself as the being who once had varied sentiments, desires, needs, 
weaknesses, sensibilities, memories, and virtues. Those have tumbled down and he has become, in 
the words of Marcuse, a “one-dimensional man”…17   
  Shariati’s lectures were attended by thousands, to the surprise of both Motahhari and 
other Irshad organizers, as well the Iranian government, which viewed Shariati’s theories with 
increasing alarm. As noted by Ali Rahnema, Ervand Abrahamian, Hamid Dabashi, and many 
others, these lectures galvanized Iran’s newly emerging professional intelligentsia as well as its 
ever more disaffected students, providing an “organic” path (to use Gramsci’s notion 
momentarily), drawing on Shiism, Marxism, and existentialism, to revolutionary upheaval and 
transformation. Although Shariati would die before 1979, his place in the popular imagination 
and in the mythology of the coming Islamic Revolution was secure, even if his adaptation of Al-
e Ahmad’s more nuanced critique and eventually even his own Islamo-Leninism would be swept 
away by Khomeini’s Islamic Republic.  
Germany 1969 
Just under a year later, on April 22, 1969, Theodor Adorno began to give a lecture, also 
attended by nearly a thousand students, at the University of Frankfurt in Germany. However, 
unlike Shariati – whose lectures were well-received by an eager and enthusiastic audience, 
particularly among students and the new professional classes in Iran – Adorno was unable to 
finish his lecture on the methods of dialectical thought because of student protest.  Adorno was 
castigated by students in his class to engage in “self-criticism,” Maoist-style; others stood up and 
wrote on the board, “He who only allows dear Adorno to rule will uphold capitalism his entire 
                                                          
17





life.”18 Finally, while Adorno allowed the students a five minute interval to determine whether 
they wished him to continue his lecture, he was confronted by a group of female students who 
attempted to kiss him, while exposing themselves, and pelting him with flower petals.
19
 Adorno 
fled the lecture hall. That summer, he was dead, although his thought had already been declared 
“dead” via SDS flyers from that same year.20 
 In the interval between these incidents and his death, Adorno kept up an impassioned 
correspondence with Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man, as already noted, was popular and widely 
dispersed enough that Shariati was drawing on it in his Irshad lectures in 1968, and in such a 
way that one can only assume much of his Iranian audience was also familiar with the text. Noah 
Isenberg writes, in his article “Critical Theory at the Barricades”, that above all other texts, 
including mimeographed copies of varied works of Walter Benjamin as well as Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man had become an 
intellectual rallying cry for students of the German New Left (and the American New Left as 
well).
21
 Although formulated before his open affiliation with the student movements and any 
                                                          
18
 Leslie Esther, “Introduction to Adorno/Marcuse Correspondence on the German Student Movement,” New Left 
Review I/233, January-February 1999. The original message in German was: “Wer nur den lieben Adorno läßt 
walten, der wird den Kapitalismus sein Leben lang bewalten.” 
19
 Noah Isenberg, “Critical Theory at the Barricades,” Lingua Franca 1998. For many interested in an account of 
these events which is more of an apologia for the student movement in 1969, particularly in Europe, this event – 
which amounts to little more than an irrational outburst of anti-intellectualism and the attempted sexual assault of an 
old and, apparently, quite sick man – is often framed as something of a triumph. As Isenberg notes in his article, the 
motto of the German SDS at the time was “Enlightenment through Action.” It is not surprising that this could read – 
especially to a theorist like Adorno, who was sharply attuned to the irrational in culture, particularly as it plays out 
in the context of a mass movement – as a page right out one of the early manifestos of Italian Futurism.  
20
 Esther gives a nearly identical description of events in her article, although she adds one crucial point that, I hope, 
will prevent this historical excursus from descending into a pitched battle between the “New” and “Old” lefts. The 
German SDS was itself split on what to do at the Adorno lectures. Many thought that the lectures provided a good 
opportunity for political dialogue with the aging theorist, whose writings from the 40s and 50s were still seen as 
inspirational to the movement as a whole. As Esther writes, “The leather-jacket fraction of the SDS was indulging in 
action for action’s sake.” 
21





kind of formal break with Adorno and Horkheimer, Marcuse’s text already contained within it 
significant departures from what had constituted much of the shared ground of many Frankfurt 
School theorists. Marcuse’s book was in equal parts analysis and exhortation to action with its 
calls for the “Great Refusal” and definitive – not critically reflective – “breaks” and other forms 
of resistance to what Marcuse called a totalized culture of late capitalism.  His description of 
“one-dimensional society” shares much with what Adorno and Horkheimer had once described 
in Dialectic of Enlightentment but it had become entirely monolithic, i.e. in many ways a non-
dialectical presentation.
22
 While he would himself deny it, in many ways Marcuse was returning 
to his pre-Frankfurt School conception of Heideggerian Marxism.
23
 In the clearest case, Marcuse 
abandoned the traditional Marxist notion that technology was neither good nor evil in itself. 
While Adorno had never quite shared precisely this sense of technology or even the same sense 
of technological optimism that characterize many moments in Benjamin’s texts (most famously 
in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” but also in several of Benjamin’s 
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 At the very least, Marcuse was no longer embracing the “negative” dialectics associated with Adorno and 
Horkheimer and with the Frankfurt School more broadly. For example, in place of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Marcuse writes: “The advancing one-dimensional society alters the reality between the rational and the irrational. 
Contrasted with the fantastic and insane aspects of irrationality, the realm of the irrational becomes home of the 
really rational – of the ideas which may ‘promote the art of life.’” (Marcuse, 1965, 247) It would be easy to mistake 
this reasoning for similar arguments in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1947) but even there, 
Adorno and Horkheimer always turn back (thus maintaining the negative, non-synthetic, dialectic) to critique in 
turn, for example, the irrational itself. It is on grounds of irrationality that Reason is critiqued.  
23
 As Andrew Feenberg remarks, “It is commonplace to find traces of Heidegger’s critique of the Gestell in 
Marcuse’s concept of technological domination.” In fact, this is precisely what I proceed to do here. However, 
Feenberg goes on to note, “But the connection goes much deeper. The most important vestige of Heidegger’s 
influence is Marcuse’s theory of the two dimensions of society. Although his presentation of this theory in One-
Dimensional Man does not reference Heidegger, on examination it reveals a remarkable resemblance to the 
argument of Die Frage nach der Technik. In fact Marcuse sketches a sort of ‘history of being’ that parallels 
Heidegger’s account in his famous essay.” (Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of 
History, 85-86). Feenberg goes on to note that Marcuse does not cite Heidegger by name in the One-Dimensional 
Man chapter, “Negative Thinking: The Defeated Logic of Protest.” He cites him – strangely – by absence. After 
reestablishing ontology as first philosophy, “Being” as having a structure in itself, and the search for “essence” 
(elsewhere the “authentic”) as necessary (Marcuse, 1965, 135-136), Marcuse states in a footnote: “To avoid a 
misunderstanding: I do not believe that the Frage nach dem Sein and similar questions are or ought to be an 
existential concern.”(Marcuse, 1965, 136). Feenberg accepts this disavowal but I think that Marcuse protests a bit 
too much, especially since he happily cites Heidegger on technology and Husserl on Cartesian dualism a mere 





other texts on film, radio, and toys), he still viewed technology dialectically, lacking either the 
Hegelian forward momentum contained within Marxist understandings of transformations in 
society as emergent from transformations in the means of production, or any kind of essentialist 
or late capitalist romantic revulsion at technology qua technology.
24
  For Adorno and 
Horkheimer, it is instrumental reason that is most crucial, not technologization per se. In One-
Dimensional Man, Marcuse, returning to his Heideggerian roots, points at technology itself, to 
make a distinction between “the natural” and “the technological” which would have no place in 
Adorno’s dialectic but which does provide a foundation for a generalizable, individualizable 
resistance that transcends class and other boundaries (thereby reinscribing and reproducing 
sociological conditions therein ignored).  
 But it was not explicitly on grounds of this intellectual divergence that Marcuse broke 
with Adorno in 1969; in fact, in their correspondence, Adorno seems eager to keep their 
conversation alive. Although recognizing that their work had already diverged a great deal by 
this point, Adorno still thought of Marcuse as something of a colleague and compatriot, and 
invited Marcuse to Frankfurt to speak at the Institute for Social Research. It was on grounds of 
political solidarity that Marcuse explicitly laid out his case against Adorno: “To put it brutally: if 
the alternative is the police or left-wing students, then I am with the students.”25 Throughout the 
subsequent conversation, although Adorno for all intents and purposes begged Marcuse to visit 
him to work through their intellectual and political differences, and although Marcuse agreed 
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 In Adorno’s famous critique of Benjamin’s “Work of Art” essay, it is not primarily against technological and 
technologically reproducible art that Adorno criticizes Benjamin but rather Benjamin’s, in Adorno’s word, 
“undialectical” approach to autonomous art.  
25
 Herbert Marcuse, letter to Adorno, April 5, 1969, in Esther Leslie, “Reading Between the Lines: Correspondence 
on the German Student Movement,” New Left Review I/233 (1999). The “police” refers to an earlier incident in 
which – during a student occupation – Adorno called the police out of fear that the students would vandalize the 





that the student rebellions of 1968/1969 did not reflect a truly revolutionary moment and also 
contained within them a disquieting tendency towards irrationalism and anti-intellectualism, this 
remained the sticking point.
26
 While Marcuse insisted that the student groups represented “the 
strongest, perhaps the only, catalyst for the internal collapse of the system of domination today,” 
Adorno countered, “I would also concede to you that there are moments in which theory is 
pushed on further by practice. But such a situation neither exists objectively today, nor does the 
barren and brutal practicism that confronts us here have the slightest thing to do with theory 
anyhow.”27 This was the key issue around which the increasingly acrimonious correspondence 
continued, intermingled with pleas from Adorno for some kind of face-to-face meeting with 
Marcuse.  
There is no need to rehash the entire conversation; it was over before it began. I do not 
begin with these narratives to cast antagonists and protagonists for this study. In some ways, all 
parties involved, in simple terms, got some things right and some things wrong. Marcuse was 
right that “a protest against capitalism, which cuts to the roots of its existence, against its 
henchmen in the Third World, its culture, its morality,” was necessary.28 Adorno was right that 
the movement lacked a material basis in society and that it was shot through with genuinely anti-
intellectual and irrational impulses.
29
 Shariati was correct in viewing that events were overtaking 
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 Herbert Marcuse, letter to Adorno, July 21, 1969. Marcuse writes: “Of course, I never voiced the nonsensical 
opinion that the student movement is itself revolutionary. But it is the strongest, perhaps the only, catalyst for the 
internal collapse of the system of domination today.” 
27
 Theodor Adorno, letter to Marcuse, May 5, 1969. 
28
 Herbert Marcuse, letter to Adorno, July 21, 1969. 
29
 Adorno was also shockingly prescient about the ways in which formal qualities in the student movement would 
eventually be absorbed into the further technocracy of the university the students were precisely against. Something 
similar can be said concerning the American student movement and the dissolution of the draft; as we enter the 
second decade of the American war in Afghanistan, it is clear that ending the draft did little to quell American 





theory in Iran in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in seeing in Marcuse a sympathetic thinker. 
It would also be incorrect and unfair to say that Shariati stopped his theoretical investigations 
altogether. Perhaps his most powerful critique of both religion and modernity came in a speech 
he delivered in August of 1970, “Religion vs. Religion” in which he responded to the takfiris of 
his time with the insight that, from a sociological perspective, he simply could not find the 
“unbelievers” they were all worked up about, just many different forms of religion.30 He was 
almost certainly incorrect to think that the burgeoning, legitimately revolutionary events in Iran 
required a theory completely subsumed to totalizing philosophy which viewed a monolithic 
“society and philosophy of history (the principal pillars) forming one’s ideology, developing the 
ideal society and the ideal human being.”31  
 Nor do I invoke this one historical fact – that Shariati once quoted Marcuse – as some 
kind of tenuous foundation for my comparative philosophical project concerning Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad and Walter Benjamin, two thinkers who most assuredly had no knowledge of each other. 
If that were the case, perhaps I would also include the even more tenuously related fact that the 
series of protests that eventually placed Adorno and the SDS at odds began partially in response 
to protests of the Shah’s visit to Germany in 1967. However, if I were to proceed along those 
lines, my comparison would devolve quickly into Jung-like mythological thinking about 
synchronicity and archetypes, instead of gesturing at the less direct but more pertinent truth that 
these historical facts help us understand a modernity already historically and materially 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
into a quasi-economic division of labor, and, increasingly, to the outright privatization of war.  Adorno’s critique of 
the lack of a socio-material base in the student movement, then, proved rather prescient as well, at least in America: 
without the draft, even the purely ideological “national” connection that provided the tenuous base for the student 
movement was dissolved.   
30
 Ali Shariati, Religion vs. Religion, 19-20. This lecture anticipated many of the critiques of secularism that would 
occur more than two decades later. 
31





intertwined by the middle of the twentieth century.
32
 In these tiny historical facts, we can shatter 
a centered view of modernity and embrace one that is perhaps more truly universal. In them we 
can imagine a different conversation that could have occurred, one that lets an Iranian-Shii 
novelist and essayist and a German-Jewish critic and philosopher speak in and at the very center 
of the project of modernity. My point, then, is not to readjudicate Iran in 1968 or Germany in 
1969, the Islamic Revolution, the New Left. Rather, it is to see in them the eclipse of the 
possibilities of a moment in time, ironically, on the very grounds of seizing the possibilities in 
that moment. This dissertation, which considers Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Walter Benjamin, and 
undertakes a comparative philosophical investigation of these two figures, examines what was 
eclipsed and what could still be.  
Introduction 
153. Finale - The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to 
contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by 
redemption: all is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the 
world, reveal it to be, with its riffs and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic 
light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects – this alone is 
the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively for such knowledge, 
indeed because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. But it is 
also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, 
from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from 
what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it 
seeks to escape. The most passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more 
unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last 
comprehend for the sake of the possible. But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or 
unreality of redemption itself hardly matters. – Theodor Adorno (Minima Moralia, 1951)33 
And they’re all awaiting the Imam of the Age. Well, we’re all awaiting him, each in our own way. – Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad (Gharbzadegi, 1961) 
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 I address this issue in my first chapter, “Theory, Methods, and Justification.” 
33
 This passage - published just over a decade after Benjamin’s death and exactly a decade after Adorno first 
received a copy of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” - is unmistakably, in the words of Susan 
Buck-Morss “in full accord with Benjamin’s theses,”(Buck-Morss, 1977, 170). I have, in some ways unfairly, been 
using Adorno partially to ‘stand-in’ for Benjamin in my narrative prologue. I explore Benjamin and Adorno’s 






How can we know a philosophy contemplated “from the standpoint of redemption”? What are 
the practices of waiting for redemption while preserving or even building the conditions for the 
possibility of that waiting, the possibility of that contemplation? How can we understand a 
philosophy from the standpoint of redemption without “betraying the world,” i.e. the empirical, 
existing, world of the now? What is left for universal philosophy in a world of multiple, distinct 
but overlapping subjectivities, without ‘the subject’? Exactly what kind of project is materialist 
redemption? Religions of Doubt: Religion, Critique, and Modernity in Jalal Al-e Ahmad and 
Walter Benjamin is an interdisciplinary work of comparative philosophy that seeks to answer 
these questions, examining two seemingly disparate critiques of modernity before they were 
appropriated, written over, or discarded by theories and movements of poststructuralism, 
religious fundamentalism, and philosophical naturalism.  
 In Religions of Doubt, I compare the texts, histories, and conditions of several works of 
the twentieth-century Iranian-Shii author Jalal Al-e Ahmad in conversation with a selection of 
those of the twentieth-century German-Jewish author Walter Benjamin. I focus in particular on 
Al-e Ahmad’s non-fiction work in Gharbzadegi (Occidentosis, 1962), Dar Khedmat va Khianat-
e Roshanfekran (On the Services and Treasons of the Intellectuals, 1968), and Khassi dar Miqat 
(Lost in the Crowd, 1964)
34
 and a broad swath of Benjamin’s work from the period beginning 
with Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 1925) through 
the Passagenwerk (The Arcades Project, 1927-1940).
35
  I demonstrate that Al-e Ahmad and 
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 “Lost in the Crowd” is Green’s very loose translation, although apt for the contents of the book. A more literal 
translation of Khassi dar Miqat would be something like a “speck” or a “mote” or a “straw” in the “holy precincts”. 
35
 As the Passagenwerk or Arcades Project was never completed and was composed over the course of a long period 
of Benjamin’s adult life, it is difficult to give a definitive date of its ‘composition.’ This is especially problematic 





Benjamin are participating in local iterations of a complementary critique which – viewed in 
light of each other – constitute a productive intervention in current philosophical debates. This 
critique addresses different facets of what was in their time an already global and shared 
conception of modernity – even if, conditionally, an uneven, imbalanced, and geometrically 
unstable one. I argue that reading these authors in comparative conversation brings forth an 
image of what can contentiously be called a “radical materialist religious philosophy.” This, in 
turn, challenges prevailing modern norms not only in terms of the assailing the categories of the 
religious and the secular but also basic philosophical stances regarding ethics, epistemology, and 
aesthetics.  
Although Al-e Ahmad has been addressed by some intellectual historians, regional 
specialists, and journalistic commentators, his work has yet to receive a sustained comparative or 
philosophical reading.
36
 Conversely, Benjamin has had a seemingly geometric expansion of 
secondary literature devoted to him in the past several decades, in some cases, collecting literally 
every jot of ink he left on a page as transcendent art objects in themselves (see, for example, 
Walter Benjamin’s Archive, 2007, eds. Marx, Schwarz, and Wizilia). However, in both cases, I 
argue that there is a current, prevailing, and ahistorical revisionism in the approach to these 
thinkers, pulling them out of their respective Marxian and Iranian-Shii/German-Jewish milieus 
that I focus on in this work and appropriating them without regard for textual or factual evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Convolutes” were organized as connected sheathes of papers. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that 
many of Benjamin’s positions in the project seem to shift, as can be observed within Benjamin’s infrequent 
commentaries in the text itself as well as through his correspondence with Adorno and Gershom Scholem about the 
work.  
36
 Ali Mirsepassi in his second major work that touches on Al-e Ahmad, Political Islam, Iran, and the 
Enlightenment (2011) has, in some ways, attempted a philosophical reading of Al-e Ahmad. However, as I 
demonstrate in my chapter “How to read Gharbzadegi?”, I believe his analysis to be reading past or over Al-e 
Ahmad. I think the comparative philosophical perspective I bring to the analysis actually helps draw out not only a 





into frames of reference of later, recognizable philosophical and political schools and 
movements. While I do not claim that my reading of either Al-e Ahmad or Benjamin is the 
definitive reading, I do think several of the current schools of interpretation are, in demonstrable 
ways, flawed or, at the very least, debatable. In Al-e Ahmad’s case, this takes the form of placing 
him within an anti-modern, Heideggerian framework and as clearly and obviously paving the 
way for Khomeini and the Islamic Republic. In Benjamin’s case – in which there are so many 
different intellectual movements that claim him – I focus in particular on a sizable group of 
authors I call the “Critique of Violence School” (Derrida, Agamben, Taubes, etc.) which reads 
all of Benjamin through the lens of this one, small, unrepresentative, and perhaps most 
importantly, misread text.  This reading also often involves a near fever-pitch obsession with the 
miniscule correspondence between Benjamin and Carl Schmitt.
37
 The intervention I perform here 
seeks to be more attentive to the larger body of work of both these authors and to their own 
histories and programs. It is intended to function both as an intellectual historical corrective and 
as the groundwork for the emergent philosophical discourse I argue is possible. This discourse 
does not negate other possibilities for reading Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. Rather, by placing Al-
e Ahmad and Benjmain in conversation, Al-e Ahmad’s Shiism helps illuminate the Judaic 
elements in Benjamin’s philosophy, while Benjamin’s “historical materialism” helps keep Al-e 
Ahmad’s own Marxian commitments in focus.      
In Religions of Doubt, I contend that the perceived failure of utopian modern projects, 
particularly Marxism, led each of these thinkers to re-engage with religious questions and 
concerns in a simultaneous critique of the corrosive, reductive and catastrophic nature of 
                                                          
37
 The reading mentioned here also involves a confusion of Benjamin’s methodological theology with Schmitt’s 





modernity and the idea of traditional religion – static, irrational, regressive – that modernist 
thought had conjured. In turning to specific, local religious practices (of interpretation as well as 
ritual but not of faith or transfiguration) as part of a Marxian project, both authors proposed to 
turn the most classic case of “false consciousness” on its head. Reading these thinkers together 
allows a glimpse at ideas and modes in philosophical and religious literature that were besieged 
and largely derailed by various discourses of secularism, naturalism, and fundamentalism.  
Moving away from (although perhaps not beyond) the philosophical cul-de-sacs of radical 
poststucturalism, textual reductionism, strict philosophical naturalism, and, perhaps most 
pernicious of all, a kind of naturalistic Hegelianism that pervade several contemporary 
philosophical discourses, I argue for a new perspective that builds on Al-e Ahmad’s performative 
doubt, Benjamin’s “dialectical images,” and the very “religious” contention of both that meaning 
itself inheres in the world. 
Chapter Outline 
My first chapter, “Theory, Method, and Justification,” is largely devoted to establishing a 
theory and methodology for the kind of “comparative philosophy” I am performing. I also set the 
stage for this comparison as I briefly examine material and historical conditions in Iran and 
Germany at the time periods in question and aspects of Shiism and Judaism that I argue are 
directly pertinent to understanding Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. Finally, I explicate my polemic 
use of the term “religious” in relation to current critiques of religion and secularism, as well as 
analytic discourses of philosophical naturalism.
38
  I draw on Roxanne Euben’s “comparative 
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 As I say here, I end my first chapter with an explanation of what I mean by saying “my polemic use of the term 
‘religious.’” As I explain in the introduction to chapter 1, I believe a great deal of preparatory critical work must be 
done before a clear understanding of my use can be presented. However, in brief, I propose “religious as polemic” to 
work on at least two levels. First, as part of my critique of the post-structuralist turn in post-colonial theory, I argue 





political theory”39 as a broad methodological precursor for my comparative philosophy and then 
on Quentin Skinner (“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” 1969), Susan Buck-
Morss (Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, 2009), Jurgen Habermas (The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, 1995), Dipesh Chakrabarty (Provincializing Europe, 2008), Partha 
Chatterjee (Our Modernity, 1997) Marshall Berman (All That Is Solid Melts into Air, 1982),  
Edward Said (Orientalism, 1978, Culture and Imperialism, 1993, and Representations of the 
Intellectual, 1994), and others in establishing the tools and aims of this particular comparative 
methodology and to establish a justification for the comparison of such prima facie disparate 
figures (although I demonstrate throughout the work that they share important temporal, 
intellectual, and historical backgrounds as well as relevant socio-cultural positions). I argue here, 
as well, that, particularly for this analysis, a concept of “incomplete modernity” (Habermas) or a 
“shifting, geometric modernity” (my own extension of Habermas via a post-colonial lens) is far 
more productive than a framework of “multiple modernities” (Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse 
of Modernity, 2000) or post-modernity or post-structuralism.
40
 Furthermore, I cite previous work 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the necessary work. Without an accompanying attempt to challenge the formal and substantive universality itself, 
the original veiled and centered modern subject lives on in an even more ideologically reified ‘spectral presence.’ In 
terms of the use of the term “religious” then, in addition to the critique of Christianity, we must allow substantive 
and formal challenges to the Christian-religious/Secular-religious understanding to be considered as part the grounds 
of an ever-shifting critical engagement with “religion.” The imperative expressed here is one of emancipation for 
both the concepts expressed and the subjects expressing them. The second level of meaning in “religious as 
polemic” would be one of reclamation vis-à-vis certain discourses of philosophical naturalism that would cast any 
notion of orders of meaning beyond those expressed through the natural sciences as religious thinking. Thus even 
though I demonstrate that neither Al-e Ahmad nor Benjamin are ‘supernaturalists’ and that they fundamentally 
accept, even if through critical engagement, scientific ontology, their thought would be ‘religious’ for reductive 
philosophical naturalism. If both truth and philosophy are to become so narrow, then perhaps “religious” thought – 
radically rethought – is precisely what is needed.   
39
 Please see Roxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, 
introduction.  
40
 Dabashi suggests the concept of “Persian Literary Humanism” as an “alternative theory to modernity”  in The 
World of Persian Literary Humanism (Dabashi, 2012, 310). I explore this conception, and also explain, in this 
section, why a different theory of modernity is most appropriate in my view, at least for comparatively discussing 





– Hamid Dabashi (Theology of Discontent, 1993 and The World of Persian Literary Humanism, 
2012) Susan Buck-Morss (Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left, 
2003), and to a lesser extent, Farzin Vadhat (God and Juggernaut, 2002) – which suggest 
broadly that a comparison of the intellectual moment of mid-twentieth century Iran and organic 
forms of social critique emerging there to mid-twentieth century Germany and Frankfurt School 
critical theory might prove fruitful. I follow this with a brief section discussing the ways in 
which Judaism (through Talmudic commentary, hermeneutic practices, and Moses 
Mendelssohn’s ‘religion of gestures’) and Shiism (particularly through the ritual narration of the 
martyrdom of Hussein – spoken, performed, painted, and otherwise – alongside a this-worldly 
religious law) provide particularly fruitful touchstones for a dialectical entrance in to the 
question of religious discourse and practice not centered around faith.
41
   
In my second chapter, “How to Read Gharbzadegi?”, I demonstrate – both through historical 
evidence and textual argument – that the currently popular scholarly idea that Al-e Ahmad’s 
discourse is best understood as a local Iranian inflection of Heideggerian thought is flawed at 
best. Furthermore, even the slightly less dubious connection to Ernst Jünger pales in comparison 
to Al-e Ahmad’s obvious intellectual milieu, which is largely Marxian, “third worldist,” French 
existentialist, and in deep conversation with his Shii upringing, his reading of Shiism, and the 
“landscape” of Iran. Far from being an anti-modern “nativist,” I argue that Al-e Ahmad was 
addressing what he saw as key gaps and fundamental problems in Marxist and other 
modernization discourses, writing towards the Iranian case in particular, but gesturing from that 
                                                          
41
 The critique of the Christian notion of faith is one of the key nodes of intersection for Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad. 
I discuss the Benjamin’s version of this vis-à-vis his arguments around loyalty/treachery/faith in The Origins of 
German Tragic Drama and in the fragment “Capitalism as Religion” in my second chapter, expanding on several 
ideas first proposed by Susan Buck-Morss in The Dialectics of Seeing (Buck-Morss, 1991). I discuss Al-e Ahmad’s 
version of this in my third chapter, via his critique of the role of faith in Shiism in Dar Khedmat va Khianat 





“center” towards new ideas in the universal. Al-e Ahmad is far more concerned with the question 
of “false consciousness” and the non-correlation of cultural-political ideas with the position of a 
subject than he is with any notion of a “true” or “authentic” Iranian subject. I show how Al-e 
Ahmad himself in Gharbzadegi pillories the notion of the “true” Shii and Iranian subject as itself 
a gharbzadeh concept, fit only for European encyclopedias and nationalist museums. How he 
proposes to address these problems is only briefly addressed in Gharbzadegi, which is largely 
concerned with “diagnosing” the problems in society, which accounts for its often misleading 
biological metaphors. Understanding how to read Gharbzadegi (the book) and gharbzadegi (the 
concept) are key in both establishing the modes in which we can best understand the kinds of 
arguments Al-e Ahmad makes elsewhere and in seeing where his interests overlap with those of 
critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, particularly Benjamin. In chapter 4, I argue that it is in 
Khassi dar Miqat, particularly its ending, that we find Al-e Ahmad’s most compelling and 
original propositions.  
In my third chapter, “Pereat Mundus? Anaesthetics and Epistemology,” I explore a reading of 
Benjamin’s methodology as one that explicitly reconnects aesthetic thought with epistemology 
and embodied, sensory experience. This is a key point of my comparison. Benjamin addresses 
through aesthetic inquiry what Al-e Ahmad does through social critique: the diminution of 
individual sensory experience, and thereby the limitation of cognition, particularly creative and 
political in late capitalism as experienced differently in Germany of the 1930s-40s and Iran in the 
1960s. For both authors, this diminution co-determines a reification of existing social order. 
Additionally, both authors see not purely a philosophy of despair in their respective critiques of 
modernity but additionally a possibility for radical transformation outside the existing bounds of 





drawing on narratives and ritual performance drawn from Shiism as methods of resistance (as I 
explore in chapter 4), in Benjamin it involved drawing from Judaism modes of hermeneutic 
practice and principles about how to regard objects in the world. Both authors saw these turns to 
“religion” as part of an ultimately materialist philosophy. I examine Benjamin’s position both by 
building on Buck-Morss’ work on Benjamin and “anaesthetics” and through my own readings of 
several of Benjamin’s texts. Benjamin’s methodology, I argue, presents us with a notion that 
might even be appropriately called an exploration of “Divine Immanence,”42 if that phrase could 
be stripped of any ‘supernatural’ connotations. Meaning adheres in the material world and the 
task of the philosopher/critic is to deduce it (in a “dream-image” which must be shattered - i.e. an 
analysis of the social, material, and natural forces that mark its facts and in a “wish-image” - the 
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 It is in this pseudo-pantheism that Benjamin is closest to both some kabbalistic thinkers. As Allan Nadler argues 
in his work, The Faith of the Mithnagdim: Rabbinic Responses to Hasidic Rapture (Nadler, 1997), the concept of 
“divine immanence” which is most key in the “kabbalistic” aspects of Benjamin is not one of the theological 
principles (or an objection at all) in the early nineteenth century debate between the Hassidim and the Mithnagdim. 
As the debate between the Hassidim and mainstream orthodoxy largely faded in the twentieth century, it becomes 
easy to mistake what was once discursively considered merely another option in Jewish cosmology as part of the 
kabbalah being ‘newly rediscovered’ by figures like Scholem in the twentieth century just as the Hassidim portrayed 
their reactivation of a neoplatonic kabbalah in the eighteenth century as a ‘renewal’ of a staid and intellectual Jewish 
life in Eastern Europe. Late in chapter 3, I discuss the neoplatonic character of kabbalah via one of the key texts of 
the Hassidim, the Tanya of Schneer Zalman. The method of reading God as part of all objects in the world – which 
becomes, in Benjamin, reading meaning as both inhering and dialogically emergent between objects in the world – 
would not be kabbalistic per se, although both the Hassidim and the Mithnagdim respected kabbalistic thought (of 
the earlier, Lurianic varieties) as normative. Ironically, the neoplatonic and Gnostic qualities of many of the 
kabbalistic schools come into direct conflict with Benjamin’s materialism and desire not to ‘transfigure’ human 
suffering through any sort of theodicy; this is the crux of the argument against Hegel that Benjamin shared with 
Adorno and Horkheimer. The point would certainly not be to see the “sparks” of “divine light” that are “trapped” in 
the “shells” of objects in the world (using classic formulations of neoplatonic kabbalah) since that would be 
precisely a theodicy that explains away, reifies, and reproduces the catastrophe. In a 1931 letter to Max Rychner, 
Benjamin gives a rather clarifying overview of the Marxian and Judaic sides of his project, “Of those, the one most 
familiar to me would be to see in me not a representative of dialectical materialism as a dogma, but a scholar to 
whom the stance of the materialist seems scientifically and humanely more productive in everything that moves us 
than does that of the idealist. If I may express myself in brief: I have never been able to do research and think in any 
sense other than, if you will, a theological one, namely, in accord with the Talmudic teaching about the forty-nine 
levels of meaning in every passage of the Torah.” (Benjamin, Complete Correspondence, 372). Benjamin goes onto 
say that “the most trite Communist platitude possesses more hierarchies of meaning than does contemporary 
bourgeois profundity, which has only one meaning, that of an apologetic.” Benjamin may have viewed himself – 
especially in the context of his exchanges with Scholem – as engaging in kabbalistic practice. But this self-
description, akin to the more enigmatic version in N7a,7 of the Passagenwerk, fuses a materialized “divine 
immanence” that can be theologically interpreted in line with “dialectical materialism” which opens the possibility 
for a multitude of meanings that are not “apologetic,” i.e. that remain in the world, to deal with the world as is. This 





messianic possibilities inherent in all objects – material and intellectual – that would only be 
fully revealed in the light of redemption) and then help arrange it such a manner that indirectly 
brings about the possibilities of a “redemptive” outcome, or messianic rupture.  This is an 
argument that can be traced in fragmentary forms from The Origins of German Tragic Drama all 
the way through the Arcades Project (and in this chapter I focus on both as well as “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” and the “Theses on the Philosophy of History”). I 
argue that while it must be in some ways understood as a “religious” mode of reading and 
material analysis, it is combined throughout Benjamin’s corpus with a withering critique of the 
concept of “faith”. This is evident not only in The Origin of German Tragic Drama but also, in 
particular, in “Religion as Capitalism” and the “Theologico-Political Fragment.” While this 
“religious mode of reading and material analysis” (“religious” being deployed polemically as 
discussed earlier) has often been associated with Benjamin’s discussions of the Jewish kabbalah 
with Gershom Scholem, I continue this chapter by showing how Benjamin’s knowledge of the 
kabbalah seems idiosyncratic at best. When read in concert with Benjamin’s writings on Kafka – 
a theme I will expand on in the second half of chapter 4 – we see a picture of Benjamin’s 
conversation with Jewish materials that is far closer to the Talmudic concepts of halachah and 
aggadah (i.e. religious law and illustrative storytelling) than to any recognizable kabbalistic 
doctrines, particularly those of a neoplatonic character (which Benjamin explicitly rejects in The 
Origins of German Tragic Drama) or of the merkabah mysticism. Benjamin’s method of 
interpretation (which he called “theological,” but I think in contemporary terms should be 
understood rather as “religious”) was part of a larger system of narrative and law which he did 
not or could not finish. I argue that this was all part of what Benjamin saw as a necessary 





Benjamin’s engagement with Talmudic thought, and the concepts of halachah and aggadah 
more specifically, have been downplayed or simply ignored in much of the existing secondary 
literature, I address what I dub the “Critique of Violence School” of Benjamin interpretation. 
This “school” of thought views – strangely, I argue – Benjamin’s engagement with politics as 
being primarily about state law, violence, and sovereignty as articulated in the early and 
unrepresentative text, “Critique of Violence”. It is rather in his aesthetic philosophy and 
epistemology that we find Benjamin’s politics and in his analyses of Kafka and halachah his 
most pertinent discussions of “law.”   
In chapter 4, “Religions of Doubt,” I present my reading of Al-e Ahmad’s Khassi dar Miqat. 
I focus specifically upon its ending. It is in this text – and at the moment of Al-e Ahmad’s final 
reflections of what it means to go on the Hajj as a “non-believer,” i.e. to live as a faithless 
practitioner – that we can begin to glimpse the concept of what I call throughout the work a 
“religion of doubt.” Without rehearsing the entire argument here, Al-e Ahmad proposes that the 
performance of a ritual activity – in this case the Hajj pilgrimage – can both arise out of a state of 
non-belief (at least in the sense of faith) and end in a different state of non-belief, inculcating 
critical reflection. This is a radically different interpretation of ritual action than is found in 
Christian theology (faith precedes action) or even in some Orthodox forms of Judaism (action 
precedes belief), and it certainly is not the understanding of ritual action found in juridical 
understandings of Shiism. Rather, the performance of ritual action is a kind of gestured iteration 
of organic intellectual life, forcing engagement with social conditions and with meaning in the 
material world through a mass form that in turn creates a social text to be read, redeployed and 
so on. I find a particular – although ultimately and importantly not coterminous – congruity 





In Benjamin’s discussion of “law” (i.e. the halachah) vis-à-vis Kafka and his conclusion that 
a new law of his kind is inarticulable, Benjamin denies certain possibilities about ritual action in 
his thought. I argue that this is partially due to Benjamin’s uneasy self-conception as a German-
Jew and an ahistorical conception of religion itself that he developed and shared with Adorno. 
Although Benjamin’s engagement with materialist aesthetics and epistemology was far more 
nuanced, sophisticated, and expansive than Al-e Ahmad’s social critique, Al-e Ahmad had far 
greater insight into the unevenness of modernity, the false solidity of concepts like “religion” and 
“tradition,” and of a bodily engagement in ritual practices as a possibly necessary enactment of 
critical uncertainty and resistance. Al-e Ahmad’s hermeneutics and epistemology are, at best, 
implicit or underexplored in comparison with Benjamin’s theories of interpretation, 
historiography, and aesthetic practice. Not being steeped in German Idealism and Romanticism 
as Benjamin had been, Al-e Ahmad lacked the philosophical armature or even inclination, to 
produce the kinds of critiques that Benjamin did. Both thinkers engaged with aesthetic practice 
(Benjamin via criticism and theory and Al-e Ahmad via his fiction) as part of a possibly better 
mode of politics and both thinkers saw a similar potential in ritual action and enactment. But 
where Benjamin ultimately denied the possibility of that particular potential, it was Al-e 
Ahmad’s insight into the identity and genealogy of modern concepts that allowed him to 
embrace the possibilities of open, embodied religious practice as a central component of 
historical materialism, while for Benjamin even the “religious” aspects of hermeneutics which he 
employed must remain “out of sight,” as he says in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” 
Al-e Ahmad understood and engaged with the complex relationship in Shiism between legitimate 





political authority and its simultaneously necessary illegitimacy; this tension necessitates an 
unending need for critical practice and consciousness.  
For Al-e Ahmad, this tension also provides the groundwork, in his organic Marxian social 
critique, for why the utopianism in orthodox Marxism is fundamentally flawed; it is not the 
historical truth of Karbala per se or the cosmological truth of the return of the Mahdi that prove 
this but the narrative lesson furnished therein. Similarly, Benjamin’s recognition of a messianic 
longing as a hidden necessity in Marxism itself carries over the logical conclusion of anti-
utopianism, as the work of the messiah is necessarily outside of history and beyond human 
action. To positively describe or attempt to build the messianic kingdom – the worldly utopia – is 
precisely to engage in Idealistic theodicy; i.e. the present may be sacrificed for the utopian 
future. Thus, Benjamin calls for the “annihilation” of “the idea of progress” in the 
Passagenwerk.
43
 If Hegel secularized the Christian Kingdom of Heaven as the telos of history, 
Benjamin demolished it by secularizing Judaic iconoclasm and negative theology. Al-e Ahmad 
looked to the competing ends of history presented by the United States and the Soviet Union and 
saw, quite simply, more self-delusion and more horror: once again illegitimate authority that 
must be critiqued and assailed from the always deferred possibility of just government. These 
were not departures from materialist thought. They were necessary correctives to it.   
These complimentary aspects of their critiques pushed both thinkers to engage critically and 
creatively with the present and the past, in ways that had been cut off both to modernist thought 
and within prevailing modes of their respective traditions. Marx had said that the logical 
contradictions of capital eventually produce “above all, its own grave-diggers.”44 But for Al-e 
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Ahmad, writing in Iran, all he saw was the production of gharbzadeh subjects who were 
anything but the grave-diggers of capital. For Benjamin, writing in Germany and France, he saw 
that far from this mechanistic determinism, those contradictions could just as easily produce 
Fascist subjects and/or reproduce the “catastrophe” of present conditions forever. Neither 
Benjamin nor Al-e Ahmad abandoned Marxian historical materialism per se, but it was utterly 
transformed in their respective philosophies. In rejecting utopianism and the mechanical 
production of the revolutionary subject, both thinkers instead could turn to grappling with how 
and why a redemptive consciousness did not come into being, and with how and why different 
ones might. Both thinkers saw some measure of hope – however small – in this emancipation 
from the very duty of utopia itself.  Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin drew on concepts, narratives, and 
practices from Shiism and Judaism respectively as necessary parts of a continuing development 
of materialist thought. However, they did not in the end fully meet; I argue that this is both 
because of inherent differences in their positions and intentions but also because of the 
unfinished nature of the projects of both thinkers.  
In my conclusion, while I do not argue that they would have gone on to converge on a single 
vanishing point, I contend that Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadegi as examined in chapter 2, 
Benjaminian aesthetics and hermeneutics as discussed in chapter 3, and the notions of ritual 
action and messianism discussed in chapter 4, can be connected in a new philosophical 
framework. It is a necessarily incomplete Weltanschauung that warily allows for a scientific 
centering of ontological thought (contra Heidegger) while stipulating that a broad swath of both 
meaning and value exists beyond the scope of scientific inquiry and must be gestured at through 
historical commentary and creative presentation (Benjamin’s “dialectical images”) and critical 





face of either a fully committed philosophical naturalism or the diffusion of the subject into the 
post-human and the world into the purely textual, any such gesture would, by negative definition, 
be “religious.” As a very small number of commentators have noted, (Margarette Kohlenbach 
and Susan Handelman, for example)
45
 Frankfurt School critical theory and Benjamin in 
particular can really only be understood as a religious philosophy, despite its quite sincere and 
consistent critique of religion (although, beyond their own scope, understood as a Christian 
category) and its quite sincere materialism and resistance to irrationalism and spurious notions of 
the supernatural. The aesthetic-moral-political grounding that is first philosophy in this 
comparative reading would have to be the liberation of actually existing, multiple contemporary 
subjects and the creation and maintenance of the possible conditions for the redemption of the 
past, understood materially: what Benjamin calls “weak messianic power” and Al-e Ahmad calls 
everyone’s right to “wait for the Mahdi.” This, then, is a radically self-critical, materialist 
religious philosophy, de-centered not in order to dissolve the subject but to allow new 
subjectivities the possibility of articulating parts of a universalistic discourse that will, by 
necessity, shift across the contours of global modernity. That by the contours of both modern and 
contemporary thought (late modern, late capitalist, etc.) this must necessarily be called a 
“religious philosophy” is both critique of the growing absurdity of the current debates on religion 
and a redemptive move on behalf of religious knowledges that may have nothing to do at all 
with the theological (as in theism or a theological cosmology, whether “believed” or 
“secularized”) or the supernatural. Thus, I focus in particular on the question of philosophical 
naturalism as a functional theodicy for late capitalism. It is in the context of examining this 
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the crux of Kohlenbach and Handleman’s analyses. “Religious” here is used in reference to my discussion of the 





philosophical and historical question that I am able to address the full dimensions of the notion 
of religion as polemic. 
I also describe how I think the structure of the category I have constructed – “religions of 
doubt” – might be dismantled and creatively reconstructed in other contexts, with other elements. 
And, finally, I suggest that this comparative synthesis of Benjamin’s and Al-e Ahmad’s positions 
creates a remarkably novel path away from what I called earlier the “cul-de-sacs” of certain 




















Chapter 1: Theory, Methods, and Justification 
Introduction 
I have adapted the phrase “religions of doubt” from my reading of the conclusion to Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad’s Khassi dar Miqat (Lost in the Crowd), his seminal memoir and commentary on 
his hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. This work combines Al-e Ahmad’s varying anthropological, 
polemic, philosophical, and literary tendencies, but ultimately produces a contentious and 
universalistic philosophical conclusion in which Al-e Ahmad gestures at an idea of religion 
reintegrated into daily life – and particularly into political, scholarly, and creative life – but 
stripped of its grounding in any faith, belief, or cosmological structures. It is a thoroughly 
immanent religion as a language of gestures, intentional stances, and normative facts in the 
world. Although there were many other moments in Al-e Ahmad’s writing that touched on this 
idea (particularly in certain sections of Gharbzadegi and, in some sense, foreshadowed by the 
discussion of the role of religion and the clergy in Dar Khedmat va Khianat Roshenfekran), this 
is a project which remained, in the end, unfinished for Al-e Ahmad. According to many 
accounts, it was also a project that he quite literally handed over to Dr. Ali Shariati, who was to 
transform the skeleton of Al-e Ahmad’s skeptical, gestural Shiism into a powerful, militant, 
faith-based ideology.
46
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 Ali Rahnema writes about this transition from Al-e Ahmad to Ali Shariati in his biography of Shariati, An Islamic 
Utopian: “Simin Daneshvar [the celebrated Iranian novelist and Al-e Ahmad’s wife] refers to the significant 
impression that he [Shariati] made on Jalal… On his return to Tehran, he added a lengthy footnote to Dar Khedmat 
va Khiyanat-e Rowshanfekran referring his readers to Shariati’s recently published Eslemshenasi, from which he 
quoted. He also mentioned the fact that he had the honor of meeting and discussing at length with Shariati in 
Mashad and had been delighted that they were in agreement on the issue of Iranian intellectuals’ misconceptions 
about religion.” Rahnema continues a little later, “Al-e Ahmad’s caustic critique of Westoxication or blind 
conformity to all that came from the West, in addition to his return to Islam as source of inspiration for struggle 
against dictatorship and injustice had brought he and Shariati close to one another. Simin Daneshvar witnessed their 
lengthy debates and discussions during which Shariati piled a carton of half smoked cigarettes and a box of used 





I also conceive “religions of doubt” as a philosophical concept that I believe is elucidated 
by the work of Walter Benjamin. Brought together, I propose that these two twentieth-century 
thinkers, Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad, point to unexplored syntheses and horizons for 
philosophical and social theoretical thought. This comparative philosophical approach brings out 
more clearly Benjamin’s own religious (as opposed to strictly theological)47 tendencies vis-à-vis 
his hermeneutic assumptions, his work on Kafka, and even his notions of Romantic science 
inspired by figures like Goethe. This category also helps highlight Benjamin’s commitment to 
objects-in-the-world qua material objects and not merely as textual events, as some later 
commentators would suggest.
48
 Benjamin was interested in the interplay of texts and images in 
order to obtain some sense of what he termed the “wish-image,” or the redemptive possibilities at 
work in the world of things – a distorted image of how they might appear or emerge in messianic 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tactics for raising the consciousness of the people, predestination and voluntarism, the reason for Man’s search for 
God, jihad and martyrdom.” Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian, 192. 
47
 I discuss my idiosyncratic and polemic use of the term “religious” at the end of this chapter. Additionally, at the 
end of my third chapter, I discuss the ways in which this comparison helps bring out the normative aspects of 
Benjamin’s Judaism – not against, but in addition to his “heretical” and kabbalistic impulses.  
48
 This is, for example, an apt description of Paul de Man’s reading of Benjamin. It can be difficult to trace all the 
threads that connect the often disparate ends of Frankfurt School critical theory, particularly if one includes thinkers 
like Benjamin who were on the Institut payroll and deeply influential on the work (a strong argument can be made, 
for instance, that a great deal of Adorno’s initial dialectical methodology comes from Benjamin, which makes 
Adorno’s later accusations towards Benjamin of being insufficiently dialectical all the more fascinating). However, 
one obvious strand is the critique of idealism’s production and reification of abstract, or ahistorical, non-contingent 
concepts, that override things-in-themselves, of course most problematically, the subject itself over actually existing 
empirical human beings. This strand is certainly apparent throughout the work of Benjamin, Adorno, and 
Horkheimer, and its abandonment for a large part in One-Dimensional Man marks Marcuse’s final break from that 
tradition. But to move from the critique of idealism into pure textuality (à la de Man or Jacques Derrida) in place of 
overcoming or overriding the objects themselves, dissolves them. In a full pendulum swing away from idealism, the 
same outcome occurs, in effect. Thus the need for the unresolved dialectic, the dialectic tension, to be maintained. 
As Susan Buck-Morss puts it succinctly in disputing de Man’s reading of Benjamin, “For Benjamin was concerned 
with the rescue of historical objects, not their disappearance.” Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, 225. Miriam 
Hansen observes a similar discord between Benjamin’s approach and post-structuralism in her particular 
observations about the post-structural critique (in film theory) of an “equipment free aspect of reality,” writing that, 
“Benjamin by contrast, rather than dismissing the fiction of a seamless diegesis for perpetuating reality as an illusion 
sees the cinematic crossing of supreme artificiality with physiological immediacy as a chance – a chance to rehearse 
technological innervations in the medium of the optical unconscious.” Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 174. I will 





time - while simultaneously never losing sight of the “dream-image,” or that which must be 
empirically critiqued in Marxian framework.
49
 Put another way, as Adorno lambasted Benjamin, 
his is an attempt to combine “magic” and “positivism.”50 Adorno almost certainly intended this 
charge to be derisive. But I believe it to be closer to the mark, and far more productive, than it 
might first appear. What emerges from my analysis is an understanding of Benjamin as a moral 
and political philosopher, most interested in the aesthetic world in both the neo-Kantian sense 
but also in contemporary sociological and psychological discoveries concerning the human body 
and sensorium. The questions which animate much of his work revolve around a Marxian and 
Judaic matrix. Some of these questions dovetail strongly with those of other Frankfurt School 
thinkers in investigating the cultural and psychological formations that prevented, so to speak, 
the fruition of history, particularly the question of false consciousness and the relationship 
between base and superstructure. But for Benjamin these were always simultaneously 
investigated alongside questions concerning “messianic time” and interpretation of the world – 
all shot through, I argue, with what can be called “Jewish” understandings of these categories, 
arising from Benjamin’s lifelong discussions with Scholem but also the deep influence of figures 
like Franz Kafka, and indeed, his own fraught position as an assimilated German Jew. 
Although I do not generally follow Agamben’s reading of Benjamin in most areas (as I 
discuss more specifically in chapter 3), his very brief definition of the “gesture” in Benjamin as 
“the presentation of something indirect, the means becoming visible as means” is helpful here.51 
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The indirectness follows both Benjamin’s specific notions of the impossibility of direct 
knowledge of the hoped for messianic condition and also the “wish-image” aspect of Benjamin’s 
“dialectical image” as presented in The Arcades Project. It also fulfills both aspects of the 
dialectic image: the dissolution of the “dream-image” into a Marxian demonstration of the modes 
of production while preserving the possibility – seen at a glance – of the “wish-image,” the 
messianic possibilities present even in the necessary inhabitation and therefore expression of 
false consciousness. The gesture can be read both textually – as in the possible field of meaning 
generated, as in Benjamin’s essay on Surrealism – or physically, as in Benjamin’s writing on 
Brecht and theater. Especially given the extraordinary overemphasis on Benjamin’s textuality 
(which is often presented as in line with or akin to later French theory), I am deeply interested, in 
this study, in understanding the latter. As both Michael Mack (German Idealism and the Jew, 
2003) and Susan Handelman (Fragments of Redemption, 1991) note, this version of the gesture 
in Benjamin is tied also to Benjamin’s (limited) understanding of halachah. Mack in particular 
draws attention not only to the connection with halachah but connects this to his notion of an 
‘other enlightenment’ which runs parallel to “the” Enlightenment, and which he traces from 
Moses Mendelssohn’s conviction that the ceremonial law in Judaism constitutes a religious 
system superior to those which rely exclusively on texts and doxologies (i.e. Christianity). For 
Mendelssohn, halachah constitutes an evolving, communal, communicative, and pedagogically 
centered ‘text’ themselves.52  
What I am proposing here is that Benjamin’s work – famously incomplete – also gestures 
at a “religion of doubt.” Both of these thinkers wrestled in what we might call a post-Marxist 
framework with the necessity of religious concepts and gestures as an integral part of a critique 
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and fulfillment of the potentials of historical materialism. This can, in part, be understood under 
the rubric of what Jurgen Habermas calls the “incomplete project” of modernity. This 
understanding helps move Al-e Ahmad’s work out of the framework of “multiple modernities” 
or “alternative modernities” into the far more challenging direction of allowing his work to speak 
at and to the heart of the modern project. A similar understanding of Benjamin pushes back 
against the current tendency to read Benjamin as some kind of progenitor of post-structuralism or 
deconstruction. It frames him instead – in a much more internally coherent and historically 
justifiable manner – as a thinker who wanted to bring his own idiosyncratic understandings of 
materialism (based on meticulous, far-ranging, and interdisciplinary research) and Judaic thought 
and practice into play as central critiques and building blocks of modernity. Far from a 
historiography which views Marxism as a mode of the critique of capitalist, liberal modernity, 
Judaism as a “marginal” or “minority” religion or helping to constitute a “minority literature,” 
and Shiism as itself a minority religion, “peripheral” even to the already-peripheral Islamic 
world, this framework brings arguments constituted within these contexts and of these contexts 
into contention as philosophical concepts to be reckoned with within a destabilized, de-centered, 
and yet still universal – at least in a contingent mode – modern.  
The theoretical framework I propose incorporates the post-colonial shift that Partha 
Chatterjee suggests in the introduction to The Nation and Its Fragments but moves into the kind 
of universality that is predicated on a notion that, as Susan Buck-Morss suggests at the end of 
Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History: “Truth is singular, but it is a continuous process of inquiry 
because it builds on a present that is moving ground.”53 As an expansion of the “incomplete 
project” of modernity, I believe this comparative study demonstrates paths for philosophy and 
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understandings of religion(s) that move well beyond current debates and provide a necessary 
intervention from these momentarily de-marginalized literatures into that “continuous process of 
inquiry” towards an ultimately porous and slippery pursuit of truth.  
I do not claim a philosopher’s disinterested and distanced stance towards these subjects, 
nor the critic’s “bird’s eye view” of the texts in question. Rather, it is precisely the “moving 
ground” of history that demands the comparison and then only from my own historically situated 
and materially bounded condition. My view on the authors is obviously, necessarily, and 
transparently positioned, both by positing a relation between the two and by actively intervening 
to make this project not merely comparative but in some sense synthetic: not by “overcoming” 
elements in the work, but rather by triangulating third positions that draw upon without effacing 
the original work, which itself has multiple valences. For example, were my study to be focused 
particularly on the development of Iranian nationalism or on a parallel discussion of 
nationalisms, I would certainly emphasize Al-e Ahmad’s deep and sometimes racist (particularly 
against Arabs) nationalist tendencies. However, since the comparative lens that I am using 
focuses on the propositions Al-e Ahmad makes about knowledge, religion, and politics beyond 
the national sphere, his nationalism is less relevant. I do, however, argue against the current 
prevailing view that Al-e Ahmad was a simplistic “nativist” thinker with little original thought 
and largely dominated by the influence of Heidegger (a view which, despite its popularity, is 
theoretically flawed, and has no basis in textual or historical evidence). Similarly a great deal of 
recent Benjamin scholarship has focused particularly on Benjamin’s views on violence and state-
law. While I find this approach to Benjamin limited and sometimes distorted as a way of 
representing his thought in a broad, systematic way, the comparative study I am engaged in here 





rather to emphasize the epistemological, political, and moral dimensions evoked by a comparison 
with Al-e Ahmad.  
However, before my analysis can proceed, I have several necessary and preliminary 
comments to make on methodology, historical and textual comparison, possible conceptions of 
modernity, and the theory and critique of religion. In order to clarify the framework and ideas 
just briefly sketched here and to demonstrate the concepts as the logical result of an unfolding 
critique, I will proceed dialectically from the starting point of the idea of “comparative political 
philosophy.”  
In this dissertation, I often employ the concept of dialectics as part of my description of 
what Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin are arguing. That use of dialectics frequently employs an 
unresolved or an irresolvable dialectic tension between concepts which must be held to be 
simultaneously true even as they conflict with one another. I also sometimes employ Adorno’s 
related methodology of “negative dialectics,” but where I do so I always mark it as such. What I 
mean by dialectics here – in discussing my own method of writing and argumentation – is the 
presentation of the discursive negation by which the description and definition of concepts are 
explained and justified. I recognize that this may be a frustrating experience for the reader and, 
additionally, an unconventional method in contemporary scholarship, even in philosophy. As a 
result, I will not be able to fully articulate each concept and idea until I have proceeded through 
the arguments that give rise to it. Furthermore each conceptual proposition to be thereby 
explored is dependent on the previous discursive unfolding. Thus, for example, I cannot explain 
the full meaning of my insistence on “religious” as a polemic without first engaging with my 
argument concerning modernity as an already global, shifting but uneven, geometry. And this, in 





of post-colonial critique, and so on. I do hope, however, that in this way, the reader may 
understand the full production, justification, and consideration that results in each concept, all of 
which are integral to the concept itself and to the arguments which proceed from it. I also 
provide several illustrative excurses alongside this dialectical argument. This is my method of 
presentation throughout the dissertation.
54
  
Comparative Philosophy and History 
Religions of Doubt is a work of comparative political philosophy. The closest 
methodological antecedent is Roxanne Euben’s study Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic 
Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, in which she explores “the tension 
between, on the one hand, political theorists’ aspirations to engage questions about the nature 
and value of politics that if not universal are at least pressing to a broad range of peoples and 
cultures and, on the other, a political theory canon almost exclusively devoted to Western 
texts.”55 Euben writes: 
Generally speaking, the project of comparative political theory introduces non-Western 
perspectives into familiar debates about the problems of living together, thus ensuring that 
“political theory” is about human and not merely Western dilemmas.56 
Euben employs this methodology to better understand both the Egyptian political thinker Sayyid 
Qutb and a broad set of ‘internal’ Western critics of modernity, from Hannah Arendt to Alasdair 
MacIntyre to Richard Neuhaus. Euben’s overarching argument is not genealogical (in terms of 
intellectual history) or modal (à la Benedict Anderson’s theories about nationalism) but rather 
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about co-illumination and explication of similar intellectual phenomena. The comparative 
approach, she argues, can help to highlight the parochial in the supposedly universalist Western 
philosophers and the universal in the supposedly “regional”, “identitarian” and “non-Western” 
Qutb.
57
 It also can help the theorist to develop further models that take seriously what Euben 
dubs legitimate “foundationalist” challenges to prevailing modes of modernity.  
My approach is related to Euben’s, but differs in several key aspects. The first is 
categorical. Euben’s field is narrower than mine, while her method is focused more exclusively 
on resemblance. She focuses entirely on exclusively political thinkers, such that the entire project 
can fall under the rubric of “political theory.” This is a completely justifiable move given the 
nature of the discourse she is seeking to understand and the figures on which she focuses. This 
dissertation touches, however, on several broad areas in philosophy: epistemology, moral 
philosophy, philosophy of religion, aesthetics and, of course, political philosophy. At the same 
time, it also draws on genealogical methods more familiar to the intellectual historian. How the 
authors and their texts are historically and socially embedded, how and who they were 
influenced by, and what sources they share in common – all of these are deeply relevant 
questions in this comparative reading of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. That is not to say that 
philological arguments and archival evidence supplant textual analysis; far from it. Nor is it an 
attempt to ride rough-shod over Roland Barthes’ famous death of the Author. Rather, since this 
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is an attempt at a systematic and synthetic philosophical reading that helps elucidate what 
systematic philosophy can be found in the respective authors and how these philosophies in turn 
can be seen as potentially complimentary and critically productive towards a third position, it 
seems crucial – especially where the secondary literatures have made significant errors – to take 
into account social-historical circumstances. For example: those of Jewish intellectuals in 
1930/40s Germany or of Shia intellectuals in 1950/60s Iran; the fruitful comparison of the 
indirect colonial condition in Iran following the second world war; or the condition of “self-
colonization” in Germany directly preceding the second world war. Both to illustrate this aspect 
of my methodology and to lay a crucial foundation for my comparison, I will briefly examine 
this example now.  
Illustrative Excursus: Colonization and Self-Colonization 
 “Self-colonization” is a term originally coined by Stalin in a rather apt description of the 
forced collectivization of the “backward” rural, agrarian population of the Soviet Union into 
agricultural collectives. It can also be usefully applied as a descriptive category to what the 
National Socialist regime conducted within Germany from 1933 until the Anschluss in 1938, and 
from then on within Germany and German occupied territories until the end of World War II. 
Although Germany did achieve a few colonial possessions in the traditional sense of the term, it 
was, in the dry language of Sebastian Conrad, “a colonial late-comer,” its colonial experience 
and possessions largely “deemed marginal and insignificant.”58  As Conrad reminds us later in 
his book, both Hannah Arendt and Frantz Fanon make the case for the connection between Nazi 
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policies – and in particular the Nuremberg Laws and the Holocaust – and European colonialism 
and imperialism. Arendt writes:  
The chief importance of continental, as distinguished from overseas, imperialism lies in the fact 
that its concept of cohesive expansion does not allow for any geographic distance between the 
methods and institutions of colony and of nation, so that it did not require boomerang effects in 




Meanwhile, Fanon writes:  
The truth is that we ought not to accept these conditions. We should flatly refuse the situation to 
which the Western countries wish to condemn us. Colonialism and imperialism have not paid their 
score when they withdraw their flags and their police from our territories. For centuries the 
capitalists have behaved in the underdeveloped world like nothing more than war criminals. 
Deportations, massacres, forced labor, and slavery have been the main methods used by 
capitalism to increase its wealth, its gold or diamond reserves, and to establish its power. Not 
long ago Nazism transformed the whole of Europe into a genuine colony. 
60
 
Although Arendt is writing in the descriptive (with a veiled, implicit normativity) and 
about the genealogy of totalitarianism while Fanon is writing explicitly in the normative 
(dependent, of course, upon description) about reparations from one capitalist power to another, 
their analyses are remarkably similar. Both view Nazism as deploying the techniques – 
“deportations, massacres, forced labor…” – of colonialism and imperialism in the “continental” 
context. Both view the structure of the power relationship in Nazism as colonial in nature; in fact 
both go out of their way to emphasize it (“Continental imperialism truly begins at home,” a 
“genuine colony”) as if expecting their readers to disbelieve them. Fanon goes on to discuss both 
the creation of the State of Israel and the continued payment of reparations from Germany to 
Israel as, in some ways, an exemplar for post-colonial states; states should reorganize away from 
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the structures of colonial rule. Additionally, sovereignty, economic freedom, and compensation 
must be demanded.
61
   
Fanon was not the only anti-colonial thinker who ventured in this direction in the era. Al-
e Ahmad himself wrote in his 1964 essay Valayat-e Israel:  
If you look with the eyes of an Easterner like me—empty of fanaticism and excess and 
vengeance—worrying for the future of an East of which one end is Tokyo and the other Tel Aviv—
and knowing that this same East is the grounds of the coming renovation and the hope of a world 
tired of the West and Westoxification, in the eyes of this Easterner, Israel with all its faults and all 
the contradictions which it contains, is a foundation of power, a giant step, the herald of a future 
no longer far off.
62
  
Al-e Ahmad does continue into a fairly astute critique of Israel – despite its promise with its 
ongoing engagement with Jewish practice and socialism – as both a “bulwark of capitalism” and 
a “curtain Christianity drew between itself and the world of Islam in order to prevent US from 
seeing them.”63 He even implicitly invokes the notion of colonial mimicry, which is one of most 
illuminating concepts in understanding the relation between political Zionism and Nazism.  
It might be tempting to cease the comparison here and to note simply the parallels 
between Al-e Ahmad’s position as an Iranian-Shii vis-à-vis the European metropolitan center 
and Benjamin’s vis-à-vis his position as a Jew within Germany. However, as compelling as those 
parallels may be, it is important to note the differences in both the “colonial” apparatus and in the 
position of German-Jews. This is not merely for the sake of historical accuracy but also to grasp 
key historical conditions for understanding some of the convergences and divergences in the 
comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. These historical and social connections help ground 
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the comparison but the fact that their conditions, while similar, were still part of an 
extraordinarily uneven modern landscape is just as important in understanding how each thinker 
formulated her particular critique of modernity.  
As both Arendt and Fanon note in their descriptions, the case of Nazism is not only self-
colonization, as – in addition to identifying a ‘native’ within the borders of the state – it also still 
has expansionist geographic aspirations, just “adjacent” ones. Furthermore, the attitude towards 
the ‘native’ in this case would appear far more settler-colonial than the imperial-colonial models 
that post-colonial theorists more often focus on: British, French, Dutch, etc. Finally, there is the 
place of German-Jews themselves.  Referring to the late scholar Suzanne Zantop, Leo Riegert 
writes: 
In her 1997 book, Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Pre colonial Germany, 
1770-1870, Susanne Zantop demonstrates that it was precisely the absence of colonial possessions 
beyond German territories that led to a variety of "colonial fantasies” within the German lands, 
and that these fantasies in turn served as kind of rehearsal for the way in which the newly-formed 
German nation approached its actual territorial acquisitions in the late nineteenth century. She 
makes clear that Germany’s developing sense of itself and its role in the colonial world took place 
vis-a-vis others both inside and outside Germany. In her portrayal, mechanisms that defined 
German Jews and other internal outsiders evolved conterminously with Germans’ understanding 




What Zantop does in her book – although from a very different angle – is tie together many of 
the themes I have been arguing here: there is a link between stifled German colonial aspirations 
and the implementations of techniques and structures of power in Nazi Germany that closely 
mirror those in colonialism elsewhere. This is a point that has been explored more abstractly in 
Sven Lindquist’s A History of Bombing (Lindquist, 2000) and, in far more ideal-cultural form, in 
Alexander Kiossev’s “The Self-Colonizing Metaphor” (Kiossev, 2011) and Stathis Gourgouris’ 
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Dream Nation (Gourgouris, 1996). Gourgouris’ analysis of Philhellenism and Orientalism is 
particularly critical for this analysis.  
As Gourgouris writes: “This is because Philhellenism – being, I would argue, an 
Orientalism in the most profound sense – engages in the activity of representing the other 
culture, which in effect means replacing the other culture with those self-generated, projected 
with those self-projected images of otherness that Western culture needs to see itself in: the 
mirrors of itself.”65 Only in the case that Gourgouris is exploring, “Neohellenic reality,” the 
“particular kind of colonial mimicry inherent in the colonization of the ideal,” can only be 
understood as an “autoscopic” gaze;66 it is self-colonization.  
I do not intend all of this to mark an all too easy elision between the condition of 
German-Jews and Iranian-Shiis. As Riegert notes, Zantop overlooks the material specificity of 
the place of German-Jews as a people who could both inhabit a space of internal-colonization 
and play important roles in colonial and imperial administration; or, in a completely different 
direction, to “pass” à la critical race theory.67 Further, even if Nazism is viewed as a kind of self-
colonization of the settler-colonial variety, with Jews (amongst others) as the “natives,” as well 
as partaking in the self-colonization of the “ideal” variety as described by Gourgouris, then Iran 
is positioned in at a rather odd angle to these notions of colonization: constantly on the knife’s 
edge of imperial powers threatening it nationally, while suffering an internal “self-colonization” 
crisis under the Pahlavis. What is important in these comparisons is not that they are equal; it is 
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that we can see the philosophies Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin produce as both part of a global, 
modern, anti-colonial discourse.  
This discussion of “self-colonization” and conditions of Jews in Germany and a 
relationship to colonization and the complex condition of Iran in relation to the question of 
colonization and “self-colonization” serves both as part of the foundation for a comparison 
between the intellectuals in question and as part of my methodology for how to proceed with that 
comparison. The socio-historical frame must remain in focus in comparisons of the texts, as must 
the context of the authors’ respective bodies of work. Thus, for example, it seems significant in 
determining the possible meanings of, say, a piece of writing by Benjamin, that Benjamin 
numerous times in his letters derides Heidegger’s work and entire approach to philosophy and 
even addresses where he thinks his work does and does not intersect with the work of 
Heidegger.
68
 This does not negate Heideggerian readings of Benjamin per se; these may rise and 
fall on the interpretative communities that give life to them. But it should give us pause in 
attributing such readings to Benjamin himself and also give us hermeneutic space to elaborate 
other philosophical possibilities in the work. Interestingly, a similar argument (regarding the 
seeming irrelevance of Heidegger) can be made about Al-e Ahmad; I devote much of my next 
chapter, “How to Read Gharbzadegi?” to it. Yet this apparent point of convergence (Heidegger) 
is based on faulty grounds, historically speaking and thankfully, gives way to a much more 
compelling (textually and historically grounded) point of convergence: that of thinkers working 
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in a Marxian tradition, coming to terms with the lasting theological contours of an already shared 




Historical and Textual Comparison towards Philosophical Comparison 
Following  the kinds of grounds I identify in the preceding excursus, I emphasize the 
secondary literature which tends to give equal weight to the textual and the socio-historical; for 
Al-e Ahmad, scholars like Hamid Dabashi, Ervand Abrahamian, to a certain extent Farzin 
Vadhat, or the far less well-know Robert Wells (author of the only monograph entirely devoted 
to the work of Al-e Ahmad in the English language) and, in the case of Benjamin, scholars like 
Susan Buck-Morss, Miriam Hansen, Michael Mack, Judith Butler, Margaret Cohen, and Susan 
Handelman (not to mention, of course, the interpretations of many of Benjamin’s friends and 
contemporaries like Scholem and Adorno).
70
   
 In this manner, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of pure textual immanence, historical 
projection, and, what is quite as pernicious, historical determination, as discussed, for example, 
in Quentin Skinner’s article “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.”71  Instead of a 
false “orthodoxy,” such as Skinner describes, of an exclusively deterministic context of 
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epistemic closure (what I call here philological)
72
 or one which emphasizes “the autonomy of the 
text itself as the sole necessary key to its own meaning,”73 I hope in my interpretive sections to 
rely on the historical contingency of those texts and their textual interplay to understand how 
they address philosophical, political, aesthetic, and religious concerns of the mid-twentieth 
century. This does not impute to Al-e Ahmad the ridiculous notion that he “prefigures” or 
“anticipates” Khomeini or, even more improbably, the neo-traditionalists of the Taliban.74 Nor 
does it assign to Benjamin the improbable role (for someone so deeply committed to the things-
in-themselves of material reality) of progenitor or prophet of post-structuralism. Rather in both 
cases, scholars who have made these kinds of arguments have engaged in a somewhat circular 
discourse. It is unquestionable, for instance, that some readers of Al-e Ahmad (Khomeini himself 
being an obvious example) took his critique of modernity and religion to call for, or partake in 
the call for, the establishment of a clerical state in Iran and, in fact, to call for global revolution 
towards universal rule of God through his representatives on earth. But this fact does not of 
course negate another fact: that in Dar Khedmat va Khianat-e Roshanfekran, Al-e Ahmad 
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directly argues against just such an arrangement, targeting the clerical class as especially ill-
suited to hold political office.
75
  
However, I do not think it follows, as Skinner does, that: 
The essential question which we therefore confront, in studying any given text, is what its author, 
in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have 
been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.
76
 
Skinner rightly lampoons the ahistorical approach (which he associates in the essay most closely 
with the work of Leo Strauss) that searches through texts for traces of elements of conceptual 
objects which only take form in the contemporary world of the critic or seek to answer “timeless 
questions” or search for “timeless truths” which are assumed to be present in the works of great 
authors of the past. However, Skinner himself succumbs to a kind of epistemic radicalism here, 
reminiscent of Arthur Danto’s puzzle-like philosophy of aesthetics (particularly when it comes to 
film): the role of the reader/viewer/listener is to ‘figure out’ what the author intended.77 It is in 
the realm of aesthetics, in fact, that this position reveals its most radical dimensions: to remark 
about natural beauty would be a necessarily theistic statement in such a worldview, in the most 
Christian-creationist sense of the word theism.
78
 This is much as Barthes himself argues in 
“Death of the Author,” writing: 
We know that a text does not consist of a line of words, releasing a single “theological” meaning 
(the “message” of the Author-God), but is a space of many dimensions, in which are wedded and 
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contested various kinds of writing, no one of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, 
resulting from the thousand sources of culture.
79
 
However, I would say with Barthes that while this refutation of the single ‘authoritative’ textual 
voice is necessary, it does not put an end to the authorial voice in all cases, even if we are to 
imagine, again with Barthes, the “birth of the reader.”80 To borrow an image that Barthes 
suggests earlier in the essay, “the Author” diminishes “like a tiny figure at the far end of the 
literary stage.”81 Diminishes, perhaps; especially from the sense of singular meaning as Barthes 
describes above. But there is no need to push the author off the stage altogether, particularly in 
the context of an attempt not to “decipher” the text in the manner suggested by Skinner in the 
above passage or by Danto’s writing on film but rather to understand a philosophical text as part 
of the corpus that will move under the sign of the author. This is not the only way to read a 
philosophical text. Although Benjamin tends to quote rarely from philosophical sources directly, 
it would be bizarre in a study that at least partially examines Benjamin not to note that Benjamin 
himself employs a rather ‘disembodied’ attitude towards textual quotation both in The Origins of 
German Tragic Drama and in the Arcades Project.
82
 However, given that this project involves 
historical as well as textual comparison, it is helpful to bring to bear both Benjamin’s or Al-e 
Ahmad’s social and historical circumstances as well as their other writings in interpreting any of 
their texts. This can also serve as a helpful corrective to more radical readings of the text that 
may subvert some of its, if not intended meanings, then its stronger valences. This places my 
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methodological approach in these sections of this study closer to Edward Said’s position in 
Orientalism, when he states: 
Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author counts for very little; empirically, 
in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I find this not to be so. Accordingly my 
analyses employ close textual readings whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual 
text or writer and the complex collective formation to which his is a contribution.
83
 
I would propose that Said’s observation is not limited to the study of Orientalism – against his 
own suggestion that it applies “perhaps nowhere else.” Foucault’s method (which also of course 
involves the death of the author, as Said discusses here) is of great value in revealing epistemic 
horizons, discursive boundaries and lacunae. However, when addressing certain genres of texts, 
understanding this discursive context as well as the interplay of the author and socio-historical 
context is necessary. It is impossible to discuss systematic philosophy without doing so. I 
consider this methodological point to be helpful beyond understanding and comparing the two 
main thinkers of this work. It also provides a foothold for further philosophical speculation that 
builds upon my readings of these thinkers.  
Returning to the initial discussion of Skinner, the authorial-intent model that he outlines 
actually conflicts with Skinner’s own intended direction: 
The most exciting possibility here, which I cannot now explore, but which I have touched on in 
discussing both the causes of action and the conditions for understanding statements, is the 
possibility of a dialogue between philosophical discussion and historical evidence.
84
 
This kind of dialogue “between philosophical discussion and historical evidence” is precisely 
what I pursue here. The questions that I am asking are prompted both by historical investigation 
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and current philosophical debates: is there a “family resemblance,”85 in the Wittgensteinian 
sense, between Al-e Ahmad’s and Benjamin’s critique? Do Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin 
participate in such a “family”?  Do they rely on certain shared sources and related socio-
historical circumstances? What do these critiques say about historical conditions in their time 
and in relation to the present day? What, if any, philosophical conclusions can we draw from 
these historical and textual comparisons? These are all questions I am posing today that are 
prompted by current philosophical debates and simultaneously require historical investigation 
and are impossible to answer without considering that investigation.  
It would be bizarre to suggest that either author in his own historical circumstance would 
have pointed to the other – or to many of the concepts I employ in this study – to describe 
themselves. There is absolutely no historical evidence that Benjamin knew anything about 
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intellectual currents in the Islamic, let alone the Iranian Shia world – the proposition alone seems 
preposterous. And while there is a passing chance that Al-e Ahmad may have been familiar with 
the work of Benjamin or, much more likely, Adorno, there is no historical evidence for that 
either, although we do find ample textual evidence of other Western Marxist figures, most 
especially Gramsci, in Al-e Ahmad’s work.86  
Outside Modernity? 
 The philosophical questions I pursue are additionally prompted by the keen observations 
of several scholars concerning the possible conceptual intersection of these two intellectual 
worlds, seemingly distant at first glance. One of the first to propose such intersection and 
resemblance was Susan Buck-Morss, in her work Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical 
Theory on the Left, although she focuses there on Sunni Arab Islamism as exemplified by Sayyid 
Qutb and the entire landscape of Frankfurt School authors. She writes: 
Now, the Western modernity that Qutb and others attacked was in fact the impoverished tradition 
of instrumental reason, possessive individualism, and lack of social consciousness that the 
members of the Frankfurt School and other European Marxists were criticizing from within.
87
 
This observation is in line with Euben’s as well; the concerns of Islamist critique are not 
necessarily identitarian per se. Buck-Morss’ proposition is further buttressed by Farzin Vadhat’s 
more specific reading of Al-e Ahmad himself and modernity in “Return to which Self? Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad and the Discourse of Modernity,” when he notes the closeness of Al-e Ahmad’s writings 
to both an early iteration of post-colonialism and to his relationship to Khalil Maleki and 
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 Vadhat returns to the theme with his discussion of Al-e Ahmad and Gramsci 
in God and Juggernaut, where he aptly notes that the other of the gharbzadeh, particularly the 
gharbzadeh intellectual, is the Gramscian “organic intellectual.”89 More broadly speaking, 
Dabashi, in his 2012 book, The World of Persian Literary Humanism, concludes, in part, with a 
comparison of “the contingent subject of literary humanism” and in particular “Persian literary 
humanism” with both Adorno’s commentary on the “insolubility of contingency” with reference 
to identity but also to Benjamin’s “theory of allegory.”90 Although Al-e Ahmad only briefly 
appears in the work, the reflection on necessary similarities between the world of “Persian 
literary humanism” and critical theory is compelling. Alongside my own readings of the authors, 
I view all these scholars as in many ways opening the field for inquiry.  
One of the major interventions I hope this study can achieve is to correct the error that 
Al-e Ahmad is relevant only for an Iranian Shia audience, in terms of application, intention, or, 
of course, legibility. There is a key observation in the passage by Buck-Morss I cite above: long 
before contemporary discussions of the phenomena of economic and social globalizations, 
modernity was already a singular, shared, multi-faceted condition in the twentieth century that 
gave birth both to Islamist and Frankfurt School theory. Furthermore, not only is modernity a 
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shared condition temporally, systemically, and, in some ways, characteristically (if not 
conditionally and spatially), what is more, the object of critique – the nature of modernity itself – 
is also shared.  
Buck-Morss continues (still comparing the conditions and critiques of German-Jewish 
and Arab-Sunni intellectuals): 
It would have taken a radical cosmopolitanism far advance of what was possible at the time for 
both sides (German Jewish and Arab Muslim) to join forces in a critique of Western reason in its 
impoverished, (neo-)liberal, instrumentalized form. But the very thought of such an alliance, an 
attack launched from both within and without, suggests the power that a new Left in a global 
public sphere might have today.
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Indeed, in addition to a “radical cosmopolitanism,” it would have taken at the least a modicum of 
mutual knowledge, not to mention recognition. Benjamin seems to have known next to nothing 
of the Islamic world
92
, nor thought terribly much about it. Even in his correspondence with 
Gershom Scholem concerning Scholem’s numerous attempts to encourage Benjamin’s 
immigration to Palestine, Arabs and the Islamic world figure into the discussion rarely and often 
only as romantic set-pieces or political talking points without subjectivity. Al-e Ahmad was far 
more of a “cosmopolitan” than Benjamin in almost every sense of the word. He travelled 
extensively (to Europe, for medical reasons, and to Mecca, the Soviet Union, Israel, and 
American for varying intellectual, political, and religious reasons) and wrote about the world, 
even famously lecturing at Harvard as a visiting scholar for a summer at the behest of Henry 
Kissinger.
93
 He was also a cosmopolitan in the theoretical sense, writing explicitly about 
cosmopolitanism in Gharbzadegi (in favor of it, which is often lost in contemporary writing on 
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Al-e Ahmad) and drawing on texts from Iran, across the Islamic world, Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
North America. The fascinating aspect of this very superficial comparison is that to read Al-e 
Ahmad (and thinkers like him) both for reasons of Orientalism and the state of his contemporary 
reception, one must constantly underscore his historically obvious cosmopolitanism. Benjamin, 
deeply parochial in a stringently European (although importantly European-qua-Jewish) world, is 
afforded something of ‘a free pass.’ Buck-Morss rightly puts the “two sides” on equal ground in 
terms of non-recognition of the other, but the language of “within” and “without” betrays the 
status that will always attach itself to intellectuals of Europe, even if they are part of the 
‘marginal’ Jewish community. 
I will address later the question of the Iranian-Shii vs. Arab-Islamic dynamic that I have 
been eliding in my discussion of Buck-Morss here. But first I would like to address the language 
of “within” and “without” that she deploys in the quotation above. While recognizing the shared 
condition/object of modernity, Buck-Morss implies that the Frankfurt School writers are 
“within” modernity and critiquing it, while Islamist writers are “without” or, somehow, outside 
modernity and critiquing it. This logic actually runs against the radical notion of universalism 
that she reclaims in Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History. However, it also ignores what is a key 
theoretical point in my methodology here and what, I think, makes possible the type of “radical 
cosmopolitan” reading that Buck-Morss advocates: viewing both of these thinkers (and their 
respective intellectual contemporaries) as “within” the condition of modernity, and viewing their 
critiques both as from and of modernity, as informed by their different geographic, economic, 
and social dimensions.  
This idea of everywhere “within” might be misunderstood easily as a variant of several 





“map” and “territory” of the whole world in Simulacra and Simulation – but I would rather 
propose it here as an attempt to acknowledge a fact of modernity and also as a challenge to the 
privilege that a binary of “within” and “without” can conjure. For instance, as in the example 
above: Walter Benjamin codes as cosmopolitan despite never leaving Europe; Al-e Ahmad is a 
genuinely global author who is treated as a “nativist” and understood as relevant only to the 
internal and local history, literature, and politics of Iran. In order to understand the distinctions I 
am drawing, I will briefly explore several pertinent definitions and critiques of the concept of 
“modernity.”  
Expanding the “Incomplete Project” of Modernity 
In his discussion of the genealogy of the word “modern,” Jurgen Habermas helpfully 
reminds us that the concept first came into use in the fifth century CE to delineate between the 
time of “ancient pagan” order and the new age in which Christianity was everywhere and 
“official.”94 This is helpful both for its location of Christianity – particularly Euro-Christianity – 
as the keystone for any notion of modernity and also for destabilizing more historicist accounts. 
Habermas is not making the claim that “the modern” begins in the fifth century, as do say, Adam 
Smith or Karl Marx with the eighteenth century and the advent of the division of labor, or Max 
Weber with double-entry book-keeping and quantitative rationalization. Nor is he laying out a 
recapitulation of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of Hegel’s “cunning of reason” which 
pushes the zygote of “the modern” into the ancient world itself. Habermas is underlining the way 
in which the “modern” is a constantly shifting plane, but predicated always on the idea of the 
“new.” In a manner that is explicitly in line with Benjamin’s understanding (and critique) of 
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Nietzsche’s “eternal return of the same,” Habermas argues that in the contemporary “modern 
age” – best understood by the aesthetic of the modern – “the distinguishing mark of works which 
count as modern is ‘the new’ which will be overcome and made obsolete through the novelty of 
the next style.”95 However, there can be no mistaking this claim for a re-inscription of Hegel’s 
dialectic or of Nietzsche’s creative rebirth of mythology, “because the emphatically modern 
document no longer borrows this power of being a classic from an authority of the past epoch… 
the relation between ‘modern’ and ‘classical’ has definitely lost a fixed historical reference.”96 In 
addition to losing a fixed historical reference, something akin to the ancient concept of cyclical 
time is recreated in Habermas’ discussion of the detachment of the “new” from any substantive 
content. We are not speaking, then, with Hegel. Habermas – in what amounts to something of an 
about-face on Benjamin
97
 – has adopted several of Benjamin’s positions concerning the notion of 
historical progression in addition to Benjamin’s critique of the eternal return of the same.  
Perhaps surprisingly, Habermas’ introductory notes on the Christian origin of the concept 
of the “modern” are not far away from Carl Schmitt’s proposition in the third chapter of Political 
Theology,  “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts….”98 However, while many (Hans Blumenberg being the most prominent example) 
have taken Schmitt to task for mistaking a historical transformation for a characterization, what 
Habermas does at the beginning of his essay with his genealogy of the term “modern” is, while 
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less directed, in many ways more bold. He diffuses the Christian world beyond law and state to 
encompass the character of an “age” and he elucidates several examples of the characteristics 
that form that “age”: aesthetic, social, cultural, and economic. It is partly a critical gesture; from 
its inception, Habermas suggests, the autonomy of these spheres – so central both to conservative 
thinkers like Schmitt and Enlightenment philosophers alike – has been a myth. They overlap 
with one another, share in the age’s characteristics, and inform the conceptual and categorical 
understandings of one another. Thus the “significance” – to paraphrase Schmitt – of particular 
“concepts” are downplayed in favor of a diffuse set of influences and characteristics. In 
recognition and response to this, I argue that Habermas’ notion of the “incomplete project” of 
modernity must be expanded both in terms of what is conceptually possible to consider as 
modern and to recognize that colonial and marginal conditions are an integral part of the 
landscape of modernity. The first expansion requires addressing post-colonial theory and an 
important critical turn I argue must be made to re-imagine modern concepts. The second 
expansion, building on the first, requires a reevaluation and redefinition of the muddled 
sociological, historical, and philosophical conceptions of modernity as a social condition.    
Expansion I: ‘Provincializing Europe’ and Beyond 
Perhaps unintentionally, Habermas, in tracing European modernity to a specifically 
Christian moment and intellectual dispersion – which looks, for lack of a better phrase, distinctly 
un-modern – opens up his critical theory to a synergistic post-colonial argument. Put another 
way, it helps in the task of, to borrow a phrase from Dipesh Chakrabarty, “provincializing 
Europe.” Particularly important for this study, especially in light of the discussion of “self-
colonization,” the Euro-Christian character of key categories of modernity can be seen in all their 





the category of religion, etc., beginning to lift. As Chakrabarty writes concerning his own work 
on the subcontinent: 
The Europe I seek to provincialize or decenter is an imaginary figure that remains deeply 
embedded in clichéd and shorthand forms in some everyday habits of thought that invariably 
subtend attempts in the social science to address questions of political modernity in South Asia. 
The phenomenon of “political modernity” – namely, the rule by modern institutions of the state, 
bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise – is impossible to think of anywhere in the world without 
invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep in the intellectual and 
even theological traditions of Europe… One simply cannot think of a political modernity without 
these and other related concepts that found a climactic form in the course of the European 
Enlightenment and the nineteenth century.
99
 
The object of this critique, as Chakrabarty says, is not Europe itself; he stipulates earlier in his 
introduction that the historical project of ‘fragmenting’ Europe –  showing its particularities, 
fissures, overlapping areas of irreconcilable difference – had already in many ways been 
accomplished. What he is addressing is an intellectual firmament, a lexicon of the metropole 
which had been dispersed throughout the world by the economic, social, and political forces of 
colonialism. The “concepts” that Chakrabarty discusses span a radically wide range: 
“citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the 
individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular 
sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and so on…”100 There are some reaches of this 
range that must be challenged – Chakrabarty’s critique of science is particularly weak.101 But it is 
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undeniable that each of these seemingly inescapable modern concepts does, precisely as he 
argues, emerge from a recognizable and yet conceptually veiled position in Euro-Christian 
particularity.  
 And yet it is not enough to “provincialize Europe” in this manner. Chakrabarty tries to 
argue for better conceptions of pre-modern history (the transformation of “minority histories” 
into “subaltern pasts,” for example, which intends to transform the conceptions into fragmented, 
local iterations, self-referential both in content and in concept) and against the continued 
prevalence of even critical modes of modern thought (liberalism and Marxism are singled out in 
particular). Even so, the thought of what is already global – conceptually – haunts the work. 
Chakrabarty’s provincialization only takes us as far as allowing the particular to speak in its own 
terms; it does not overturn – as Chakrabarty would seem to hope – the conceptual sovereignty of 
that “imaginary Europe.” In Chakrabarty’s own words, the “heritage” of liberalism and Marxism 
“is now global.” He may claim not to adhere to Heideggerian ontology but in his critique 
Heideggerian concepts (“present-at-hand,” “ready-to-hand” and so on)102 are allowed their day in 
the global sun, so to speak; whither the truth content of the global-particular approaches 
Chakrabarty seeks to let speak? There is a factual, historical case at work here as well, in which 
Chakrabarty is entirely correct: these Euro-Christian concepts and even their most nuanced 
critiques are, in a very liberating way, part of a “global heritage,” available for all – with access, 
ability, time, and resources – to draw upon when wanted or needed. But if there is an ontology 
peculiar to Bengalis (to continue in Chakrabarty’s case), how and when does it get to speak 
globally? Shall the notion of not only “the universal” but in fact of universal discourse, or more 
simply global discourse (and philosophy, like science, by definition must attempt the universal 
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even if attaining it is impossible) be ceded forever as another bad idea to come out of Europe, 
like nationalism or colonialism? If the wide range of concepts listed above are not “universal,” 
then surely the newly reiterated and reconstituted particularities may not only de-center these but 
supplant some, augment others, cast light on which should remain, turn an authoritarian 
conceptual universe into a web of interconnected people and ideas.  
There is something to be said that for the idea that the entire project that Chakrabarty sets 
out on is to precisely not reconstitute such a universe, that reconstituting a universe or sphere 
even in a truly fragmented and decentered mode would be to recapitulate the mistakes of the 
Enlightenment and colonialism itself. And, yet, if it is not transformed or augmented, then the 
critical apparatus has reinscribed these locales as forever peripheral, while the remnants of Euro-
Christian past lives on as the spectral global metropole. To move out of Chakrabarty’s areas of 
concern to my own: how does this mode of reading do justice to Al-e Ahmad’s Iranian and Shii 
inflected modernist critique of modernity? This is not only a question too of allowing non-Euro-
Christian voices to speak globally. It is also the question of what is to remain of the 
Enlightenment project despite its origins; merely to unveil it as self-deceived does not constitute 
a negation. Chakrabarty writes in the end that he does not wish to “shun” “European thought,” 
and yet without hesitation he equates science with scientism. In critiquing the notion that “we see 
our ‘superstitious’ contemporaries as examples of an ‘earlier type,’”103 he goes on to endorse the 
superstition itself, out of uncritical deference to the (true) unknowable being and subjectivity of 
the Other. But taken to its logical conclusion, this is the end of knowledge. Chakrabarty has 
mistaken an epistemological problem for an ontological one. It is because of economic and 
conceptual hegemony that one would conclude that differences from the categories of the 
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metropolitan center, in and of themselves, are a sign of “backwardness” or “superstition”. The 
ontological exclusivity of the varieties of human experience apply to people’s beliefs vis-à-vis 
their own experience. The problem of self-knowledge aside, the experience of that belief, the 
habitation and/or practice of it, is exclusively in the realm of the self-reporting and the purely 
discursive. The epistemological verification of that belief – difficult as it may be to pronounce 
both in terms of the observers’ own problematic being and in terms of finding the right language, 
the formula which will be scrutinized – cannot be ruled impossible simply on the grounds that 
there is a subjectivity which experiences it otherwise. For all of his talk of de-centering European 
conceptual armature, Chakrabarty again draws on Heidegger – here the notion of the “’worlding’ 
of the earth”104 – to obscure what is, in the end, an actual empirical question: in this case, 
whether or not a “magical,” “telepathy” has in fact occurred.105  
To ground these arguments in this study, I intend to argue that to deny this distinction is 
precisely to misunderstand the critique of faith that occurs in both Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad; it 
is to cast them both – the post-colonial and/or minority/marginal – permanently into the realm of 
the irrelevant because others have dubiously claimed the rational high ground first. Both the 
rational and the empirical become not questions of thought but of Being, and thus, ironically 
beyond interrogation in the particular, in history, in embodiment, precisely in all the ways that 
Chakrabarty wants to encourage. Chakrabarty’s argument is half a critique.106 Although I find 
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the notion of “provinicializing Europe” incredibly useful for understanding the new critique that 
must take place, in the spirit of Benjamin, the theory it engenders on its own must be labeled as a 
Heideggerian nightmare in which the actually-existing-world fades further and further from the 
theoretical horizon.  There is another critical turn which must be taken. As Asha Varadharajan 
asks in Exotic Parodies, her insightful study into post-coloniality, critical theory, and 
subjectivity: 
If the discourses of post-modernism and post-structuralism have been responsible for decentering 
the patriarchal and imperialist subject by demonstrating that the unity and self-sufficiency of this 
subject is possible only at the expense of the racial, ethnic, and feminine object, why has this 
perception not produced emancipation and self-acceptance of the object? The object, in other 
words, continues to function as a dark continent of sorts, a species of otherness whose point of 
reference remains the Eurocentric and masculine self.
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Put simply – and openly as a challenge – if post-modernist and post-structuralist approaches to 
the post-colonial constitute the path to de-center/deconstruct/dethrone the Euro-Christian, 
masculine norms of global capitalist domination (which Varadharajan correctly identifies as the 
new, more virulent form of colonialism), then where is the liberation? What use is this discourse, 
if the condition of the colonial just continues on and the expressions, conceptions, arguments, 
but, above all, needs of the post-colonial world are simply relegated from the “dark continent” of 
barbarism and superstition to the “dark continent” of fragmentary parochialism? All while the 
Euro-Christian norms are simply sublimated (in the chemical sense of matter changing form 
without an intermediary stage, not “sublated” in the Hegelian sense of aufgehoben) via capital 
into the ‘true’ global forms.  
Varadharajan – indirectly – demonstrates that Chakrabarty’s starting dilemma is 
reproduced by his concluding maneuvers. Varadharajan is aware that these are fighting words, 
stating in the conclusion that hers has been a “sustained effort” to “risk affiliation with the 
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‘enemy’ in order to envisage the most effective mode of decolonization, at least within the realm 
of theory.”108 She is risking much. Against what she perceives as the prevailing post-structuralist 
headwinds of the questioning of all utility and the disinclination to view objects in the world and 
the world itself as anything other than textual events, she is positing a fundamentally crucial 
conditional: if the goal of this critical apparatus is “emancipation” then why have we pulled the 
rug out from the very people that are struggling in the face of new colonial? Varadharajan 
correctly calls it a question of “decolonization”; post-coloniality has meaning, but the world – 
both material and conceptual – still requires decolonization. Stripping away the very notion of 
fact and the possibility of a subject emancipates and empowers no one. Again, in Benjaminian 
terms – and this is helpfully illustrative of where certain readings of Benjamin fail – we would be 
left with neither the manifest factual critique of the “dream-image,” the sine qua non of human 
emancipation, nor the ephemeral “wish-image” of possibility.109 Perhaps surprisingly – although 
it is in fact the telos of her study – Varadharajan brings Adorno (despite his noted and amplified 
indifference to non-European subjectivities and, often, out-and-out racism) and Frankfurt School 
critical theory into conversation with post-colonial theory to address the question of 
decolonization. She does so precisely to bring the dialectical method to bear on the possible 
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reconstitution and emancipation of post-colonial subjects and to return to the questions of the 
production and reproduction of material conditions and their ideologies. What is more, 
Varadharajan does this without running roughshod over the notion that resistances do take place. 
The question becomes not where to locate the resistance, nor how to simultaneously posit agency 
and resistance while dissolving the agential subject who resists (which a deconstructionist 
reading of post-coloniality does). There is a silent and deadly liberal tolerance that inhabits all 
such attempts; all resistances are equal, all beings are different. Varadharjan’s challenge is to 
choose sides, to actually stake out a claim, drawing on the facts of the lived conditions of 
marginalized and colonized peoples (and, for that matter, theorists): to demand, which resistance 
is better, in terms of efficacy and morality?
110
 It is a question that is fraught with tension and 
peril both for incorrect answers and for the potential of producing yet some new form of 
domination. It is also a question that I propose Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin are answering, in their 
most radical moments.  
 But while the theoretical lens turns on both a critical theoretical and a post-colonial lens 
on modernity and critics of modernity, I will demonstrate by dint of intellectual history and 
comparative philosophy, that Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad inhabit precarious, ambivalent positions 
articulating what Partha Chatterjee has called, referring to the history of the subcontinent, “our 
modernity.” Not an alternative modernity, nor post-modernity, but a face of the total condition, 
emergent, largely simultaneous, and interdependent. He does, at first, toy with the idea of 
modernities, but then he embraces an idea of the “our” of it: the particular part of the whole that 
is, unfairly, and lopsidedly, in the particular case, Indian. On his way to presenting the dilemma, 
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Chatterjee alights upon the same territory as Chakrabarty – the elusive expression of colonial and 
then post-colonial subjectivity and the unsatisfactory limitations, in the case Chatterjee is 
discussing, of the “statistical facts of demography.” Yet, unlike Chakrabarty, he presents the 
rejection of those facts as “baseless” even while maintaining that the discursive expression of a 
challenge to those facts could be meaningful. This is not a contradiction.  He presents the 
dilemma: 
My argument is that because of the way in which the history of our modernity has been 
intertwined with the history of colonialism, we have never quite been able to believe that there 
exists a universal domain of free discourse, unfettered by differences of race or nationality. 
Somehow, from the very beginning, we had a shrewd guess that given the close complicity between 
modern knowledges and modern regimes of power, we would forever remain consumers of 
universal modernity; never would be taken seriously as its producers. It is for this reason that we 
have tried, for over a hundred years, to take our eyes away from this chimera of universal 
modernity and clear up a space where we might become the creators of our own modernity.
111
 
The question is one of production and consumption.
112
  But even this “our” is too self-
provincializing; it is, perhaps, an intermediate step towards what Chatterjee himself identifies 
indirectly as the differed desire: to “be taken seriously” as “producers” of modernity as at least 
part of a universal condition.  
Expansion II: the Shifting, Uneven Geometry of Modernity 
Consider again Habermas’ notion – as discussed more fully before – of the modern as the 
repeated historical instantiation of the radically new. Rather than one sharp break from the pre-
modern to the modern, we
113
 are presented with a shifting plane of the modern which, itself, 
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continues to shift. To remain within the realm of geometric metaphors, we can think not only 
with the image of a shifting plane but also, by extrapolation, of modernity as a multi-faceted 
polyhedron. If we think of the sum total of the “age” vs. the strict one-to-one secularization of 
concepts, the image of the polyhedron becomes more and more compelling.
114
 In this way, we 
can elaborate geospatially and temporally a quite conventional definition of modernity such as 
that provided by Anthony Giddens: 
At its simplest, modernity is a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilization. 
Portrayed in more detail, it is associated with (1) a certain set of attitudes towards the world, the 
idea of the world as open to transformation by human intervention; (2) a complex of economic 
institutions, especially industrial productions and a market economy; (3) a certain range of 
political institutions, including the nation-state and mass democracy… It is a society – more 
technically, a complex of institutions – which unlike any preceding culture lives in the future 
rather than in the past.
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I do not wish to endorse Giddens’ definition of modernity. Nor do I wish to suggest that it 
summarizes Habermas’ definition. Rather, in elaborating on this definition geospatially and 
temporally in light of Habermas’ argument in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and put 
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“regional” or “native” voice, a chance to speak in the universal, not to dissolve the universal and only leave a 
spectral European modernity to inhabit it perpetually. I believe that this third position dovetails with the move 
Dabashi is suggesting but the paths to get there are different.  
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within the post-colonial frame I discussed in the previous section, we can see both how deeply 
parochial Giddens’ definition is and simultaneously where it does bring together key – if 
necessarily skewed – observations on modernity. Giddens’ first condition is, fundamentally, 
about subjectivity; it is integral to any conception of the modern, even the geometric redefinition 
which I am applying here. The subject as some kind of integral whole and the relationship of that 
subject to knowledge are a crucial link between the writings of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. They 
are a shared aspect of the modern experience and the critique of the modern experience. The 
final comment – about the modern society as one that “lives in the future” – has mistaken 
modernity for modernization theses. The limitations within these categories, such as the 
centrality of things like a “market economy” or a “nation-state,” become all the more obviously 
absurd as one elaborates on the variety of angles, facets, and faces one finds on whole in 
modernity. In addressing Giddens’ second and third conditions now, by briefly addressing 
specific Iranian and German conditions in the periods in which Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin were 
writing, I hope to make this point clearer.
116
   
 To begin with, we must contrast, drawing in part on the Chakrabarty discussed above, the 
factual conditions of modernity (which I have been describing geometrically) with the abstract 
condition of modernity – the discursive object of modernization theses, Enlightenment 
aspirations, and European colonial discourse. I am not trying to make a distinction that promotes 
the notion of a ‘rarefied’ philosophical discourse of modernity against some ‘purer,’ more 
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empirical, sociological understanding. Rather, I would like to connect the two; some sociological 
positions fall in to the “abstract” category, while some philosophical positions must be addressed 
as “factual.”117 Thus, unless we subscribe to a highly dubious thesis of evolutionary or divine 
determination and simultaneous emergence, we must engage with the concept of modernity as 
one that unfolds already constituted – centrally, not epiphenomenally – by conditions like 
resource extraction, colonization, “self-colonization,” the struggle for national identity, and so 
on. Thus, we must note that by the beginning of the twentieth century, both Germany and Iran 
were deeply integrated into what would now be called globalized systems of commerce and 
communication;
118
 both had experienced a truncated experience of the “advent” of modernity 
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 Germany was both an emerging major center for global manufacturing and, as early as the long nineteenth 
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vis-à-vis foreign military intervention;
119
 both had seen both mass-popular movements mobilized 
in addition to “modernism” in literature and the arts.  
 In the question, then, of the comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin a new constellation 
and perhaps the firmest foundation for the comparison unfolds within this uneven geometry of 
modernity: that of a shared status as oppositional intellectuals, in the model that Said outlines in 
Representations of the Intellectual (Said, 1994) for which the seemingly odd pairing of Julien 
Benda
120
 and Theodor Adorno both prove paradigmatic cases.
121
 Unlike the Said of Orientalism, 
who draws heavily on Foucauldian discourse analysis and Gramscian hegemony, here Said is 
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to religion but also that sometimes his arguments would land him somewhere other than where his theory (think 
“Religious Criticism” vs. “Secular Criticism” from The World, the Text, and the Critic) would suggest. I address this 





working largely from Gramsci’s notion of the “organic intellectual”122 and from Benda’s 
(extreme) example in representing an uncompromising oppositional stance to power.  
If this perhaps seems too open up too much or to be potentially too broad, that is 
precisely the methodological point. A similar (but non-identical) argument – as the links I drew 
between conditions in Iran and Germany and the subsequent basis for a comparative analysis of 
intellectuals – could be made about any number of other arrangements on the landscape of the 
uneven, geometric modernity I have been discussing. However, these would always have to 
stand on factual foundations – historical and textual – and not only on “family resemblance.” 
Thus, we can move from the rather succinct and reductionist account we read in Giddens to 
Marshall Berman’s more radical account of modernity: 
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of 
class and nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all 
mankind. But it is a paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of 
perpetual disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish. To 
be modern is to be part of the universe in which, as Marx said, “all that is solid melts into the 
air.”123     
It is a rather stirring depiction and a literalist reading of it is found centrally in both Mehrzad 
Boroujerdi and Ali Mirsepassi. For them this is the ontology of “the modern.”  But if we want to 
take seriously what a universalistic but non-totalizing philosophy might look like – if we, in 
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 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 9-10. Gramsci’s insights into intellectuals, but also 
into the notion from Marx of “town and country,” are particularly helpful in understanding Al-e Ahmad and 
Benjamin and yet – even putting aside Said’s concern of “opposition” – it would be wrong to draw a straight line 
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some sense, want a truly modern modernity – we need to read a bit closer and a bit more, just as 
we did with Giddens. “Modern experiences,” “cut across” some “boundaries of geography and 
ethnicity,” but in uneven ways with different corresponding social structures; they cut across 
some boundaries of “class and nationality,” but mostly to dissolve the bonds of the former and 
ironically reify notions of the latter. It is not a unity of disunity; it is rather, disunity under 
domination and the illusion of unity. Berman is writing in 1988 and part of the “maelstrom” is 
the ‘identity’ crisis that is postmodernism. Rather than name (and thereby destabilize) the “unity” 
which has economically and politically dominated the world for several centuries, 
postmodernists would rather dissolve everything the ‘veiled’ modern had simply sought to 
control, including modernity itself. Of course, unveiled, it is capitalist, Christian, Europe that 
stands invisible to all on the terrain of the modern except itself. It stands or perhaps stood at the 
center, alone. It does not have to be this way; this dissertation is an attempt at describing at least 
one alternative way amongst many. It is on the grounds of these arguments that I can finally 
address current debates in the critique of religion as a category and my own stated use of 
“religious” as a polemic.  
Religion and Religious: The Critique of Secularism and Religion as Polemic
124
 
There has been, over the course of the last several decades, something of a seismic shift in 
scholarly understandings of “religion” as a conceptual category by a wide range of scholars, 
most prominently Talal Asad (Genealogies of Religion, 1993 and Formations of the Secular, 
2003), Tomoko Masuzawa (The Invention of World Religions, 2005), and Gil Anidjar 
(“Secularism,” 2006). As I argue in this dissertation, Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin themselves can 
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be seen as performing critiques of the concept of religion, particularly of the notion of faith 
within “religion.” Benjamin even goes so far in one of his fragments as to write, “Christianity in 
the time of the Reformation did not encourage the emergence of capitalism, but rather changed 
itself into capitalism.”125 As I discuss in my third chapter, his critique of faith – at least of the 
notion of faith as in belief against the objects of our senses, faith in transcendence – goes 
considerably further back historically than the Reformation. But before I proceed to Al-e 
Ahmad’s and Benjamin’s critiques and propositions concerning religion, I would like to spend 
some brief time with the genealogical critique that begins with Asad. 
  Asad proposes in his works Formations of the Secular and Genealogies of Religion that 
the “secular” and the “religious” – born in and of the same discursive moment – are incoherent in 
their deployment in modern and contemporary political and philosophical conversation. Against 
the general narrative of neutrality or universal principles, Asad presents a counterargument from 
the point of view of historical specificity and genealogy. As he writes of religion: 
For the entire phenomenon is to be seen in large measure in the context of Christian attempts to 
achieve a coherence in doctrines and practices, rules and regulations, even if that was a state 
never fully attained. My argument is that there cannot be a universal definition of religion, not 
only because its constituent elements and relationship are historically specific, but because that 
definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes.
126
 
In other words, Asad rejects even some of the more complex anthropological, sociological, and 
historical accounts of religions as having treated “religion” as something like a peculiarly-shaped 
box into which different substantive contents can be placed, but which takes on a similar form, 
performs similar functions and makes similar demands in different societies, even if content, 
appearance, and all manner of other differences might obfuscate this. Furthermore, he asserts that 
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the complementary relationship between the contours of Christianity and the shape of that box 
are not an accident of history but rather a deliberative historical process by which Christianity (or 
rather the Christians who constitute it) came to see itself as providing the universal model of 
religion. The conceptual category “religion” was projected back in both temporal and spatial 
terms; the Greeks suddenly have a “religion”; the Indians have many.   
In pushing this observation even further, Gil Anidjar suggests that “secularism” is not just 
shaped or historically derived from Christianity, but really is just Western Christianity or, rather, 
the name with which Western Christianity re-christened itself (if you’ll pardon the pun) when it 
collectively decided that another category, namely “religion,” was the to be the grand historical 
“problem” of modernity itself: the myth of myths that the Enlightenment would overcome, to 
move the argument into more familiar critical theoretical terms. As Anidjar argues: 
Christianity invented the distinction between religious and secular, and thus made religion. It 
made religion – rather than itself – the problem, the object of criticism that needed to be no less 
than transcended. The two terms, religious and secular, thus function together as strategic devices 
and as mechanisms of self-blindness, doing so, at any rate, in such a way that it remains difficult, 
if not impossible, to extricate them from each other as if by fiat… Most importantly, then, 
secularism is a name Christianity gave itself when it invented “religion,” named its other or 
others, “religions.”127 
This, by way of Asad and Anidjar, is not to say that there were not practical and intellectual 
objects like “Islam” around before Christendom decided to come up with a fully structured and 
bounded ideal of what “religion” is (although it does lend credence to those many scholars who 
have pointed out that there really may never have been such a thing as, for example, “Hinduism” 
before European-Christian ideas of “religion” were applied to a disparate, uncoordinated and 
sometimes even inimical set of subcontinental ideas and practices). It is to say, though, that the 
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 notion of “religion” (and its mirror “secularism”) is entirely a Christian invention and 
dependent upon Christianity’s history and content in informing what that normative notion of 
religion is. Nor is it a politically innocent formulation: what Anidjar underlines is that at 
precisely the moment at which all others are reconfigured as religion and Christendom is 
reconfigured as “secular,” “religion” itself is then posited as that which much be controlled, 
dominated, and, if all else fails, cut-off, excluded, or annihilated. The issue at hand here is not 
just about marginalization and incoherent legitimacy; it is about concealing and legitimating a 
mode of potential violence by allowing secularism to act as a veil. Anidjar continues: 
To uphold secularism today is to erase the fact that secularism continues to serve mostly – and 
certainly has historically served – one particular religion…and one economic game, one elite-
serving apparatus, namely, the secular nation…, the discourse of power that legitimates itself and 
presents itself as secular, as if indifferent to religion yet producing religion as a (generic) 
problem. Secularism’s key words – consensual keywords for one keyword among others – are 
human rights, international law, sovereignty, democracy, and so forth, all of which are avowedly 
“secular” projects. Is it possible to be for or against these?128 
The “secular,” then, Anidjar himself notes later in his paper, becomes like the “white” in racial 
discourse: always present and yet always disappearing. “Is it possible to be against these?” The 
implicit answer is no. So what then is always posited against these? More specifically, what is 
“the secular” defined against?  Why, “religion,” of course. It must be noted in a study like this 
that Islam and Judaism are marked as the respective interior and exterior other to Western 
Christianity, that is to say, to secular modernity. 
Despite recognizing the philosophical illegitimacy of the marginalization of religion, the 
constitution of secularism as its own particular tradition, the primary necessity of negotiability on 
principles, and so on, when secularism shifts from proposition to existence, in theory or on-the-
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ground, it is a particular identity defined, as argued in my earlier analysis of Anidjar’s position, 
by and of Christians-transcending-Christianity. As he points out: 
Usually, however, or rather, hegemonically, the word “secular” has participated in another 
history and served another function. It has operated in a differential relation, indeed, in 
opposition to the word “religious,” doing so within a specific religious tradition (on which more 




Before Christians viewed themselves as “secular” or occupying “secular” space, they had already 
constructed the divide between “religious” – a supernatural realm of spirit entirely removed from 
the physical world, eternal, benevolent and loving – and “secular” – the actually existing world, 
temporal, malevolent, and menacing. It is the fundamental separation of the two—and that the 
allegiance implied in sacrality is paradigmatically wrongly placed within the actually existing 
world — that is centrally and seamlessly reproduced from ontological-Christianity into 
ontological-secularism. It is merely the valorization that is changed. Talal Asad argues, in a 
similar vein: 
For the representation of the Christian God as being sited quite apart in “the supernatural” world 
signals the construction of a secular space that begins to emerge in early modernity. Such a space 
permits “nature” to be reconceived as manipulatable material, determinate, homogenous, and 
subject to mechanical laws. Anything beyond that space is therefore “supernatural”—a place 




Although other systems of thought (that is to say, other religions or those aspects of what we call 
religions which pertain to systematic thought) may have characterized similar divisions, 
“formations of the secular,” if you will, and continue to work in rearranging similar elements, the 
particular valences and dimensions of the secular as it was, and continues to be, defined in 
history, by Christians, was, and is, a peculiarly Christian invention, the logic of which depends 
                                                          
129
 Anidjar, 57, emphasis in original.  
130





entirely on the ultimate truth of a Christian cosmogony.  The only change between the Christian 
and the Secular periods, then, is what is valorized and what is demonized. “Religion” in its 
proper place is supernatural under secularism and certainly not worldly.  “Religion” which 
exceeds that proper place is always characterized as ‘invading’ or ‘returning’ or, of course, 
‘politicizing.’  
In following Asad’s and Anidjar’s logic, where they coincide, and bringing us a little 
closer to the rest of this chapter, the problem is complex: Christendom – the loosely linked 
collection of political entities in Europe dominated in one way or another by Christianity – 
vanishes and is replaced, through the process of the self-consciousness of the Enlightenment, by 
the secular universal that I have been discussing hitherto. The irony is, of course, that Europe 
remains, the Christians remain, the domination remains. Merely the name vanishes and is 
replaced by the very same spectral universal subject (abstract, secular, modern, transcendental, 
etc.) that I argued earlier would be left if the task of ‘provincializing Europe’ were not carried 
out to its furthest conclusions. For debates about secularism – and I would note that there are 
several
131
 – this identification of “secularism” as far from empty is the most operative 
component. But what of religion? Religion is at the same time raised as the name for that which 
is to be overcome and that which is other, but its normative form is determined by Christianity. 
So, to follow the logic for a moment, Christianity is both secularism and the ideal form for 
religion; let us for the sake of establishing just a measure of clarity call this ideal form religion
1
 
(religion “prime”) for the moment. “Religion,” that which was overcome in the advent of “the 
modern,” is recast as a name for that which is not yet modern; it is religion ‘out of bounds,’ and 
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yet, as we have already seen, the argument for the not-yet-modern in many of the exact cases 
where “religion” should apply is incongruous. Meanwhile Christianity gets a third afterlife in 
this model: Christianity – Secular Empire; Christianity – religion1; and Christianity – the 
measure of “religion” with respect to which actually existing now-dubbed-religions, Islam the 
primary object, are always found wanting.  
I quote Anidjar at length here, as he helps to explain the stakes of what can appear simply 
semantic:  
These same elites, occupying the same places and functions (and a not altogether different dress 
code), were and remain devoted, wittingly or not, to the training and exercise of the power of the 
few over the millions, indeed, billions of individuals conveniently located in the very same 
neighborhoods, the very same areas of the world colonized and administered, massively 
transformed by good and bad Christians since 1492… It participates in a set of devices that make 
religion (the religion of the others, that is, or their nationalism, primitivism, militarism, and 
terrorism) more of an ominous danger than, say, the dealings of the ruling and no-longer-welfare 
states, the practices of gigantic corporations and their national and international banking, to say 
nothing of homeland security and its consequences... Secularism continues to be fostered by the 
same institutions and structurally identical elites, who work out of the same centers of power that 
earlier spread their “civilization” and continue to expand their mission, be it economic, military, 
cultural, humanitarian even. It still has the bigger bombs—it is the history of bombing—and the 
bigger police, security, military, and financial forces. It builds the bigger walls. It leads the war 
on terror. Minimally, it maintains its hold on the institutions that preserve and reproduce a power 
structure and a ruling and intellectual elite that suffers or holds with true Gelassenheit (and a few 
international laws and trade agreements) those billions in abject poverty, judging unsatisfactory 
their inability to escape the dark theological ages out of the depth of which they allegedly seek 
artificial comfort and solace. Or the ground of their misguided resistance. There would be the 
problem, along with the demonstration of the poor man and woman’s inability to restrain their 
theological or quasi-theological failings. Thus to uphold secularism (or, for that matter, religion) 




Anidjar is correct to identify these phenomena and the identity of the culpable party – some 
continuous iteration of Christendom. It cannot be viewed as historical accident that the regions 
and peoples of the world who were most directly addressed by colonial practices and discourses 
are suddenly refashioned as the most in need of secularization and that a new variety of attendant 
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practices and discourses of control, domination, and indeed demonization, continue apace. It also 
cannot be viewed as historical accident that there is continuity in the people who are doing so; 
Anidjar simply names them, “Christians.” And I quote him at length here also to underline that 
these are precisely the stakes that Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin (and Shariati and Adorno for that 
matter) saw in the balance. Not, of course, with the exact War on Terror valences that Anidjar 
employs. But the question of identifying the structures of human misery that had been in place 
since, yes, at least 1492 without explaining away, without the Hegelian “transfiguration,” 
without Christian theodicy – this is a central aspect in both Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin.  
Although Anidjar does not put it in such starkly Marxian terms, this is a process of 
demystification, of critiquing conceptual categories which veil the all too real conditions that he 
describes. And, although this is a narrative presentation, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact of this condition. And yet, something is missing in the analysis and something else is amiss 
in the argument. What is missing is the other ascendant discourses that take part in the matrix of 
“secularism,” which also assault not simply the concept of religion but, as Anidjar notes as well, 
the actually existing human beings and their being-in-the-world that operate under that sign. 
Anidjar’s primary concern in this passage, to paint with a broad brush for a moment, is the 
confluence of Empire and Capital: to name the identity which is veiled by the universal subject, 
by “the modern,” “the religious,” and “the secular” is a key step. But – and this may simply be 
outside of Anidjar’s concern or purview here – within “Christendom” what was once the 
dynamic of good religion
1
 and bad “religion” has given way to the notion that religion1, whether 
that be Protestant Christianity or other sets of historical practices that have been refashioned to 
match Protestant Christianity, is now seen as a gateway, so to speak, to “religion.” To borrow 





given way to self-hatred in the name of narcissism. This is the major thrust of strict philosophical 
naturalism
133
 which, in “fear of religion,” as Thomas Nagel aptly puts it, seeks to dissolve any 
aspect of reality – particularly of human reality – that does not emerge as a verifiable result of 
the natural sciences. To say nothing of the Nietzschean point that lying at the heart of this project 
is a continuation of a Platonic-Christian ideal of truth carried over uninterrogated, this project of 
strict philosophical naturalism – in the name of human emancipation – dissolves everything not-
directly explicable by the natural sciences: “qualia,” norms, even, in the end, human subjectivity 
itself.  Although its terms are new (Daniel Dennett’s Darwinian “universal acid,” for example), 
the project is recognizably old. Adorno and Horkheimer address it in different terms in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment when they write: 
…anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with 
suspicion. Once the movement is able to develop unhampered by external oppression, there is no 
holding it back. Its own ideas of human rights then fare no better than the older universals. Any 
intellectual resistance it encounters merely increases its strength… No matter which myths are 
invoked against it, by being used as arguments they are made to acknowledge the very principle of 
corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands accused. Enlightenment is totalitarian.
134
 
In light of what Adorno and Horkheimer write here, Anidjar’s argument, then, is to go further 
and say, “Enlightenment is secularism, Enlightenment is Christianity.” Critical theory initially 
addressed both rationalism (read today, theoretical and mathematical physics, alongside the 
enduring old Kantian projects) and empiricism (read today, evolutionary biology and 
psychology, scientism) under the catchall (if slightly confusing, since it was not exactly the 
common use at the time) term of “positivism.” But this was a rhetorically reductive move against 
reduction writ large. But if we are concerned with the confluence (indeed co-production) of 
Empire and Capital as part of a critique of Christianity where, again as Al-e Ahmad and 
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Benjamin both attest, it is the move to otherworldly faith that reifies and reproduces the 
conditions of human misery, surely then we should also be attentive to when the philosophy of 
empire seeks to eradicate every aspect of humanity that has the potential to point to current 
conditions as other than purely “natural,” that is, as static, eternal, given. This would finally be 
the totally administered world of late Capitalism triumphant: meaning, history, humans, non-
rationality, all reduced to causal apparati and nothing more. Perhaps Benjamin, although 
predating this critique by some sixty years, was right all along: at the time of the Reformation, 
Christianity did not merely have “elective affinities” with Capitalism; it did not merely foster its 
growth, nor was it “secularized”. It “transformed” into Capitalism. And what must be eradicated 
for the reproduction of capital in late capitalism is the meaningfulness of objects, and, failing 
that, the objects themselves. And then, only then, will we have reached Fukayama’s “end of 
history,” a horrible transmutation of the Kantian “kingdom of ends” into a Kingdom of Means.  
Here I return to the end of the long quotation from Anidjar above: “Thus to uphold 
secularism (or, for that matter, religion) as the keyword for critical endeavors and projects today 
is, I am afraid, not to be all that worldly.” While one reading of this sentence would be to finally 
allow the formerly bounded subjects which have come to be called “religions” to exist as din or 
makhtab or yiddishkeit, that would be rather unworldly, or perhaps, more accurately both 
unworldly and ahistorical. The notion that whatever it is that Jews do can have nothing to do 
with the transcendent, the supernatural, or the otherworldly is an idea at least as old as the 
Talmud itself.
135
 That one of the central acts of the Shia is to commemorate, recreate, remember, 
and mourn a historical catastrophe is indisputable.
136
 It was modernity (or to be more specific, 
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moderns) that conjured the (Christian-shaped) specter of religion, the unworldly, the anti-
material, the anti-rational, the ahistorical. It then castigated “religions,” which were too, for lack 
of a better word, secular, as being the enemy. Yet to merely name an entity which has been 
hiding behind the veil does not erase five hundred years of history. We are left with the same 
dilemma Chakrabarty makes in naming the formerly transcendent universal subject in order to 
dissolve it. If I may play a post-structuralist game for just a moment, what good does it do to re-
religionize Christianity? For Anidjar, the answer is quite clear: it is to allow critique to become 
“anti-Christian” and in fact to finally perform the critique of Christianity that includes its veiled 
self. But I am examining two authors who performed critiques of Christianity, so to speak, and 
were without a doubt, “anti-Christian”; what of them? Just as I asked earlier if post-colonial 
subjects would forever be themselves haunted by the specter of the newly emptied out “universal 
subject,” it is necessary to ask: if we give up the discussion of whatever tenuous links remain to 
us between the discourses that came to be called “religion” in relationship to the historical 
development of Christianity, have we just reified the universality of Christianity as, at the very 
least, the measure of religion?
137
  
These questions are also prompted by the challenge of philosophical naturalism, as 
briefly mentioned above. Philosophical naturalism working in the explicitly ahistorical terms of 
scientism describes religion as supernatural hogwash. It goes much further – this is what truly 
frightens Nagel about the “fear of religion” – and says to any aspect of what is assumed to be 
human reality that cannot be registered by the natural sciences: this is an illusion. This comes 
down to humans themselves; as Dennett says, “We are each of us mindless robots, nothing more, 
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no non-physical, non-robotic ingredients at all.”138  Dennett says this as if the central phrase “no 
non-physical” implied all the surrounding clauses. This physicalism, this radical reductionism, is 
a mode of violence. And it is no historical accident that it performs the Christian theodicy to the 
letter. If this is the picture of humans, (and I am careful to say humans and not “the human” or 
“the post-human”) then their history is a meaningless mass that had to be this way. Dennett can 
truly say with Leibniz that we live in the best of all possible worlds.   
Secularism says religion is “shutting off human investigation,” “deference to the 
authority of the more-than-human, the supernatural, the other-worldly.”139 Fundamentalism says 
in return a simple and horrifying, yes, and sets about effacing both its former self and the world 
around it. What true room is created when post-structuralism responds by dissolving the 
conceptual object altogether? Yes, it is true, this is a freeing gesture, but only in theory; I mean 
this quite literally, only in text. Anidjar’s critique is located in a political setting and articulated 
towards a political telos, but its politics are seemingly nowhere, or assumed.
140
 The only political 
move I can locate in the article is at the very end, with the suggestion of “anti-Christian” as a 
viable position. But this merely identifies the enemy, and whose politics is that?  
I would like to suggest an alternative. Asad’s genealogy – without rehearsing the entire 
argument – is broadly correct. Additionally, his choice of Clifford Geertz as an interlocutor is 
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particularly effective as well. Geertz gives a nuanced, thick, contemporary definition of religion 
for ethnographers, and Asad shows how even the contours of that definition can be traced back 
to that moment “in the seventeenth century, following the fragmentation of the unity and 
authority of the Roman church and the consequent wars of religion, which tore European 
principalities apart, that the earliest systematic attempts at producing a universal definition of 
religion were made.”141 Tomoko Masuzawa’s genealogy not of “religion” but of “world 
religions” sees the “monumental transition” from a Christian view of other practices and ideas in 
the world as relational (Judaism as pre-Christian, Islam as heresy, paganism as unreligion) to a 
still Christian view that is constitutional (Judaism, Islam, paganism, and soon several others, as 
“world religions”).142 These critiques are different ways of describing a similar phenomenon. 
They also intervene with different historical foci as critically crucial. Subsequently, they end 
with subtly different conclusions. 1492 is the historical punctum of Anidjar’s critique: the mass 
expulsion, conversion, or massacre of Muslims and Jews from Spain, and the conquest of the 
New World, gives us Christianity the enemy, and well-deservedly so; it unveils the existing 
continuity in a supranational political entity that ought rather to be called Christendom. Events in 
the sixteenth century are the central foci for Asad: the Reformation, the Wars of Religion, the 
Christian crises that mark “religion” as a problem to be overcome, leads to a formalized notion of 
Christianity that we can then call religion.  Masuzawa focuses instead on the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century: the consolidation of the colonial world, philology, the reinscription of history 
as the site of progress – from here we receive “world religions,” an ordering of systems around 
the world no longer in strictly theological terms but now described in terms of their varying 
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degrees of deficiency in relation to Christianity. We have many critiques of religion and many 
critiques of Christianity. What I propose is another critique (and probably not a final one).  
 It is not enough to name the enemy, to provincialize Europe in a different manner. In the 
mid-twentieth century Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Walter Benjamin both wrote theories of philosophy 
and religious practice, about reading and ritual, as fundamental to understanding the material 
world, both as it is and in how it could be. These theories did not conform to the Christian 
category of religion. Indeed, they were often against Christianity in its identified and veiled 
forms. Even more, theirs was not mere enmity of Christianity but also critique of precisely what 
it was (the Christian notion of faith itself) in Christianity that seemed to explain so many of the 
errors in modernity: the economic, social, and historical oppression associated with the modern 
rule of Christendom.  
To return momentarily to Said’s list of the qualities of “theological criticism,” for 
Benjamin, theology (that is theology as a hermeneutic system, not as a theistic cosmology) was 
precisely the beginning of “human investigation,” not one that produced a single authoritative 
voice of God, but at least if not more than the “forty nine levels of meaning in every passage of 
the Torah.”143 For Al-e Ahmad, the performance of a ritual was not “deference to the authority of 
the more-than-human, the supernatural, the other-worldly.” Rather, it was the beginning of the 
resistance to, even the repudiation of deference to authority, the origin point of a philosophy and 
a politics that were profoundly and only worldly. Neither believed in the supernatural; both 
affirmed the material. The idea of divine immanence becomes here a proposition about meaning 
in the world and a concomitant “intentional stance” (to borrow Dennett’s useful phrase for a 
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moment) towards objects in the world. It is not a “third person perspective,” but a perspective in 
and from which subjects and objects in their infinite variety are, to use Benjamin’s term from 
The Origin of Tragic Drama, “loyal” to each other.  
This study then is an attempt at an intervention or reclamation. This is religion as 
polemic. This is not about re-establishing a new “normalizing concept”144 or a new abstract 
universal. It is about expanding and shifting the possibilities of that universal space. This is 
allowing Shiism, a “religion of protest,”145 or Judaism, the religion whose secularity so offended 
the German Idealists,
146
 to speak at the center of the uneven geometry of modernity, to speak 
instead of Christianity, at least insofar as we may reevaluate what religion can be, at least so we 
can see what can emerge. This would be to use religion against the inherited Christian paradigm 
that is so perfectly affirmed in the fundamentalists who name essay contests after Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad and then ban his books.
147
  This would be to consider religion which in its commitment 
to the world (the of course only existing world) speaks against the post-structuralist “textuality” 
that claims Benjamin and yet denies his commitment to objects beyond texts. This is religion if, 
for no better reason than that strict philosophical naturalism (that is to say, scientism) does not 
deem these kinds of claims as valid. In negating the legitimacy of such claims, it affirms the 
conditions of the world;
148
 worse than affirms, it naturalizes them, in the strongest sense of the 
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word. It suppresses the idea that other conditions are possible. And not out of fear or dystopian 
horror – for these would require dialectic reflection not naturalistic reduction – but out of faith  
(Nietzsche’s irony alive and well) in a limited, static, and always knowable truth. What could be 
more frightening, then, than Al-e Ahmad’s steady walk, on his unbeliever’s Hajj, crumbling the 
“world of certainty” with every step.149  
A “religion of doubt,” then, is a categorical challenge.  In my reading, Al-e Ahmad (less 
obviously) and Benjamin (more obviously) are profoundly for science as a reliable ontology and 
as the sine-qua-non for material justice. But scientific inquiry should not pretend to be 
foundationally disinterested even if its practical methodology must be: “putting the jinn back in 
the bottle,” for Al-e Ahmad, as he says in Gharbzadegi, means remembering that science is both 
for knowledge and for human emancipation; as a fetish or a talisman, it produces neither. Indeed, 
in a fascinating reversal, Al-e Ahmad’s critique of science does not turn on suspicion of 
scientific knowledge or of the scientific method but is actually part of his critique of superstition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the insight that whatever was intended by the Eternal Wisdom has come to fulfillment – as in the realm of nature, so 
in the realm of spirit that is active and actual in the world. To that extent our approach is a theodicy, a justification of 
the ways of God.” (Hegel, 1988, 18). Of course, theodicy is not simply “a justification of the ways of God.” It is, 
more specifically a justification for why evil exists, why “the happiness of nations, the wisdom of states, and the 
virtues of individuals were sacrificed” on the “slaughter-bench” of history (Hegel, 1988, 24). A good example of the  
naturalization of Hegel’s theodicy can be found in Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (Pinker, 2012). 
Pinker’s work attempts to demonstrate empirically what Hegel argues rationally, although he certainly does not 
believe that he is engaging in Hegelian philosophy. Nevertheless there is an astounding near one-to-one correlation 
between Pinker’s concepts and Hegel’s. In Pinker, there is a direct line from physical causation to human nature to 
social phenomena; there are no intervening systems or structures or dilemmas that must be explained, in his 
language, fully “endogenously.” A conception of evolution – rather unscientifically pumped full of teleological 
value – is employed to explain the logical emergence of reason. Hegel’s “cunning of reason” becomes Pinker’s 
“escalator of reason”; Hegel’s admiration of “God’s wisdom” in world history becomes Pinker’s “exogenous” basis 
for the “escalator of reason”: the determinate “nature of reality” itself. This is a limited treatment here, but it should 
be no surprise that just as Hegel eventually concluded that something much akin to nineteenth century Prussia is the 
logical unfolding of reason in history, Pinker ‘discovers’ the astonishing fact that it is modern, Western, capitalist, 
liberal, democracy that is an approximation of the ‘best of all possible worlds’ so far. But what is most important is 
the effect. Pinker’s book is a theodicy in the most crucial understanding of the word – it is an apologia for the status 
quo. Any further transformation is already contained within the step-by-step theory of largely predisposed natural 
development.  
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For Benjamin, this engagement with science and scientific inquiry is even more clearly 
integral to his project. This is clear not only in some of Benjamin’s more traditional Marxian 
commitments and in his ambivalent enthusiasm for the technological possibilities in aesthetic 
production and reproduction, but even in some of the least expected places. For example, in his 
writings on Kafka, Benjamin affirms that reality is “realized” in “modern physics” and that 
simultaneously “in all of literature” he knows of “no passage which has the Kafka stamp to the 
same extent,” as a nearly page long description of known physical laws in relation to bodies in 
space quoted directly from a physics textbook.
150
 In Benjamin, these engagements often come at 
precisely at the moments he is also closest to his “theological” tendencies. As I demonstrate in 
this dissertation, neither Benjamin nor Al-e Ahmad saw a contradiction in cosmological 
materialism, historical materialism, and religious practice.  
To end, I would like to explore a specific moment of this closeness in Benjamin: the 
concept of active “waiting.” The case of this concept is not as direct as Benjamin’s assertions 
concerning physics in his Kafka discussion but it is helpfully illustrative of how so many of these 
tendencies can be simultaneous in Benjamin. “Waiting” for Benjamin did not only connote 
waiting for a messianic possibility understood in Judeo-Marxian terms. “Waiting” was also the 
condition of engaging phenomena pregnant with that possibility: 
The more narcotizing effect which cosmic forces have on a shallow and brittle personality is 
attested in the relation of such a person to one of the highest and most genial manifestations of 
these forces: the weather. Nothing is more characteristic than that precisely this most intimate and 
mysterious affair, the working of the weather on humans, should have become the theme of their 
emptiest chatter. Nothing bores the ordinary man more than the cosmos. Hence, for him, the 
deepest connection between weather and boredom. How fine the ironic overcoming of this attitude 
in the story of the splenetic Englishman who wakes up one morning and shoots himself because it 
is raining. Or Goethe: how he managed to illuminate the weather in his meteorological studies, so 
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that one is tempted to say he undertook this work solely in order to be able to integrate even the 
weather into his waking, creative life.
151
 
“Weather” – along with night – is precisely what the Paris Arcades banished in order to create 
their phantasmagoric perpetual rainless day. There is an obvious materialist critique to demystify 
that particular “dream-image”: the Arcade perpetuated commerce; it made twenty-four hour 
commerce possible. It was also the place that facilitated the existence of all the familiar 
Benjaminian characters and in which they dwelled: the flaneur, the prostitute, the gambler, the 
collector. Benjamin subjected each of these, sometimes explicitly, sometimes through “literary 
montage,” to the critical apparatus of the “dialectical image”; their “dream” must give way to 
waking, but in the image the “wish,” however distorted, remains. But let us remain with 
“weather” or rather with the “contemplation of weather,” which is what really is in question in 
this passage (“weather” itself being, as we are told, a proper subject for “meteorological 
studies”). The initial observation applies both to the “ordinary man” as well as to anyone “whose 
shallow and brittle personality” cannot see in “weather” an “intimate and mysterious affair.” 
“Mysterious” here should not be mistaken for mystified, for, even beyond Benjamin’s own 
methodology, we are about to be told about “meteorological studies” in a salutary manner; surely 
this is demystification at the very least. The “narcotizing effect” is not produced by the 
“weather” itself but by, if you will, an “intentional stance” which cannot see an “intimate and 
mysterious affair.” “Or Goethe.” What is Goethe doing here? If I might put it into slightly 
different terms, Benjamin is not simply comparing an “ordinary man” and “Goethe”; he is 
comparing two attitudes towards phenomena. The reductive, what I would call scientistic, 
attitude cannot by definition partake of the “mysterious affair” or appreciate the qualities of 
weather that are “highest” and “most genial”; those are illusions which give way to nothing, to a 
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view of phenomena as static and meaningless. For the scientistic perspective – as for the 
“ordinary man” – the weather simply is; and in their attitude, the weather itself becomes 
“narcotizing,” that is, desensitizing and soporific. People with this perspective will return to 
sleep; they will also not recognize that the conditions around them are a kind of dream from 
which they must awake.
152
  I am pushing hard on the first half of the quotation, but the second 
half demands it. That the actual Goethe’s science was not precisely scientific – certainly not in 
the way the physics Benjamin cites in relation to Kafka is – is not relevant.   In the figure of 
“Goethe,” who “illuminates the weather in his meteorological studies,” we catch a glimpse of a 
certain “wish-image,” that of non-reductive science, science that is integrated as a part of 
“waking, creative life.” This all happens under the epigram Benjamin has placed from Victor 
Hugo near the top of the page, “Waiting is life.” To apply Benjamin here, the philosophical 
naturalist may think that – unlike the “ordinary man” – he is not bored by the cosmos. But he is 
not truly conscious unless he can adopt the attitude for which “Goethe” is emblematic, which by 
Benjamin’s logic would mean not only integrating the phenomena they study into “creative, 
waking life” but to embrace that the phenomena are simultaneously “intimate” and “mysterious” 
even as they are explained – after all. This is no extolling of pseudo-science and certainly not of 
mystification. He must examine the weather as meaningful.  
 Is this religion? Scientism says yes. But it has even better reason to. This is all under the 
sign of “waiting”: the active waiting for the messianic that is actually indirectly helping to 
prepare the grounds for its arrival. This is partially why one must learn “waking” from 
phenomena and not merely be narcotized by their mere being. It is to be aware that conditions 
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are transitory. It is not only Judaic and Marxian. There is an element, too, of the German-
Romantic, of science as wonder. In Benjamin’s case, these must be linked. And it is tempting to 
push further and read the illumination of the weather here alongside the famous “profane 
illumination” Benjamin argues is achieved by the best of the Surrealists. I will return to these 
themes in my subsequent Benjamin discussions. 
I have established in this chapter what a substantive, comparative philosophical method 
is, and an attendant theory of modernity that I believe is both historically accurate and 
complementary to this study. Furthermore, I have grounded my comparison both by looking at 
specific conditions in Iran and Germany in the mid-twentieth century and by looking at the 
positions that Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin held as intellectuals in relation to those conditions. 
Finally, I have established the grounds on which I call the conceptual formation produced by the 
comparison, “religious.” I have ended here with a discussion of Benjamin, narcotizing effects, 
and waking. I will now turn to Al-e Ahmad and Gharbzadegi, a book and a theory that – contrary 














Chapter 2: How to Read Gharbzadegi? 
Introduction 
 Jalal Al-e Ahmad writes in the Preface to Gharbzadegi of his indebtedness to Dr. 
Mahmud Human, who urged him  
...to see one of the works of the German, Ernst Junger, a work on nihilism entitled Uber die Linie. 
As Dr. Human pointed out, Jünger and I were both exploring more or less the same subject, but 
from two viewpoints. We were addressing the same question, but in two languages.
153
 
 For a large group of contemporary scholars of Iranian intellectual history, including 
Medhi Boroujerdi, Ali Mirsepassi, and Farzin Vahdat, this reference to Jünger, and from there to 
Heidegger, provides, to differing degrees, the hermeneutic framework for understanding Al-e 
Ahmad’s foundations and goals in writing Gharbzadegi and his other non-fiction works.  This 
connection to Jünger, as well as the even more tenuous connection to Heidegger through the 
Iranian scholar Ahmad Fardid (the original coiner of the gharbzadegi neologism), helps these 
authors construct a narrative of the formation of Al-e Ahmad’s critique of twentieth-century 
Iranian society, connecting it to anti-modern philosophies of the European far right and 
subsequently, to politics of the European far right.  
 Yet it is far from clear what Al-e Ahmad means by “exploring more or less the same 
subject, but from two viewpoints.” In interpretations with only slight variations, this group of 
contemporary scholars asserts that the connection is the exploration of the same kind of 
European alienation in the face of modernity and especially technology that Jünger and 
Heidegger describe. In this presentation of Al-e Ahmad’s thought, Al-e Ahmad is merely 
translating and imposing the European crisis of authenticity described by Jünger and Heidegger 
into a local Iranian context: i.e. “same subject,” “different language.” He is using European anti-
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modern philosophy, this argument continues, to craft an equally anti-modern “nativist” response.  
In this chapter, I propose an alternative reading. There is little historical or textual evidence that 
Al-e Ahmad was anti-modern, aligned or influenced intellectually or politically with the 
European far right or engaged in a simplistic “nativist” revival.  In my reading, the “question” he 
is answering is this: what are the effects of the now global European modernity, especially 
capitalism, on local conditions?  Al-e Ahmad seems to think that Jünger (alongside a series of 
existentialist thinkers and novelists) has correctly identified these effects in the fully 
industrialized and secularized European context, but he understands Jünger’s grasp of them in a 
‘provincializing’ way; Jünger’s experience is not a universal experience of modernity. The 
experience expressed is what global capitalism and modernity have wrought there. It is a 
European experience of what is, at its core, a transformation in economic relationships and the 
modes of production. The Iranian experience, and its solution, is far removed from anything 
described by either Jünger or Heidegger.  
More than either of those figures, the actual content of Al-e Ahmad’s essays identifies his 
intellectual touchstone as Marx. In this chapter, I will proceed dialectically through the existing 
arguments toward a definition and analysis of gharbzadegi that takes this into account. A great 
deal of misunderstanding surrounds this concept, often stemming from the choice of an 
translation that connotes infection and disease (“occidentosis”) or, in other versions, a translation 
that connotes intoxication (“westoxication”). Both imply a metaphor of bodily infection by 
foreign agents. In contrast, the translation of “west-strucken-ness” that some scholars have 
suggested, while an even more unwieldy neologism, is both a more literal translation and a more 
accurate representation. It does not conjure the image of a poisonous modern western culture 





population dazzled by a false phantasmagoria of “Western Civilization.” In fact, Al-e Ahmad 
uses all three metaphors in Gharbzadegi. However, even when speaking of “disease” (bimari), 
the “occidentosis” translation more readily facilitates a slippage into the metaphor of infection by 
a foreign pathogen or agent (where the “West” is the pathogen) as opposed to what Al-e Ahmad 
is arguing: infection by a process, wherein the “West,” or experience of certain iterations of it, is 
the catalyst. 
 In pursuit of this analysis, I will first outline Boroujerdi [et al]’s claims, then mark just 
how far Al-e Ahmad’s analyses and prescriptions are from either Heidegger or Jünger. I will 
suggest an alternate intellectual genealogy that brings Al-e Ahmad’s Marxist influence more 
clearly into view. Finally, I will examine how Al-e Ahmad departs from Marx, on both strategic 
and philosophical grounds, only to converge with the (also Marxian) approach of Walter 
Benjamin. 
The Jünger/Heidegger Approach 
Ali Mirsepassi discusses several trends in the existing scholarship on twentieth-century Iranian-
Islamic Intellectuals in his work Political Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment. Mirsepassi begins 
by discussing an earlier scholarly tradition of treating “political Islam” as “representative of 
Islam or the Muslim world against the values and institutions of the democratic West or Judeo-
Christian civilization… framing this conflict as a fundamental clash of two essential 
worldviews.”154 This description applies not only to this earlier scholarly tradition but can also 
be extended to contemporary arguments in journalism and policy literature. In practice, this often 
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involves the interpretation of Islamism within a hermetic ‘Islamic world,’ seeing in every 
Islamist idea and text a direct intellectual antecedent in medieval or Quranic literature.  
 Beyond this tradition, Mirsepassi writes of two other scholarly approaches: 
These two mainstream tendencies are embodied in the writings of, for example, Esposito and 
Hadad, in arguments that “Islam” represents a tradition that does not separate religion from 
politics. There is also the “critical theory” social science approach that interprets Islamist 
movements as part of larger emerging discursive movements identified, in Michel Foucault’s 
terms, as the rise of “subjugated knowledges.”155 
These approaches, Mirsepassi argues, are ultimately “anchored in a notion of romantic 
authenticity.” Unlike the first tradition, these scholars recognize the dialogic development of 
Islamist thought but emphasize, in Mirsepassi’s thinking, Islam as a “tradition presenting an 
alternative to liberal modernity and challenging the totalizing nature of rational Enlightenment.” 
Mirsepassi extends this critique to post-colonial thinkers like Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, 
arguing that writers using these approaches essentially engage in a reification and reproduction 
of historical differences into discourses of static authenticity.  
 Strangely, in his otherwise comprehensive description of the existing literature, 
Mirsepassi ignores the ‘social historians’ like Abrahamian and Dabashi who have focused less 
on an axiomatic treatment of the thought of writers like Al-e Ahmad and more on the social 
context of its production and reception and its role in twentieth-century Iranian political 
development. This is particularly odd given that Mirsepassi’s own argument is largely about 
connecting a revised version of the dialogic interpretation with political-historical consequences 
in post-revolutionary Iran.  
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Mirsepassi, along with a considerable number of contemporary scholars, represents a 
different school of interpretation which places Al-e Ahmad (and also Shariati) in an intellectual 
trajectory of European anti-modern right wing and/or counter-Enlightenment thought and within 
a recognizable political narrative of rejecting liberal institutions in favor of ‘authentic’ 
authoritarian alternatives, i.e. fascism. This is related to what Mirsepassi calls the “critical 
theory” approach. Like the authors in the “critical theory” approach, Mirsepassi accurately 
highlights the historical fact that these ideas did not develop in some kind of Iranian or Islamic 
bubble and were deeply conversant with early and contemporary European philosophy and 
politics. But where those authors see historically emergent difference, Mirsepassi sees familiar 
ideological rejection. Islamist writings bear for him the obvious stamp of European right wing 
thought, and he views Islamist politics as represented by the Islamic Republic as a) a clear 
political manifestation of Islamist thought and b) not a unique formation or an alternate mode of 
modernity but rather an easily recognizable manifestation of counter-Enlightenment reactionary 
politics, already well-known from European examples.
156
 As Mirsepassi puts it: 
I argue that political Islam in Iran is in considerable part a nativist reaction to modernity that is 




This reaction is directly linked to particular European intellectuals and their ideological disciples 
in Iran: 
Many Islamic thinkers have become fascinated by the Nietzschean and particularly Heideggerian 
critique of the West as the source of modern dehumanization and a general loss of cultural and 
existential meaning, or so-called roots.
158
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In Mirsepassi’s argument, this applies most particularly to what I would call the proto- or Ur-
Islamists and the early Islamists: 
This project presents a clear case study of the rise of Political Islam in Iran, and the strong 
Heideggerian influence on a number of leading Iranian intellectuals who helped enormously to 
articulate the Islamist ideology that paved the way to the 1979 revolution (Fardid, Al-e Ahmad, 
Shariati, Shayegan, Davari, etc.)
159
 
While I would want to note that this easy elision between all of these Iranian authors is in no way 
self-evident, this position owes a great deal to Mehrzad Borourjerdi and his Iranian Intellectuals 
and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism. It has been recently advanced in varying 
forms by, in addition to Borourjerdi and Mirsepassi, Mohamad Tavakoli-Targi, Ali Gheissari 
and, with some important and nuanced differences to be discussed later, Farzin Vahdat.   
This approach does provide a much needed counterweight to what I earlier called the 
‘hermetic school.’ The influence of European sources on proto- and early Islamist writings in 
Iran are both numerous and obvious and the approach of looking for antecedents exclusively in 
Islamic religious and legal texts is flawed both historically and theoretically. Similarly, although 
Mirsepassi mischaracterizes what he calls the “critical theory” approach (particularly in the 
charge of a kind of ontological exclusivity in thinkers like Asad and Foucault), the effort to treat 
the texts and ideas as philosophical material in themselves is also a deeply important turn. Too 
often, anthropological and area studies approaches have subordinated the actual philosophical 
claims of twentieth century Iranian intellectuals (and frankly other non-Western thinkers) as 
either irrelevant to a ‘true’ understanding of their social role along given liberal, Marxist, 
traditional analytic terms or subordinate to, and therefore irrelevant by, internal cultural logic. 
There is much to be gained from taking seriously the challenging universalist language of a 
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thinker like Al-e Ahmad, especially when that particular universalism is so destabilizing to the 
prevailing contours of secular liberal thought. 
However, equally problematic in the approach of thinkers like Mirsepassi and Boroujerdi 
is the subsuming of any meaningful, local influence under an interchangeable category of a 
“nativism.” This particular use of the term, I will argue, amounts to little more than an accusation 
of window dressing in native clothes to mask a nihilistic or authoritarian politics—a charge that, 
ironically, Al-e Ahmad himself also formulates as part of the phenomenon of gharbzadegi. The 
exclusive focus on conservative anti-modern and/or counter-Enlightenment figures is still more 
problematic. While the influence of Heidegger is certainly apparent, especially in certain 
interests and idioms in Shariati, and a stated interest in and knowledge of Jünger is present in Al-
e Ahmad, it seems a strange oversight to emphasize these philosophical influences over the 
overwhelming and obvious influence of Marx, Marxism and other leftist critiques of modernity. 
Together these interpretive decisions lead Mirsepassi, Boroujerdi et al to overlook how Islamic 
(specifically Shii) materials are deployed by these writers in particular ways that do not turn on 
theories of authenticity or identity. Rather, they emphasize challenges to the formally European 
and Christian shape of key concepts and ideas from a materialist presentation of Shii doctrine 
and experience. Furthermore, this exclusive emphasis on right wing European sources, leads 
Mirsepassi, Borourjerdi et al to mistakenly address discussions about mechanization and 
routinization within a purely Heideggerian idiom. For, in fact, these discussions are firmly 
embedded within a largely Marxist economic critique; as such, their primary concern is not 
alienation from an authentic self, but the stagnation of economic development.  Similarly, what 
is read through the Heideggerian lens as “return-to-self” often has far less to do with authenticity 





conditions. The mere act of addressing local conditions and critical potentials in local intellectual 
traditions is a far cry from a call for nativist authenticity.  
Nativism 
Mehrzad Borourjerdi writes in Iranian Intellectuals and the West: 
In its broadest sense nativism can be defined as the doctrine that calls for the resurgence, 
reinstatement or continuance of native or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs and values. 
Nativism is grounded on such deeply held beliefs as resisting acculturation, privileging one’s own 
“authentic” ethnic identity and longing for a return to “an unsullied cultural tradition.” Nativism 




There are a series of theoretical claims that Boroujerdi extends here. He encourages us to see any 
doctrinal (or ideological) calls in favor of “native” values, beliefs or customs as intrinsically part 
of an empirically and theoretically suspect discourse called “nativism,” which, as Borjourdei 
suggests in the previous sentence, casts off a “seductive lure.” This “nativism” is really just an 
expression of what Boroujerdi calls “orientalism in reverse,” which is a “discourse bent on 
manufacturing difference, a self-validating and closed discourse that emphasizes other-ness.” 
Although it is fascinating to underline artifice (“manufacturing”) in an argument against the 
logic of authenticity, the connection is clear: promotion of “native” values is always the 
promotion of  “‘authentic’ ethnic identity and longing for a return to ‘an unsullied cultural 
tradition.”  But what exactly is a “native” value? For Boroujerdi the answer is surprisingly 
simple: any value that challenges liberal universalism. Boroujerdi does not dispute Eurocentrism 
on the grounds that it veils largely particularistic Euro-Christian claims under a guise of 
“universalism,” but rather merely its claims to its own “uniqueness” in suitability to such values 
and to its “unequivocal manifest destiny.” (Bad) Eurocentric chauvinism and colonialism have 
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gotten in the way of (good) Eurocentric universalism.  “Nativism” becomes a catchall category 
for anything which, in Boroujerdi’s own words, “champions the cause of abandoning, subverting 
and reversing these same metanarratives and master codes” (of orientalism and colonialism).161 
Above all this is about “authentic identity,”162 and therefore the content of any “nativist” claims 
can be dismissed as both romantic fantasy and epistemologically inaccessible.
163
   
 It is only in this light that the staggering list of implicated political leaders, thinkers and 
authors that Boroujerdi provides (“Yasir Arafat, Ahmed Ben Bella, Steven Biko, Houari 
Boumedienne, Amilcar Cabral, Fidel Castro, Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Paolo Freire, Ernesto 
Guevera, C.L.R. James, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Albert Memmi, Mohammad Mosaddeq, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, Pablo Neruda, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, Leopold 
Sedar Senghor, Sukarno and Mao Zedong”) begins to make sense. Despite running a wide gamut 
of political ideologies, from radical Marxists to true nationalists (not to mention creative writers 
far more difficult to classify so succinctly), these were, according to Boroujerdi, all “nationalist” 
figures who came to “dominate the terms of the discourse, narrative, imagery and rhetoric” of the 
mid-twentieth century with nativist calls for “political independence, cultural authenticity and 
knowledge indigenization.”164  
 There are several major theoretical issues with Boroujerdi’s definition and description of 
“nativism.” First, in painting with such a broad brush (as exemplified in the above list), he loses 
the strongest point that his argument could potentially yield—namely, that the historical 
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fabrication structurally inherent in nationalist thought and authenticity discourses shut down the 
possibility of political discourse. Clearly, for example, figures such as Pablo Neruda, Yassir 
Arafat and Chairman Mao aren’t saying more or less the same thing, nor are they saying what 
they are saying on largely similar grounds. By grouping all figures who have used any kind of 
East/West rhetoric and “political independence” as part of their discourse under the heading of 
the same ideological disposition, Boroujerdi leaves little space for any critical work. There is an 
inescapable circular logic involved. Although Boroujerdi admits, for example, that it was “right” 
to challenge “Western social sciences’ nominal universal notions, assumptions and language,” he 
simultaneously tells us that this is always done by “nativism” in the name of “authenticity and 
indigenization,” and that we can recognize “nativism” by looking for that very resistance. Yet 
such resistance is, of course, rendered at best suspect and more generally null by reference to the 
asserted authenticity discourse. To be clear, this argument is made on ontological and not 
epistemological grounds: it is not when it resorts to “authenticity” in an argument challenging 
supposedly universal norms that a discourse falls into Boroujerdi’s “nativist” category. Rather, 
following the logic of his theory, it is because the arguments arise as critiques of liberal 
universalism that they can be recognized as nativist. This argument precludes the possibility of 
anything but the most superficial critique of orientalist discourse and Euro-Christian/liberal 
universalism.  
 Understanding these theoretical limitations of Boroujerdi’s designation of “nativism” 
explains to a certain degree why he would apply the category to a thinker like Al-e Ahmad. In 
expanding the scope of inclusion (of thinkers) in his theory of nativism while simultaneously 
strapping that wide array into a marginalized theoretical straitjacket, Boroujerdi overlooks the 





obscurest, nostalgic, jingoistic”165) that Boroujerdi himself is trying to discredit. He misses the 
fact that in Al-e Ahmad there are “native values” that aim in fact not at parochial authenticity but 
at a challenging universalism that understands and integrates local material contexts. A modern, 
market-oriented liberal might point to a bazaar filled with fashions from around the world and 
think of the liberated individual consumer awash in a sea of free choice and possibility. Al-e 
Ahmad looks at the same scene and notes that none of the clothes now displacing local industry 
were manufactured in Iran and that they bear no historical connection to local tradition or 
context. In place of the liberation of the market, one can imagine a more pernicious gharbzadegi, 
being dumbstruck by these dazzling new goods of the market. These observations are not 
mutually exclusive or even contradictory, despite the fact that the latter observations are 
unmistakably expressing “native value.” They can be viewed alongside each other as competing 
normative evaluations of a given scenario.  But this is precisely the kind of evaluation that 
Boroujerdi’s theoretically strangling notion of “nativism” prevents. He also misses new efforts at 
reform of universal values that Al-e Ahmad attempts through the use of Iranian and Islamic 
texts, traditions and experience. In Khassi dar Miqat, for example, Al-e Ahmad asks, through the 
experience of the Hajj, if modern doubt could be the foundation of an understanding of religion, 
instead of faith or the negation of religion.
166
 This is a universalist challenge, using a local 
context to make a universal claim; it is clearly intended to have just as much relevance in 
London or Paris as in Tehran or Tabriz. The Christian experience of the modern condition might 
predicate faith as the sine qua non of religion, particularly faith in and against empiricism or 
rationality. But to even suggest that an Islamic experience might lead to different arguments 
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about those same topics – arguments presented as freestanding and not themselves dependent on 
a privileged class of being, i.e. identity – should not be dismissed simply because they express 
what Boroujerdi calls “native values.”  The misconstruction and misapplication of this theory 
also leads Boroujerdi to lay the intellectual groundwork for what Mirsepassi picks up and 
expands: the connection between Iranian “nativism” and right wing, anti-modern German 
philosophy.  
Boroujerdi’s Al-e Ahmad and Gharbzadegi 
 Boroujerdi presents Al-e Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi as staking out four key positions. First, it 
offers a “critical chronicle of a century of Iranian enlightenment”; second, “a nativistic 
alternative to the universalism of the Iranian Left”; third, “a Third-Worldist discourse very much 
skeptical of what the West had to offer”; and fourth, a call for “an awakening and resistance to 
the hegemony of an alien culture that increasingly dominated the intellectual, social, political and 
economic landscape of Iranian society.”167 While the first position is largely accurate, the latter 
three are readings thoroughly distorted by Boroujerdi’s flawed theoretical lens of “nativism.” 
 He begins by quoting one of Al-e Ahmad’s definitions of gharbzadegi: 
Al-e Ahmad began his defiant monograph with a definition of gharbzadegi as “the aggregate of 
events in the life, culture, civilization, and mode of thought of a people having no supporting 
tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of transformation.” His clear intention was to 
sensitize the Iranian public to the problem of growing “rootlessness.”168 
Boroujerdi uses this passage and argument to frame Gharbzadegi as a largely identity-based 
attack on “rootlessness” and an exhortation to “return to self.” This also helps Boroujerdi make 
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that argument that the “disease” in question itself, gharbzadegi, the “social malady,” was the 
infection of Iran with the contagion of Western Civilization. Boroujerdi continues: 
Influenced by Heidegger’s view on science and technology (which were somehow conveyed to him 




This is the other pillar of Boroujerdi’s reading of Al-e Ahmad. On the one hand, Al-e Ahmad is 
calling for a return to an authentic Islamic, Iranian Self and on the other he is participating in a 
Heideggerian critique of technology and borrowing from Heidegger’s critique of contemporary 
modernity. Although this reading conforms well to the contours of Boroujerdi’s theory of 
“nativism,” it does not accurately represent Al-e Ahmad’s views towards a ‘return to self’ or 
technology. 
 As can be inferred from Boroujerdi’s own phrasing – “somehow conveyed” – the 
connection to Heidegger is, in fact, tenuous at best. Heidegger appears nowhere in the pages of 
Gharbzadegi (nor in any of Al-e Ahmad’s other works). There is also scant evidence of the use 
of Heideggerian language.  In fact, there is little in common even in those areas of shared 
interest, like technology. The best evidence that Boroujerdi puts forth for the Heidegger 
influence is the connection with Fardid, which is, for lack of a better phrase, circumstantial at 
best. While Al-e Ahmad did know and work with Fardid and Fardid did coin the word 
gharbzadegi, it is widely acknowledged
170
 that Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadegi had little to do with 
Fardid’s. Fardid’s gharbzadegi was a direct adaptation of a Heideggerian critique of Western 
philosophy as emphasizing “an existential separation between man as the knowing subject and 
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the external world.”171 But this was not a concern of Al-e Ahmad’s. Al-e Ahmad was so far from 
Fardid’s philosophy that the two actually fell out over Al-e Ahmad’s use of the term, when 
Fardid accused Al-e Ahmad himself of being gharbzadeh, particularly since his analysis turned 
on such social scientific (read: Marxist) terms instead of the Heideggerian existential ones. Al-e 
Ahmad, in turn, did not claim to be using the term in its original sense.
172
  While Fardid pursued 
an Islamo-Heideggerianism which sought a rebirth of Islamic Zivilisation in place of Western 
Kultur.
173
 Al-e Ahmad decried both concepts as gharbzadeh and went off with Gholamhossein 
Saedi and “traveled extensively throughout Iran and wrote path-breaking sociological accounts 
of places they visited.”174 As Wells notes, “Fardid suggests that looking to culture to determine 
national characteristics is a sign of the new age, and the prevalent ‘self centredness’, whether of 
an individual or national nature, is an exclusive product of western thought.”175 Fardid, like the 
post-war Heidegger, preferred introspection to materialist analysis. Al-e Ahmad, following 
Gramsci in part, wanted a Marxism that was neither Stalinist nor philosophically restrictive. He 
did see what one might call a spiritual crisis in ‘the West.’ But for him, that crisis was expressed 
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in literature, in French writers like Andre Gide and Albert Camus.
176
 But, as I will demonstrate 
in chapter 4, Al-e Ahmad posited not a solution to this crisis, but an indeterminate negation of it, 
outwardly, through participation in Shii ritual. Al-e Ahmad, like so many of his friends and 
colleagues, including Nima Yushij, Sadeqh Hedayat, Saedi, and his wife Simin Daneshvar, was a 
committed modernist. His modernism was simply expansive and, despite being an ‘unbeliever,’ 
he saw no conflict between being ‘modern’ and being ‘Shii.’ Fardid, quite correctly, saw this 
stance as antithetical to his own project and to Heidegger and condemned Al-e Ahmad for it.  
Even on the question of technology, where his interests and Heidegger’s do partially 
converge, Al-e Ahmad neither follows the Heideggerian line nor even addresses Heidegger’s 
questions. Primarily, for Al-e Ahmad, the question of technology is addressed not in terms of an 
epistemic arrangement with the world and the subsequent effects of that arrangement upon 
“Being.”177 It is addressed in terms of economic production and consumption. Questions of 
“Being” are largely relegated to routinization and alienation, in the vein of nineteenth century 
social thinkers such as Weber, Simmel or Marx rather than twentieth century ontological 
philosophy à la Heidegger. Immediately following the passage Boroujerdi cites, Al-e Ahmad 
writes: 
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Occidentosis thus characterizes an era in which we have not yet acquired the machine, in which 
we are not versed in the mysteries of its structure. Occidentosis characterizes an era in which we 
have not yet grown familiar with the preliminaries to the machine, the new sciences and 
technologies. Occidentosis characterizes an era in which the logic of the marketplace and the 
movements of oil compel us to buy and consume the machine.
178
 
Al-e Ahmad proposes that the only way forward is mastery of technology, and not in the sense of 
the recognition of its true “essence” as an ontological extension of human Being. As such, his 
view is very much at odds with Heidegger’s.179 Heidegger spends the majority of his essay Die 
Frage nach der Technik (“The Question Concerning Technology”) discussing the Gestell 
(“Enframing”) that technology casts over the world. This is about a fundamental relationship 
between humans and the world around them as epistemically framed through a technological 
worldview. This Gestell is essentially an obfuscation of the true or healthy human being-in-the-
world and it is entirely predicated on the instrumental view that humans take concerning 
technology. Modern technology, based on and also reproducing the precision of modern physics, 
frames nature for humans in a mode of “challenging” [Herausfordern] to produce for 
“unreasonable demand.”180 Technology produces an adversarial, instrumental and, ultimately 
false relationship. Towards the very end of the essay, in reflecting on a line where the poet 
Friedrich Hölderlin suggests, “But where danger is, grows/ The saving power also,” Heidegger 
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states that finally if there is any hope in the relationship between humans and technology, it lies 
in moving beyond the instrumental, beyond “the will to master it.”181 
In stark contrast, Al-e Ahmad consistently portrays the proper understanding of 
technology as being entirely instrumental: the subordination of technology from the exploitation 
of the “machine economy” (eqtisad-e mashin, the production of wealth for advanced overseas 
economies, i.e. capitalism) to the fulfillment of human needs.
182
 Early on, Al-e Ahmad marks out 
technology and technological advancement as the historical point of departure for Iranian/Islamic 
decline and “Western” advancement as well as crucial and necessary for a progressive, just 
society in which it is possible to “abolish poverty” and put “material and spiritual welfare within 
the reach of all.”183 This attitude should be instantly recognizable: it is ‘production for use,’ i.e. 
socialism. Al-e Ahmad clearly does see something particularly pernicious in both the central and 
peripheral geographies of the “machine economy,” and he uses the language (devoting a chapter 
to it entitled “Mashinzadegi”) of enthrallment to describe it. Yet it is the “economy” part of that 
equation—a social question—that is the key. A ‘production for use’ economy is a frequent 
argument in Gharbzadegi, and serves as the primary thesis of the only prescriptive chapter, 
chapter 6, Ra-ye Shekastan-e Talsim, “The Way to Break the Spell.” After rejecting both the 
options of being a permanent economic colony and of “retreat into the depths of our ancient 
ways, our national and religious traditions,” Al-e Ahmad alights upon a “third way”:  
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The machine should naturally serve us as a trampoline, so that we may stand on it and jump all 
the farther by its rebound. One must have the machine; one must build it. But one must not remain 
in bondage to it; one must not fall into its snare. The machine is a means, not an end. The end is to 
abolish poverty and to put material and spiritual welfare within the reach of all.
184
 
While development was not much of a concern (in fact, to my knowledge, not any concern) to 
Heidegger (or Jünger for that matter, but I will address that in a later section), it is of primary 
concern to Al-e Ahmad. For him, economic development is the sine qua non of all other 
questions, including, as he notes here, the question of “spiritual welfare.” And the “bondage” 
here is not a phantasmagoria of the machine, but rather the economic bondage that Al-e Ahmad 
presents on the very first page of Gharbzadegi and Boroujerdi completely overlooks. Al-e 
Ahmad writes: 
Occidentosis has two poles or extremes—two ends of one continuum. One pole is the Occident, by 
which I mean all of Europe, Soviet Russia, and North America, the developed and industrialized 
nations that can use machines to turn raw materials into more complex forms that can be 
marketed as goods. These raw materials are not only iron ore and oil, or gut, cotton, and gum 
tragacanth; they are also myths, dogmas, music, and the higher worlds. The other pole is Asia and 
Africa, or the backward, developing or nonindustrial nations that have been made into consumers 
of Western goods. However, the raw materials for these goods come from the developing 
nations… 
While the Heidegger connection rests upon the tenuous application of Boroujerdi’s “nativism” 
theory and an unstated, implicit and apparently invisible transmission via Fardid, despite Al-e 
Ahmad’s obvious and noted departure from Fardid, there is an equally obvious, albeit different 
German philosophical influence on these analyses: Marx.
185
 What Al-e Ahmad presents in these 
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two passages and again and again throughout Gharbzadegi is both an application of Marxist 
analysis and a departure from Marxist metaphysics (the question of “spiritual welfare” which he 
expands elsewhere). But in all cases, his touchstone in terms of intellectual milieu and 
intellectual influence is, unmistakably, Marx. While there is little Heideggerian analyses or 
language, discussion of bases, superstructure, infrastructure, modes of production, economic 
development, surplus capital, etc. proliferate in Al-e Ahmad’s texts. As I will discuss at more 
length in the sections on Khassi dar Miqat and Sangi bar Guri, no small portion of this talk 
constitutes a departure from traditional Marxist theory. Indeed, Al-e Ahmad thinks cultural 
concerns are not merely epiphenomenal; that traditional institutions, language and local 
conditions have a great deal of legacy knowledge, value and importance; and that radical 
materialist reduction is ultimately part of the problem of material exploitation. But when it 
comes to both his analyses and his solutions, the starting point is Marx. This is so much the case 
that Al-e Ahmad even tries to ‘de-culture’ the ideas of “East” and “West,” stating that: “East and 
West are no longer geographical or political concepts to me… for me, they are economic 
concepts.” Shortly thereafter, he continues: 
Western nations generally have high wages, low mortality, low fertility, well-organized social 
services, adequate foodstuffs (at least three thousand calories per day), per capita annual income 
of at least 3000 tumans, and nominal democracy (the heritage of the French Revolution.) The 
second group of nations [Eastern] has these characteristics: low wages, high mortality, even 
higher fertility, social services nil (or for hire), inadequate foodstuffs (at most 1000 calories per 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
this dissertation primarily on Al-e Ahmad’s thought, and not political activities, but the image of Al-e Ahmad the 
Nativist Heideggerian which has become so prominent so quickly, I believe, can only be seen as an attempt to 
reverse-engineer a reading of Al-e Ahmad from the point of view which sees him as directly connected to the 
current political realities of the Islamic Republic and which, simultaneously, wants these to be linked – almost as in 
a child’s game of electricity – to intellectual figures associated with the European Right and not the Marxist Left.  
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For Al-e Ahmad, these are the crucial terms for understanding the character of “East” and 
“West”: economic terms and their social and political (welfare and democracy) consequences.  
Al-e Ahmad does worry a great deal about the effects of this highly exploitative 
economic arrangement on the psychology, culture and “spiritual welfare” of individuals, but so 
does Marx himself (“species being”)187 and other Marxist thinkers. But the economic is primary. 
Boroujerdi, amazingly, claims that “in the entire Gharbzadegi essay, no mention is made of the 
positive results of technology.”188 But the development of a local “machine economy,” albeit 
with certain augmented features to ensure “spiritual welfare,” is presented throughout the book 
as the only path to prosperity and justice for Iran. In fact, in his early chapters, Al-e Ahmad 
continually returns to the theme that it was industrialization and technological advancement that 
laid the groundwork for the power that the West exerts. Furthermore he notes that the economic, 
political and even spiritual stagnation of the East were likewise predicated on the lack of 
technological development and subsequent overemphasis on interiority, “gnosis” and “self-
absorption.”189 Consequently, he does not write of this in a Gandhian, ‘back-to-the-village,’ 
‘trains-cause-famines’ approach. He does not dispute that the progress marked by 
industrialization, however problematic in terms of routinization, alienation and other qualities, is 
real progress, creating real wealth and opportunities for working peoples. Technology is not only 
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the “trampoline” on which the people will leap to material and spiritual welfare. Al-e Ahmad 
outlines an economic program designed entirely around technological advancement, through 
“factories,” “schools,” “machines,” and “industrial goods,” albeit within the context of “village 
markets” and an “independent economy.”190  
 Al-e Ahmad explicitly frames his idea of the “machine economy” as an extension of 
Marxist critique: 
What Marx said is true today, that we have two worlds in conflict. But these two worlds stretch far 
vaster than in his time, and the conflict has grown far more complex than the one of worker and 
employer. In our world, poor confront rich, and the vast earth is the arena. Our age is one of two 
worlds: one producing and exporting machines, the other importing, consuming and wearing them 




This argument is far closer to Lenin or Gramsci than Heidegger. The Marx connection is stated 
and clear. Furthermore, gharbzadegi is outlined as an emergent and contingent condition based 
on the forces of economic production.  
It is in this context that one can more easily understand the quotation that Boroujerdi uses 
to open his discussion of Gharbzadegi. Boroujerdi omits that this phrase – “the aggregate of 
events in the life, culture, civilization, and mode of thought of a people having no supporting 
tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of transformation” – is actually part of a 
conditional proposition. He writes:  
If we define occidentosis as the aggregate of events in the life, culture, civilization, and mode of 
thought of a people having no supporting tradition, no historical continuity, no gradient of 
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Read together with the preceding comments, all from the first chapter of Gharbzadegi, it is clear 
that Al-e Ahmad‘s central metaphor is not “infection” by a contagious disease of Western 
Civilization that turns Iranians into Europeans. It is being rendered prone for exploitation by 
international capital, by the “machine economy.” It is being reduced to consumers of commercial 
products and producers of raw materials. The machine does not act of itself as a “talisman” on 
the helpless gharbzadeh, as Boroujerdi interprets Al-e Ahmad.
193
  As I will elaborate in the next 
section, the gharbzadeh treats the machine as talismanic because s/he isn’t modernized enough!  
 Perhaps the greatest irony of Al-e Ahmad’s actual argument vs. Boroujerdi’s theory is 
that Al-e Ahmad declares quite blatantly that a “nativist” response – returning to an authentic 
self, desperately clinging to and reasserting national and religious traditions – is gharbzadeh. As 
he writes immediately preceding the conditional proposition: 
We are all equally acceptable to Westerners, the makers of our machines, as contented museum 
pieces. We are to be objects of research in the museum or the laboratory, nothing more. Watch 
that don’t you alter this raw material! I am not speaking now of their wanting Khuzistan’s or 
Qatar’s oil, Katanga’s diamonds or Kirman’s chromite, unrefined. I am saying that I, as an Asian, 
or an African, am supposed to preserve my manners, culture, music, religion, and so forth 
untouched, like an unearthed relic, so that the gentlemen can find and excavate them, so they can 
display them in a museum and say “Yes, another example of primitive life.” 194 
“Nativist” responses in the vein that Boroujerdi describes are a double duty gharbzadeh response 
and certainly not the appropriate retort to the condition of gharbzadegi. On the one hand, they 
promote economic stagnation, ensuring the reproduction of the producer/consumer relationship 
between East and West. On the other, they provide yet another source for raw materials for 
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Western harvest and exploitation. In a later chapter, Al-e Ahmad had already acknowledges that 
the static understanding of “culture,” particularly of Iranian or Islamic culture, is itself an 
invention of orientalists, hilariously noting:  
I haven’t the foggiest notion when orientalism became a “science.” If we say that some westerner 
is a linguist, dialectologist or musicologist specializing in Eastern questions, maybe this is 
defensible… But what does it mean to be an orientalist without further definition? Does it mean to 
know all the secrets of the Eastern world? Are we living in the age of Aristotle?
195
 
And in his comments about the preservation of native identity, he links this idea to an astute, 
Bourdieuian observation that the manufactured, static ‘otherness’ of the “Eastern world” was a 
goldmine of capitalist reproduction for Western interests, the performance or possession of 
something totemistically Other being highly desirable and therefore profitable in advanced 
Western economies. This is a critique of orientalism and a critique of the kind of idea of culture 
implicit in the conception of authenticity-based nationalism or “nativism” which Boroujerdi 
imputes to Al-e Ahmad. Al-e Ahmad argues that this kind of “tradition” is just another foreign 
import, stapled together from the local raw materials of texts, customs, music, etc. What he 
wants to propose instead is neither an idea nor a practice of nativist authenticity. Rather, he 
proposes a materialist reckoning with local conditions. And it is also the possibility of 
renegotiating the universal from new or additional standpoints.
196
 Orientalists produce 
ideological clothes for these “museum piece” people just as factories in Manchester produce 
clothes for the newly urbanized. Both are equally gharbzadeh. They are both ‘west-struck’ in the 
sense that they have ironically overlooked just how unmodernized and unwesternized and, 
simultaneously, how unlocal they have become.  It is not that technology and “the machine” has 
dazzled them on its own; they are enchanted by the “machine” because they are not modern 
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enough to understand its bases, both economic and technical. They have not maintained a 
connection with local conditions or built upon local institutions because they are not 
sophisticated enough to recognize that essential “authenticity” is just another product which 
stands in the way of modernization. 
This is the context, then, in which we need to read Boroujerdi’s criticism of Al-e 
Ahmad’s supposed rejection of technology and promulgation of Heideggerian philosophy:  
What is most troubling about Al-e Ahmad’s criticism of machines is his parroting of Heidegger. 
Whereas Heidegger’s criticism of machines was pertinent to post-WWI Europe (with the 
unbelievable carnage and destruction left behind), one wonders how appropriate it was to 
criticize “machinism” in the Iran of the 1960s.197 
What Boroujerdi completely misses here is that what Al-e Ahmad is doing in those sections of 
Gharbzadegi is reflexively extending the mode of cultural critique that he is applying to Iran in 
the book to the processes of cultural formations in Europe. Mashinzadegi is not the same 
condition as gharbzadegi. The –zadegi formulation is Al-e Ahamd’s designation for the 
pernicious false consciousnesses that threaten the “material and spiritual welfare” of people. And 
true to the methodology he outlines throughout Gharbzadegi, when Al-e Ahmad is analyzing 
existing mashinzadegi, he notes constantly how its contours are shaped by its specifically 
European local context. He even goes so far as to point out how the similar formations there 
prove a vital and disturbingly fertile ground for fascist ideas and movements which require “the 
constant need for vigilance against the seeds of fascism.”198 He is painfully aware throughout his 
text that the relationship between Europeans and mechanization is a different beast than the 
relationship between Iranians and mechanization. And in fact one of the vectors of Al-e Ahmad’s 
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work and the significant departures he makes from Marxist theory and, in particular, 
historiography, is his conviction that through building upon different philosophical formulations 
and different institutional arrangements and languages, Iranians need not necessarily bind 
themselves to a European fate that he sees—in light of rampant economic exploitation, two 
world wars and the threat of nuclear annihilation—as a truly frightening prospect. In sharp 
contrast to the image of his work created by those who describe it as economically disengaged or 
primarily an adaptation of Heidegger, Al-e Ahmad strongly emphasizes the point that in the 
colonial ideal, the Third World plays a very different role as a consumer and user of “machines” 
and as a source for their raw materials. This is the discourse he describes not in the colorful 
romantic language of right wing Europe, but in the recognizable terms of Marxist critique.  
 For in his conditional statement (quoted above) about gharbzadegi and his rejection of a 
nativistic identity politics, Al-e Ahmad is in many ways restating a Marxist, and, more 
specifically Gramscian
199
 critique of imperialism, culture and consumption. If a people have only 
the economic base of exporting raw materials and the cultural superstructure of cosmetic 
modernity or stultified traditionalism, just enough to reproduce the conditions of that 
consumption and exploitation of resources, then they are gharbzadeh. Although there is no doubt 
that Al-e Ahmad is concerned with the effects of an increasingly technological and rationalized 
civilization on human life, the ‘disease’ of gharbzadegi is a brand of false consciousness, not a 
nativist attack on straying from the authentic national or religious life of a people.  
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Mirsepassi’s Al-e Ahmad and Jünger   
 So what, then, of Jünger’s influence? I began this chapter discussing the reference to 
Jünger that Al-e Ahmad includes in the preface to Gharbzadegi, where he obliquely references 
Mahmud Human’s comparison of his work and Jünger’s as “addressing the same question.”  
Jünger plays a particularly prominent role in Mirsepassi’s account of twentieth-century Iranian 
intellectual history in Political Islam, Iran and the Enlightenment. Mirsepassi draws a straight 
line from Jünger and Heidegger through Fardid and Al-e Ahmad to Shariati to the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic. In his view, the expansive cultural and moral statism in contemporary 
Iran has its roots in Jünger and the vision that it is “the responsibility of the government to 
elevate the population on cultural and moral grounds.”200 This is more particularly emphasized in 
specific relation to Al-e Ahmad’s Gharbzadegi. Mirsepassi writes that Al-e Ahmad was 
“certainly aware of his debt” to Jünger, continuing:  
In the preface to Westoxication he indicates his intellectual debt to Ernst Jünger, whose work he 
translated into Persian, and whose ideas had also deeply influenced Heidegger. He wrote: 
“Jünger and I were both exploring more or less the same subject, but from two points of view. We 
were addressing the same question, but in two languages.” In this way the Gharbzadegi discourse 
was similar to the Germany “reactionary modernist” movement… 201   
There are several separate questions here. The first is the question of influence. Multiple times in 
Political Islam, Iran and the Enlightenment, Mirsepassi draws these straight lines of influence, 
stitching together far-right German thought and the Iranians who localized it and transformed it 
into the Islamic Republicanism recognizable today. But the question of actual, direct influence 
here turns on something as straightforward as an inconvenient historical fact. If one notes the 
timeline of the writing and initial publication of Gharbzadegi, as Dabashi does in Theology of 
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Discontent, it was not until after Al-e Ahmad wrote and circulated the manuscript of 
Gharbzadegi that Mahmud Human informed him of the existence of, and his similarity to, 
Jünger. It was only after this that Al-e Ahmad and Human together worked on a translation of 
Jünger’s Uber die Linie [Over the Line].202 This takes the question of Jünger’s influence out of 
the realm of a stated link, or an “intellectual debt,”203 as Mirsepassi argues, and puts it in the 
company of the same implicit Heideggerian milieu somehow tacitly transmitted by Ahmad 
Fardid, as discussed in the previous section, and with scant textual evidence, as critiqued in the 
previous section. This is particularly strange for thinking about the case of Uber die Linie. In 
both Mirsepassi and Boroujerdi, the analysis is primarily about Heidegger, not Jünger. It is true 
that Heidegger and Jünger held each other in great esteem. And yet this particular text of 
Jünger’s, which is referenced exactly once in the preface to later editions of Gharbzadegi, 
actually marks a point of friendly disagreement between Heidegger and Jünger. Jünger wrote the 
text as part of a collection, Anteile: Martin Heidegger zum 60 Geburtstag [Parts: To Martin 
Heidegger on his 60th Birthday].  Heidegger even wrote a response essay, Uber ‘Die Linie’ 
[Concerning “the Line”]204 which was a substantive critique of Jünger’s position.205 So this, too, 
proves to be yet another weak and strange link to Heidegger for Mirsepassi (and Boroujerdi).  
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But what of Al-e Ahmad’s own claim about Jünger, which I cited at the opening of this 
chapter? “As Dr. Human pointed out [after reading the draft of Gharbzadegi] Jünger and I were 
working on more or less the same subject, but from two viewpoints. We were addressing [in 
Human’s opinion] the same question, but in two languages.”206 Even leaving aside the question 
of Al-e Ahmad’s distancing of himself (Human is carefully and specifically cited as the source of 
the observed, potential similarity) how should we understand Ernst Jünger and Jalal Al-e Ahmad 
working on “more or less the same subject but from two viewpoints”?  Eliot Neaman provides a 
helpful gloss of Jünger’s text in his study of Jünger, A Dubious Past: 
Over the Line is Jünger’s diagnosis of nihilism; the “line” here is conceived as a meridional 
demarcation. Going “over” the line means entering the sphere of nihilism. At a less metaphysical 
level, Jünger’s analysis reads like a cultural criticism of the economic boom years. Everywhere he 
sees feverish production as a dominant activity, speaking of a “workshop landscape,” in which all 
of nature’s reserves are transformed by the work process. Work in modern society is a “zero-
point” by economic and spiritual exploitation. The “highest values” are destroyed and in their 
place sects and cult religions take over. Jünger’s description of the shrinkage (Shwund) of life 
sounds like a description of the workaday world of the busy 1950s: “Today the contraction takes 
hold of the entire world, but it is not only contraction, it is at the same time acceleration, 
simplification, potentiation, and drive to unknown destinations.”207 
There is much in Uber die Linie that must have been alien to Al-e Ahmad, particularly the frame 
of the emptiness of the “boom years”; an anomie of plenty is certainly not the grounds that he 
lays out as his frame for gharbzadegi. Gharbzadegi is what helps reproduce the condition in 
which the majority of Iranians live on at most “1000 calories a day”; this is the irony of literal 
starvation while trying to keep up with the latest (Western) fashions.  Instead, in Iran, Al-e 
Ahmad saw a feverish consumption propped up by (diluted) oil revenue and even that was 
largely ‘aspirational.’ Similarly, although Al-e Ahmad bemoans the cultural alienation he sees all 
around him throughout Iran, he does not have deep nostalgia about the “highest values.”  
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For Al-e Ahmad, there was a distanced but necessarily dialectical relationship between 
individual and community.
208
 There was also a highly critical understanding of the very notion of 
“highest values” as ahistorical, asocial constructs. “Highest values,” in precisely the way they are 
deployed by Jünger – eternal, true, the aspirations of the spirit, etc. – are a gharbzadeh concept 
as understood by Al-e Ahmad: an idealist, mystifying phantasmagoria the West sells to itself as it 
marches to totalitarianism or self-destruction.
209
 Beyond this, as Al-e Ahmad writes in Sangi bar 
Guri [A Stone on a Grave],
210
 “If only you knew how happy I am to be the very last tombstone 
of my deceased ancestors. I am, as it were, in one place and by measure of one body the sole end 
point of tradition. I am the soul of the negation of the future that must remain enslaved to the 
past.”211 Shiism – the institution, the language, and the practice – were pregnant with possibility 
for Al-e Ahmad, but combined with an understanding that the individual’s freedom is part and 
parcel of the community’s liberation, the negation of the transcendence of faith, the literal 
grounds for the cultivation of practice. Yet, even with these major differences, one can begin to 
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see in Neaman’s description and his quotation from Jünger himself what the “same problem” 
was that Al-e Ahmad saw from a ‘different viewpoint’: the convergence of “nihilism” and 
“economic and spiritual exploitation.” And although their frame is different, this fear of the 
“shrinkage” of life is also a concern shared by Al-e Ahmad. I will return to this theme again in 
chapter 4, in order to discuss part of Al-e Ahmad’s own engagement with a dialectic that I see as 
very close to Benjamin’s in not believing in the ‘truth’ of something like the Hajj, and yet not 
believing in its meaninglessness either. For Al-e Ahmad this is a non-reductive but firmly 
materialist skepticism. It is dialectical but does not produce synthesis or sublation. Rather, it 
opens up greater space for inquiry. It is a kind of negative theology or, to borrow Adorno’s 
construction, “negative dialectics.”  
 But, for the moment, let us look at the question of “shrinkage” (i.e. reduction, the 
“murder” of “beauty and poetry,” “spirit and humanity”)212 and the horror of the convergence of 
what Jünger and Al-e Ahmad both call “nihilism” and “economic and spiritual exploitation”. 
This is the “same question” that Dr. Human is suggesting Al-e Ahmad and Jünger are 
addressing. And yet, even here there are “two languages,” and they are not necessarily merely 
German and Persian. “Nihilism,” for Jünger, is of a piece with the “spiritual exploitation”; it is 
“inner emptiness”;213 for Al-e Ahmad, “nihilism” is the ideology which affirms late capitalism in 
its place
214
 and “spiritual exploitation” is the alienation (in a Marxian sense) of people not only 
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from their own local conditions – to be supplanted with unreal fantasies of “the West” – but of 
the potentials for new knowledge and new resistance in their “spiritual” heritage. “Economic 
exploitation,” for Jünger, was an individual and a romantic-conservationist concern; here he is 
aligned with Heidegger, contending that modern productive conditions transform both the inner 
life and Being-in-the-world of the modern individual and distort or destroy the natural landscape. 
For Jünger, the tragedy of “economic exploitation” is the end of a certain noble possibility in 
being and the end of a romantic sublime that exists in nature. And yet again I stress that for Al-e 
Ahmad, “economic exploitation” meant quite mundanely the systemic reproduction of conditions 
of impoverishment and imperial control in the third world.
215
 So, “two languages” indeed. But in 
both authors, the questions are on the table and the position of humanity is understood in relation 
to the “machine,” even as that too was understood in two very different languages. But what then 
of the answer? 
 Here, too, we see two different languages. As Marcus Bullock remarks in his study of 
Jünger’s work, Jünger embraced a late Nietzschean conception which insisted that “nihilism” 
could be overcome through the will to power and that Uber die Linie was a good example of the 
fact “that all his work is part of an ongoing struggle against nihilism.”216 Neaman is more 
explicit in what Jünger’s answer to the question looks like: 
He conjures up a “heroic soldier” who will take on the force of nihilism the way the Germans 
overcame the ruins left by the war. Confident that nihilism can be overcome, everyone stands in 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
preferable that was indirect, but unlike Benjamin he was far clearer on the role of the state – that is, the actually-
existing-bourgeois state.  
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In Uber die Linie, the “heroic soldier” is metaphorical; but that metaphor is based on a belief in 
the truth of heroic struggle as best understood in militaristic terms of armies, steel, and combat. It 
is in this that we can see the “highest values” reappear in the world. As Jünger writes in Das 
Abenteuerliche Herz [The Adventurous Heart]: 
In the last two years I have spent some time with pilots, and even lived for a few weeks one fall on 
an airfield. There is good company here because among them the very best blood possible in our 
day comes together. In them one finds the highest workerly and soldierly virtue stamped in fine 
metal, combined with intellect applied to the tasks at hand, and not without a certain freedom of 
style and an aristocratic delicacy.
218
 
Unlike Heidegger, Jünger famously did not endorse the Nazis. Although this did not prevent 
Benjamin from seeing in Jünger the same “war mysticism”219 that he would later decry in the 
Italian Futurists as paving the road for fascism. As Benjamin suggested of Jünger and similar 
writers, “the most rabidly decadent origins of this new theory of war are emblazoned on their 
foreheads: it is nothing other than an uninhibited translation of the principles of l’art pour l’art to 
war itself.”220 Jünger’s rejection of the Nazis rested upon their insufficient understanding of what 
was at stake in total war; they ‘sullied’ the ‘pure’ struggle of war, in a paltry program of 
nationalism, anti-semitism, and imperialism. For Junger, actual ‘pure’ combat was the ideal of 
‘struggle for struggle’s sake,’ best expressed and experienced in war. But, Jünger argued 
consistently, throughout his writings that this literal model of struggle as combat-in-war was the 
metaphorical way in which society should understand itself.  I quote from Bullock at length: 
But what emerges in Jünger’s account of his war [the first World War] is not this surge of 
nationalistic or imperialistic feeling. The attitudes that the early writings show coming gradually 
into focus are distinct from this, opposed to it. While the commonplace illusions of grandeur or 
glory were ground away in the relentless mill of a struggle that threatened to consume everything 
without resolving anything, Jünger’s affirmation, rooted from the outside in a more radical 
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agonism, underwent an extraordinary intensification. Nor was there any war-weariness or 
disenchantment as time went on. Jünger’s extensive diaries and commentaries on his experience 
as a soldier in the trenches show no diminution of his faith in the value of war throughout all the 
danger, the boredom, the discomfort, the decimation of comrades, the stench of rotting corpses 
that he documents so vividly, and the seven times he himself was wounded. In a strange reversal, 
the experience of defeat also contributed to this conviction. Because there was nothing gained by 
the struggle, it was all the clearer that he had not fought the war to achieve any particular end. He 
had not fought to fulfill some separate purpose formulated in the language of country, politics, or 
a conception of the state and society that he regarded as sterile, discredited, and irrelevant. The 
war was a revelation to him that such violence was the language of a different world, a different 
order, and a different value. It was a passion that defined being entirely in rites of absolute 
conflict. As he wrote in Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis in 1922: “It is the song of life devouring 
itself. To live is to kill”.221 
There are two reasons to linger so long with Jünger, and with Bullock’s account of him. The first 
regards Al-e Ahmad and his possible relationship to Jünger’s answer to their ambiguously shared 
“question.” Not only are the terms of the dilemma to be understood differently in Al-e Ahmad, 
the solution in terms of the valorization of war is precisely the opposite of everything Al-e 
Ahmad argues, in Khassi dar Miqat, Dar Khedmat va Khiyanat-e Roshanfekran, and Sangi bar 
Guri, and in Gharbzadegi itself. Al-e Ahmad explicitly names the military as one of the emptiest 
of the institutions of the Pahlavi state. Even its “struggle” is merely a waste of human energies 
best spent elsewhere. Al-e Ahmad writes, precisely in the kind of terms that Jünger decries: 
All these soldiers and all these armaments accomplished nothing in Shahrivar 1320/1941 [when 
the allies invaded Iran in 1941] or on 28 Murdad [the date of the American-backed coup against 
Mossadeq]. To arm one hundred fifty thousand of the cream of our youth to the teeth (this is the 
official figure), to feed and train them so that one may rely on them to secure and perpetuate the 
rule of an individual – this is the whole meaning of our government’s military establishment. But 
in the climate for transformation and ceaseless building that is before us, it can never be well 
advised to constrain all this labor power to activities that do nothing to aid in the capital 
development of the country. In our circumstances, one must not drain the villages of the best of 
their labor force through conscription, sticking these people into barracks and setting them to 
learning the art of combat against some unknown future enemy. One cannot fold one’s hands and 
constrain at least three hundred thousand well-exercised shoulders to bearing arms and 
practicing tactics that have availed us nothing since the siege of Herat.
222
  
All of Jünger’s romanticism, all his Nietszchean overcoming, all his “war mysticism,” is 
completely absent in Al-e Ahmad, who would rather speak of labor, politics, social 
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transformation, and financial waste. These qualities in Jünger are, in fact, inimical to his 
thinking. Al-e Ahmad and Junger are not merely speaking “two languages” when answering the 
same “question”; they could not be more diametrically opposed. Beyond seeing an absence of 
any productive usefulness in the military and in combat, Al-e Ahmad condemns war itself as “the 
war machine”: 
Conformity in the workplace culminates in conformity in the party and union, which in turn 
culminates in conformity in the barracks – that is, before the war machine…This standardization 
of form, dress, and thought first in the service of the machine (Charlie Chaplin had such a 
powerful attraction, we value him so highly, because he was the first to perceive the danger of 
going like sheep to the slaughterhouse of the machine),
223
 then in the union, club, and party, then 
in the barracks, leads straight to the standardization of form, dress, and thought of the Blackshirts 
and Brownshirts that in turns leads the Western countries to bloodshed and calls the world to war 
every twenty years. It leaves all these consequences as memorials to itself. Warmongering – apart 
from the fact that it appears in the wake of the expansion of heavy industry and the search for new 
markets for exports – derives even its conventions and customs from the machine, which is itself 
the product of pragmatism, scientism, and positivism.
224
 
Where is Jünger’s struggle for struggle’s sake? All Al-e Ahmad gives us instead, in discussing 
war qua combat or war as metaphor, is consequentialism. War is its consequences. There is no 
heroism here. What’s more, war helps reproduce the very internal conditions of bourgeois 
conformity which so aggravate Jünger. War is a crucible in which the non-synthetic dialectic of 
individual and community, which for Al-e Ahmad must be preserved, is overcome and all is 
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collapsed into similarity and conformity. Even that is illusory – and here we really get another 
glimpse that Al-e Ahmad’s critique of technology is economic and sociological and not 
essentialist – as war itself “derives its convention and customs from the machine, which is itself 
the product of pragmatism, scientism, and positivism.” As I will discuss at the end of this 
chapter, part of Al-e Ahmad’s critique of modernity as it is foisted by ‘the West’ is that it 
promises two futures: annihilation in war or a literally de-sensitized, living death in a ‘shell’ to 
protect what remains of the biological human being from a totalizing society. But we can see 
both those ends anticipated here as the necessary consequence of “pragmatism, scientism, and 
positivism.”  
War is not an exceptional state. Jünger writes, in perhaps his most famous work, In 
Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel, 1924/2004), of his experience in war. It is an experience of 
existential triumph. As he lies, stricken by a bullet in a trench, he holds forth: “Strangely, that 
moment is one of very few in my life of which I am able to say they were utterly happy. I 
understood, as in a flash of lightning, the true inner purpose and form of my life.”225 But if we 
follow Al-e Ahmad’s comments on war, we understand that Jünger’s “true inner purpose” was 
just another illusion, to reproduce conditions for more conformity, more commidification, more 
markets, more imperialism, and more war. By Al-e Ahmad’s standards, Jünger’s answer is no 
answer at all; it is just more of the problem. It is in this way that Al-e Ahmad and Jünger are 
exploring “the same question, but in two languages.” Jünger prides himself on his service in the 
First World War and before that in the French Foreign Legion fighting in North Africa. These 
were “true” experiences in which he “overcame,” in ecstatic embrace of destruction and of 
“struggle,” bourgeois conditions. This was the hiding place where the “highest values” were to 
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be discovered; this was the secret of the “nobility” of those airmen. Jünger writes, “[to] live is to 
kill”; Al-e Ahmad sees death, dismemberment, and injustice in the “slaughterhouse of the 
machine.”  
This is not the answer for Al-e Ahmad; this is the superstructural crisis of ‘the West.’ He 
says coldly of “Western Civilization”: 
One basic problem of Western civilization – in the Western countries themselves,226 in the context 
of nineteenth century liberalism – is the constant need for vigilance against the seeds of fascism. 
In France, where we see de Gaulle wading through the Algerian problem, we have right-wing 
extremists in and out of the military, led by the gangsters of the Foreign Legion, who daily stain 
the streets of Paris and Algiers with the blood of those advocating a solution. In Italy and 
Germany, we have the remnants of the Brownshirts, and in America, the new John Birch Society, 
which regards even Mr. Eisenhower as a communist… 227 
Jünger’s answers are what we are to be “vigilant against.” This excoriation is also a self-critique; 
it is precisely this type of culture which the Pahlavis have been promoting in Iran. I will discuss 
this in more depth in my extended reading of Al-e Ahmad’s chapter on the Pahlavis in a moment. 
But it is important to note that at the core of Al-e Ahmad’s critical practice lies a commitment to 
demystification, to iconoclasm, to revealing illusions. What Jünger extols is precisely one of 
those illusions. In making an argument from silence, I do not wish to even partially repeat, in 
reverse, the move that Boroujerdi and Mirsepassi make in reading Al-e Ahmad as deriving his 
thought from Jünger and Heidegger. However, I must point out that Jünger’s work simply never 
reappears in Al-e Ahmad’s. I hope that in the juxtaposition of these radically different points of 
view I have sufficiently dispelled the other specter of Al-e Ahmad’s “intellectual debt” to Jünger.   
As I said after the long quotation from Bullock above, there are two reasons to linger so 
long on Jünger and Al-e Ahmad. The first reason is to demonstrate just how divergent Al-e 
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Ahmad’s and Jünger’s views were. The second reason pertains to my comparison of Al-e Ahmad 
and Benjamin. Jünger writes in Storm of Steel, “In those moments, I was capable of seeing the 
dead – I jumped over them with every stride – without horror.”228 This is not seeing, not for Al-e 
Ahmad, as I will show in Chapter 4, and certainly not for Benjamin, as I will explore in chapter 
3. To see “the dead” “without horror,” and the war dead at that, is literally not-seeing “the dead.” 
It is not seeing the material conditions that made them dead nor is it letting “the dead” make their 
claim upon the now. Jünger thinks he has achieved something in being able to see without 
meaning, to see beyond meaning. This is perhaps where I will first point to, within my readings 
themselves, one of the “religious” moments in Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin, that to “see” clearly is 
to see a form meaning as inhering in objects, and/or meaning as understood by a reference point 
of “redemption.” This marks a different line, one that cuts right across the “same question” (that, 
as we have seen, it was the same question asked from different points of view) and “different 
languages” (the radically different ways that Al-e Ahmad and Jünger discuss the problem and 
their complete diametric opposition on what could be seen as an answer). Although I have drawn 
this line here, Bullock suggests that a similar line can be drawn between Jünger and a different 
thinker/tradition: 
I refer to ideas drawn from the Frankfurt School and Walter Benjamin in my discussion because 
they are often the source of extremely useful correspondences. Since they build on a similar 
mistrust in bourgeois society as the inheritance of industrial capitalism, ableit with a quite 




 This, then, is the second reason, to linger with Al-e Ahmad and Jünger in comparative 
conversation; not because, as Boroujerdi and Mirsepassi would have it, Al-e Ahmad owes an 
“intellectual debt” to Jünger, but rather because the “useful correspondences” between Al-e 
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Ahmad and Jünger, which hold a “quite different view of change,” “frequently arrive at positions 
that run parallel to Jünger’s, though in opposite directions.” In other words, they help us 
understand how close was Al-e Ahmad to Benjamin. Although I do not endorse all of Bullock’s 
arguments about Benjamin, Benjamin is something of a polestar for Bullock’s study, helping 
Bullock demarcate the difference and distance between two distinct critiques of modernity which 
might appear deceptively similar. Jünger is helpful here as well, both in distinguishing between 
Al-e Ahmad, the writer and political activist and “Al-e Ahmad,” the proto-fascist who was “to 
dominate the future of Iranian politics,”230 and in outlining a similar model for critique in Walter 
Benjamin.  
Excursus: An Alternative Theory of Nativism/An Alternative Notion of Authenticity 
I have devoted a great deal of space to an analysis of Boroujerdi’s particular theory of 
“nativism” as he outlines it in Iranian Intellectuals and the West, specifically to his argument 
about a primarily Heideggerian intellectual influence on Al-e Ahmad. Furthermore, the overall 
purpose of this project, the comparative philosophical evaluation of Al-e Ahmad, requires that I 
address the content of Al-e Ahmad’s claims as philosophical positions as opposed to merely 
addressing their social and political contexts. An alternative theory of “nativism” can, I think, 
help us understand some parts of Al-e Ahmad’s philosophy. Dabashi writes of Al-e Ahmad and 
“the roots of the Iranian intellectual nativism” in Post-Orientalism that: 
In his attempt to de-colonize the mind of Iranians, Jalal Al-e Ahmad diagnosed a disease that he 
called “Westoxication” and thereby contributed massively to the domestication of the Spenglerian 
abstraction, “the West.”… Al-e Ahmad began on the correct premise of his attempt to de-colonize 
the colonially constituted Iranian subject in order to restore historical agency to it. This was a 
necessary, admirable, and historically crucial move. But in the absence of a historically informed 
and a critical awareness of the joint projects of capitalist modernity and the Enlightenment, Al-e 
Ahmad fell squarely into the Hegelian trap of a ghostly attribution of authenticity to the 
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phenomenal abstraction “the West.” “The West” was thus uncritically borrowed and 
categorically accepted as a reality sui generis. In response to that originating gesture, a native 




There are several key points to address here. First, Dabashi’s operating theory of nativism is 
almost entirely different than that of Boroujerdi. As opposed to Boroujerdi’s location – and 
condemnation – of nativism in “resurgence” and “resistance” through “native values,” Dabashi’s 
theory of nativism is a critique of the subjects of such discourses: namely, “the West” and “the 
native.” As Dabashi notes, these two subjects are ahistorical reflections of each other. Whereas 
Boroujerdi’s reproduction of liberal universalism sublimates the identifiably “West” into the 
omnipresent universal, leaving the “native” alone as “manufacturing difference,” Dabashi’s 
theory frames both as a false, obfuscating binary. This theoretical frame has multiple effects. It 
allows Dabashi to locate at least Al-e Ahmad’s “attempt to de-colonize the colonially constituted 
Iranian subject” as “necessary, admirable and historically crucial.” Instead of a limited discourse 
of good universalism (secular liberalism) vs. bad universalism (colonial racism), Dabashi’s 
theory and analysis opens up the possibility for “native values” to negotiate on universal turf. 
The critique turns, instead, upon Al-e Ahmad’s ultimate move – and it is, as Dabashi notes, 
perhaps his most crucial failure – to reify the categorical ideas of “East” and “West” in ways that 
would come to have horrific consequences in Iranian political history.
232
 This is a critique of 
nativism that focuses not on the presupposition of “native values” but on the production of “The 
Native” as an idea and as a category, as a “geographical space in need of discovery.”233 
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 As demonstrated in the previous section, Al-e Ahmad was not quite as fully ignorant of 
the “joint projects of capitalist modernity and the Enlightenment” as Dabashi suggests here. As I 
noted earlier and Dabashi argues on his next page, Al-e Ahmad does begin by trying to redefine 
the geo-cultural notion of “West,” “on the promising note of trying to locate Iran and the rest of 
the colonized world in relation of production to the centers of the capitalist cosmopolis.”234  
However, Dabashi’s critique vis-à-vis his alternative theory of nativism stands: Al-e Ahmad in 
the end fails to extend the logic of his critique in Gharbzadegi to the theoretically crucial 
dismantling of those geo-cultural poles themselves in favor of more productive concepts. This is 
in part an intellectual failure and in part a problem that Al-e Ahmad will address again – still 
without completion – in Khassi dar Miqat. As Dabashi states, Al-e Ahmad employs some 
questionable historical and linguistic arguments as well as a sometimes overly casual style that 
occasionally elides his economic and political arguments with cultural/civilizational ones. It is 
also a long-term strategic failure in terms of advancing his philosophical arguments. Especially 
in Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad lessened or traded some of the universal philosophical implications 
of his own work for language that was more tactically useful in the immediate national context.   
 But it is worth pausing to evaluate the new “native authenticity,” as Dabashi puts it, that 
Al-e Ahmad conjured. Like his reimagining of the conceptual geography of “the West,” even if 
that too slid inexorably in later use back into simplistic geo-cultural language, Al-e Ahmad 
embarks on a radically peculiar version of what Dabashi calls “native authenticity.” As I 
remarked above in my discussion of Boroujerdi’s reading of Al-e Ahmad, Al-e Ahmad himself 
did not trade in the typical tropes and arguments of native authenticity, explicitly critiquing his 
contemporaries who did call for a “retreat into the depths of our ancient ways, our national and 
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religious traditions”235 and labeling them as gharbzadeh.  And yet, as Dabashi notes, there is 
something different concerning authenticity in Al-e Ahmad and this difference is crucial for 
coming to a fully nuanced understanding of Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadegi.  
 Dabashi posits this authenticity as reaching into history and reconstructing an ‘authentic 
native identity’ out of an ahistorical amalgamation, à la all forms of recognizable ethno- or 
religious-nationalism. This kind of amalgamation is doubly ironic as it is usually constructed 
from imagined ‘traditional’ elements, themselves only newly recognized through the lens of the 
modern discourses of history, tradition and development. But Al-e Ahmad explicitly condemns 
this kind of thinking, even more so later in his chapter “Asses in Lion’s Skin or Lion on the 
Flag” (khari dar poost-e shir ya shir-e elm).236 Part of Dabashi’s focus on the more 
commonplace ethno-nationalist reading of gharbzadegi comes from the fact that he is both 
interpreting Al-e Ahmad and situating him in the development of radical Islamist political 
history both in Iran and globally, i.e. reading how gharbzadegi came to be used in the wake of 
Al-e Ahmad’s text. This historical contextualization causes him to focus on the “xenophobic 
maladies” of the “Truly Islamic or Genuinely Iranian” and particularly on the use of the term 
gharbzadegi by Khomeini and Khomeinists. It is undeniably true that the term gharbzadegi and 
the accusation of being gharbzadeh became enduring and indeed foundational aspects of 
Islamism in Iran (and beyond), to the point where Dabashi can safely claim that “no other term 
than ‘Westoxication’ has been the singular source of so much calamitous consequences in 
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contemporary Iranian history.”237 However while, as Dabashi points out, Al-e Ahmad’s 
empirical and theoretical shortcomings in some ways allowed or invited some of these historical 
developments, the “Truly Islamic or the Genuinely Iranian” was not part of Al-e Ahmad’s own 
critique of gharbzadegi. In fact, Al-e Ahmad’s work was influential enough that within his own 
lifetime he heard these kinds of amplifications and distortions of what he wrote in Gharbzadegi 
and found them disturbing. In Khassi dar Miqat, there is a recurring vignette in which Al-e 
Ahmad encounters a Pakistani mullah preaching on gharbzadegi. After being a bit astonished 
and self-deprecating (calling it his “nonsense” [cherundiat]), his reaction is highly wary: even 
when the preacher was saying things closely related to some of his ideas, Al-e Ahmad quipped, 
“there was something about it I didn’t like.”238 Khassi dar Miqat, a travel diary and series of 
reflections on the Hajj, is a far more literary text than Gharbzadegi.
239
 At one point Al-e Ahmad 
even tries, and fails, to engage the man in conversation late in the text. But here the only other 
note Al-e Ahmad includes before moving on is a fond recollection of and negative comparison to 
Sayyid Jamal al Din Asadabadi, i.e. Afghani, the famed Islamic modernizer of the late nineteenth 
century.  
 But if it is clear that hewing to tradition is a symptom of, rather than a solution to 
gharbzadegi, exactly what is this theory of authenticity that is at work in the notion of 
gharbzadegi? It was not, in the end, a “new native authenticity.” Rather, gharbzadegi is a 
critique of inauthenticity that manages to avoid conjuring a specified authentic being by 
centering its discussions on self-knowledge, by taking a largely epistemological stance in 
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response to an ontological question: how does what you know correspond to who you are? One 
of the reasons that “authenticity” is so slippery a concept in reading Gharbzadegi is that Al-e 
Ahmad is advancing a unique theory of inauthenticity that is not dependent on a performance or 
assumption of a singular authentic identity. In the next section I will discuss this understanding 
of gharbzadegi. 
Gharbzadegi: A Question of Self-Knowledge and Consciousness 
In order to understand Al-e Ahmad’s theory of inauthenticity, it is helpful to examine his 
lengthy description of the gharbzadeh (as Campbell translates, “the occidentotic”) in chapter 
seven of Gharbzadegi. It is here that Al-e Ahmad finally describes what gharbzadegi actually is: 
not its signs, not its symptoms, nor its effects or history, but the actual character of the condition. 
 Al-e Ahmad writes several long paragraphs describing the gharbzadeh. This is the first: 
The occidentotic is a man totally without belief or conviction, to such an extent that he not only 
believes in nothing, but also does not actively disbelieve in anything… He is a timeserver. Once he 
gets across the bridge, he doesn’t care if it stands or falls. He has no faith, no aim, no belief, 
neither in God nor in humanity. He cares neither whether society is transformed or not, nor 
whether religion or irreligion prevails. He is not even irreligious. He is indifferent. He even goes 
to the mosque at times, just as he goes to the club or the movies. But everywhere he is only a 
spectator. It is just as if he had gone to a soccer game. He is always to be seen off in the 
grandstands. He never invests anything of himself – even to the extent of moist eyes at the death of 
a friend, attentiveness at a shrine, or reflection in the hours of solitude. In fact, he is not 
accustomed to solitude at all; he flees it. Because he is in terror of himself, he turns up 
everywhere. He offers opinions, if it is appropriate, and particularly if it is fashionable to offer 
opinions, but only to someone from who he hopes to gain some further benefit. Never do you hear 
from him any outcry or protest, any but why or wherefore. He will explain everything with the 
utmost gravity and grandiloquence. He will feign optimism.
240
 
From the very beginning of this description, Al-e Ahmad is telling us that gharbzadegi is not 
about believers and non-believers or about true or false Islam. It is about the inability either to 
believe or to have conviction. It certainly is not liberal or empirical or utilitarian skepticism that 
is under attack, as suggested by Boroujerdi, Mirsepassi et al., and which one would expect in a 
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work inspired by Heideggerian philosophy. The gharbzadeh is not irreligious; the gharbzadeh 
lacks the ability to be irreligious. In the place of performance qua identity, the gharbzadeh has 
pure performance, performance qua performance.  It is important to remember that Al-e Ahmad 
is theorizing in this chapter and elsewhere in the book with two working examples of the 
gharbzadeh: the peasant who has migrated to the city and is unable to understand modernity and 
can only don its trappings, and the Shah himself, in much the same position, but on the world 
stage, merely “donning” the jet planes, oil wells and national ceremonies of the modern state. 
The gharbzadeh is not limited to these cases, but both exemplify the ultimately sad and 
tragicomic nature of the gharbzadeh. This is not a person against whom one musters the kind of 
vitriol associated with takfiri Islamists, attacking the unbeliever or the uncommitted Muslim. The 
gharbzadeh is a rather pathetic figure to be pitied. And crucially, this sadness comes not from his 
irreligion or from his modernization but from his fundamental incapacity to connect his being 
with his knowledge. Here, gharbzadegi is the disconnect between epistemology and (an 
uncertain) ontology.
241
 Al-e Ahmad is not sketching out the True Iranian or the True Muslim. He 
is lamenting a condition in which individuals have been anaesthetized and are incapable of 
commitment, even of some of the basic building blocks of commitment: emotion (“tears”), 
thought (“reflection”), “attentiveness.” The gharbzadeh is atomized and mentally bound.242   
 Al-e Ahmad writes in this section that the gharbzadeh seeks, at best, “ease,” and “will do 
nothing for the sake of anyone else.”  He is educated only enough to be able to successfully 
                                                          
241
 In chapter 4, I discuss how in Khassi dar Miqat, Al-e Ahmad rejects the transparency of self-knowledge and of 
non-intersubjective self-knowledge.  
242
 As I discuss at the end of this chapter and more thoroughly in chapter 4, this “mentally bound” status refers to 
desensitization to aesthetic stimuli and an incapability to process these stimuli into consciousness itself, let alone 





execute the performance of an activity, fully incapable of understanding, critiquing or creating. 
Al-e Ahmad continues: 
The occidentotic has no character. He is a thing without authenticity. His person, his home and 
his words convey nothing in particular, and everything in general. It is not that he is a 
cosmopolitan, that the world is his home. He is at home nowhere rather than everywhere. He is an 
amalgam of singleness without character and character without singularity.
243
  
Does this “thing without authenticity” [chizi bi-ehsalat] imply the kind of authentic thing that 
animates nationalist or Islamist discourses? Does this “thing without authenticity” imply the kind 
of nativist authenticity discussed above? Here we see something that can be taken to be the 
clearest instance of Heideggerian language.
244
 Campbell’s translation is accurate but in certain 
respects incomplete. Ehsalat is often used to translate “authenticity” in the very context of 
translations of Heidegger. But it also moves in several other conceptual directions. It can indicate 
authenticity in terms of the essential, as those who advocate for the reductive nativist argument 
propose. It can also indicate authenticity in the sense of originality or of being sui generis in a 
Nietzschean, self-willed sense. This may seem like a scholastic distinction, but there is actually 
quite a bit of cognitive distance between the Heideggerian self-realization as becoming-what-
you-essentially are and the Nietzschean self-actualization of becoming-what-you-will-to-be.  
There is also a further sense of ehsalat as “genuineness,” not in terms of essence but rather quite 
literally as the opposite of disingenuousness: genuine as in not dissembling, not pretending or 
posturing. It is this sense, I believe, that most closely expresses the argument Al-e Ahmad is 
making in this chapter and throughout Gharbzadegi. He does not make the case for the Truly 
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Islamic or Purely Iranian. He makes the case against the disingenuous, the case against 
inauthenticity. However, the consciousness, the willed nature of action implied by dissembling, 
pretending or posturing, is purposefully absent in Al-e Ahmad’s rendering. The gharbzadeh 
lacks even the consciousness to understand his posturing. The gharbzadeh is shallow: his “words 
convey nothing in particular.”  Most pointedly, he is not a “cosmopolitan.” To be a cosmopolitan 
would be to attain a self-possessed consciousness and this is the feature that the gharbzadeh in 
whatever form he takes – foolish urban dandy, parading nationalist hero, nostalgic traditionalist 
cleric – most certainly lacks. The gharbzadeh is ultimately a tragicomic figure. S/he is no great 
apostate, for apostasy is virtue beyond his/her grasp.   
There is a moment in this description, particularly in the lines, “he is not accustomed to 
solitude at all; he flees it. Because he is in terror of himself, he turns up everywhere” which is 
reminiscent of the early Heidegger writing about das Man [the “they”] in Sein und Zeit. 
Heidegger writes:  
Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The “they,” which supplies the answer to the “who” 
of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody” to whom every Dasein has always already surrendered itself, 
in Being-among-one-another. In these characteristics of being which we have exhibited—everyday 
Being-among-one-another, distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the 




Although there are superficial similarities between this argument and Al-e Ahmad’s description, 
it is important to note both the differences between what Al-e Ahmad writes and what Heidegger 
argues and, more importantly, how these lines on existential terror are something of an aberration 
in a section that is far less focused Dasein or Being (ontological concerns) than it is on 
consciousness or unconsciousness (epistemological concerns).  Al-e Ahmad does not argue for 
gharbzadegi as an “averageness” cultivated through “everyone” being “the other.” It is not that 
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the gharbzadeh becomes average through the “leveling” into “averageness” of interaction 
amongst the masses. Gharbzadegi is presented as intervening between the gharbzadeh and the 
rest of the world, including, and especially, “the other.” The gharbzadeh never encounters “the 
other.” A phantasmagoria of “the West” or of “tradition” – generated through an at least partially 
external economic-cultural apparatus – blinds, dazzles and stupefies the gharbzadeh. S/he is 
gharbzadeh through not knowing her fellows, not because of knowing them. This existential 
terror that Al-e Ahmad expresses is in fact a generic, common existentialist sentiment and one 
which is not dominant in this description or in Gharbzadegi in general.
246
 It is a sentiment which 
is also operating within a critique of inauthenticity that is neither an expression of “nativism” nor 
of the anxieties that Heidegger himself would later discuss in terms of technology.  
 This chapter of Gharbzadegi provides us with clear arrows pointing to its own theoretical 
framework and heritage. Its primary intellectual antecedent is not Sein und Zeit, Die Frage nach 
der Technik or Uber Die Linie. It is Marx’s Der 18te Brumaire des Louis Napoleon [The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon]. Towards the beginning of the chapter, Al-e Ahmad 
specifies precisely which kind of people he is talking about.  He does so both by the structure of 
his argument and by painstakingly transliterating Marx’s term: “lumpenproletariat.”247 The title 
of chapter seven is Khori dar poost-e shir ya shir-e elm?
248
 There are several ways to translate 
and read this. Campbell chooses the general: “Asses in Lion’s Skin or Lions on the Flag” 
(Campbell omits the question mark that is present in the original). An alternative translation 
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could read the first part in the singular: “An Ass in Lion’s Skin.” An alternative translation of the 
second part of the title could read: “Lions of the Flag” or, more simply, “Flag Lions” (or the 
indefinite, singular versions). The multiple and simultaneous meanings and critiques cannot be 
overemphasized.
249
 There are the general, mass gharbzadeh, “Asses in Lion’s Skin,” wandering 
about, country bumpkins transported to the city, wearing the newest fashions (including national 
fashion) and using the latest gadgets as if they were the magical talismans that once protected the 
itinerant traveler or cured gout, knowing nothing, understanding nothing, incapable of knowing 
anything or understanding anything. Then there is the simultaneous reading of “An Ass,” one, 
particular, singular, gharbzadeh ass: the Shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the farce to Reza 
Khan’s tragedy. An ass who parades as a lion (the ancient national symbol) and who is both led 
and leads with Lions on the Flag or Flag Lions. These two dimensional phantasms of national 
legitimacy operate exactly as the “empty watchwords of the old society: property, family, 
religion, order,” that brought and maintained Louis Napoleon. As Marx writes: 
Every demand of the simplest bourgeois financial reform, of the most ordinary liberalism, of the 
most formal republicanism, of the most insipid democracy, is simultaneously castigated as an 
“attempt on society” and stigmatized as “socialism.”And, finally, the high priests of “religion and 
order” are themselves driven with kicks from their Pythian tripods, hauled out of their beds in the 
darkness of the night, put in prison-vans, thrown into dungeons or sent into exile, their temple is 
razed to the ground, their mouths are sealed, their pens broken, their law torn to pieces in the 
name of religion, property, of family, of order.
250
 
Add the additional watchword of “nation” to the panoply Marx supplies here, and Marx’s 
description of  the betrayal of 1848 and the rise of Louis Napoleon mirrors Al-e Ahmad’s 
account, spread throughout the whole of Gharbzadegi, of the betrayal of Mossadeq in 1953 and 
the rise of Muhammad Reza Shah. The Shah also suppressed religious dissent and commentary 
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under the auspices of official state Shiism. He squandered bourgeois wealth through rampant 
corruption, nepotism and concession. He presented himself as the Father of the Nation and the 
bulwark against anarchy and communism. And he did so with a paper-thin nationalism that 
suppressed actual national resistance, the nation’s security apparatus arrayed exclusively against 
the nation’s people, all of which was further augmented ignominiously by the fact of the Shah’s 
installation and maintenance by foreign powers, a bit of imperialist humiliation to compliment 
the revolutionary failure. Marx describes the peasants who supported Louis Napoleon as 
possessing nothing more than “mere local interconnection,” begetting “no unity, no national 
union and no political organization, they do not form a class.” These are the people about whom 
Marx famously pronounced: “They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented.”251  
In Orientalism, Edward Said linked this notion of representation to Marx’s incredible 
lacunae when it came to the relationship between colonialism, orientalism and the observable 
characteristics of “Asiatic” economy and society. As noted earlier  Al-e Ahmad – in many ways 
anticipating the critique that Said would make some decades later – had already posited a fairly 
damning critique of the kind of orientalism in which Marx’s original “Asiatic mode” 
commentary had been made. What is so amazing here is that Al-e Ahmad is providing both an 
explanation to the phenomenon Marx is describing (transposed to Iran) and a companion to what 
Said would critique in Marx. What Marx has descriptively addressed here, about peasants in 
France, is linked to his most well-known orientalist observation. Al-e Ahmad addressed this 
same point critically, describing how these people without unity, organization, politics or 
characteristics beyond the trivial came to be. Al-e Ahmad, by providing a universal theory – a 
non-nativist theory, but certainly built from a “native” point of view and utilizing “native” values 
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– pushes a variation on Marxist critique past its orientalist blinders and provides a prelude and 
companion to Said’s critique, explaining orientalism from the receiving end. 252  
In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, Marx gives an account of a 
lumpenproletariat regime coming to power; bourgeoisie resistance to 1848 “brought the 
lumpenproletariat to domination, with the chief of the Society of December 10 at the head.”253 
And of this head, he writes: 
But, above all, Bonaparte looks on himself… as the representative of the lumpenproletariat to 
which he himself, his entourage, his government and his army belong, and for which the prime 
consideration is to benefit itself and draw California lottery prizes from the state treasury.
254
 
In the seventh chapter of Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad presents this same image as the age of the 
“occidentotic leader” and the kind of society he brings: 
… the lumpens from every trade and class customarily come to power – that is the misfits, the idle, 
those with no will of their own. The most unreliable merchants of the bazaar manage the chamber 
of commerce. The most idle of the cultural elite are directors of culture. The most bankrupt money 
changers are the bankers. Either the most lifeless members of society or the most gangsterlike end 
up as the representatives to the Majlis. The general rule in this land is to give power to the 
shiftless, the characterless if not the crooked and the depraved.
255
 
The “entourage” of Muhammad Reza Shah is characterized in potentially two ways. First it is 
characterized, directly parallel to that of Louis Napoleon, as a rising of the lumpenproletariat to 
positions of power and influence. Or, in a slight but potentially significant difference with 
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Marx’s account, it is characterized as accentuating and cultivating the lumpenproletariat qualities 
from members in various classes. The characteristics of the gharbzadeh, including his/her 
“effete” enslavement to fashion, always ready to parade and consume,256 are a nearly note-for-
note echo of Marx’s description of the “entourage” of Louis Napoleon: 
At the court, in the ministries, at the head of the administration and the army, a crowd of fellows 
pushes forward, of the best of whom it can be said that no one knows whence he comes, a noisy, 
disreputable rapacious Boheme that dresses itself in gallooned coats with the same caricature of 
dignity as the high dignitaries of Soulouque.
257
 
The precursor for the gharbzadeh masses and also the gharbzadeh elite are, as Al-e Ahmad 
explicitly indicates, the lumpenproletariat.  
As for the Shah himself, Al-e Ahmad writes, just obliquely enough to avert the censor’s 
gaze: 
Thus our occidentotic leader rides the waves and never comes to rest on solid ground. It is never 




The gharbzadeh leader is simply also gharbzadeh. He is no mastermind, grand ideologue, or 
even truly great tyrant. His horizons, just like those of his followers, are defined by their 
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gharbzadegi, just as are Louis Napoleon’s by ultimately being of and for the lumpenproletariat. 
Marx’s description of Louis Napoleon is similar but goes further: 
This contradictory task of the man [being representative of the lumpenproletariat] explains the 
contradictions of his government, the confusing groping hither and thither which seeks now to 
win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against 
him, whose practical uncertainty forms a highly comical contrast to the imperious categorical 
style of the government decrees, a style which is copied obsequiously from the Uncle.
259
  
Replace “Uncle” with “Father” and this description, which begins like Al-e Ahmad’s of 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, reads like a rather prescient description by Marx of what would 
become of the second Pahlavi Shah after Al-e Ahmad’s death. In Al-e Ahmad’s own chapter on 
“contradictions,” chapter 5, Jang-e tezavha [The War of Contradictions], he explains in detail the 
“war” that was taking place in Iran to “modernize,” which was instead, in truth, a war on the 
newly discovered and newly declared “unmodern.” It was a war against the bazaar but for the 
market, a war against the religious but for religion, it was a war for the nation but against its 
people.
260
   
Al-e Ahmad identifies the gharbzadeh people with that mass of people described by 
Marx in the Manifesto as:  
The “dangerous class”, [lumpenproletariat] the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown 
off by the lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a 
proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed 
tool of reactionary intrigue.
261
 
Marx has in mind the criminal underworld, the corrupt, the hopelessly damaged or 
neglected members of society. He thinks of them as a contested site for ideological manipulation, 
beyond the reach of class consciousness, which is also to say, beyond the reach of self-
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consciousness. But Marx, in his various descriptions of the lumpenproletariat, portrays this non-
class mass as either being “thrown off” from the actual working class, or falling off, or merely as 
an anti-social given, perhaps naturally occurring. This is where the theory of gharbzadegi and the 
theory of the lumpenproletariat diverge. This is another place where Al-e Ahmad is expanding 
upon Marx, just as he explicitly claimed to be doing when he attempted to redefine the East/West 
dynamic.  
Gharbzadegi is a mode of false consciousness. But it is a particularly damning mode of 
false consciousness in that it erodes self-consciousness of any kind, even the ‘standard’ false 
consciousness of the proletariat. The fully gharbzadeh cannot see themselves as any kind of unit 
or class, like the lumpenproletariat. Gharbzadegi is the process by which people are turned into 
fully unconscious beings, beings lacking any sense of or capacity for self-knowledge.
262
 It is the 
process of creating lumpenproletariat and expanding at least the unconsciousness of that sector to 
the far reaches of society. Like Gramsci and Althusser, Al-e Ahmad, who had already left the 
Tudeh, is answering what had become by the twentieth century an obvious question in Marxist 
(and post-Marxist) thinking: why had the revolution not come? Why, in some specific ways, was 
Marx wrong? While Gramsci pointed to the under-theorized and under-analyzed field of culture 
and Althusser to the contestation and reproduction of ideology, Al-e Ahmad points to 
gharbzadegi. He points to the phantasmagorias that do, in fact, originate through imperial 
exchange and conflict with “the West” as he defined it. One is the phantasmagoria of the happy 
‘enlightened’ modern consumer who is completely oblivious to the foundations of the market 
and the enlightenment. At the same time, Al-e Ahmad also points to the phantasmagoria of the 
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traditional ‘Eastern’ religious or national soul – completely oblivious to the idea of the traditional 
as modern manufacture, to the empty nostalgia of illo tempore.  
Gharbzadegi is the performance of modernity without any understanding of what it 
means to be modern; it is also the performance of tradition without any understanding of what it 
means to be traditional. When faced with the images of these phantasmagorias, these fantasies, 
the individual succumbs to gharbzadegi or, to borrow a theoretical formulation from Susan 
Buck-Morss, the individual experiences “anaesthetics. “ S/he is, in a sense, anesthetized. Her 
senses – both external and internal – are desensitized to material conditions and replaced with 
totalizing images of fantasy. Buck-Morss writes: 
The human sensorium changes from a mode of being “in touch” with reality into a means of 
blocking out reality. Aesthetics – sensory perception – becomes anaesthetics, a numbing of the 
senses’ cognitive capacity that destroys the human organism’s power to respond politically even 
when self-preservation is at stake.
263 
This is also how gharbzadegi functions, through the empty images of consumption that Al-e 
Ahmad describes, “directly upon the bodily senses in order to contain rebellious potential,”264  
but Al-e Ahmad adds the crucial observation for his own case of the additional, material 
observation of foreign intervention, foreign domination, and foreign production of the images in 
the first place. Gharbzadegi is then, quite literally, the affliction of being “struck” by “the West”: 
Weststruckenness. If it is an intoxication, Westoxification, then it is closer to being punch-drunk 
than it is to a junkie’s habit. If it is an “infestation,” as Al-e Ahmad writes on the first page, 
Occidentosis, then it is an infestation of phantasmagoria, not an infection of “Westernism.”  
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There are three artists who are addressed in the bulk of Al-e Ahmad’s final chapter, “The 
Hour Draws Nigh”: Camus, Ionescu, and Bergman. Al-e Ahmad views Camus’s The Plague as 
something of a European parallel to Gharbzadegi itself. I would like to focus, however, on his 
readings of Ionescu’s Rhinoceros and Bergman’s The Seventh Seal.  Al-e Ahmad writes of the 
latter: 
A knight has returned from the Crusades, beaten, tired, and dejected. Note carefully! He has 
returned from the Crusades, during which he was never able to find the Truth, or in the Holy 
Lands he saw the same things that his European descendents see today in that world victimized by 
colonialism in the East and Africa but this knight unlike modern Europeans did not come to the 
East in search of oil, spices, and silk. He came in search of the Truth. The Absolute Truth at that; 
that is he thought he would find and experience God in the Holy Lands of Palestine. Exactly like 
the Apostles who, when they thought they had seen God, spread the word of the Gospels to the 
four corners of the earth… But, instead of Him, he found Satan blocking his path. At times he 
appeared as an opponent in a game of chess, or as a man of the Church, but always with the face 
of Azrael, the Angel of Death, who spead the seeds of plague in that land and was now the reaper 
of men’s souls. At the very time when this knight was returning from his pursuit of the Truth, tired 
and battered, the Church was ranting about the torments of hell and promising the Day of 
Judgement was at hand. This is Bergman’s allusion to the fact the era of faith is over and the era 
of empirical knowledge has begun.
265
 
I take Al-e Ahmad at his word here. He thinks, with Bergman, that the “era of faith is over”; in 
relation to Truth, it never began. The Apostles only think they saw God. Besides, what was faith 
anyway? The knight “was never able to find the Truth,” in Palestine, “he saw the same things 
that his European descendants see today in that world victimized by colonialism in the East and 
Africa.” Instead of God or Truth, the knight found the “Satan blocking his path,” “at times he 
appeared as an opponent in a game of chess, or as a man of the Church,” “but always with the 
face of Azrael, the Angel of Death, who spreads the seeds of plague in that land and was now the 
reaper of men’s souls.” The “empirical knowledge” that the knight found in his journey was that 
the torments of hell were already at hand.  Faith was merely pretending that hell was in a 
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different world and betraying the knight with promises of the “Day of Judgment.” But without 
faith, what is that “Day of Judgment,” “the era of belief is at an end and the age of 
experimentation is at hand; and experimentation leads to the atomic bomb. These are Bergman’s 
allusions, or at least my interpretation of them.”266  This is one end of history that Al-e Ahmad 
sees Bergman foretelling.  
Al-e Ahmad may not believe (is not, himself, a believer) in faith, but it would be wrong 
to interpret this section as him saying that he does not believe (does not trust) in experimentation. 
He is not again science or technology; he is against scientism and mashinzadegi. It is easy to 
forget that Al-e Ahmad, in his fiction writing and his literary criticism, believes in the virtues of 
experimentation, of novelty. As noted earlier, Sangi bar Guri itself can be seen as an experiment, 
the transformation of an end of tradition into something new. There are two ends of humanity 
that Al-e Ahmad sees these existentialist authors foretelling; he precludes a fatalism towards 
both by his use of a conditional, “if we don’t reign it in.”267 Reign what in? What must be 
reigned is is “the machine demon,” read as expansively as possible to include the machine 
economy: not just the propagation of false consciousness, but the destruction of the conditions in 
which any self-consciousness itself is possible.  Al-e Ahmad is simultaneously commencing and 
announcing a project: how to fix modernity, not only for the emancipation of Iran from economic 
and political exploitation and certainly not for the sake of some ontologically superior sense of 
Being within newly ‘awakened’ Muslims. His critique is a part of a universal project, because 
modernity itself is already everywhere and the crisis it brings promises global implications. 
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Nuclear annihilation or the only slightly less dramatic “being crushed under the machine”268 is 
only one end of the world dominated by mashinzadeh modernity.  
Al-e Ahmad describes the other end (of the world, so to speak) via Ionescu’s Rhinoceros: 
The disease is to become a rhinoceros. First one develops a fever. Then one’s voice changes, 
becomes thick and coarse. Then a horn appears on one’s forehead… the skin thickens and so 
forth. Everyone catches it, the housewife, the corner grocer, the bank manager, someone’s 
sweetheart, and all take to the streets and trample city, civilization, and beauty. Of course, I need 
not translate the work to convey what the author is saying. But I have been thinking about 
translating this play into Persian since I first read it, indicating in the margins how our fellow 
urbanites [Tehranis in the original to be precise] are headed further toward becoming 
rhinoceroses by the day.
269
  
The atom bomb may be the more dramatic of the two ends, but in many ways this end is 
the more important for understanding the actual content of Al-e Ahmad’s project, as opposed to 
the scope. The “disease” in question in Rhinoceros is “like occidentosis.”270 Gharbzadegi can 
become mashinzadegi if modernization is misunderstood as a project of progress, from one stage 
to the next. The horror here is not contemplating apocalypse in the face of the non-existence of 
any other world. The horror here is contemplating two kinds of ‘hardening.’  First, the hardening 
of social conditions, of both the gharbzadeh and the mashinzadeh. This hardening is to freeze in 
time current conditions forever, which is terrible enough for Ionescu in Europe and even more 
frightening for Al-e Ahmad in Iran; this would be to preserve the shape and the injustice of what 
I called in my first chapter “the uneven geometry of modernity.” The second kind of hardening is 
of subjective experience itself. To continue from the discussion of anaesthetics, to be 
gharbzadeh for too long requires the hardening of the body: the end of the possibility for 
anything but the reproduction of phantasmagoria. It is not merely self-alienation (understood in 











Marxist, not an existentialist fashion) but here, at the end, as Al-e Ahmad would have it, it is a 
desperately expansive hardening against “beauty and poetry, spirit and humanity.”271  
Just as there are multiple valences for gharbzadegi, so there are for mashinzadegi. Up 
until now I have largely focused on the definition closest to the most productive reading of 
gharbzadegi—that is, to be “struck” by a phantasmagoria of “the West” is akin to being “struck” 
by alienated, mystified, and fetishized “technology.” But perhaps when contemplating Al-e 
Ahmad’s reading of Ionescu, I should employ the notion of being “afflicted” or “stricken” by 
“technology” as opposed to dazzled by it. The hardening of the rhinoceros skin becomes 
understandable in a different way, then.  To understand this we must return again to Jünger. 
Bullock is not the only scholar who saw in Jünger some “points of convergence” with Benjamin; 
Buck-Morss also draws on Jünger in “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics,” in bringing us the idea to 
compliment the hardening image, from Jünger’s Uber den Schmerz [Concerning Pain], that 
“technology is our uniform.”272  She writes:  
Jünger connects this changed perspective with photography, that "artificial eye" which "arrests the bullet 
in flight just as it does the human being at the instant of being torn to pieces by an explosion." The 
powerfully prosthetic sense organs of technology are the new "ego" of a transformed synaesthetic system. 
Now they provide the porous surface between inner and outer, both perceptual organ and mechanism of 
defense. Technology as a tool and a weapon extends human power-at the same time intensifying the 
vulnerability of what Benjamin called "the tiny, fragile human body"-and thereby produces a counter-need, 
to use technology as a protective shield against the "colder order" that it creates.
273
 
One need only recall Jünger’s writings I quoted earlier on the “storm of steel” and the “stamp of 
metal” amongst the noble and heroic airmen.  There is a beginning here of how we can 
understand the rhinoceros in the sense of a mashinzadegi of ‘being-stricken-with.’ Technology 
has become part of the nature of the being that was once there. But in Jünger’s telling, this is not 
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affliction per se but a wonderful armor. In the period in question, Jünger saw “technology… as 
the creator of a renewed order of heroic authority with a new place for art in its service.”274 As 
Buck-Morss notes, this individual transformation mirrors a social transformation. This would 
bridge then, the two levels of ‘hardening’ I discussed above in terms of Al-e Ahmad. As Jünger 
states in Uber den Schmerz, “This second and colder consciousness manifests itself in 
progressively sharper development of a capacity to see oneself as an object.”275 This is the basis 
of the “heroism” in Storm of Steel when Jünger reveled in his ability to see “the dead,” “without 
horror”; he was seeing them as object. This is, as I discussed in chapter 1, precisely the demand 
that scientistic naturalism makes today, not in the name of heroic overcoming of the self, but in 
the name of reductive ontology. Consider Daniel Dennett for example, announcing: “I declare 
my starting point to be the objective, materialistic, third-person world of the physical 
sciences.”276 Dennett proposes that much of philosophy is “folk psychology” to be taken as 
seriously as “folk physics,”277 i.e. that we have no reason to take seriously anything but the 
falsifiable and reproducible results of the natural sciences. The effect is the same as Bullock 
describes of Jünger’s in Uber dem Schmerz, “From the point of view of human happiness as we 
ordinarily understand it, and the avoidance of human pain, this notion is quite appalling. The 
values of the entire tradition of rationality are rejected. The distinction between positive and 
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negative contents of experience is dismantled in favor of the contrary sovereignty constituted by 
the negation of those forces as powers over it.”278  
There is a tightrope which Al-e Ahmad tries to walk in preserving the dialectic necessity 
of the co-determination of individuals and community without putting forth a positive proposal 
of either or dissolving one into the other. This is not a question of the transcendent subject but of 
actually existing human beings, representatives of what, as we briefly saw in Buck-Morss’ 
argument above, Benjamin called “the tiny, fragile human body.” Jünger writes in Uber den 
Schmerz that “the world of the individual who takes pleasure or bemoans himself is behind us”; 
he would come to revisit and rethink his ideas about technology later in life, but this would 
always be his point of view. Thus he couched even his rejection of Nazism as a rejection of a 
modern intoxicant that plays upon human weaknesses—that is, the very possibility to feel 
pleasure and pain. Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin too viewed fascism as playing on pleasure, the 
“aestheticization of politics,”279 but did not see the solution in rendering individuals as affectless 
objects-in-the-world. To read Al-e Ahmad’s conclusion is to understand that this is part of the 
problem. 
Buck-Morss draws this phrase, “the tiny, fragile human body,” from Benjamin’s article, 
“The Storyteller.” Benjamin writes: 
With the [First] World War a process began to become apparent which has not halted since then. 
Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent – 
not richer, but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured out in the 
flood of war books was anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth. And there was 
nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than 
strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by 
mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to school on 
a horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained 
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unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in fields of force of destructive torrents and 
explosions was the tiny, fragile human body.
280
 
Following the First World War, a Benjamin describes a “process,” which had begun, a process 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad called, with many of the same formulations, mashinzadegi. And both 
Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad saw the purpose of their inquires as, in part, addressing the horror of 
this condition. This is one of the major vertices upon which Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin 
converge.  I say converge because this also corresponds to the observations I have examined in 
Jünger, but his project is wholly alien. For Jünger does not see this as the impoverishment of 
experience but precisely its opposite: “Time only strengthens my conviction that it was a good 
and strenuous life, and that the war, for all its destructiveness, was an incomparable schooling of 
the heart.”281 We do not need Benjamin’s article on “Theories of German Fascism” or his line 
here about “the flood of war books” to know that Jünger is not nearly as free as he proclaims 
himself to be. His freedom is an illusion, to prop up an alienated, diminishing ego with the Idea 
of freedom in the face of unfreedom. He has to not-see “the dead”. His “schooling of the heart” 
corresponds to a disability in the “eye of the heart” that Al-e Ahmad will bring up in Khassi dar 
Miqat.  Jünger may not “aestheticize politics” in a direct way, but his is an aesthetic of war, an 
anaesthetic.  
 Buck-Morss draws her idea of anaesthetics from several of Benjamin’s writings in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire,” and The Arcades Project, among others. Both Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad had, as 
part of a critique and extension of Marxist analysis, come upon similar “languages” to the “same 
question.” Jünger, it turns out, is the proof text of a very different comparison. In this chapter, I 
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have analyzed and come to understand how to read Gharbzadegi/gharbzadegi. I have also here, 
through Buck-Morss‘ conception of anaesthetics, seen one way in which Al-e Ahmad’s 
Gharbzadegi might be viewed in light of some of Benjamin’s observations. In the next chapter, I 



















Chapter 3: Pereat Mundus? Anaesthetics and Epistemology 
Introduction 
“‘Fiat ars– pereat mundus,’ says Fascism…”282 “Create Art- Destroy the World.”283 Benjamin 
begins the very last paragraph of his most famous essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” with this phrase. As Rolf Tiedemann notes, this is a play on “the 
motto of the sixteenth- century Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I: ‘Fiat iustitia et pereat 
mundus’ (‘Let justice be done and the world pass away.)”284 This phrase proves quite slippery. In 
“Aesthetics and Anaesthetics,” Susan Buck-Morss translates it in a footnote as: “Create justice, 
transform the world.”285 In this translation, Buck-Morss preemptively recapitulates her argument 
from The Dialectics of Seeing that the silent shadow commentary to Ursprung des Deutschen 
Trauerspiels [The Origin of German Tragic Drama] is a worldly, particularly Jewish and 
kabbalistic counter-argument to “the Baroque concept of Christian redemption” that “stood 
opposed to both nature and history.”286 This argument is that kabbalistic thought 
provided an alternative to the philosophical antimonies of not only Baroque Christian theology 
but also subjective idealism, its secular Enlightenment form. Specifically, Kabbalism avoided the 
split between spirit and matter which had resulted in the Baroque dramatists’ “treacherous” 
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I will return later in this chapter to Buck-Morss’ use of the term “Kabbalism” here via the 
question of Benjamin’s engagement with kabbalistic thought. What I want to focus on for now is 
the way in which these observations translate what can be, and most frequently is, a particular 
motto (that is, fiat iustitia et pereat mundus) from an expression of a rigid, other- or  anti-worldly 
deontological morality (“let there be justice, though the world perish”; that is, let there be static 
and already-given justice, even if the actually-existing world is destroyed) into a creative, 
contingent and yet still recognizably moral morality. Benjamin argues that justice must already 
include recognition of the epistemic limitations of being a part of the material world and modes 
of interpretation that are oriented toward the “redemption” of objects in the world.288 Buck-
Morss’ translation not only incorporates her argument from The Dialectics of Seeing but also 
Benjamin’s play on it at the end of “The Work of Art…” It fuses the creativity of artistic practice 
with the creativity of interpretive practice as always set against the concept of Christian / secular 
redemption.  
This is not to say that Buck-Morss’ translation is at all unfair or even exceptionally loose; 
the original Latin phrase provides a great deal of hermeneutic flexibility. Kant, famously, 
rendered it as, “Let justice rule on earth, although all the rogues in the world should go to the 
bottom.”289 This particular harmony290 incidentally provides some support for Buck-Morss’ 
contention about the connection or even equation between Christian other-worldliness and 
subjective idealism.  I dwell on this motto here for two reasons. First, it is the jumping-off point 
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for Buck-Morss’ exploration of the concept of “anaesthetics,” which I argued in the last chapter 
is also part and parcel of an understanding of Al-e Ahmad’s critique of gharbzadegi. Second, this 
particular tension, between an other-worldly idealism and an active, this-worldly, creative, 
pursuit and construction of justice, is also, as Farzin Vadhat claims, “at the heart” of Al-e 
Ahmad’s critique of Shiism and, as I argue, more broadly, from there,291 his style of a materially 
and temporally grounded, organic thought that is still, in some way, universalizable.  
In chapter 2, I described how Al-e Ahmad has been largely misunderstood and 
mischaracterized in much of the secondary literature about him. Furthermore, I argued that he 
was in fact engaged in a kind of post-Marxist critique that sought to understand several 
fundamental flaws in Marxist theory, most importantly the question of how the lumpenproletariat 
are produced and reproduced, and the attendant place/role of localized historical conditions in 
those processes. I claimed that the theory of gharbzadegi is largely concerned with this very 
question and is in many ways a response to and commentary addition upon Marx’s 18th Brumaire 
of Louis Napoleon. Finally, I noted that the contours of the critique of gharbzadegi are similar to 
those that Walter Benjamin identified in his own critique/addition in regard to Marxism. The 
issue that both of these authors are addressing is the one that Susan Buck-Morss has called 
“anaesthetics,” a matrix of cognitive-sensory effects upon, within, and through human subjects 
in modern conditions. Although over the course of this chapter and the next I will perform 
several of my own readings of Benjamin and address a number of his commentators, I am 
building my arguments concerning Benjamin largely on the foundation of Buck-Morss’ reading 
of Benjamin – particularly in the Dialectics of Seeing (1991) and several articles. I do this for 
several reasons. I find her account of Benjamin’s work – which takes into account the entirety of 
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his output as well as historical context– among the most thorough and plausible readings of 
Benjamin and his oeuvre. Additionally, in hewing close to Benjamin’s own materialist, 
“theological,” and textual commitments – and not eliding these – her reading proves particularly 
resonant with this dissertation. That said, in this chapter and the next I am augmenting, 
modifying, and disputing several elements of Buck-Morss’ reading; indeed, part of the purpose 
of this form of comparative philosophical reading I am performing is to help elucidate and 
highlight elements of a thinker that may have been overlooked or unconsidered in previous 
renderings.  
In this chapter, I will proceed dialectically from the starting point of “anaesthetics.” First, 
I begin with a brief discussion of Al-e Ahmad and roshanfekri [enlightenment
292
] that helps to 
connect much of the discussion of Benjamin below to my discussion of Al-e Ahmad in chapter 2 
as well as to set up the parallels, convergences, and divergences which are the subject of my 
fourth and final chapter. In addressing the phenomenon that Buck-Morss describes as 
“anaesthetics,” Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad both present materialist arguments that include an 
engagement with religious practices as necessitated by materialist concerns.
293
 The primary topic 
of this chapter is how we should understand the close relationship between Benjamin’s most 
recognizably material concerns – the effect of material conditions on the sensory capacities of 
human bodies – with his seemingly esoteric concerns with Talmudic and kabbalistic 
interpretation. In order to address this topic, I must first explore how Buck-Morss constructs the 
concept of “anaesthetics” and how she connects it to Benjamin’s interest in Jewish practice. To 
do this requires addressing some of the most basic elements of Benjamin’s philosophy and 
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methodology.  I also attempt to elucidate Benjamin’s views of the kabbalah.  Not only have these 
positions often obscured Benjamin’s other interests in Jewish practices and concepts, but they 
can appear to conflict directly with his stated anti-Neoplatonic positions. Finally, in order to 
discuss aspects of the broader Judaic contours of Benjamin’s thought, in terms of understanding 
his interest in aggadah and halachah and the difference between the ‘messianic’ and 
‘apocalyptic,’ I address what I called in my introduction “The Critique of Violence School” of 
Benjamin interpretation, which has quite successfully obscured and confused these important 
contours and distinctions.  
Enlightenment and Roshanfekri 
Vadhat writes: 
At the heart of three related dilemmas that Al-e Ahmad never managed to resolve completely was 
the failure, indeed the inability, of secular movements to disseminate rushankfekri 
[enlightenment], as he called the universalization of empowerment. Secular ideologies could not 
penetrate the depth of the social universal, he maintained, as Iranian history had proven time and 
again… But at the same time, Al-e Ahmad found religion to be the greatest obstacle to 
disseminating rushanfekri. In particular he criticized the Shiite expectation of justice (intizar) 
upon the advent of the promised Imam…294 
In other words, Shiism contained elements of both Christian other-worldliness and immanent, 
materialist critique. However, unlike Shariati, who would present this as an easy and obviously 
solvable problem, Al-e Ahmad saw that part of Shiism’s ‘success,’ at least in terms of its 
historical colonial resistance, was based in part on the very clerical intransigence and 
obscurantism that he wanted to critique.   
 As Hamid Dabashi notes in Theology of Discontent and as Vadhat echoes, Al-e Ahmad 
began Dar Khedmat va Khianat Roshenfekran [On the Service and Treason of the Intellectuals] 
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in the wake of the failed clerical revolution of 1963 – which, among other things, resulted in the 
subsequent exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. As Vadhat explains, Al-e Ahmad’s dilemma was 
twofold: 
… on the one hand, he found clerics “ineligible” to become “indigenous” intellectuals and 
therefore political leaders of the nation because they, like members of the military, belonged to the 
realm of “obedience” (ta’abud.) 
This is to say that in addition to the devastating but primarily socio-historical critique of 
“traditionalism” he had already performed in Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad was lodging a formal, 
philosophical and political critique as well: namely, that the structure both of the thought and of 
the organization of the Shiite clergy was not conducive to roshanfekri. Al-e Ahmad’s particular 
characterization of roshanfekri does not map one-to-one with “Enlightenment.”  Vadhat notes 
that Al-e Ahmad defined roshanfekri partially as the “dissemination of free-thinking and the 
freedom to ask questions” in opposition to previous epistemic forms that relied on authoritarian 
“command” structures.295 This seems remarkably similar to a straight adaptation of the famous 
Kantian line that “Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is 
the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance.”296 However – and this 
seems to be a moment where Vadhat overlooks the Gramscian connection – this roshanfekri 
(literally “bright-thinking” or “enlightened-thinking,” that is to say, an activity), unlike the 
Kantian equivalent and clearly incorporating the historical revision of the Kantian project that 
began with Hegel and continued through Marx and others, is always contingent in its 
performance, form, and content on the historical conditions required to produce it. For Al-e 
Ahmad, ahistorical roshanfekri is literally impossible.  
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 This epistemological commitment, in addition to considerations of political efficacy 
which Vadhat and others emphasize, led Al-e Ahmad to his paradoxical relationship and 
engagement with Shiism. As Vadhat continues: 
On the other hand, he believed that “by virtue of its defense of tradition, the Shiite clergy” was 
not only a “resistance force against the encroachments of colonialism whose primary target for 
pillaging is cultural and traditional,” but also “a bulwark against the Westoxication of 
intellectuals and the absolute submission of government to the West and its imperialism.
297
  
So Al-e Ahmad is left with the dilemma: Shiite clerics by their philosophical and political nature 
block the possibility of roshanfekri while they seem, simultaneously, somewhat unique in their 
ability to resist certain aspects of foreign economical, political and cultural imperialism. 
Furthermore, as becomes evident in Khassi dar Miqat [Lost in the Crowd
298
] and Sangi bar Guri 
[A Stone on a Grave], this dilemma not only apply to clerics, but concerns Shiism and Islam 
more broadly. It contains within it both the revolutionary potential and the reactionary impulse. 
Vadhat accurately presents Al-e Ahmad’s “dilemmas” as “unresolved,” but there is at least one 
proposition upon which Al-e Ahmad insists, in terms of clerics and politics:  
…if clerics decided to participate in sociopolitical movements, they would have to abandon their 
idea of government based on revelation or else refrain from political activity altogether.
299
 
 Although Al-e Ahmad never gives the concept of ‘religion’ the kind of explicit critique he 
performs in Gharbzadegi upon the concept of the ‘traditional,’ he continues in Dar Khedmat va 
Khianat Roshanfekran an extended and ultimately unfinished critique of religion. The critique 
starts with this particular admonition – the separation of revelation from politics – and extends to 
the conclusion of his Meccan travelogue Khassi dar Miqat, where he proposes what I read as the 
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separation of a specific kind of ‘faith,’ that is, a ‘certain faith,’ from ‘religion.’ There he 
introduces the idea of religion without this kind of “faith,” a religion of “question marks.”300 This 
unfinished critique, as I’ve called it, is not merely incomplete; its trajectories are also unresolved. 
I will return to the question of this critique later in this chapter and also in chapter 4. For the 
moment, however, I will return to the discussion of “anaesthetics”. 
Anaesthetics and Benjamin 
I argued in the previous chapter that in Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad was addressing one of the 
same primary concerns as do certain works of Benjamin: namely, an answer to the question of 
how certain material conditions, including economic, political, intellectual and psychological 
conditions, work upon people in different varieties of advanced capitalist economies to produce 
what amount to lumpenproletariat subjects,
301
 how specific varieties of phantasmagoria literally 
desensitize people. This is one of the areas Marx had overlooked, and also potentially one of the 
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th
 Brumaire, while leaving this discussion 
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answers to the post-WWI and -WWII question as to why Marx was, in some specific ways, 
wrong. This move in Benjamin has been best characterized, by Buck-Morss, as a critique of 
“anaesthetics.” Before moving further in my discussion of Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad’s different 
approaches to this conceptual problem, I think it worthwhile to spend some time understanding 
both how Buck-Morss defines the concept, comes to analyze it, and also how Benjamin 
formulated the ideas and work that led Buck-Morss to fashion the category in the first place.  
 Although Buck-Morss begins “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics” with Benjamin’s comments 
on the Fascist aestheticization of politics vs. the Communist politicization of aesthetics, the 
actual architecture she creates for the concept of “anaesthetics” rests on two foundations. The 
first is a location, both empirical and philosophical, of the “senses” as firmly ensconced within 
the material, biological human being. I also term this location philosophical because Buck-Morss 
is careful to avoid the trap of neuro-scientistic reduction of the human senses to merely the 
functioning of neurons, organs, etc. The biological realities constitute – indeed, must constitute – 
some part of the foundation for a philosophy of the senses, for aesthetics, but they do not 
constitute the limits of that philosophy.
302
 And beginning with the biological fact is not merely to 
be an ideologically ‘good’ materialist. Nor is it merely to write correctively against both 
Cartesian dualism and the anti-sensual in Kant. It also reconnects the question of “aesthetics” – 
so successfully abstracted from the sensual by Kant in the Critique of Judgement – with the 
senses themselves, as activities and effects of bodies which are fragile, manipulable, and which 
mediate between a bodily world and a sensory world, as opposed to linking a sensory world to an 
intellectual world.  
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 The second foundation is a story built upon the first:
303
 “Walter Benjamin’s 
understanding of modern experience is neurological.”304 This statement comes in relation to 
Benjamin’s discussion of the poetry of Baudelaire, its reception, and the audience it seemed to 
anticipate unconsciously, in his work on the poet. In this discussion, as Buck-Morss notes, 
Benjamin enters into one of his longest engagements with the work of Freud. However, he only 
does this after dismissing an entire early twentieth century philosophical phenomenon: 
Since the end of the last century, philosophy has made a series of attempts to lay hold of the 
“true” experience as opposed to the kind that manifests itself in the standardized, denatured life of 
the civilized masses. It is customary to classify these efforts under the heading of a philosophy of 
life. Their point of departure, understandably enough, was not man’s life in society. What they 
invoked was poetry, preferably nature, and, most recently, the age of myths.
305
 
This is perfectly in line with Benjamin’s general disposition towards the early existentialist 
philosophers, particularly Heidegger. 
306
 For Benjamin, the “true” being, as in a “true” atomic 
self or even a self-actualizing, autonomous self, was a ridiculous, ahistorical myth, and, he 
pointed out, one that had ended most recently with the universalizing mythological magical 
thinking of “Klages and Jung,”307 who, not coincidentally, “made common cause with 
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Fascism.”308 If there was a “true” as in a real to be apprehended, it was precisely in what was in 
“man’s life in society” and perhaps among some of the “standardized, denatured life of the 
civilized masses.”309  
 This dismissal sets the stage for a friendly engagement with Jung’s teacher, Freud. 
Drawing on Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Benjamin writes, “In Freud’s view, consciousness as 
such receives no memory traces whatever, but has another important function: protection against 
stimuli.”310 This may seem an odd digression in an introduction to a reading of the poetry of 
Baudelaire, but Benjamin continues, following his discussion of Freud, to make the case explicit: 
“The question suggests itself how lyric poetry can have as its basis an experience for which the 
shock experience has become the norm.”311 Benjamin is deeply aware that he is moving Freud’s 
insight into “shock” in Beyond the Pleasure Principle far away from its original context, namely 
“shell shock” and other war-related neuroses. As Buck-Morss continues: 
Perceptions that once occasioned conscious reflection are now the source of shock-impulses that 
consciousness must parry. In industrial production no less than modern warfare, in street crowds 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
project to collapse the false antithesis between the “natural” and “human” worlds. It is not that Benjamin does not 
believe that there are special and unique qualities to humans. Rather, it’s that there is simply only one world and it is 
the natural world.  
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Benjamin, Buck-Morss argues here, was making the argument that to understand Baudelaire, we 
had to reconstitute our sense of the “norm” of the “modern experience” more broadly. In other 
words, Buck-Morss says through and with Benjamin that the “human sensorium” in modernity is 
“exposed” to:   
…physical shocks that have their correspondence in psychic shock, as Baudelaire’s poetry bears 
witness. To record the “breakdown” of experience was the “mission” of Baudelaire’s poetry: he 
“placed shock at the very center of his artistic work.”  
This, then, is the second foundation of the “anaesthetic,” the moment where the logic of 
aesthetics as understood as the interaction between the external world and the bodily senses, of 
which particularly ‘the arts’ (that is, what had historically been marked as particularly one of the 
primary objects of aesthetic philosophy) are exemplary, is turned on its head. Instead of an 
expansion of sensory and hence, simultaneously, cognitive experience, there is a “numbing,” or 
even damage or destruction of the effects of that nervous system. As she remarks later in the 
essay, “Beginning in the nineteenth century, a narcotic was made out of reality itself.”313  
If we can conceptually materialize and historicize the process that Benjamin is 
describing, and imagine a scene in which, instead of the Kantian abstract universal disembodied 
critic, a very much embodied critic, in a geography of an intellectual safe and sufficient critical 
distance were writing – in, say, Iran – we might imagine that this phenomenon would look an 
awful lot like gharbzadegi, particularly in its intoxicating or active translation, like being struck 
by the West.  Buck-Morss writes that “Drug addiction is characteristic of modernity. It is the 
correlate and counterpart to shock.”314 Gharbzadegi addresses within in its multiple valences 
both the sense of shock and the sense of addiction. It should scarcely be faulted, at least from a 
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materialist point of view, in locating a particular economic (and frequently cartographic) 
geography that dominates the ways in which power moves along those valences. It is not that 
“modernity” is happening exclusively in Europe and centrally in Germany and France and then 
being viewed from afar, but rather that the modern landscape is remarkably different there, and 
the political, economic, and social forces and their attendant analyses and critiques appear 
remarkably and understandably inflected with a locality that is absent from their discourse.  
 However, we should not think of Baudelaire only as the site for critique. Benjamin marks 
Baudelaire as perhaps an intervention for “emancipation.”315 As Benjamin continues after the 
“mission” section Buck-Morss cites: 
He [Baudelaire] envisioned blank spaces which he filled in with his poems. His work cannot be 




As Buck-Morss intimates, there is a connection between this analysis of Baudelaire and 
Benjamin’s cryptic comments about how Fascism aestheticizes politics while Communism 
politicizes aesthetics. I think, however, that Benjamin makes the point more or less explicit in 
this short passage: Baudelaire, a highly unlikely candidate for this role, is (perhaps not at all 
consciously) politicizing aesthetics by having “cushioned” the shock even while rendering the 
modern, urban conditions that are characterized by shock. In this way, he does not overwhelm 
the senses so much as it help them come to grips with the norms of the conditions those senses, 
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and the self they are ensconced within, exist in. This ‘cushioning’ does not harden human 
subjects to the “shocks of modern life,” but actually helps subjects understand and experience 
them, as these shocks, like everything else for Benjamin, have a messianic double: in this case, a 
shock that can effect a realignment of consciousness, even if for but a moment. Although 
Baudelaire comes up short in some ways for Benjamin, it is important to note that in Baudelaire 
there is something of the revolutionary, that is to say, messianic possibility that would later come 
to define Benjamin’s philosophy of history.  
 It is helpful to remember that Benjamin at one point intended the essays on Baudelaire 
(which later were separated from the mass of the material and became “Paris, Capital of the 
Nineteenth Century”) as the introduction to The Arcades Project, as a kind of prologue and 
theoretical musing to set the stage for the staggering work to come. This, Benjamin states in a 
1935 letter to Adorno, is much akin to the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to the Trauerspiel study. 
In his letter, Benjamin writes that the Trauerspiel prologue will be much like the Baudelaire 
material in that “the self-contained exposition of the epistemological premises followed their 
probative formulation in the material itself, the same will be the case here.”317 Furthermore, 
Benjamin does not merely indicate a parallel but in fact a connective harmony between all these 
works: 
Moreover, in a way surprising even to me, the analogies between this book and the Baroque book 
[the Trauerspiel] now emerge far more clearly than at any earlier stage of the plan. You must 
allow me to see this as an especially significant confirmation of the process of remelting by which 
the whole mass of ideas, originally driven by metaphysics, has reached a state of aggregation in 
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The major works, the Trauerspiel and the Passagenwerk, are not merely shown to be analogous 
through the Baudelaire exposé. The 1935 exposé, which Benjamin is sending to Adorno for his 
review has ‘confirmed’ an original “mass of ideas,” formulated and “driven,” by “metaphysics,” 
through a “process of remelting,” and has reached a “state of aggregation,” containing so many 
“dialectical images,” that “objections provoked by metaphysics” fall away. That is to say the 
objections that people would make or have made to both the original positions and the fact that 
they were “driven” by “metaphysics” are addressed. This is a tremendous claim, for it prohibits 
any tidy bifurcation between different Benjamins (the “literary Benjamin,” the “theological 
Benjamin,” “the Marxist Benjamin,” etc.), a project scholars have attempted in the past. Earlier 
in the letter, Benjamin explicitly places himself within “the Marxist debate,” and indeed as 
holding a “strong position” therein because he is claiming – and I would concur with his claim – 
to be the first scholar to attempt to deal with “the fundamental question of the historical image,” 
which he is addressing “for the first time in all its implications.”319 Here, Benjamin is linking the 
question of the senses as raised in the Baudelaire essays, to the methodology and scope of the 
Passagenwerk and to the metaphysics explicitly and implicitly outlined in the Trauerspiel. 




 Despite Benjamin’s protestation that he “must” be allowed to see his project as “an 
especially significant confirmation,” Adorno felt quite differently. Writing in response to 
Benjamin, after several pages of criticisms of the piece, he embarks on several withering 
critiques of Benjamin’s effort. First, he admonishes Benjamin, saying that the grand work he has 
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embarked on in the Passsagenwerk, as introduced by the Baudelaire exposé, may in fact be 
reinforcing rather than dialectically undermining the archaic magical thinking of Jung: 
The collective consciousness was invented only to distract attention from true objectivity and from 
the alienated subjectivity that is its correlate. Our task is to polarize and dissolve this 
“consciousness” dialectically into society and individual, and not to galvanize it as a pictorial 
correlative of the commodity character. That no differentiation between classes remains in the 
dreaming collective speaks a clear enough warning… Thus, the disenchantment of the dialectical 




Adorno warns Benjamin that he is slipping dangerously out of a truly materialist Marxist 
paradigm, which would identify each experience as not only primarily but thoroughly and 
completely determined through class position. In the presentation of the material constellations 
that constitute the Arcades Project, especially as framed through the lens of the Baudelaire 
exposé emphasizing the question of the numbing of the senses and the role of poetry and, by 
direct connection, philosophy, in filling in the “blank spaces” left by the shock of the modern 
condition, Adorno believes that Benjamin is reproducing, instead of explaining, “unrefracted 
mythical thinking.” In relating this criticism to the Arcades Project as a whole, Adorno correctly 
notes that Benjamin, despite populating the work with what amounts to various characters, does 
mark modernity as a unifying condition affecting all (albeit always in historically and materially 
specific and embedded ways). Adorno’s critique is apt, if one wants to preserve (as the Adorno 
of 1935 apparently did) certain elements of Marxist orthodoxy. Benjamin, as noted above, posits 
that he views this as part of “the Marxist debate.” But implicitly, he participates in that debate in 
order to introduce a corrective.  
What Adorno does not appreciate here is that Benjamin is challenging not only what 
orthodox Marxists categorize as proper ‘theory’ and ‘philosophy,’ but also meditating on how to 
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be true to the task Marx famously set out in his final thesis on Feuerbach: “the philosophers have 
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”322 If we 
understand Baudelaire as writing poetry both as a necessary and perhaps even conscious creation 
of, and reaction to, a modern condition in which “shock” is the norm, then a different kind of 
philosophy altogether is called for. One of Adorno’s chief criticisms of Benjamin’s work in the 
mid-1930s was what Adorno viewed as Benjamin’s under-theorization, but Benjamin precisely 
wanted the arrangement of the materials – which accreted historical experience in them – to 
somehow allow the theory itself to produced by an individual coming to consciousness.
323
  
Benjamin may openly call this project an attempt at an Urgeschichte of the nineteenth century 
[Ur-history, or as Edmund Jephcott translates, as related in the Selected Writings, “primal 
history”]324 but it is consciously written as such within and to the moment of the twentieth 
century. As such, in the name of historical materialism, self-criticism, and fulfilling Marx’s own 
maxim, Benjamin’s project pushes at the frayed edges of what constitutes class experience, what 
separates class experiences and individual experiences. It does not do so to reify a liberal 
conception of the individual, nor does it accept that there is only base and superstructure, 
discretely separate from each other.  
For Benjamin then, a new mode of philosophy is demanded and practiced (as Buck-
Morss asks broadly in the title of the appropriate chapter in The Dialectics of Seeing: “Is this 
Philosophy?”). Adorno himself would, in some respects, come to reverse this particular position 
and to rethink these same edges in his post World War II work, particularly in Negative 
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Dialectics, at a point where edges were not merely frayed but completely torn. The philosophical 
intervention that Benjamin wishes to enact, and for which the Baudelaire exposé provides the 
metaphorical and material introduction, does not collapse paradoxes, conflicts and, above all, 
differences into archaic, ahistorical, transcendental, and pre-existing archetypes in the Jungian 
mode. Far from it. Benjamin seeks, as he later explicitly claims as the task of the historical 
materialist, to “explode a specific epoch out of the homogenous course of history.” That is to 
say, Benjamin understood this mass arrangement (in the Passagenwerk) of what Adorno saw as 
an attempt to “galvanize… a pictorial correlative of the commodity character” as an opportunity 
to present an impossibly exhaustive catalogue of a particular moment, as a “constellation 
overflowing with tensions” that has the potential to present “a revolutionary chance in the 
struggle for the suppressed past.”325 Far from sliding into mass-collective consciousness to 
mirror Jung’s collective unconscious, Benjamin was formulating the Passagenwerk as an attempt 
at a new messianic philosophy of history that he was never able to fully articulate.  
As Adorno’s response continues, he alights upon the most crucial turn in what Benjamin 
was proposing: 
If I might venture to draw together the arc of my critique, it would have to encompass the 
extremes. How could it be otherwise? A restitution of theology, or rather a radicalization of the 
dialectic extending into its incandescent theological core, would necessarily also mean an extreme 
sharpening of the social – indeed economic – motif of the dialectic… But only a precise definition 
of the industrial form of the commodity as clearly distinct from the earlier form could fully yield 
the “primal history” and ontology of the nineteenth century. All allusions to the commodity form 
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As I noted earlier, Benjamin thought his position particularly crucial within the Marxist debate 
precisely because it was the first to deal with historical “image,” with artifact and production in 
“all its implications.” Furthermore, Benjamin viewed this position as taking into account the idea 
that philosophy must stand not only on “definitions” as Adorno partly demands, but also upon 
“standpoint,” which, in essence, Adorno dismisses here.327 Adorno insists in this letter (and 
reinforces the same insistence a few lines later) on an abstracted theoretical framework, here, a 
recognizably Marxist one. “A precise definition of the industrial form of the commodity could 
full yield the ‘primal history’ and ontology of the nineteenth century,” only if Marxism is taken 
as a given and not as a guide. Benjamin is addressing material/industrial production, but also 
lived experience of the objects, images, texts, etc. He is also, in breaking from Marxist 
theoretical orthodoxy, emphasizing the positionality of the philosopher and of the reader. All are 
individuals within vast interlaced networks of material relation and production that make up the 
modern condition for which the Arcades are a paradigmatic case and emblem, and for which the 
Passagenwerk is a philosophical intervention in the sense implied both by the exposé and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
taken historically. The commodity character specific [Adorno’s emphasis) for the nineteenth century… would need 
to be far more clearly elaborated in material terms…” Even an evolving concept of history that had messianism at its 
center would be impossible, since that would imply, in fact, what amounts to, for Adorno, an ahistorical, idealist 
stance, i.e., for Adorno, theology. Adorno is telling Benjamin that he has taken up for himself a not only physically 
impossible task – something Benjamin would say himself of his own project time and again – but a logically 
impossible one as well. Adorno would elaborate on this idea some twenty-two years later in his short essay “Reason 
and Revelation,” when he argued that, “There once was a time when religion… insisted upon its truth even in the 
cosmological sense, because it knew its claim to truth could not be separated from its material and concrete contents 
without incurring damage.” (The Frankfurt School on Religion, 172) Adorno is doing two things here. One, he is 
advancing a generalizable category of religion which is synonymous with Christianity. He is of course not alone in 
this mistake, but it is particularly detrimental to his analysis here. Islam and Judaism had long reconciled 
cosmological truth with revealed Truth. Because of specific characteristics within Christianity, this is always a 
crisis. This leads to the second move: Adorno himself is guilty of deeply ahistorical thinking in this critique. He is 
positing that there was “real religion” sometime in the past and that now it is gone and only exists in facsimile form. 
Benjamin, as I will examine more closely in the next section, is working far closer to a vaguely kabbalistic-inspired 
position in which the theological idea, which is commentary upon reality, is always being produced historically and 
cannot have any “reality” other than its historical manifestation. Oddly, in this very same essay, Adorno remarks 
that Judaism, perhaps because of historicist insight, chose “to stipulate virtually no dogmas and to demand nothing 
but that people live according to the law.” Whatever the truth value of this claim, the fact that Adorno overlooked it 
in his concluding sweeping statements speaks to the power of the historically hegemonic position of Christianity.  
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demanded by Marx’s final thesis on Feuerbach. To incorporate the lived, daily experience of 
individuals, philosophers and otherwise, within the modern condition, even at a safe historical 
distance, is to undermine the primacy of what Benjamin is implicitly critiquing as a now-
ahistorical Marxist dialectics of economic and social conditions. Adorno – who, admittedly, is a 
strange choice to be playing the role of orthodox Marxist – describes these moves as 
“intolerable.” The discussion of the commodity “as such” is a reification of its phantasmagoria 
(in Marx’s original sense, the hiding of its origins in estranged labor). Any commentary on that 
can merely be “metaphorical” and not the “precise definition” that Adorno desires.  
But above all, Adorno has illuminated the problem, if indirectly, perhaps out of deference 
to his friend and respect for his scholarship and acumen.
328
 And in this case Adorno proves more 
insightful than Benjamin, or perhaps just more transparent in his language. If Benjamin’s desire 
for a mass unified project as announced in his letter to Adorno is carried through it would, in its 
logical conclusion, require “a restitution of theology” and all the attendant work and 
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reorientation that would involve. As I will address in the next section, the Baroque dramatists in 
the Trauerspiel study required a “theological” critique that addressed their attitude toward the 
fallen state of the world in a way that is parallel to Baudelaire’s poetry in being built from and 
for the shocks of the modern condition. The Arcades Project is both a material ‘ur-history’ of the 
nineteenth century and the enactment and provision of materials for the commencement or 
possibility of an explosion of messianic time. Both of these, addressed together, correlate as a 
cohesive whole quite well to the description Adorno provides of some kind of “restitution of 
theology” or “radicalization of the dialectic extending into its incandescent theological core” (i.e. 
extension, or re-attachment, of philosophy to theology.)
329
  
 Adorno, who is quite open about his criticisms of Benjamin’s work in this letter, seems to 
dance around the issue of theology. What is clear, though, is that Benjamin took Adorno’s 
criticism to heart and never wrote the “restitution of theology,” even as the theological and other 
elements of the “metaphysics of youth” that had so excited him haunted his work until his death. 
Theology, as such, as Benjamin’s first thesis in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History”330 tells 
us, is wizened and must remain out of sight. I will address more closely Adorno’s use and 
direction of thought after Benjamin’s death in Chapter 4. Now, however, I will set out to 
understand how and in what manner, even “out of sight,” Benjamin returned to “theology.” What 
was this theology? What kinds of thought and practices did it entail? Why did it remain 
necessary in an avowedly “Marxist debate,” where it would seem least welcome? 
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Materialism, Religious Practice, and Judaism 
Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” completed sometime in the Spring of 
1940,
331
 were, in part, drawn from Convolute N of The Arcades Project and were intended as a 
“methodological introduction to” it.332 I would like to consider here and over the next several 
sections specifically the first thesis, as read in the context of other discussions of materialism and 
“theology” in Convolute N:333 
The authentic concept of a universal history is a messianic concept. Universal history, as it is 
understood today, in an affair of obscurantists.
334
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Bear in mind that commentary on reality (for it is a question here of commentary, of interpretation 
in detail) calls for a method completely different from that required by commentary on a text. In 
the one case, the scientific mainstay is theology; in the other case, philology.
335
 
The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of 
chess, answering each move of an opponent with a countermove… A system of mirrors created the 
illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an 
expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can imagine 
a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called “historical materialism” is to win all 
the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as 
we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight.
336
 
“Theology,” we are told here, “today” – that is to say, we are told by a marked Jewish 
intellectual, today, here, 1940, Nazi-Occupied France
337
 – is “wizened and has to keep out of 
sight.” The system appears to be fully autonomous, self-governing, and self-sustaining. But at a 
first glance at Benjamin’s description it can appear that what is being described is a deception. 
The spectators and the opposing player marvel at the seeming fully technological (the sign of the 
utilitarian scientific) apparatus that has bested all challengers. It seems a triumph not only of 
technology, and of ‘pure’ scientific thinking, but specifically of technology over nature. Humans 
have demonstrated full mastery over ‘nature’ (extending for just one second the spurious 
separation of ‘technology’ from ‘nature’). As Tiedemann reminds us in the Gesammelte 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constellation overflowing with tensions.” The earlier section of Convolute N that is explicitly on methodology is 
expressed in a simultaneously descriptive and imperative tense. Benjamin himself reminds and instructs – very 
much in the Hebraic imperative mode of so many of the mitzvot, to zakhor, “remember,” which is implicit here– 
“How this work was written: rung by rung, according as chance would offer a narrow foothold, and always like 
someone who scales dangerous heights and never allows himself a moment to look around, for fear of becoming 
dizzy (but also because he would save for the end the full force of the panorama opening out to him.” The Arcades 
Project, 460, Convolute N [2,4]. A new mitzvah:היגולודותמה תא רוכז [Remember the Methodology]. Theology is not 
Schmitt’s cosmological order; it is a religious activity. 
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Schriften notes, this was, in fact, the historical case, as the device in question was actually built 
by “the polymath scholar and inventor Baron Wolfgang von Kemplen to entertain his sovereign 
Maria Theresa… the automaton toured the great cities of Europe in 1783-1784, winning most of 
its matches.” It even, as Tiedemann tells us, defeated Napoleon in a game in 1809. To be fair, the 
phrase “most of its matches” indicates that the actual incarnation of the device, while perfectly in 
line with the trajectory of the dialectic outlined in Benjamin’s description, left some room for 
further technological improvement.  But, particularly with the Napoleonic victory in hand, the 
ultimately inevitable and mechanical Marxist historical order and sense of progress is clear and 
‘victorious’ over all other comers.  
The “secret” of the actual apparatus was revealed in 1834 and the apparatus itself was 
soon packed away into a museum and forgotten.
338
 The revealed deception was that all along it 
was just a small man, who also happened to be a chess master, hidden inside, who was operating 
the device, moving the various mechanical arms of both game-playing and even performing a 
wide-variety of “expressive” motions. But this is only a deception within the logic of what 
Adorno and Horkheimer would later come to call the “dialectic of enlightenment”; it is only a 
deception if the goal is to have reason triumph over itself, which is to say, over reasoners. I 
would  suggest, however, that this logic is only one element of the ways in which we can 
understand Benjamin’s presentation of the chess-playing automaton. The parallel follows to a 
certain extent. “Historical materialism” is like the apparatus; it appears to have a counter-move 
to every play, to fully understand the rules of the game, and to achieve its telos, winning. It 
appears a God-like triumph of both analysis and execution: human intellect analyzing a given 
scenario and imbuing inert matter with the power to best organic beings. Especially under the 
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heading of Über den Begriff der Geschichte, one can easily make the connection that Marxism 
‘has all the answers’ to the “concept of history.” But this argument only works – and here is the 
‘deception’ reading – with the hidden help of “theology,” with the help of specific theological 
practices and, in particular, a Jewish messianic view of history.  
But there is another way to read Benjamin here that productively takes into account the 
specificity of the “small man.” It is not just a case of a small chess master hidden within the 
device, i.e. it is not merely that the device relies upon its hidden operator to achieve its success; it 
is not, to borrow a Benjaminian phrase from elsewhere, a “one way street.” The man, too, relies 
upon the device. The small man in question is in fact a buckliger Zwerg, a “hunchback dwarf” or 
a “crookback pygmy” or a “humpback midget.” Not only is the man a buckliger Zwerg, he is 
also, like “theology,” klein und häßlich. Again “small,” doubly emphasized, but also häßlich, 
ugly, deformed, hideous, ill-favored, gross. Zohn suggests the translation as “wizened,” bringing 
klein und häßlich together in a category of withered old age; this hunchback is, perhaps, wasting 
away. What begins to become apparent, though, is that eine buckliger Zwerg, klein und häßlich, 
even if he is also ein Meister im Schachspiel (a master at playing chess), needs the apparatus to 
play the game, and to win, at least as much as the apparatus needs the buckliger Zwerg to operate 
at all. He is deformed, ugly, miniscule, decrepit, and above all incapable of the activity to which 
he is most directly suited, Schachspiel. Historical materialism may need a messianic conception 
of history to work, but theology –  understand as a religious practice – equally needs historical 
materialism to act on its own concepts, to fulfill its own messianic conception of history. These 
needs connect the critique of “anaesthetics” with which I began this chapter to Benjamin’s 
“theology.” But why then the need for the illusion or the deception at all? Why must the dwarf 





I would argue that Benjamin seems to have internalized Adorno’s criticism-challenge 
from 1936, that Benjamin’s project would require a “restitution of theology,” as well as 
Adorno’s criticism from 1939 that “it does not seem to me [Adorno] that the concept of empathy 
with inorganic matter yields anything decisive,” particularly in terms of “Marxist pertinence.”339 
In addition, Benjamin’s particular experience as an assimilated German-Jew should not be 
ignored.
340
 But in terms of “the concept of empathy with inorganic matter” – Adorno’s words, 
not Benjamin’s – Benjamin saw this concept as a fundamental and indissoluble link between 
theology as a religious practice and materialism as a transformative worldview. One must, he 
thought, remain “loyal” to the world of objects and to objects in the world. This is one of the 
unnamed concepts that, as Benjamin argues in his earlier letter to Adorno, extend from the 
Trauerspiel through the Passagenwerk. It is also one of the concepts that clearly demonstrates 
the Judaic character of his theology and of his messianism. To understand this, we must turn to 
the earlier work, the Trauerspiel, to grasp the way that Benjamin viewed a Christian worldview 
as “betraying” the very world it claims to save.  
Die Versteckte Zwerg  
For “commentary on reality,” Benjamin says, “the scientific mainstay is theology.” To 
understand why this is the case, we must address the project which Benjamin sets out in the 
Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels. The Trauerspiel study is a historical materialist work, 
without being explicitly Marxist. Written largely over the course of 1923 and 1924, Benjamin’s 
work was nominally a utilitarian move to achieve Habilitation status in the German university 
system which, in turn, would allow him to work as a Privatdozent. However, Benjamin was, as 
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George Steiner argues, deeply committed to the project, “devouring” library archives like a 
“Coleridge or Marx” and “steeped in the actual composition of the Ursprung.”341 Particularly 
important in Benjamin’s development of the Trauerspiel was the time he spent finishing the 
work in the spring and summer of 1924, when meeting the Bolshevik actress Asja Lacis “raised 
in his mind the possibilities of ‘a radical communism’”: 
Simultaneously, Benjamin was reading Lukács’ History of Class Consciousness; it was striking 
and, in a sense, validating, observed Benjamin, that Lukács, operating from wholly political 




One could argue that there was something in this simultaneity that helped Benjamin – still in his 
‘pre-Marxist’ phase, but after he had met Adorno et al – to see a potential fusion between the 
more political “Manifesto” side of Marx and the political economist Marx of Capital.  But there 
is a crucial connection between the Trauerspiel and the Passagenwerk that is still missing in my 
presentation. 
In The Dialectics of Seeing, Buck-Morss makes the case
343
 that we must see the 
Trauerspiel as part of a complete project that culminates in the Passagenwerk. There is, she 
argues, a constant shadow counter-argument that runs throughout the Trauerspiel.  Buck-Morss 
summarizes it as follows: 
The German Baroque dramatists understood each of nature’s elements as full of signification that 
humans only needed to interpret in order to uncover truth. But the fact that each element could be 
translated in a multiplicity of paradoxical ways so that ultimately any object could stand for 
anything else, implied referential arbitrariness, which seemed to negate the very claim of a 
“meaningful” nature. As we have seen, Benjamin praised the Baroque dramatists for recognizing 
that this paradox demanded a “theological” (thus philosophical) solution, not an aesthetic one. 
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But he criticized the particular theological frame which they employed, because in the dialectical 
leap from the hill of skulls to the resurrection of the spirit they “treacherously” abandoned to the 
devil the very sorrowful nature, the very physical suffering that had been their original concern.
344
 
Here, Buck-Morss summarizes her rendition of Benjamin’s analysis and critique in the 
Trauerspiel. The “German Baroque dramatists” had – in line, of course, with the historical 
material conditions of the nineteenth century – alighted upon part of a methodology that would 
allow them to interpret nature in search of truth. Benjamin argues in the Trauerspiel that the use 
of allegory by the Baroque dramatists led them along a methodologically appropriate path to 
interpret nature as inherently laden with meaning, as “full of signification that humans only 
needed to interpret in order to uncover the truth.” This was in part “paradoxical” because the 
open ended nature of allegorical writing “implied referential arbitrariness,” or, as Benjamin 
himself puts it in reference to Plato’s Symposium in the “Epistemo-Critical Prologue” to the 
Trauerspiel, “there is a hint of relativism here.”345 The dramatists had, in a sense, built upon 
Plato’s case for the intrinsic internal coherence of concepts, but confused this coherence for 
transcendent form, not the historical accretion of “convention.”346 They had erred in addressing 
phenomena because – rather in line with Nietzsche’s famous aphorism of Christianity as merely 
Platonism for the masses
347
 – they sublimated that intrinsic internal coherence into ideal 
transcendence. They did not “redeem” them in “their basic elements,” from their “crude 
empirical state,” as Benjamin suggests. How does such a redemption take place? Benjamin 
responds as follows: 
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As a salvation of phenomena by means of ideas takes place, so too does the representation of 
ideas through the medium of empirical reality. For ideas are not represented in themselves, but 




If one takes a step back from the density of the argument for a moment, it can appear more 
clearly: “salvation of phenomena” can happen if and only if “through the medium of empirical 
reality.” If not, quite literally nothing is saved, nothing is redeemed. 
This is precisely where the ‘treachery’ Buck-Morss describes enters the picture. The 
German Baroque dramatists adhered to a “particular theological frame,” that of Christianity as a 
whole, and more specifically, Christian other-worldliness, ahistoricality, amateriality, and 
asceticism, which rendered material redemption impossible. The assumption of this impossibility 
had led them to sublimate “the very physical suffering that had been their original concern” into 
an ahistorical Christian sotierology. This sublimation is a theodicy which explains injustice 
instead of opposing it. This theodicy is what Horkheimer and Adorno decry as Hegel’s 
“transfiguration” in so many of the early texts of the Frankfurt School. This is of course nothing 
novel in the history of Christian discourse, whether we choose to begin such an analysis from the 
sayings of Christ himself related in the Gospels (“My kingdom is not of this world” John 18:36) 
or Augustine’s complete separation of the “Earthly” from the “Heavenly” city throughout City of 
God or Luther’s treatise On the Freedom of a Christian.349 Although Buck-Morss quickly turns 
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to the question of the Benjamin and the kabbalah as the implicit ‘theological other’ in the 
Trauerpsiel that is more fully expressed in the Passagenwerk, it is worth stopping to address this 
“treacherous” “theological frame” of the dramatists, both because Benjamin himself addresses it 
in the Trauerspiel, but also because there is yet another historical materialist argument that is 
being made by Benjamin. It is only now, once this “treacherous” ideological frame can be 
viewed and understood, that this new mode of interpretation can unfold both in idea and product. 
As Benjamin later argues in The Arcades Project, “Marxism, too, shares the expressive 
characteristics of the material products contemporary with it.”350 Trauerspiele (that is to say, the 
actual ‘plays of sorrow’) were produced dialectically – drawn from and in reflection upon their 
historical conditions. In turn, Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study is produced dialectically from the 
historical reality and content of the Trauerspiele as set against the new historical reality and 
criticism that would arise in the nineteenth century. 
Buck-Morss begins her discussion of the “treacherous” abandonment of the world to “the 
devil” with Benjamin’s concluding remarks in the “Allegory and Trauerspiel” section of the 
Trauerspiel. She writes: 
Evil disappears, but at what a cost! In order to remain true to God, the German allegoricists 
abandon both nature and politics: “Their… intention ultimately does not remain loyal [treu] to 
the spectacle of the skeleton, but treacherously [treulos] leaps over to the Resurrection.” This 
“treacherous” leap from the mournful spectacle of history as “sad drama” to the miracle of the 
resurrection, done in the name of allegory, is in a philosophical sense its negation… When the 
allegoricists, claiming that the fragments of failed nature are really an allegory of spiritual 
redemption as their opposite, a redemption guaranteed only by the Word, when they declare evil 
as “self-delusion” and material nature as “not real,” then, for all practical purposes allegory 
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becomes indistinguishable from myth… It “sweeps away” the entire objective world as a 
“phantasmagoria” and the subject is “left entirely on its own.”In short, Benjamin criticizes 
Baroque allegory for its idealism.
351
 
Their “treachery” lies in their abandonment of “both nature and politics.” They do not remain 
“loyal [treu]” to either the “the spectacle of the skeleton” or to the “failed nature” which 
provokes and comprises such a spectacle. They escape into a “treacherous” sublation: the evil of 
this world “disappears” in proving the Truth of the next. Buck-Morss makes the case in her long 
footnote on page 445 that “much is riding” on her translation of the world treulos as 
“treacherous.” She proposes this translation against the background of “earlier interpreters” who 
“have taken Benjamin to be establishing an ironic distance between this word and his own 
judgment.”352  That is to say that somehow Benjamin was ironically showing that the 
allegoricists through their “faith” [treu] were “unfaithful” [treulos] to what their true faith would 
have demanded. I agree wholeheartedly with Buck-Morss’ contention that this would in turn 
implicitly endorse the truth of the Christian faith. She finds it “inconceivable that Benjamin 
should actually affirm the Christian idea of bodily crucifixion and spiritual resurrection, as it is 
so foreign in conception precisely to the “theological” elements of his thinking.”353 However, I 
am not sure just how much is actually riding on that particular definition of treulos, or if, perhaps 
more importantly, her translation is as tenuous as she makes it out to be here. Furthermore, I 
think the scare quotes around “theological” are not quite necessary for precisely this reason. 
 One could read in treulos that the German tragic dramatists do not remain treu, as in 
faithful or true, to the “bones” and that they treulos, faithlessly, “leap over into Resurrection.” It 
could be simply that in their leap into transcendence they are both treacherous, in the sense 
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Buck-Morss describes, to the bones and their representation, but also faithless, in a very different 
definition of faith. Buck-Morss writes that in his ultimate critique, Benjamin faulted “Baudelaire 
for his inability to transcend the melancholy contemplation of the allegoricist.” She adds, 
“Benjamin’s own notion of transcendence was political: to ‘smash’ the mechanism that endlessly 
rearranged the fragments of the material world in its given state.”354 If Benjamin meant, as Buck-
Morss’ “earlier interpreters” suggest, that he was ironically criticizing their treulos stance, surely 
he would have utilized a word more directly suggesting “faithlessly” in terms of belief, such as 
disbelivingly, like ungläubig. Buck-Morss has in mind a particular line from the Trauerspiel: 
“the intention does not faithfully [treu] rest in the contemplation of bones, but faithlessly 
[treulos] leaps forward to the idea of resurrection.”355  But in fact they don’t disbelievingly “leap 
into transcendence.” They do so believingly, and as such they are “faithless” and “treacherous.” 
For if they were to be treu, true, faithful, loyal to the “bones,” they would leap nowhere and 
immanently. They would “faithfully rest in the contemplation of the bones,” not to arrive at a 
standstill but to find those “bones” “re-discovered,” “playfully in the world of things,” as 
Benjamin explicitly says in the previous page that the allegoricists fail to do. This is their 
treachery and it is because they have faith, that is, because they have Christian faith, the faith 
that now defines faith, faith against the world, against the evidence of the senses. To refocus for 
a moment on the comparative philosophy of this dissertation, this is the concept of faith (faith 
through authoritarian structures, expressed around revelation) mentioned for a brief moment 
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before that so troubled Jalal Al-e Ahmad and that he wanted to exorcize from its firm post-
Christian and post-colonial position within Shiism.
356
  
Benjamin sets up this final discussion and this definition of “treachery” in the Trauerspiel 
with an episode earlier in the text. He does so there under the rubric of verrat, which can be 
understood more directly as “betrayal,” “treason,” or “treachery.”  When discussing the 
culmination and end of the Trauerspiel era, Benjamin discusses the particular play Leo Armenius 
by 17
th
 century German poet and dramatist Andreas Gryphius.
357
  In this work, Gryphius 
presents the character of Michael Balbus, a general in Byzantine Emperor Leo V’s army, who 
“laments”: “Was ist der hof nunmehr als einie modergruben, | Als ein verräther-platz, ein 
wohnhous schlimmer buben?’ [What is the court but a den of murderers, a place of treachery, a 
house of rogues and villains?]”358 Der hof, the court, this verräter-platz [place of treachery], is 
neither an historical accident nor a dictate of God, as Benjamin is careful to point out. Benjamin 
ultimately critiques the dramatists in that they abandon this realm to “the devil” instead of trying 
to understand “that this time of hell is secularized in space,” in a material world which is also 
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“God’s world,” the only world, not heaven.359 Thus, Benjamin presents the German dramatists’ 
vision of the court in the Trauerspiele as the realm of the “sovereign intriguer” who “is all 
intellect and will-power.”360 Benjamin continues: 
As such he corresponds to an ideal which was first outlined by Machiavelli and which was 
energetically elaborated in the creative and theoretical literature of the seventeenth century… 
‘Machiavelli saw the roots of political thought in its anthropological principles. The uniformity of 
human nature, the power of the animal instinct and emotions, especially the emotions of love and 
fear, and their limitlessness – these are the insights on which every consistent political thought or 
action, indeed the very science of politics must be based…’”361 
But of course this presentation of “human nature” was itself historically contingent. It was filling 
up the “empty time”362 that had been left in the wake of the Christian separation of ‘truth’ and 
‘faith’ from the world. This “realm,” then, is not only created in the wake of Augustine’s skillful 
argument for the classical virtues of the “City of Man” as distinct from the new Christian virtues 
of the “City of God” but is possibly demanded by Jesus himself as in Mathew 22:21: “’Render 
unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.’” There are 
now at least two distinct kinds of unrelated justice. The loyalty and faithfulness one would have 
to this world are transmuted into faith in otherworldly salvation. Christ demands it. Jesus speaks 
in a time of Roman imperial rule and oppression, when many of the leading Pharisaic authorities 
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were preaching at least passive, if not openly active, resistance. Such resistance was for both God 
and man. That is to say, for God through man. The Pharisees – a primary target of ridicule in the 
Gospels – did not recognize strict distinctions between the political, the “religious,” the 
economic, etc. Neither did their immediate rabbinical successors. They viewed these as linked by 
a thread of halachah [Jewish law]. There could be a quiescent resignation but that would still 
recognize that justice was in abeyance, not that justice would be theodical recompense in a 
spiritual afterlife. And, of course, the opposite was also possible: not long after Christ preached 
acceptance, Rabbi Akivah officially anointed a worldly messiah, Simon Bar Kokhba, to lead a 
worldly struggle for treu salvation against Roman rule.
363
  
Augustine argues that the entire Weltanschauung, if you will, of classical antiquity, is not 
necessary for successful political governance of a political system like the Roman Empire. In this 
argument, still quite current, one can create a separate sphere of “religion” and still govern the 
“City of Man” according to the newly “secular” political virtues of the “City of Man.” But, 
Benjamin argues, those political virtues of the “City of Man” give way to the detached 
calculations of Machiavelli,
364
 which in turn gives way to the verräter-platz [place of treachery] 
depicted by the German dramatists. This is not a historical accident, according to Benjamin; it 
occurs as the long-term effect of the philosophical separation of the moral from the political. 
Benjamin gives us Machiavelli here via a long quotation from Wilhelm Dilthey, the 
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Lebensphilosopher. Benjamin presents the verräter-platz as the manifestation of treulos 
Christian politics in its embrace of, in Dilthey’s words, the “uniformity of human nature,” and 
the “limitless” “power” on which “the very science of politics must be based.”365 
Later, at the end of the chapter on “Trauerspiel and Tragedy,” Benjamin again addresses 
the realm of the political in Trauerspiele, stating:  
Wie hierin die Gestalt des Tyrannen, so ist durch die Treulosigkeit — einen anderen Zug des 
Saturnmenschen — die Figur des Höflings betroffen. Nichts Schwankenderes ist vorstellbar als 
der Sinn des Hofmanns, wie die Trauerspiele ihn malen: der Verrat ist sein Element.  
Osborne translates this as: 
Just as this characterizes the figure of the tyrant so does unfaithfulness – another feature of 
saturnine men – characterize the figure of the courtier. It is not possible to conceive of anything 




The courtier, the man of the court, political man, is “characterized” by his “unfaithfulness,” his 
Treulosigkeit.  Der Verrat is his element. The accuracy of the conjecture that Buck-Morss set out 
upon in her translation of treulos turns out to rest not only on its counter-argument (that it is 
unfathomable that Benjamin sought to affirm the Christian theological worldview in preferring 
the afterlife) but on a direct textual connection. “Unfaithfulness,” “faithless,” and “treachery” are 
all deeply connected in the Trauerspiel. What is more, they are simultaneously and purposefully 
theological and political terms. The Machiavellian courtier’s “unfaithfulness” or “disloyalty” 
[untreu] is expressed in a debased caricature in his “absorbed contemplative devotion” to the 
objects and art of power.
367
 It is because of faith, because of the complete worldview of the 
Christian faith, that he accepts, even revels in this. The caricature is to the image of true 
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“loyalty” [treu] that is “completely appropriate only to the relation of man to the world of 
things.”368 As Benjamin concludes the section: 
Die Treue ist der Rhythmus der emanatistisch absteigenden Intentionsstufen, in welcher die 
aufsteigenden der neuplatonischen Theosophie beziehungsvoll verwandelt sich abspiegeln. 
[Faithfulness is the rhythm of the emanatively descending levels of intention which reflect the 
appropriately transformed ascending ones of neoplatonic theosophy.]
369
 
To remain with Osborne’s translation for the moment, we are now dealing with true 
“faithfulness,” which, as Benjamin has just told us, is in fact loyalty to the material, existing 
world. It is a practice defined in part against Christian faith, which is its foil. This difficult 
passage is itself an explication of the previous and even more arcane passage in which Benjamin 
states that we should contrast this image of “unfaithfulness” with its “isolated dialectic contrast,” 
portrayed by “Abu Masar,” that is, the eighth century Persian astrologer and philosopher Abu 
Ma'shar al-Balkhi, as “faithfulness in love.” Theosophy in any form (neoplatonic, Christian, etc.) 
should be turned against itself, for Benjamin.
370
 Truth is not to be sought in the higher and higher 
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conventional and banal ideas of the theosophists. First, genuine aura appears in all things, not just in certain things, 
as people imagine. Second, the aura undergoes changes, which can be quite fundamental, with every movement the 
aura-wreathed object makes. Third, genuine aura can in no sense be thought of as a spruced-up version of the magic 
rays beloved of spiritualists and described in vulgar works of mysticism.” (Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol 2.1, 
328) The latter writing, “Light from Obscurantists,” excoriates in particular Rudolph Steiner’s anthroposophists 
along precisely the same lines that Adorno would address astrology in “The Stars Down to Earth.” Not only do they 
engage in general occultist irrationality in “supernatural ways of seeing,” but like advertisements, they “drape 
themselves in the world of knowledge,” with “technical information, classical rules on how to live, statistical tables, 
and chemical and physiological data,” in order to conjure “the great universal harmony in which all individual 
details are subsumed,” and to ‘allure’ with the semblance of scientific authority (in a pre-Enlightenment, argument 
from authority sense). (Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol.2.2, 655-656) I examine Benjamin’s own “mysticism” later 





orders of a Gnostic reality that removes itself step by magical step from the world of material 
things but rather by examining in ever proliferating depth both the natural, historical, and 
potential meanings in objects. The dizzying array of celestial entities and levels should be 
understood as the distorted reflection of the real levels of meaning possible in objects and the 
intricate networks of relations that link them. The further we move into the material analysis of 
the world of things, and simultaneously are treu to the world of things, the closer we are to both 
truth and goodness. It is, to put it bluntly, a better faith, or perhaps, more accurately, better than 
faith.
371
 And it is not in a search for their ‘holy’ essences, but in the very empirical elements of 
objects themselves that redemption is to be sought.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
understanding material relations and in consciousness. Benjamin’s theological practice and concepts are not 
supernatural and, furthermore, are, perhaps ironically, aimed at demystification of conditions.   
371
 Benjamin, in this frankly surprising discussion of Abu Ma'shar al-Balkhi, is drawing on the work of the early 
twentieth century German art historians Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl in their article “Melancholia I” on the late 
medieval/early Renaissance engraving of the same title by Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528). Panofsky and Saxl went on 
to later expand this work, with the help of fellow German-Jewish exile, Raymond Klibansky, into the magisterial 
Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art. In Panofsky and Saxl’s 
original 1923 work, Dürer’s Melancolia I: Eine Quellen- und Typen-Geschichtliche Untersuchung, they write, in 
addition to the tyrannical qualities of Saturnine men, of them being “treu in der Liebe.”  This is where Benjamin 
draws the phrase “faithfulness in love.” Panofsky and Saxl are discussing in this section the portrayal and collapse of 
multiple qualities into the category of “Saturnine” men in the works of Abu Ma’shar.  But this “faithfulness in love” 
is described under the aspect not of the Saturnine Melancholic (as Benjamin had been discussing Panofsky and 
Saxl’s work earlier in the section) but here directly connected to deeply material, worldly planning for human 
happiness and prosperity: “plowing and agriculture,” “prosperity of the land, buildings, water and rivers,” etc. As 
Benjamin suggests, this is how we should understand Abu Ma’shar’s “isolated dialectic contrast.” This points at 
what treu means for Benjamin. As Panofsky and Saxl suggest, Abu Ma’shar was working in late antiquity with little 
to no distinction being made between scientific observation and mythological reporting, partly because he was fully 
in possession of a kind of critical distance which eluded the medieval Christian commentators who would come to 
rely so heavily on his texts for all of their knowledge of ancient astrology and astronomy. The sciences were open to 
inquiry and adaptation and the mythology was simply a question of transmission of a set of largely ‘foreign’ beliefs. 
It did not matter that astronomical research and geometric inquiry were portrayed alongside an already collapsed 
mythology that had combined Jupiter and Saturn into one category. None of it was static; it was all open to practical 
use and interpretation. As Panofsky and Saxl say, “thus are the seemingly chaotic texts of Abu Ma’sar [made] 
understandable.” Panofsky and Saxl, Dürer’s Melancolia I: Eine Quellen- und Typen-Geschichtliche Untersuchung 
5-9 (the translations are my own). 
 
The critique that Benjamin is making here and at the end of the Trauerspiel is that in unraveling this tangle, first the 
medieval Christian commentators and then, more importantly, the German Dramatists, took the negative thread of 
Saturn and wrapped it firmly around the Earth and material existence. They took the positive thread and thrust it at 
the heavens at precisely the moment, Benjamin argues, they should have attempted to entwine the two in affirming 





 In the end, the apotheosis of individualized faith against the evidence of the senses is the 
meaningless farce of circular subjectivity. As Benjamin writes in the conclusion to the 
Trauerspiel: 
And thus it is that the fire of ecstasy is preserved, without a single spark being lost, secularized in 
the prosaic, as is necessary: in a hallucination, St. Theresa sees the Virgin strewing roses on her 
bed; she tells her confessor. ‘I see none’, he replies. ‘Our Lady brought them to me’, answers the 
Saint. In this was the display of manifest subjectivity becomes a formal guarantee of the miracle, 
because it proclaims the divine action itself. And ‘there is no turn of events which the baroque 
style would not conclude with a miracle’.372  
The “me,” Benjamin emphasizes, is the ultimate assertion of the purely subjective. All the 
passion that had been directed towards the hellish images of the world and the fantastic images 
of the world’s salvation is preserved but sublimated373 into the self-confirming circularity of 
“manifest subjectivity.” Knowledge is thus void as subjectivity confirms miracle, and miracle 
confirms subjectivity. But this is, in Benjamin’s words, a “hallucination.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
world” (France, mid-13th century, reproduced from Saturn and Melancholy) / FIGURE B: Dürer’s Melancholia I 
(Germany, 1514, reproduced from Saturn and Melancholy) 
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It is important to remember that for Benjamin, the significance of the Trauerspiele lay in 
their failure. It is easy to confuse the concept of allegory that Benjamin seeks to recover and the 
Trauerspiele themselves. Benjamin explains this via architectural metaphors. He approvingly 
quotes Karl Borinski’s presentation of Baroque architecture, “the impression of supernatural 
forces is supposed to be around in the powerfully projecting and apparently self-supporting 
structures precisely in the upper regions.”374 But, “the reality of these laws is, on the other hand – 
in the lower regions…the enormous pedestals, the doubly and triply augmented projecting 
columns and pilasters, the strengthening and reinforcement of their interconnecting elements, all 
bearing – a balcony?”375 Borinski, rather astutely, notes that these elements reinforce each other 
(hence “a balcony?” which turns the gaze back to the supporting structure) but also point 
outwards at “the intervention of God in the work of art.”376 However, this “miracle” too is a 
“hallucination,” for Benjamin. In pointing to “the intervention of God,” the Baroque architectural 
form distorts the “reality,” of the physical construction and ignores that “the soaring miracle 
above” is only a differently distorted ideal reflection of the possibility of redemption in the 
material reality below.
377
 Given this quite literal manifestation of base and superstructure, it 
should hardly be surprising or hard to explain the appeal of a certain kind of Marxian analysis to 
Benjamin. But “the inadequacy of the German Trauerspiel,” with its “banal equipment of the 
theater – chorus, interlude, and dumbshow,” endows it with a great virtue: it can transmit a 
concept of allegory itself which asserts that “Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins 
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are in the realm of things.”378 When the Trauerspiele try to tie the neat bow of “miracle” as the 
final “about-turn,”379 all they demonstrate is the flimsiness of the gesture. The “leap forward,” to 
faith, in the affirmation of Christ or in the Baroque architectural “intervention of God in the work 
of art,” merely confirms and reproduces the pure subjectivity of true Christian faith, as 
exemplified in St. Theresa’s statement. And, at the same time, it betrays what it so successfully 
demonstrated in attentiveness to historical and material reality, “the reality of those laws… in the 
lower regions.”380  
So Buck-Morss is on much firmer ground than she imagines when she interprets treulos 
and its connection to treachery. While she turns to her interpretation of Adorno’s language 
(which I differ on) to shore up her interpretation, it is in fact within the Trauerspiel itself that 
Benjamin advances the direct connection between treulos and Verrat. Indeed, he does so within a 
critique, just as Buck-Morss suggests, of a “particular theological frame,” as I have shown, that 
of Christianity. Benjamin, writing from the edges, so to speak, of the Jewish community and in 
the midst of Christian Europe, did not produce a convenient historical materialist critique of 
religion as a concept, although he did apply religion critically as in the essay “Capitalism as 
Religion” which posits Capitalism as a “religion” in very much a Marxist sense of the word. 
Benjamin does this provocatively against a dialectical historical image of what he calls the 
previous “so-called religion,” which he describes – in a style tantalizingly close to contemporary 
discussions of genealogies of secularism – as a Christianity upon which Capitalism has 
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“developed parasitically” and which even traps its greatest critics: Benjamin lists Marx, Freud, 
and Nietzsche. 
“Freudian theory,” Benjamin says here,381 “is, at bottom, still an illuminating analogy to 
capital—to which the hell of the unconscious pays interest.” What Adorno would call the 
palliative nature of Freudian psychoanalysis is here faulted for not delving deep enough to 
provide the material for a true break with historical continuity. It becomes, in Benjamin’s words 
here, part of the “priestly rule of this [capitalist] cult.”  Benjamin continues, “This type of 
capitalist, religious thinking,” which again allows us for a moment to ponder something 
Benjamin refuses to let himself ponder, a non- or anti-capitalist religious thinking, 
“magnificently reconciles itself in Nietzsche’s philosophy.” 
The thought of the Ubermensch loses the apocalyptic “leap” not by changing its ways, atonement, 
purification, or penitence, but the apparently continuous, but in the end discontinuous 
intensification… The Ubermensch is the one who without changing, arrived, streaked across the 
heavens – historical man.382 
Although critical of Nietzsche in the Trauerspiel, there he at least acknowledges that Nietzsche’s 
critique of tragedy is valid: “Nietzsche’s renunciation of any understanding of the tragic myth in 
historical-philosophical terms is a high price to pay for his emancipation from the stereotype of 
morality in which it is usually clothed.”383 Within this fragment, “Capitalism as Religion,” 
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 While here Benjamin is antagonistic towards Freud, elsewhere Benjamin presents a much more salutary image of 
Freud. Benjamin writes in the preparatory materials for the 1935 version of the Arcades exposé, “Freud’s doctrine of 
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Benjamin’s critique of what Nietzsche actually prescribes (as opposed to his hermeneutics) is 
withering: the Ubermensch is nothing but a kind of Hegelian world historical individual. Even if 
read in aesthetic terms, the critique is damning: the Nietzschean Ubermensch may recognize the 
“genealogy of morals” but he merely, in Benjaminian terms, “keeps going,” much like the 
onlookers in The Gay Science when confronted with the madman who announces the death of 
God.  
 For Marx, according to Benjamin, the critique is much simpler: “the non-inverting 
capitalism becomes socialism with interest and compound interest, which are the functions of 
blame.”384  As translator Chad Kautzer notes, Benjamin is playing here on the German word 
Schuld, which, Kautzer says, “can mean either blame, guilt, or debt.”385 It can, of course, also 
mean “sin.”  Benjamin notes later in the truly fragmentary section of the fragment that 
“Christianity in the time of the Reformation did not encourage the emergence of capitalism, but 
rather changed itself into capitalism.”386 So there are three intimately connected crises 
announced and embodied by Christianity, in reverse order: Capitalism, the treulos leap into 
other-worldliness, and the “empty time” invoked by the separation of politics from morality. 
What, then, does it mean then to be treu immanently, and perform a theological critique? 
That is to say, what does it mean to recognize inherent meaning in the world, perhaps 
metaphysical, certainly meta-empirical, without performing a treacherous leap of faith? And if 
Benjamin, rather openly in the Trauerspiel and in this rather late fragment is fully comfortable 
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naming the specifically Christian as the object of critique, why is he so elusive about identifying 
the critique itself? In Buck-Morss’ reading in The Dialectics of Seeing, these questions are 
answered by Benjamin’s turn to kabbalah. However, I would contend that Benjamin’s 
‘kabbalism’ is far looser than his friendship with Scholem might lead one to believe and, in fact, 
often correlates to other Judaic practices of interpretation with which Benjamin was obviously 
aware. It is partly his position as an assimilated German-Jew and his view of himself – and his 
generation of Jews – as largely estranged from their own practices, that allowed Benjamin the 
space to develop his rather unique formulation of historical materialism which is recognizable as 
Marxian and Judaic at the same time.   
A Strange Case of the Productivity of Misunderstanding: Benjamin and the Kabbalah 
Earlier, I set aside the question of what I called the “constant shadow argument” in the 
Trauerspiel, in order to spend more time on the question of Christianity and the treulos that is so 
central to Benjamin’s critique of the German Dramatists. But what constitutes the shadow 
argument, exactly? What is always in the background? Buck-Morss argues that it is the kabbalah. 
After noting that “within philosophy, allegory has another status as the mode in which not the 
subject, but the objective world expresses meaning,” she describes again Benjamin’s critique of 
the German Dramatists in their particular resolution to the “sorrow-filled” world, in Christian 
redemption. She asks: “Was another resolution possible? The Trauerspiel book does not tell us 
explicitly but Benjamin knew there was.”387 
 This is a provocative declaration in addressing what amounts to an empty space in 
Benjamin’s own words. But Buck-Morss provides significant evidence: 
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“I continue to find it very strange,” wrote Scholem in his reminiscences, “that around 1930 
Benjamin told at least two men (Max Rychner and Theodor Adorno) that only someone familiar 
with the Kabbalah could understand the introduction to his book on tragic drama…” This was 
more remarkable, he continued, as Benjamin never discussed the connection with him, who alone 
would have understood it. But in dedicating a copy of the book for Scholem, Benjamin wrote: “’To 
Gerhard Scholem, donated to the Ultima Thule of his Kabbalistic library’ as if this work indeed 
somehow belonged in a kabbalistic library.”388 
I do not doubt Scholem that Benjamin did say this to Adorno and Rychner. Indeed he may have 
himself understood this to be the case, although I cannot help but offer the mere possibility that 
this inscription of Benjamin’s might be read as a joke, references to the “Ultima Thule” not 
generally being associated with ideas meant to be taken seriously.
389
 Speculation aside, however, 
in his writings to Adorno and Rychner, Benjamin never mentions kabbalah. He corresponds 
frequently with Scholem about the subject and in a manner that demonstrates more than just 
casual conversation with a friend about their work. What was Benjamin’s interest in kabbalah? 
Buck-Morss hones in on it precisely: 
It was a mystical mode of cognition that revealed previously concealed truths within nature, which 
were meaningful only in the context of a Messianic Age (in secular Marxist terms, a socially just, 
classless society). Kabbalists read both reality and the texts, not to discover an overarching 
historical plan… but to interpret their multiple, fragmentary parts as signs of the Messianic 
potential of the present. The truth thus revealed was expressed in the Kabbalist writings 
inventively, indirectly, in riddles, providing an anti-authoritarian form of pedagogy. Kabbalist 
cognition replaced the dogmatism of institutionalized religion with a “novel and lived experience 
and intuition” of the doctrines it contained.390  
Buck-Morss is correct that this is precisely what interests Benjamin. But is this interest 
particularly kabbalistic? The notion of the messianic age as a reorientation of the existing, 
natural world is common in many modes of Judaic thought (HaOlam HaZeh [this world] is 
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HaOlam HaBah [the coming world]). The idea of a “book of nature” to be interpreted goes as far 
back at least as Maimonides and the other medieval rationalists, who also “read both reality and 
texts, not to discover an overarching historical plan.” These concepts are perfectly legible within 
Talmudic literature, including the messianic possibilities. Benjamin may in fact have believed 
that “Kabbalist writing” invited an “anti-authoritarian mode of pedagogy.” But he seems to have 
been blissfully unaware that the kabbalistic texts and certainly kabbalistic teaching practices 
were precisely the opposite; the “riddles” could only be translated with magic keys via texts or 
through a chain of authority from one master to the next. What did Benjamin really know of the 
kabbalah? The point here is neither to quibble with Buck-Morss’s interpretation nor merely to 
expose a possible lacuna in Benjamin’s thought. Nor is it, of course, to try to dismiss the Judaic 
element in Benjamin. Rather, it is to ask whether we have missed other Judaic elements in 
Benjamin? Not the seemingly transgressive kabbalah, but the more normative Talmudic 
categories of aggadah and halachah? 
 In the discussion of the Trauerspiel, I demonstrated, vis-à-vis my own readings of 
Benjamin and building on Buck-Morss’ interpretation, that Benjamin’s theological practice 
rejects theodicy, theosophy, and neoplatonism. Not to do so would be to make “the dialectical 
leap from the hill of skulls to the resurrection of the spirit they ‘treacherously’ abandoned to the 
devil the very sorrowful nature, the very physical suffering that had been their original 
concern.”391 But most kabbalistic thinking was, precisely, theosophical and neoplatonic. Take, 
for a major example, the Tanya (officially titled the Likkutei Amarim or collection of statements) 
of Schneer Zalman – one of the most influential of all kabbalistic thinkers of the modern period 
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and the founder of Lubavitcher Hassidism.
392
 In it, Zalman argues in a nearly purely neoplatonic 
(and Gnostic) fashion that sparks of “divine light” are trapped within the physical shells [kelipot] 
of mundane being. Here kabbalistic interpretation is to smash those shells, not to reconstitute the 
messianic world – not to save natural phenomena – but to transcend them, not temporally but 
physically and cosmologically.  The natural world is a series of “traps”; kabbalistic interpretation 
and the new understanding of Jewish practices are to help release these divine sparks from this 
sullied existence to return to the utterly transcendent God.
393
 This transcendence is precisely 
what Benjamin decried in the Trauerspiel. Kabbalistic practice, in the example here of Zalman’s 
thought, is not about the transformation of the world; it is about a life after death or ecstatic 
reconnection with the Divine Other. 
This idea is not limited to later Hassidic kabbalistic systems. Indeed, it is even more 
visible in earlier ones. Scholem writes, “The idea of the seven heavens through which the soul 
ascends to its original home, either after death or in a state of ecstasy while the body is still alive, 
is certainly very old.”394 Here Scholem is discussing the school of Merkabah mysticism, which 
contemplates the shape, measure, etc. of the “chariot” of God.395 What of other forms of 
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kabbalistic thought? Scholem argues that, in the Zohar itself, Moses de Leon does suggest a 
reunification in this world: 
Only the Fall has caused God to become “transcendent.” Its cosmic results have led to loss of the 
original harmonious union and to the appearance of an isolated existence of things. All creation 
was originally of a spiritual nature and but for the intervention of evil would not have assumed 
material form. No wonder that where the Kabbalists of this school describe the state of the 
Messianic world and the blissful knowledge of the devotee in a world purged of blemish, the 
emphasis is on the restoration of the original coexistence and correlation of all things. 
396
 
So this, then, is an instance of the kabbalistic “restoration” of things.397 There are several key 
propositions to notice here. First, the “material” itself is not what is being restored. Materiality is 
being annihilated in the “descent” of God who has been forced into “transcendence.” Second, the 
world of the “existence of things” is “isolated,” that is, bereft of divine meaning. Third, there is 
the mysterious “intervention of evil,” without which “material” form would never have 
existed.
398
 Finally, as Scholem notes a short while later, this is a theodicy: “The ancient 
Christian, and the medieval Jewish Gnostic, have both asked the question, unde malum? What is 
                                                          
396
 Scholem, Major Trends, 224. 
397
 Not only does this “restoration” in Scholem’s description seem to have little relation to Benjamin’s “theological” 
hermeneutic practice that I have been describing here. Idel is again helpful in further differentiating the two as he 
notes that Scholem tends to overemphasize the negative theological and messianic aspects of kabbalah, “Though 
indubitably there are elements in Kabbalistic texts that represent negative theology, like some – though not all – of 
the discussions regarding the nature of the ‘Ein Sof, my assumption is that, by and large, Kabbalists were much less 
inclined toward negative theology than Scholem’s school assumes. In some cases, negative theological language 
was considered an exoteric strategy hiding an esoteric anthropomorphic propensity, which may be viewed as a sort 
of positive theology.”(Idel, Ascensions, 15) Indeed, as I am demonstrating in the main text, even this most negative 
theological and simultaneously materialist moment in Scholem seems, upon closer inspection, to be only loosely 
either.  
398
 Indeed as Scholem notes: “It will not surprise us to find that speculation has run the whole gamut – from attempts 
to retransform the impersonal En-Sof into the personal God of the Bible to the downright heretical doctrine of a 
genuine dualism between the hidden En-Sof and the personal Demiurge of Scripture.” (Scholem, Major Trends, 12) 
As Idel reminds us, even the seemingly hyper-negative theological Ein Sof in kabbalistic discourse was sometimes 
“hiding an esoteric anthropomorphic propensity.” However, it is the idea of the “Demiurge,” the evil other god or 
demi-god which creates the world and a series of barriers between humanity and the true good, spiritual God which 
is most pertinent here. This is a common idea in near-Eastern Gnosticism before and after the Second Temple period 
but it most closely associated with Manichean and Christian-Gnostic thought (in which Christ often appears as an 
emissary of the true God and in which the Tenakh is rejected as the word of a false, lesser god). This Gnostic and 
neoplatonic Demiurge should be distinguished from the actual Platonic Demiurge, found in the Timaeus. Far more 
relevant for my discussion are the broad implications in kabbalistic thought – particularly accented in the idea of the 
Demiurge – for a transcendental, anti-realist system of thought which is fundamentally inimical to Benjamin’s 





the source of evil?... to the intellect the problem is really no problem at all. All that is needed is 
to understand that evil is relative, more that it does not really exist.”399 But this understanding is 
precisely the ‘disloyalty’ described by Benjamin in the Trauerspiel. Theories of neoplatonic 
emanation and transcendence must be “transformed” to become loyal to the world; they must 
become ever more material, ever more immanent in a mirror of the neoplatonic ascent.
400
 
 Benjamin’s materialism becomes even more apparent when juxtaposed with such 
instances of genuine kabbalistic thinking.  And this example is from the supposedly pre-Marxist 
days of the Trauerspiel (‘pre-Marxist,’ and yet he was reading and quoting Lukács and 
discussing Marx with Asja Lacis). The theodicy in kabbalistic thinking is no less powerful than 
Hegel’s justification of history that leads to his “slaughter-bench,” its answer no less Idealist. 
Benjamin not only positions his project as the redemption of material things in their materiality, 
it is a redemption drawn from their very baseness. Material things are not kelipot to be shattered 
to release their inner sparks of divine light; they are of the divine light, distorted. In his 
naturalistic – but not reductive – account, there is no difference between the two. This is both 
radical negative theology and radical divine immanence.
401
 Scholem provides, indirectly, a clue, 
as to the source of these qualities in Benjamin’s philosophy. When discussing the Merkabah 
mysticism, Scholem writes: 
On the other hand there is a complete absence of any sentiment of divine immanence. J. Abelson 
has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of the subject in his “Immanence of God in 
Rabbinical Literature,” where he has devoted a particularly searching analysis to the theory of 
the Shekhinah, God’s “immanence” or “indwelling” in the world, in the literature of the 
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Aggadah. But in the Merkabah mysticism with which we are dealing here, the idea of the Shekinah 
and of God’s immanence plays practically no part at all.402 
The clue here is the word aggadah. Messianism without faith, without God, which is this-
worldly and remain true to both to the “world of things” and loyal to their materiality itself, 
demands some notion of – or like – divine immanence. As Moshe Idel simply puts it, there is a 
“paucity of discussions on the immanent nature of the Sefirot,”403 “the dominant pattern is 
viewed as existing not only beyond but also above the material realm,”404 “the path of 
immanence only rarely occurred in theosophical Kabbalah… but even these Kabbalists would 
unequivocally acknowledge the existence of a transcendent layer of the Divine.”405 In other 
words, kabbalistic thought and practice is largely alien and often inimical to Benjamin’s 
philosophy. But the aggadot, the illustrative stories that appear amongst the halachah or legal 
rules in the Talmud, or in midrash, are full of notions of divine immanence, the emergent 
materialist messianic, the utterly negative or entirely irrelevant God, and so on.   
Benjamin’s conceptions of aggadah and halachah and his commentaries on them are 
found in his writings on Kafka, both in essays and in his letters, which I examine in the next 
chapter. But as, I will examine in more detail shortly, in one of the rare moments where 
Benjamin explicitly self-identifies his “theological” practice, he aligns it concomitantly with the 
“stance of the materialist,” which “seems scientifically and humanely more productive in 
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everything that moves us than does that of the idealist,” and “accord with the Talmudic teaching 
about the forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage of the Torah.”406 What Benjamin 
describes here as “Talmudic” is an extraordinary admixture of ideas from midrashic,407 
Talmudic, and, indeed, kabbalistic traditions. It is not extraordinary for the mélange (nearly any 
Ashkenazi or Sephardi rabbi from the last five centuries or so would comfortably draw on all 
three) but for the way Benjamin chooses elements from each. These choices reflect, probably, in 
part, Benjamin’s incomplete knowledge and understanding of traditional Jewish learning but also 
show a remarkable philosophical intuition: he gravitates towards those elements in each which 
promote the dialectical, the negative, the hermeneutic, and materialism.
408
 Furthermore, 
Benjamin fundamentally alters many of these elements in outlining his philosophy and precisely 
along the lines that are suggested in Benjamin’s critique of the Trauespielen.409 Yet they are still 
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 Benjamin, Correspondence, 372. “Materialist” here is explicitly Communist. As I discuss below, this letter is 
attempting to explain Benjamin’s “Communism” to Rychner.  
407
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recognizable: as Scholem reports, “if ever I have a philosophy of my own, he [Benjamin] said to 
me, it somehow will be a philosophy of Judaism.”410 Scholem assumed that this “philosophy of 
Judaism” would have theological concerns similar to Scholem’s own and subsequently viewed 
Benjamin’s Marxism as a pretension or a deception. But, as I have shown from at least the 
Trauerspiel, Benjamin was already thinking that this “philosophy of Judaism” should be oriented 
towards understanding the material world and not pondering the reality or unreality of the 
revelation of scripture.
411
  One year after completing the Trauerspiel study, Benjamin would 
write to Scholem regarding Scholem’s antipathy for Benjamin’s growing Marxism, “anyone of 
our generation who feels and understands the historical moment in which he exists in this world, 
not as mere words, but as a battle, cannot renounce the study and the practice of the mechanism 
through which things (and conditions) and the mass interact.”412 As I have already shown, the 
end of the Trauerspiel points towards materialism and at the same time suggests an implicit 
Jewish critique of Christianity and recovery of allegory.
413
 Benjamin’s turn to explicit Marxism  
did not end this Jewish critique, though. As Benjamin continues in the same letter, “radical 
politics that are ‘just’ and, precisely for this reason, are intended as nothing but politics will 
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always work on behalf of Judaism and, what is infinitely more important, will always find 
Judaism actively in support of them.”414 Here in this 1926 letter we see yet another instance of 
Benjamin’s view of an indissoluble but necessary dialectical relationship between Marxian 
thought and Judaism. As the comparative presentation with Al-e Ahmad helps illuminate, it may 
be helpful to look at some of the non-kabbalistic elements of Benjamin’s Judaism, especially as 
so many of them, especially as deployed by Benjamin, seem to resonate much stronger with the 





Benjamin may have fundamentally misunderstood kabbalah, but it was a case of 
extraordinarily productive misreading. My point here is not to reinscribe ‘orthodox’ conceptions 
of what kabbalah is or what Judaism should be. Rather, it is to grasp a clearer understanding of 
Benjamin’s theological methodology (Marxian and Judaic) and to mark it as legitimate Judaism 
(and, I might add, legitimate Marxism). From where Benjamin stands, this is how Judaism ought 
to be best understood and employed. Benjamin’s stance is creative engagement and distanced 
critique.  From his published and unpublished writings, his letters, and notes, we know that he 
was deeply familiar with certain understandings of Judaic concepts and practices without being 
fully fluent; and yet he invents a new understanding. Novelty is not illegitimacy. Perhaps 
Benjamin did make the remark about the kabbalah to Adorno and Rychner just as Scholem 
relates in The Story of a Friendship. Perhaps he saw his interpretive method as kabbalistic. But 
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he seems to have known little of the content of kabbalistic thought itself; he had an idea of it.
416
 
Benjamin’s knowledge of Judaism is uneven at best. This is also visible elsewhere in his work, 
for example, in his repeated confusion of the word aggadah (as described above) with Haggadah 
(commonly the Passover story or more generally a story that explicates a non-legal passage in 
the Tenakh).
417
 It is clear from the accompanying text that Benjamin means aggadah and that he 
understands what aggadah is, but nonetheless he makes this simple error at least twice. Benjamin 
did not know how to read Yiddish, Hebrew, or Aramaic.
418
 His “Jewishness” has always been up 
for discussion, by scholars and even by his friends. Scholem regarded it as an open and shut 
case; Benjamin, in his view, was a Jewish theologian “marooned in the realm of the profane.”419 
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and have vaguely related meanings (both involve stories, at the very least). This mistake is shockingly basic.  
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In contrast, scholars like Tiedemann read precisely the opposite “this messiah is a symbol of the 
proletariat… Otherwise, it makes no sense.”420  
As I stated in chapter 1, the amount of secondary literature on Benjamin is staggering, 
even the subsection devoted to this very question alone. In my reading of Benjamin – especially 
in light of the comparison with Al-e Ahmad – it is not simply that we must account for 
Benjamin’s Judaism and his Marxism; it is also that there are elements in Jewish practice and 
thought that are necessary in a universalistic critique of Marxism and of modernity more 
broadly. To return for a moment to Benjamin’s first thesis on the philosophy of history: the 
dwarf needs the machine and the machine needs the dwarf. The messiah, theology, justice, 
waiting, interpretation, redemption, etc.: these are all necessarily both Marxian and Judaic, in an 
indissoluble dialectical relation. Benjamin’s Judaism is drawn from broad concepts, the life of 
growing up in an ‘assimilated’ but still Jewish family,421 the different Jewish movements at the 
time, second-hand learning from Scholem, Bloch, Kracauer, Rychner, Horkheimer,
422
 reading in 
Buber, Rosenzweig, Kafka and countless others. But this does not negate its “Jewishness.” In 
possibly misreading kabbalah, Benjamin helped fashion a new mode of hermeneutic practice 




 The constant description of Benjamin’s life and family as “assimilated” in nearly all sources can be confusing 
since “assimilation” in fin-de-siècle Berlin is a fairly radically different question than “assimilation” discourses in 
contemporary Europe or the United States. The “Jewish Question,”  which was quite alive at the time, was about the 
persistence of Jewish difference, not about its dissolution. In numerous early writings, Benjamin demonstrates that 
he is very much involved in the various discussions (Liberal, Marxist, Social Democratic, Zionist) that were an 
active part of the daily life of even the most “assimilated” Jews of this period; please see Benjamin Witte’s Walter 
Benjamin: An Intellectual Biography (1991) or Scholem’s Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship for more on 
this. Benjamin’s own presentation of this milieu can be found in numerous places in early writings and letters in the 
20s and 30s. In terms of his own family, during his recollections collected in “Berlin Chronicle,” Benjamin mentions 
while describing a trip to a synagogue for Rosh Hashanah that his mother came from a Reform background and his 
father from an Orthodox one (Benjamin, Selected Writings, 629). It is illuminating to note that this distinction 
(between Reform and Orthodox) was only beginning to be articulated at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
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which, to reiterate the point, was both Judaic and Marxian. Susan Handelman writes 
perceptively: 
Similarly, the Jewishness of a Benjamin or Kafka is present in often fragmentary and esoteric 
form, revealed only negatively, through its “impossibilities.” But their greatness lay in the way 




All of this must be accounted for. And yet, others have made the case that in accounting for the 
incredibly diverse set of texts and ideas we find in Benjamin, the attitude Handelman adopts here 
would be overly attentive to Benjamin’s Judaism (and in fact to his Marxism). Samuel Weber 
offers just this kind of argument in countering Scholem’s equally problematic reading of 
Benjamin’s “exclusively” Jewish oeuvre.424 But this leads to reading over, not to close reading. 
Weber is right in that Benjamin was in dialogue with quite a bit more than just Judaism and 
Marxism, including “Kant, the early Jena Romantics, Goethe, and above all Hölderlin.”425 
Indeed, Goethe was a towering figure for Benjamin. But a figure of what? If we follow 
Benjamin’s own methodology as laid out in Convolute N of The Arcades Project and explicated 
in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Goethe helps us know a moral, worldly science 
and how to wait for the messiah. And one need only reread the Trauerspiel or “Religion as 
Capitalism” to know that the messiah, for Benjamin, is not Christ.  
Weber goes on to note that in Benjamin’s “Franz Kafka” (1934) – just when it seems 
Benjamin is at his most Jewish – Benjamin raises ideas from Taoism, “Perhaps such studies were 
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worth nothing. But they stand very close to that Nothing, which alone can make Anything useful: 
that is to say, the Tao.”426 This is true; Benjamin – always interested in new constellations of 
historical possibility – does mention the Tao in relation to Kafka. However, Weber is strangely 
uninterested in the fact that Benjamin introduces Tao and Lao-tze in the essay to differentiate 
Taoist parable and Kafka’s work: “Thus Lao-tze. Kafka was also a writer of parables, but he did 
not found a religion.”427 He is uninterested in the fact that these potentially Tao-like qualities in 
Kafka were suggested to Benjamin by Brecht in a withering critique of a draft of Benjamin’s 
Kafka essay.
428
 Weber is finally uninterested in Benjamin’s excoriation of Lao-tze in his “Ibizan 
Sequence” (1932) where Benjamin equates Lao-tze with Rudolph Steiner429 as a “philistine” (the 
boring, “normal failure”) whom Benjamin juxtaposes with the “Genius of failure: Chaplin or 
Schlemiel. The schlemiel takes offense at nothing; he just stumbles over his own feet. He is the 
only angel of peace who is suited to this world.”430 The “genius of failure,” is not reserved for 
comic film actors and Yiddish folk characters; it is also how Benjamin discusses Baudelaire and, 
of course, Kafka.   
Taken together, these pieces of textual evidence clarify Benjamin’s meaning when he 
writes that those “studies,” in Kafka’s stories are “very close,” to “that Nothing, which alone can 
make everything useful.” They do not clarify “how complex a role ‘religion’ or ‘religions’ play 
in Benjamin’s writing,”431 as Weber hopes; they clarify how complex Benjamin’s attitudes were 
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towards Kafka and his relationship to Judaism. Lao-tze’s nothingness, just like Steiner’s 
anthroposophy, is an anti-realist theodicy which captures and reproduces meaningless 
contemplation and can make “Anything seem useful.”  In contrast, as Benjamin tells Brecht and 
as Benjamin writes in “Franz Kafka,” the nothingness that “studying” gestures at in Kafka turns 
the gaze back outward, toward life, in both its material, physical condition (“Kafka has in mind a 
specific place: Zurau in the Erzgebirge”432) and simultaneously to “another village,” “the village 
in Talmudic legend….”433 However, the turn to Talmudic legend (to aggadah) does not become 
“attached to the study of the Torah;”434 rather, it turns back to the material world. It is on this 
very point that Benjamin criticizes Scholem. Scholem believes that the value of Kafka lies in the 
“nothingness of revelation”435  and “the existence of secret law.”436 Benjamin, instead, 
emphasizes the messianic “reversal,” “the small, nonsensical hope,” that is not in “Scripture, but 
life.”437  
 Benjamin is obviously extremely unorthodox in his Jewish thought but in much the way 
that Handelman describes both Benjamin and Kafka. Thus, Benjamin writes in the same essay 
that Kafka’s “prose pieces” do not “belong entirely in the tradition of Western prose forms; they 
have, rather, a relationship to religious teachings similar to the one Haggadah has to 
Halachah.”438 It is the second major task of my next chapter to examine how Benjamin engages 
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with the categories of aggadah and halachah in his philosophy. My task here, however, is to ask, 
why Weber is reading like this. It is clear that in examining Benjamin’s work on Kafka and the 
copious correspondence that accompanied it, one cannot escape that precisely in Kafka, 
Benjamin saw engagement for his materialism on both its Judaic and Marxian ends. The element 
of “Tao” within the essay is fascinating both in terms of intellectual history and in understanding 
how Benjamin is negatively defining both the Judaic and Marxian ends just mentioned. It 
certainly helps overturn Scholem’s attempt to portray Benjamin in purely Jewish terms, but more 
importantly, it helps identify just how different Benjamin’s positions on critical elements in 
Jewish thought were from Scholem’s. This is a difference that matters. However, in Weber’s 
reading in Benjamin’s –abilities (2008), both Judaism and Marxism are pushed off the table in 
favor of emphasizing trivial differences. The answer to the question I posed above is to be found 
in Weber’s methodology in this text. 
In seizing on “Tao,” and elevating it, Weber, in following Derrida’s legitimate a priori 
methodological problem of “undecidability,”439 mistakes overturning the recognizable binary 
that Benjamin must be understand as only Jewish and theological (Scholem) or only Marxist 
(Tiedemann) with identifying the key aspects of Benjamin’s own project. To ask a similar 
question: why does Weber cite Hölderlin “above all” as an exemplar of Benjamin’s non-Jewish 
interlocutors and not, say, Baudelaire, a distinctly non-Jew – and an anti-Semite to boot – with 
whom Benjamin spent much of his later life and literally hundreds of pages struggling? Is it 
because Baudelaire was incorporated into the too overtly Judaic and Marxian materialist 
Passagenwerk? Is it because when Benjamin sent the manuscript of the piece of the 
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Passagenwerk that would be finalized as “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire” to 
Adorno, he remarked, “I will let my Christian Baudelaire be taken into heaven by nothing but 
Jewish Angels”?440 Sadly, I think all of these questions are probably answered by a no. There are 
several possible reasons for Hölderlin being held “above all.” Most importantly, for now, there 
are a sizable group of authors who view Benjamin’s career up to and including the Trauerspiel as 
the sole interpretive lens for “Benjamin.” If we look at Benjamin from the period before the First 
World War until the Trauerspiel (about 1913-1924), then Hölderlin’s importance would be 
greatly magnified. Benjamin’s protestations that his entire thinking changed after the First World 
War and really began during the Trauerspiel are, of course, irrelevant. The author is dead after 
all. I call this group of scholars “The Critique of Violence School” and they are the topic with 
which I end this chapter.  
But there is one more vital dimension that must be examined in Weber’s reading. His 
reading, through logical extension, also leads to an unintentional, essentialist perniciousness. 
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Benjamin is set against “Jewish tradition”; Scholem resides there comfortably. By placing 
Benjamin outside or against “Judaism” and “Jewish tradition,” Weber has reified a certain kind 
of orthodoxy. Weber’s understanding of Scholem – certainly not an Orthodox Jew – signals that, 
somehow, Scholem is ‘more Jewish’ than Benjamin. Is it simply a matter of self-profession and 
self-identification? Of course not, or else Weber would not be able to read over the centrality of 
all of Benjamin’s statements of “Jewishness,” of being a Jew, and of thinking in Jewish concepts. 
Weber thinks he has dissolved an essentialized Jewish tradition, but all he has done is reproduced 
one. And with tradition or Scholem it is one of the most ironic reproductions:  Orthodoxy or 
Zionism?
441
 Justification of obedience or blood. The challenge – as stated above – is in seeing 
Benjamin, who is involved in so many conversations that inform both his Marxism and his 
Judaism, as also a legitimate expression of Judaism. This is crucial for this study because this is 
also the challenge for Al-e Ahmad. And in the negative space of considering these 
simultaneously local, elsewhere, and universal projects in thought as “legitimate” there is, in the 
negative space, even the possibility to see them as fulfilling aspects of the tradition previously 
unaddressed.  
If we want to understand the Judaic and Marxian materialism that is found in the “Theses 
on the Philosophy of History” and The Arcades Project, we must turn to Benjamin’s writings on 
Kafka. These writings are pivotal in showing in what other sense (besides hermeneutic) 
Benjamin’s project can be deemed “religious” and can be fruitfully compared with Al-e 
Ahmad’s.  In this chapter, I have demonstrated the connection between Benjamin’s materialist 
analysis of the desensitizing and narcotizing effects of modernity – what Buck-Morss calls 
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“anaesthetics” – and his theological method. I have furthermore demonstrated how this 
theological method was articulated as a necessarily concomitance to materialism and Judaic 
hermeneutic practices. In chapter 2, I demonstrated how Al-e Ahmad’s influential Gharbzadegi 
can be read as an analysis of a similar condition, based on perceived deficiencies in Marxian 
thought and how, in Al-e Ahmad, this opens up the possibility to a different kind of religious 
practice. In the next chapter, in reading and comparing Al-e Ahmad’s accounts of the Hajj and of 
waiting for the Mahdi, with Benjamin’s discussion of aggadah and halachah in relation to Kafka 
and the arguments made in this chapter, I show several points at which the respective 
philosophies gesture at each other without fully converging. But before I can do that I must 
address what I call here “The Critique of Violence School,” which argues, as we have seen here 
with the brief case of Weber’s reading of the “Tao” in Kafka, precisely against the line of 
reasoning I believe should be followed.  
A Strange Case of the Production of Misreading: The Critique of Violence School 
Please bear with this imprecise humanistic arithmetic for a moment: Benjamin’s 
“Critique of Violence” was written in 1921 and, depending on the particular edition, runs about 
twenty pages. It is a strange text in Benjamin’s oeuvre, even in the opinion of those who value it 
so highly. In it, Benjamin directly addresses topics that are otherwise largely absent from his 
work: violence, state law, legality, and the political. If I add up Benjamin’s writings on toys, 
play, and games – crudely, again – I end up with, conservatively, fifty or sixty pages. These latter 
writings span the whole of Benjamin’s adult life, but are concentrated in the early 1930s. Such 
writings – in stark contrast with the “Critique of Violence” – cover topics that seem vitally 
central to the Benjamanian project: material culture, interpretation, play, history, possibility, and 





are solved by weighing stacks of papers on scales. What is fascinating is that there are some 
scholars who take the “Critique of Violence” as the lens, the Gnostic key if you will, to 
understanding Benjamin and his work (Taubes, Agamben, Derrida, and many others) and then 
there are scholars who actually read the latter work (Buck-Morss, Hansen, Cohen, and a few 
others).
442
  It is not that these latter thinkers do not take Benjamin seriously as a philosopher or 
as a political thinker.
443
 It is rather that they argue, in different ways, that the aesthetic 
philosophy, hermeneutic method, and interest in materialism writ large and specific instances of 
material culture, all constitute the basis on which Benjamin can be taken seriously as a political 
thinker; those are his politics. For the former, it is only that which is marked by violence, statist 
vs. anarchic vs. “divine” violence, which defines “the political.” Benjamin and “political 
theology” can be read at least two ways: political theology as the secularization of a hypostasized 
(and Christian) cosmology or political theology as in the hermeneutics of interpretation and its 
implications for political practice.  
One could easily make the case that, for instance, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction” has had a far more prominent place in Benjamin scholarship than the 
“Critique of Violence” ever did. But, like the writings on toys, “The Work of Art…” essay, 
again, deals with topics that Benjamin addresses repeatedly from the period of the Trauerspiel 
until his death. Thus “The Work of Art…” essay, as employed by some art historians and 
aesthetic theorists, is a better, if still limiting, lens through which to read Benjamin. It is beyond 
the scope of this section to review the entire work of all contemporary scholarship on Benjamin 
and the “Critique of Violence,” and I in no way wish to dismiss the ways – particularly in critical 
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legal theory – in which this school has been productively influential. I wish merely to note its 
growing prevalence and the ways in which it shuts down (in the name of opening up) certain 
other readings of Benjamin, readings that are vital for my project and far more broadly. What I 
will explore here are some of the key arguments for this “School.” Why does this text in 
particular become so attractive? Why does its idiosyncrasy mark it, for certain scholars, for 
special attention?   
Taubes and the Letter
444
 
  I can begin my discussion with either Jacob Taubes or Jacques Derrida. I will choose the 
former for the sake of historical clarity as it, in part, helps explain Derrida’s insistence on the 
primacy of a connection between Benjamin and Carl Schmitt in his work. In 1987, Taubes 
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“Critique of Violence” as their primary topic. “Critique of Violence School” treatments of Benjamin or arguments 
influenced by these treatments appear in nearly all contemporary ‘Left’ Political Theology. See, for example, the 
mammoth Political Theologies (ed. Hent de Vries, 2006). Not all of the responsa in Telos nor in the Cardozo Law 
Review were, of course, in agreement with Kennedy or Derrida’s propositions. Indeed some, like Seyla Benhabib in 
“Some Comments on Deconstruction, Justice, and the Ethical Relationship” in Cardozo Law Review 13: 4 (1991),  
note the precipitous and possibly ill-advised proliferation of the discourse while simultaneously noting many of its 
obvious deficiencies with considerable overlap with what I cite in this section. There is no small irony in noting that 
Derrida’s nominally anti-apocalyptic, anti-anarchistic, and anti-violent text ended up part of a canon of apocalyptic 
political apologia for anarchistic violence. As Benhabib asks, in regard to the shocking proliferation and content: 
“Last year the conference was called ‘Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice.’ The title of Jacques Derrida’s 
paper was Force of Law: the ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority.’ This year’s conference is called ‘On the Necessity 





delivered a series of lectures that were later collected as The Political Theology of Paul (Taubes, 
2004). Earlier, Taubes relates that he “discovered”445  a letter that he claimed was a “mine that 
can blow to pieces our conception of the intellectual history of the Weimar period.”446 The letter 
was sent in 1930 from Benjamin to Carl Schmitt. What is at stake in the letter is that “this whole 
left-right scheme doesn’t hold and that in fact the old Frankfurt School [Taubes means pre-
Habermas] stood in a very intimate relation to Schmitt if you count not only the official heads of 
the school, that is, Mr. Horkheimer and the Musikus Adorno, but the more profound Walter 
Benjamin…”447 The very first part of this statement bears much merit; the reductive left-right 
scheme, which Taubes specifically references on the same page to the student movements in 
1968, indeed does not hold for the early Frankfurt School. But this aspect of the Frankfurt School 
project was never repressed.
448
 The very reexamination of theological concepts and categories 
marks one major site of just such an instance in which an explicitly left-committed philosophical 
project becomes deeply involved with arguments crassly associated with the political and 
philosophical right. However, this upsetting of the comfortable left-right orientation of politics 
and philosophy was openly discussed by both Horkheimer and Adorno, particularly by the 
former in terms of Schopenhauer and the latter in terms of Spengler. Benjamin – much to 
Adorno’s chagrin – was the most explicitly leftist of the three, embracing the aesthetics and 
politics, at least in part, of Brecht, and preferring “the clumsy and caddish analyses of a Franz 
                                                          
445
 It was, as Taubes himself states, Rolf Tiedemann who actually found and published the letter originally. Just as it 
would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to address every scholar currently writing on the “Critique of 
Violence,” it is also beyond the scope of this dissertation to address the all of the literature devoted to this one letter.  
446
 Agamben, State of Exception, 53. 
447
 Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, 98. 
448
 Adorno himself wrote of it publicly and clearly. For example, in the preface to Negative Dialectics: “The author 
is prepared for the attacks to which Negative Dialectics will expose him. He feels no rancor and does not begrudge 
the joy of those in either camp who will proclaim that they knew it all the time and now he was confessing.” 





Mehring” to “the most profound paraphrases of the realm of ideas emanating today from 
Heidegger’s school.”449 Taubes’ palpable disdain for Adorno (the Musikus, “musician”) is not 
just idle slander. It is Adorno who is concerned with aesthetics and epistemology; Benjamin’s 
concerns, for Taubes, are much more “profound.” Considering that Adorno and Benjamin, even 
when they were in disagreement, wrote of their project largely as a shared one, particularly 
around the question of aesthetics,
450
 one must ask, where does Taubes find this ‘profundity’ in 
Benjamin? Benjamin spent nearly his entire career – including the early period – writing about 
the relationship between aesthetics and epistemology. But for Taubes, something else is much 
more important. It is this letter to Schmitt: 
Distinguished Herr Professor, 
 You will be receiving in a few days from the publisher my book, Origin of the German Mourning Play. With 
these lines I would like not simply to announce its arrival, but also express my joy at being able to send it to you, at 
the suggestion of Mr. Albert Salomon. You will quickly see how much the book owes you in its presentation of the 
seventeenth century doctrine of sovereignty. Perhaps I may go even further and say that in your later works as well, 
above all in “Dictatorship,” your mode of research in the realm of political philosophy has confirmed by own mode 
of research in matters concerning philosophy of art. If in reading my book this feeling seems comprehensible to you, 
the purpose of my sending it will have been fulfilled. 
With the expression of particular esteem, 




As Judith Butler succinctly states, this “formal expression of thanks hardly forms a basis for 
inferring that Benjamin condones Schmitt’s book in part or in whole.”452 Indeed, especially in 
light of Benjamin’s unusual formality, it could easily be read as the letter of a perennially 
unsuccessful scholar to a slightly better known one, hoping perhaps for a review or a reference 
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(why exactly is Saloman suggesting Benjamin contact Schmitt?). But even read as a sincere 
expression of “thanks,” while its mode is effusive, its claims are reserved. Benjamin does not say 
the book agrees with Schmitt’s arguments about sovereignty; he says it “owes much” to them.  It 
is also worth noting the “mode of research”; this “mode” would be Schmitt’s arguments about 
the “secularization” of concepts from the theological to the political realm. Benjamin’s 
comments would suggest that he too is “secularizing” concepts but in the aesthetic realm. But 
whose concepts? Which secularization? To answer this, let us examine Benjamin’s use of 
Schmitt in the Trauerspiel: 
Whereas the modern concept of sovereignty amounts to a supreme executive power on the part of 
the prince, the baroque concept emerges from a discussion of the state of emergency, and makes it 
the most important function of the prince to avert this. [Benjamin cites Schmitt in Political 
Theology here]. The ruler is designated from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if war, 
revolt, or other catastrophes should lead to a state of emergency… The theological-juridical mode 
of thought, which is so characteristic of the century, is an expression of the retarding effect of the 




What has happened between the modern and baroque periods is “secularization” à la Schmitt: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not 
only because of their historical development – in which they were transferred from theology to the 
theory of the state… but also because of their systematic structure, the recognition of which is 
necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.
454
 
Benjamin’s wording in his letter is quite apt: he owes [verdankt] much to Schmitt’s theory in this 
particular case. Schmitt argues that political concepts that are taken to be sui generis, rational, 
and/or secular have both historical and formal theological (Christian) antecedents/counterparts. 
Benjamin agrees that this is how “the political” has come to be created. Benjamin and Schmitt do 
agree about the identity of these concepts in terms of the state. But for Schmitt this ‘unveiling’ 
serves to reinforce the legitimacy of a dictatorial vision of the modern order. Schmitt’s critique of 
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parliamentary democracy is that it fundamentally misunderstands the true and good nature of 
politics or sovereignty (as defined by the corresponding theologico-juridical concepts from 
Christianity) as completely distinct from rational or sociological precepts. Benjamin’s critique of 
parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, is that in thinking political concepts are based on 
rational or sociological precepts, liberals and social democrats misunderstand not only those 
concepts but how to challenge them. Benjamin, as I will show, frames this ‘challenge’ in 
explicitly historical and/or aesthetic terms, not in juridical ones. Furthermore, Benjamin’s 
critique of Social Democracy is particularly predicated on its idealism.
455
 That is to say, on the 
grounds of their faith in progress and their conviction that the bourgeois state would transform 
gradually, along this course of progress, into the “classless society.” Schmitt defines the existing 
political accurately; what Benjamin wants to tell us about is the other politics that are possible.
456
 
Thus, revisiting the long quotation from the Trauerspiel, we can see that Benjamin 
simultaneously agrees with Schmitt’s genealogy but calls it “an expression of the retarding effect 
of the over-strained transcendental impulse, which underlies all the provocatively worldly 
accents of the baroque.” The “over-strained transcendental impulse” may provide the foundation 
for “all the provocatively worldly accents of the baroque,” but it is also the same “impulse” 
which turns to betray the world in individualized transcendent salvation. Its ideological form is 
the eternal justification and preservation of present conditions. The political order that Schmitt 
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desires and views as fundamentally correct is central to the “betrayal” of the world that Benjamin 
discusses in the Trauerspiel.   
 Taubes seeks to establish that Benjamin is a Jewish thinker in line with, of all people, the 
apostle Paul.
457
 But he conveniently overlooks that it is Pauline transcendentalism – from Paul 
through Hegel – which Benjamin marks as treacherous. Therein he completely confuses 
Pauline/Christian “apocalypse” with Benjamin’s “messianism.”458 Taubes achieves this 
confusion through a reading of the notoriously difficult “Theological-Political Fragment.”459 
Benjamin writes: 
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happiness,” as well as with his critique of social democracy, not on grounds of the state but on grounds of idealism 






Only the Messiah himself completes history, in the sense he alone redeems, completes, creates in 
relation to the messianic. For this reason, nothing that is historical can relate itself, from its own 
ground, to anything messianic. Therefore, the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the historical 
dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal. From the standpoint of history, it is not the goal but 
the terminus [Ende]. Therefore, the secular order cannot be built on the idea of the Divine 
Kingdom, and theocracy has not political but only religious meaning. To have repudiated with 
utmost vehemence the political significance of theocracy is the cardinal merit of Bloch’s “Spirit of 
Utopia.”460 
Taubes says of the first line, “A very difficult sentence. All right, first of all, one thing is clear: 
There is a Messiah. No schmontses,”461 “like ‘the messianic.’” This is a strange reading of  the 
first line, in which Benjamin puts the “Messiah” in direct relation to the “the messianic,” and 
also which is principally about “the messianic” and its relation to “history.” Indeed, Benjamin 
follows this proposition with two conclusions about how we should understand “the messianic,” 
not the Messiah. The first is as follows: “Therefore, the Kingdom of God is not the telos of the 
historical dynamic; it cannot be established as a goal.” This statement is a negation of Hegel’s 
teleological history and state
462
 and the way in which this aspect of Hegel persists in Marx. The 
second conclusion is as follows: “Therefore, the secular order cannot be built on the idea of the 
Divine Kingdom.” This statement seems to be a rather stark repudiation of Schmitt. Benjamin is 
not just restating the historical critique of teleology; he is saying, additionally, that this “secular 
order cannot be build on the idea of the Divine Kingdom.” That is to say, an ordering of the 
political like Schmitt suggests, which mirrors the transcendent Christian cosmological order, is 
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also challenged by the realization that “nothing that is historical, can relate itself, from its own 
ground, to anything messianic.”  
It is important to recognize that the “Theologico-Political Fragment” operates on two 
levels as a critique of a philosophy of history and a critique of the existing “secular order.” 
Benjamin is very precise here. It is not that there is no relation between history (as a practice) 
and the messianic but rather that if there is a relation between the historical (that is the existing, 
real of the “secular order”) and the messianic, it cannot be related “of itself, from its own 
ground.” This “of itself” [von sich aus]463 is crucial to understanding the complex argument 
Benjamin is making, particularly in regard to certain political positions in Marxist discourse that 
view the subject as actively bringing about the utopian classless society.
464
 Benjamin clarifies 
and intensifies his first two conclusions by following this passage with the normative statement: 
“The secular order should be erected on the idea of happiness.”465 
 Taubes overlooks nearly all of this. He dismisses the second two sentences of the 
fragment, with the statement, “Benjamin shares Scholem’s idea… that apocalyptics knows no 
transitions, but posits between the Now and the Then a time of catastrophe, a time of silence, a 
time of total destruction and annihilation.”466 Not only does the assertion ignore what Benjamin 
actually says, it is not entirely clear that it is even true.
467
 He also dismisses the second half of 
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the paragraph and in particular the line about Bloch by saying, “It’s not quite possible to 
recognize Benjamin’s intention here, because the sentence is too enigmatic, too short.”468 What 
Taubes suggests instead are a series of “Christian concepts,” which are “highly political and 
explosive, or become so at certain moment.”469 Taubes offers a two-fold proposition: first, that 
“the messianic” in Benjamin is the same as in Scholem and is the same as in the Christian 
apocalyptic longings expressed for example, in “Romans,” and “Revelations”;470 second, that 
Benjamin wants this “total destruction and annihilation.” This proposition fails the test of logic 
for two reasons: 1) it does not make sense in terms of the way Benjamin describes the messianic 
in his writings on Kafka, Baudelaire, the Paris Arcades, and in the “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History;” and 2) it make sense neither in light of the arguments Benjamin makes in the 
Trauerspiel that I examined above, nor in light of the fact that one of Benjamin’s chief criticisms 
of “the baroque” is that in knowing “no eschatology,” it invites not only a frantic theodicy of the 
present but an eschatological “vacuum, one day to destroy the world with catastrophic 
violence.”471 This criticism directly follows Benjamin’s citations of Schmitt on the nature of 
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sovereignty and constitutes a component of his critique of the “over-strained transcendental 
impulse” discussed before.  
Taubes proceeds to read “happiness” as the only pertinent word in the statement, “the 
secular order should be erected on the idea of happiness.” He likewise ignores Benjamin’s quite 
intricate explanation of this principle: 
The relation of this order to the messianic one is one of the essential teachings of the philosophy 
of history. It is the precondition of a mystical conception of history, encompassing a problem that 
can be represented figuratively. If one arrow points to the goal toward which the secular dynamic 
acts, and another marks the direction of messianic intensity, then certainly the quest of free 
humanity for happiness runs counter to the messianic direction. But just as a force, by virtue of the 
path it is moving along, can augment another force on the opposite path, so the secular order – 
because of its nature as secular – promotes the coming of the Messianic Kingdom. The secular, 




This explanation is extraordinarily rich. Benjamin’s discussion of “secular order” should not be 
confused with current debates about secularism. Benjamin’s “secular” [Profane, profane, 
mundane, worldly] here is speaking of the “historical.” Benjamin also provides a rare – although 
maddeningly abrupt – glimpse at what actual politics would look like within Benjaminian 
philosophy. Quite simply, the vector of the “quest of free humanity for happiness” is related to 
the “Messianic Kingdom” only in the sense that the vector of happiness indirectly allows for the 
“most unobtrusive approach” of the messianic. Although there might seem to be an indication 
that “happiness” and “the messianic” are opposite conditions, it is merely the “path” of their 
“forces” which are so. The relationship of the condition of “happiness” itself and the condition of 
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“the messianic” is left unexplained.473 But even without turning to the writings on Kafka, one 
can see from the above and from this section, that there is a clear distinction between the notion 
of apocalypse as the final “total destruction and annihilation” of all things and Benjamin’s 
messianism. Quite contrary to the violent apocalypticism that Taubes wants to impute to 
Benjamin, Benjamin offers a quiescent politics of happiness that runs quite perpendicular to the 
illegitimate “secular order” that Schmitt builds on an image of divine order. Through the medium 
of a “secular order,” which “should be erected on the idea of happiness,” a messianic order can 
emerge indirectly, in a “most unobtrusive approach.”  
 Taubes ignores all of this. He does not even propose a reading of any of the above section 
except the word “happiness,” which he links with “downfall,” completely ignoring what 
Benjamin writes of both “happiness” (see above) and “downfall.” Taubes links “downfall” with 
apocalypse, with cessation, whereas Benjamin links it with quite the opposite: namely, 
“transience.” Taubes misses the fact that Benjamin in the last two paragraphs of the fragment (it 
is only two pages long) critiques a “spiritual restitutio in integrum,474” which “corresponds to a 
worldly restitution that leads to an eternity of downfall.”475 This is the same dilemma of the 
other-worldly, individual salvation that Benjamin critiqued in the Trauerspiel. Put differently, a 
“spiritual restitutio in integrum” is something of a contradiction in terms. Taubes links 
“happiness” to “downfall” [Unterganges] and equates “downfall,” to “passing away” 
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[Vergängnis]. Although Eiland and Jennings (and Taubes) translate Vergängnis as “passing 
away,” I think “transience” captures both the word and Benjamin’s meaning more precisely.476 
But Benjamin wants to distinguish the connection between “happiness” and “downfall,” on the 
one hand, and “happiness” and “transience,” on the other. The former “leads to an eternity of 
downfall.” The latter leads to an understanding that that “nature is messianic by reason of its 
eternal and total transience.”477 The “eternity of downfall” from the former expresses an infinite 
sweep of time, the “empty, homogenous time” which Benjamin ascribes to historicism in the 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History.”478 But in the latter distinction, it is not “eternity” 
[Ewigkeit] but “eternal” [ewigen], and even that “eternal” is an aspect of nature’s “total 
transience.” This “eternal and total transience” does not express an expanse of time but rather, as 
Benjamin writes, an “eternally transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its spatial 
but also temporal totality.”479 This statement expresses the utter contingency of time and space, 
not only in the sense of historical possibility but also in the sense that there is the possibility to 
think time and space themselves anew in each moment. Thus, while the “secular order,” “erected 
on the idea of happiness,” facilitates in an indirect “most unobtrusive approach” “the coming of 
the Messianic Kingdom,” nature, by virtue of its utter “spatial” and “temporal” contingency, 
facilitates the possibility of the messianic. Unlike the spiritual which is static and singular, “an 
eternity of downfall,” the natural, “eternal and total transience,” is portrayed as having a 
“rhythm” and “the rhythm of this eternally transient worldly existence… the rhythm of messianic 
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nature, is happiness.”480 The happiness in the “idea of happiness” is different than the happiness 
in this “rhythm.” The former is linked to the needs of real human beings, the “quest of free 
humanity for happiness.” The latter is linked to spatial and temporal possibility of the messianic 
condition, which is natural.  
 So while Taubes is correct when he identifies that there is a subtle critique of Nietzsche 
here,
481
 in his zeal for his Pauline reading, in pursuit of which he has misread or read over nearly 
the entire text he claims to be reading carefully, he misinterprets entirely the very last line of the 
fragment: 
To strive for such a passing away – even the passing away of those stages of man that are nature – 
is the task of world politics, whose method must be called nihilism.
482
 
Taubes thinks that the key word here is “nihilism,” saying, “I contend that this concept of 
nihilism, as developed here by Benjamin, is the guiding thread of the hos me
483
 in Corinthians 
and Romans.”484 I could not summarize this position better than Taubes’ editors do in The 
Political Theology of Paul: “Taubes sees the closest parallel to Benjamin’s ‘nihilism as world 
politics,’ in Paul and in his relation to the world in the mode of ‘as though not’ (hos 
me).…Benjamin is for Taubes a Paulinian… like Paul he proceeds from the desperation and 
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irredeemability of creation.”485 As I have shown throughout this chapter, this is almost entirely at 
odds with any recognizable form of Benjamin’s thought. But what is most crucial here is that 
Taubes has missed that they key here is not “nihilism” but “to strive” [zu erstreben]. “To strive” 
for Vergängnis violates the precisely indirect formulas that Benjamin presents in the fragment. 
This entire last sentence is a critique of existing “world politics,” not an endorsement of them. In 
terms of the philosophy of history, it is an argument against utopianism and teleology. In terms 
of political philosophy, it critically juxtaposes the “nihilism” of existing “world politics” with 
“the idea of happiness” that the “secular order should be erected on.” “To strive” in this way 
precisely undermines the messianic possibility. Paul suggests with the hos me (for example, in 
Corinthians 7:25-36) that worldly actions are meaningless because apocalyptic destruction is at 
hand. Benjamin, in stark contrast, argues that worldly actions are most meaningful because they 
may indirectly bring about a messianic transformation. The emergent messianism in Benjamin’s 
formulation of historical materialism could not be more different than the anticipated destructive 
apocalypse in Paul’s formulation of ahistorical spiritualism. As I have demonstrated before, 
Benjamin has no use for the supernatural and specifically for the Christian notion of faith. 
Needless to say, these are quite central for Paul.   
Taubes, in presenting the Pauline hos me wants to distinguish it from what he called the 
Adornan “as-if”. He views Benjamin’s messianism as more “substantial” than Adorno’s 
“aestheticization.”486 Yet, he ignores that it is Benjamin who presents the arguments, in the 
“Theologico-Political Fragment,” by way of visual, auditory, and heptatic aesthetic figuration, in 
the “arrows,” “paths,” and “rhythms.” Taubes also ignores that in the very letter, which he claims 
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“blows to pieces” all existing conceptions of the early Frankfurt School period, Benjamin 
specifically labels his “own mode of research” as one in “philosophy of art.”  
To pose perhaps obvious questions: why should we imagine that Benjamin would want to 
reproduce what he has just decried? In other words, why should we assume he is “secularizing” 
Christian theological cosmology? Benjamin writes in 1931 in a letter to Max Rychner:  
Perhaps I may also assume that, when you asked me the question to which all of what I have said 
here is very loosely related, you did not do so without having quietly considered some solutions 
for yourself. Of those, the one most familiar to me would be to see in me not a representative of 
dialectical materialism as a dogma, but a scholar to whom the stance of the materialist seems 
scientifically and humanely more productive in everything that moves us than does that of the 
Idealist. If I might express it in brief: I have never been able to do research and think in any sense 
other than, if you will, a theological one, namely in accord with the Talmudic teaching about the 
forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage of Torah. That is, in my experience, the most trite 
Communist platitude possesses more hierarchies of meaning than does contemporary bourgeois 
profundity, which has only one meaning, that of an apologetic.
487
 
This passage from Benjamin’s letter to Rychner is crucial. First, Benjamin rejects another new 
variant on “faith,” that is, materialism as dogma. Instead he endorses the “stance of the 
materialist.” This could not be further from Taubes’ argument that Adorno aestheticizes 
Benjamin. Taubes writes, quoting Adorno:
488
  
“’But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of 
redemption itself hardly matters.’ There you have the aestheticization of the problem. Benjamin by 
contrast begins with “the Messiah.” These are the same ideas diverted into the aesthetic… It 
hardly matters if it’s real. In Benjamin, it does matter.”489  
Except, of course, in this letter to Rychner, it doesn’t. It is the stance that matters, not the 
cosmology. That stance is measured by what is “productive,” “scientifically and humanely.” 
Even here as early as 1931, we see a kernel of Convolute N of The Arcades Project.  Marx, who 
“lays bare the causal connection between economy and culture,” must be fixed by demonstrating 
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“the milieu in which Marx’s doctrine arose affected that doctrine through its expressive character 
(which is to say, not only through causal connections); but second, it will show in what respects 
Marxism, too, shares the expressive character of the material products contemporary with it.”490 
But of course in doing that, Benjamin must “bear in mind” that the “scientific mainstay” for 
“commentary on reality” “is theology.”491 Benjamin does not view this “theology” as in any way 
relating to faith or “dogma.” Rather, it is dialectically oriented to Benjamin’s “materialism,” 
here. Benjamin in this letter proposes that “the most trite Communist platitude possesses more 
hierarchies of meaning” measured “scientifically and humanely” than does any Idealism or 
“bourgeois philosophy.” This is an application of a “theological,” indeed Talmudic methodology 
which posits at least “forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage of the Torah.”492 However, 
in the Passagenwerk, these “forty-nine levels of meaning” are applied as “commentary on 
reality.”  
There is still one final aspect to the passage in the letter to Rychner: apologetics. For 
anyone familiar with Benjamin’s corpus, “contemporary bourgeois profundity” is easily 
identifiable as Heideggerian ontology (cf. the quotation above about “Heidegger’s school”; these 
comments can be found in multiple places in the Passagenwerk and in Benjamin’s 
correspondence). But, putting Heidegger aside for the moment, Schmitt too, in his critique of the 
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bourgeois state, does not overcome the “apologetic.” Schmitt’s challenge is not to current 
conditions – particularly as understood in terms of economic justice – but rather to what he views 
as popular but erroneous understandings of the origin and order of the modern state. For 
Benjamin this would be an apologia for an equally unjust order, an order in which the worldly is 
still sacrificed for a greater good.  
Here too, Convolute N begins to come into focus: the “annihilation of progress” is the 
end of theodicy. Marxism offers some of the pieces when it begins by seeking to eradicate evil in 
explaining it, and not simply enduring evil by explaining it. But Marxism itself needs to be 
wedded to a “stance” that sees the world as laden with meaning; it needs Talmudic interpretation, 
theological practice. As in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” both Judaic messianism 
and Marxian thought seek a materially redeemed world. But Marxism needs Judaic 
interpretations of these concepts to annihilate its own utopian impulses which lead it back into 
idealism, back into theodicy. Judaism needs Marxism as the most “productive” system of 
thought to understand and realize its own materialist loyalty, “scientifically and humanely.” The 
machine needs the dwarf. The dwarf needs the machine.  
Derrida: the Eclipse of Reason 
Taubes’ claims about the importance of the letter “haunt,” to use one of Derrida’s 
favorite words, Derrida’s “reading” of Benjamin. The actual reading occupies less than a third of 
the essay; the frame text is what is important, since it predetermines the “reading” beyond 
measure. About the actual “Critique of Violence” I will say little beyond what I already have: it 
is unrepresentative of Benjamin’s work as a whole both thematically and stylistically, which 
makes it a poor choice to read his entire body of work through. Its most confounding feature, its 





and the possibility of non-violent practice. And although it inveighs against casual “childish” 
anarchism, it does contain something of an anarchistic spirit from which Benjamin distanced 
himself quickly afterwards.
493
 It marks a brief infatuation with Sorel and an abortive attempt at 
writing formal legal critique. Seyla Benhabib, in discussing Derrida’s “Force of Law,” presents a 
quite nice summary of the general failings of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” in terms of 
political philosophy: 
Professor Derrida suggests that with some careful reading and analysis, the Benjamin text may 
still be able to illuminate our reflections on the problems of ethics, legality, and legitimacy in 
democratic societies. I am skeptical that this is so; my reasons here are threefold. First… I find it 
very difficult to extricate the Walter Benjamin text from the political constellation of the 
confrontation at the time between the Social Democrats and the Communists and the fate of the 
eventually developing Weimar Republic. Second, and perhaps from a systematic point of view this 
is a more interesting reason, I find in Derrida’s text a certain confirmation and continuation of the 
vision of politics as the activity of what Nancy Harstock calls the “warrior-hero.” This is a vision 
of politics as the agonistic struggle of male bodies with the problem of violence at its center.
494
 
As I demonstrated in my close examination of the “Theologico-Political Fragment” above, it 
appears Benjamin himself would largely agree with many aspects of Benhabib’s critique of the 
“Critique of Violence.”  Yet Derrida, in a text nominally about the topics of justice and reading, 
in addition to violence and law, manages simultaneously to not read the “Critique of Violence” 
and to be unjust while doing so. Thus, the issue at hand – unlike in the case of Taubes’ reading of 
the letter to Schmitt or his reading of the “Theologico-Political Frgament,” as inaccurate and 
misleading as those are – is not to produce a reading of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence.” It is 
to try and understand, rather, Derrida’s “Force of Law” and this essay’s strange privileging of the 
“Critique of Violence” while devoting so little space to Benjamin’s actual text, so accurately and 
succinctly contextualized and critiqued by Benhabib here.  
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We must begin from Taubes’ letter (really Tiedemann’s). By 1989, under Derrida’s 
watchful gaze, Taubes’ letter first metastasizes into a second completely imaginary letter, and no 
sooner than this new letter is conjured, Benjamin’s work is suddenly afflicted with a full blown 
case of Nazi correspondence: “Carl Schmitt, whom Benjamin admired and with whom he 
maintained a correspondence, congratulated him for this essay.”495 Needless to say, this 
congratulatory letter does not exist and the “correspondence” thus referenced is, in fact, the one 
letter already discussed above. The imaginary letter and correspondence is not the only 
imaginary correspondence that Derrida invokes. Apropos of nothing, shortly into the preamble to 
the “reading,” Derrida remarks, “The words Walten and Gewalt play a decisive role in a few 
texts by Martin Heidegger…”496 Why does this statement appear other than to mark the utterly 
trivial occurrence of two common German words in Benjamin’s text (this one text is all we are 
talking about, according to Derrida) and a “few texts by Martin Heidegger”? Derrida deigns to 
explain nearly twenty pages later in his second preamble of “certain analogies”:  
…between the discourses of some “great” German, non-Jewish thinkers and some “great” 
German Jewish thinkers: a certain patriotism, often a German nationalism, and sometimes even a 
German militarism (during and after the First World War) were not the only analogy, far from it, 
for example in Cohen or Rosenzweig, and in the converted Jew, Husserl. It is in this context that 
certain limited but determinate affinities between Benjamin’s text and some texts by Carl Schmitt 
and even by Heidegger seem to me to deserve a serious interrogation.
497
  
Derrida’s first point, if again trivial, is not without merit. There is no special magic in being 
Jewish that made German-Jews as a total group immune to German militarism, patriotism, and 
nationalism.
498
  Benjamin, however, partook of none of these. He did not serve and broke with 
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many of his youthful affiliations over their enthusiasm for the War.
499
 But Derrida tells us this is 
not the “only analogy” and that there are “certain limited but determinate affinities.” The 
affinities with Schmitt are the inflated false claims evaluated in my section on Taubes, here 
multiplied by Derrida’s inflationary theory of correspondence. What is the analogy, or what are 
the affinities, with Heidegger? First, Derrida presents the fact above that they both used common 
German words while writing in German. Derrida tells us: 
Benjamin’s discourse, which then develops into a critique of the parliamentarianism of liberal 
democracy, is therefore revolutionary, even tending toward Marxism, but in the senses of the word 
“revolutionary,” which also includes the sense “reactionary” – that is, the sense of a return to the 
past of a purer origin.
500
 
Derrida perhaps has in mind Benjamin’s arguments in the prologue to the Trauerspiel 
concerning the true origin of philosophy being in Adam’s naming. However, this is clearly an 
allegorical argument, so even if that were the argument, it would be hard to justify. But Derrida 
is not referring to that case. In fact he is so thoroughly collapsing Benjamin and Schmitt in 
thought that he is claiming Benjamin is nostalgic for “absolute monarchy” like Schmitt.501 As we 
will see shortly with Agamben, it is easy to misread Benjamin as an anarchist, particularly if one 
is not attentive to other definitions of law. For example, Benjamin writes in “Critique of 
Violence”: 
Taking up occasional statements by Marx, Sorel rejects every kind of program, of utopia – in a 
word, of lawmaking – for the revolutionary movement: “With the general strike, all these fine 
things disappear; the revolution appears as a clear simple revolt, and no place is reserved either 
for the sociologists or the elegant amateurs of social reforms or for the intellectuals who have 
made it their profession to think for the proletariat.” Against this deep, moral, and genuinely 
revolutionary conception, no objection stands that seeks, on grounds of its possible catastrophic 
consequences, to brand such a general strike as violent.
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Benjamin certainly seems to be taking up Sorel’s “general strike” and his anarchism more 
broadly. However, not only would Benjamin come to repudiate many of these positions in short 
time, but they are hard to reconcile with his arguments for non-violence in the same essay. Still, 
they display an anarchistic sympathy that is hard to ignore.  
However, to misread Benjamin as an absolute monarchist requires a certain level of skill. 
I am tempted to stop at this point and conclude that Derrida has already disproven his own 
method, in terms of this essay, as far as he is from any tenable interpretation. But there is much 
more to deal with that will get us closer to the heart of the misreading itself. Derrida continues: 
The analogy with Schmittian or Heideggerian schemas does not need to be emphasized. This 
triangle would have to be illustrated by a correspondence, I mean the epistolary correspondence 
that linked these three thinkers (Schmitt/Benjamin, Heidegger/Schmitt). 
503
 
At least we get a clearer picture of the frame, shaped as a triangle: one side is made up of the 
(largely imaginary) Schmitt/Benjamin correspondence; one side of the Heidegger/Schmitt 
correspondence
504
; and what of the third side? We must recall that Derrida already gave it to us 
before: Benjamin and Heidegger both use the German words Gewalt [violence] and walten 
[prevail]. Even Derrida backs away from his final underlining of this “affinity” when after 
making much of the (meaningless) play of walten, Gewalt, and Walter (as in Benjamin), he adds 
a footnote disavowing it.
505
  
 This disavowal is particularly characteristic of Derrida’s text. Derrida at one moment 
says that he will not speak of the “Critique of Violence” as an exemplar of Benjamin’s thought 
and then concludes with a specific (and unmeaningful) self-contradiction: “This text, like many 
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others by Benjamin, is still too Heideggerian, too messianic-Marxist or archeo-eschatological for 
me.”506 Is it or is it not exemplary? If only this were the only contradiction. Nominally, the essay 
is about “justice.” We are told first that “the suffering of deconstruction…is perhaps the absence 
of rules of norms, and definitive criteria to distinguish in an unequivocal manner between law 
and justice.”507 This seems a fair evaluation. Surely a philosophy which involves only the 
disruption of definitions, even of definitions in tension, even of the kinds of dialectic tensions I 
have been discussing in terms of Benjamin (and Al-e Ahmad in the last chapter) does not provide 
definitions, even negatively. Of course, Derrida follows up on this ten pages later: 
“Deconstruction is justice.”508 Clearly, Derrida cannot mean for this to be accepted prima facie.  
He precedes this statement by writing, “Justice in itself, if such a thing exist, outside of beyond 
the law, is not deconstructible.”509 We are already quite far from the understandable “the 
suffering of deconstruction,” and its inability “to distinguish in an unequivocal manner between 
law and justice.” But in stating that “Justice in itself… is not desconstructible,” Derrida would 
seem to be actually demarcating where “Deconstuction” as a philosophical system cannot 
successfully apply. This, in turn, would make Derrida’s project in “Force of Law” more 
understandable: namely, as an anti-systemic philosophical criticism of systemic philosophy 
which points to the fact, value, or proposition that the systemic philosophy cannot and yet must 
contain, akin to Kierkegaard’s existential challenge to Hegel’s systemic logic. But in his 
emphatic “Deconstruction is Justice” Derrida denies this reasonable possibility and invites 
speculation as to the grounds on which such a claim is being made.   
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 It is on precisely these grounds that Nancy Fraser addresses Derrida’s “Force of Law” in 
her response essay, “The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Physical?” Fraser writes: 
There are three things worth noting about this account of “the force of law.” The first is the 
unnecessarily paradoxical character of the discussion of judgment. Derrida goes too quickly from 
the uncontroversial claim that judgment is not calculation to the hyperbolic, and, I think, 
indefensible claim that it is “madness,” “mystique,” and “violence.” There is no discussion of 
intermediate positions, such as those derived from the Aristotelian conception of phronesis, which 
understand judgment as neither the application of an algorithmic decision procedure nor the 
exercise of an irrational will. Because he fails to consider alternatives like these, which give 
nonaporetic accounts of noncalculative judgment, Derrida fails to justify his claim that judgment 
is shot through with aporias. On substantive grounds, then, his account is flawed.
510
  
I do not quote Fraser to defend Aristotelian conceptions per se. Rather, what Fraser notes here 
goes beyond demonstrating the substantial failure of Derrida’s account on basic philosophical 
grounds; she suggests that Derrida is being inattentive to positions that might meaningfully 
disrupt the binary that Derrida himself conjures between “calculation” and “violence.” This helps 
explain Derrida’s attempt to clarify the claim that “Deconstruction is Justice,” when he states, 
“Deconstruction is possible as an experience of the impossible, there where, even if it does not 
exist, if it is not present, not yet or never, there is justice.”511 Although presented in the context 
of law, justice, and violence, this is an argument about justice in speculative philosophy. As 
Fraser goes on to argue, “his [Derrida’s] account directs our attention to a level of so-called 
‘violence’ in law that is constitutive and inescapable. This is a ‘violence’ that can in no 
meaningful sense be called ‘political,’ since it is independent of any specific institutional or 
social arrangements and since it is not subject, even in principle, to change. Thus, ‘the force of 
law’ in Derrida’s account is essentially metaphysical.”512  
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It is telling that in Fraser’s whole essay she does not feel the need to mention Benjamin at 
all. Benjamin is seemingly irrelevant to the arguments Derrida actually wants to make about law, 
justice, and deconstruction. Perhaps it is this metaphysical “responsibility without limits,”513 
which is necessarily ahistorical in addition to being effectively apolitical, as Fraser suggests 
above, that spurs Derrida to read Benjamin and the “Critique of Violence” as “an experience of 
the impossible, there where, even if it does not exist....” Perhaps convinced by the ‘scandal’ of 
the Schmitt letter, Derrida wants to read Benjamin as a cautionary tale of how the 
“revolutionary” “also includes the sense of the reactionary.” But, this would be an unproductive 
approach to questions of law, justice, and violence – this is Fraser’s point. This is also, I would 
suggest, an unproductive approach to trying to understand the “Critique of Violence” and even 
more so Benjamin. When he finally gets to addressing some elements that are actually in the 
“Critique of Violence,” Derrida writes that the text is “revolutionary in a style that is both 
Marxist and messianic.”514 But the “Critique of Violence” is “revolutionary in a style” that is 
neither Marxist nor messianic. Sorel’s anarcho-syndicalism or what Benjamin describes as 
Sorel’s “taking up occasional statements by Marx” fails at being Marxist precisely on grounds of 
style. If Derrida had made the claim that the “Critique of Violence” was part of a long chain of 
literature that drew on Marx for inspiration, that would be defensible. But in terms of the style of 
the essay, its rhetorical, philosophical, and scientific contents (if all three can be so discretely 
separated and if we note the third merely by its rhetorical and philosophical absence), what 
Benjamin (and Sorel for that matter) does in this essay does not resemble Marx at all.  The case 
for the messianic style is even worse. Not only is there nothing like the intricate discussion of 
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messianism that I discussed before in terms of the “Theologico-Political Fragment,” but the 
Messiah, messianism, the messianic, even some sense of the ‘emergent’ beyond the word 
“revolutionary” are also completely absent.  
Derrida attempts to clarify his position on justice again ten pages after his declaration that 
“Deconstruction is Justice” by stating that he “would hesitate to assimilate too quickly this ‘idea 
of justice’ to a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, to whatever content of a messianic 
promise… or to horizons of the same type.”515 To give us a better idea of just what is eclipsed in 
the elevation of deconstruction to the very definition of justice – whatever that can possibly 
mean – Derrida lists what he has in mind: “messianism or determinate messianic figures of the 
Jewish, Christian, or Islamic type, the idea in the Kantian sense, eschato-teleology of the neo-
Hegelian type, Marxist or post-Marxist, etc.”516 In doing so, Derrida helps clarify what he means 
when he writes “revolutionary in a style that is both Marxist and messianic.” He seems to mean 
any thought – other than deconstruction, I assume – that can potentially affect social or political 
transformation. Thus, I should augment Fraser’s earlier analysis. Deconstruction is not in “no 
meaningful sense political”; it is, perhaps simply conservative.  
But what is truly frustrating is that when Derrida finally tries to justify his entire 
“reading” of Benjamin, he says it is to resist the “great antiparliamentarian and anti-‘Aufklärung’ 
wave upon which Nazism will have, as it were, surfaced and even ‘surfed’ in the 1920s and the 
beginning of the 1930s.”517 I will return to the bizarre chronology at play in the whole of 
Derrida’s essay, but I want to stop and address this question of “antiparliamentarian and anti-
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Aufklärung”. I am earnestly confused as to what is left of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment] if 
everything Derrida lists above is discounted as “messianic”; surely even the liberal tradition 
would fall under an “etc.” that broad.  But what does Benjamin write of parliaments, even in the 
“Critique of Violence”? 
When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the 
institution falls into decay. In our time, parliaments provide an example of this. They offer the 
familiar, woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the revolutionary forces to 
which they owe their existence. Accordingly, in Germany in particular, the last manifestation of 
such forces bore no fruit for parliaments. 
518
  
Even here at the height of Benjamin’s explicit writing on a political institution, he turns to 
questions of consciousness; one is reminded, again, of Benjamin’s letter to Schmitt. This is not 
because they share a critique of parliaments (they both critique parliamentarianism for different 
reasons and Benjamin more or less only in this text) but rather because, reading alongside Buck-
Morss, Beatrice Hansen, Margaret Cohen, James Martel, and Benjamin himself, we must 
conclude that the politics in Benjamin read “seriously as a political thinker”519 are to be found 
precisely in his theories of aesthetics and epistemology. That is to say, precisely where I began 
this chapter, with problems of knowledge, judgment, the senses, and consciousness. However, 
even Benjamin’s explicitly anti-parliamentarian idea here is predicated on two factors: first, his 
lack of consciousness; and second, his effort to answer the question he poses, “Is any nonviolent 
resolution of conflict possible?”520 Benjamin answers his own question, “Without doubt.” Before 
he moves into the allegorical territory that so enchants and confuses Derrida, he writes, 
“Nonviolent agreement is possible wherever a civilized outlook allows the use of unalloyed 
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means of agreement. Legal and illegal means of every kind that are all the same violent may be 
confronted with nonviolent ones as unalloyed means. Courtesy, sympathy, peaceableness, trust, 
and whatever else might here be mentioned, are their subjective preconditions.”521 A judicious 
or, indeed, just reading of Benjamin would probably venture a connection between “bloodless” 
violence and this discussion of “non-violence.” As I said, I do not need to defend the “Critique of 
Violence”; I think even the point Benjamin makes here and the discussion he enters into are a 
kind of naïve and pointless anarchism that Benjamin discards as his thought develops, 
particularly in the period during which he was composing the Passagenwerk. But the point is that 
Derrida is so unjust a reader that instead of seeing poorly formulated anarchism and a kind of 
non-violent aspiration, he actually reads Benjamin as Nazi. 
And I do not use the word “Nazi” lightly. Derrida, making a running leap over any kind 
of historical logic,
522
 claims that the text is “haunted in advance” by “the final solution”: 
I believe this uneasy, enigmatic, terribly equivocal text is haunted in advance (but can one say “in 
advance” here?) by the theme of radical destruction, extermination, total annihilation of the law, 
if not of justice, and among those rights, human rights, at least such as can be interpreted within a 
tradition of natural law of the Greek type or the “Aufklarung” type.523 
Again: 
The temptation [is] to think the holocaust as an uninterpretable manifestation of divine violence 
insofar as this divine violence would be at the same time annihilating, expiatory and bloodless, 
says Benjamin, a divine violence that would destroy current law…524  
Again: 
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When one thinks of the gas chambers and the cremation ovens, this allusion to an extermination 
that would be expiatory because bloodless must cause one to shudder.
525
 
Of course, this very reading that Derrida so fears is the one he has produced based on imaginary 
history, imaginary letters, imaginary affinities, and bizarre associative non-logic. Here is what 
Benjamin actually writes about “divine violence”: “Mythical violence is bloody power over mere 
life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of the living.”526 There 
is a bit of power worship and something a bit Nietzschean here. But I see no reason to read the 
last phrase, “for the sake of the living,” as anything other than a permutation of a kind of non-
violence. Certainly Derrida gives me no such reason. Here is what Benjamin actually writes 
about “bloodless violence”:  “if mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine 
power only expiates; if the former is bloody, the latter lethal without spilling blood. The legend 
of Niobe may be confronted as an example of this violence with God’s judgment on the company 
of Korah. It strikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat, and does not 
stop short of annihilation.”527 The story of Korah and the Levites (Numbers 15-16) is indeed 
disturbing. Yet we have little reason here to read the Levites as arbitrary – as possible stand-ins 
for just anyone. Benjamin says it clearly, “privileged.” This may still prove disturbing, even if 
suddenly justified. Although, again, there is no reason to read Benjamin this way; Derrida 
certainly provides none. Judith Butler provides a reason far more resonant with Benjamin’s work 
in general and even within this very text: “Is there another kind of violence that is not only 
waged against coercion but is itself non-coercive and, in that sense if not some others, 











fundamentally nonviolent?”528 Butler does point out that it is “not finally clear where he 
[Benjamin] can make good on this promise.”529 This last observation may in fact be the most 
salient one to make about the “Critique of Violence”; it fails in its descriptive and normative 
dimensions. It is a poor critique and its claims, descriptive and normative, fall out of Benjamin’s 
project. Outside his inflammatory and audacious frame, which circularly requires the very same 
frame, Derrida’s reading makes no sense. Why, therefore, does Derrida produce this reading?   
 At one point in “Force of Law” Derrida cites his own concept of “undecidability” and its 
relationship to “deconstruction.”530 He writes: “Undecidable – this is the experience of that 
which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the rule, must 
nonetheless – it is of duty that one must speak – deliver itself over to the impossible decision 
while taking account of law and rules.”531 I would like to remove this definition from the context 
of “Force of Law” for the moment, so as to strip it of the trappings of legal theory and focus on 
its primary claim reformulated: undecidable is the experience of something which is foreign and 
heterogeneous to a given or apparent order, of which it is a duty that one must speak.  But taken 
as an imperative “duty” (perhaps this is the sense of Aufklärung that Derrida wishes to 
preserve?) it runs the risk of quickly devolving into the kind of mania for the heterogeneous 
element that we observed in Samuel Weber’s reading of Benjamin on Kafka before. It also 
means the desperate attempt that Derrida performs here. Where the heterogeneous element is 
simply boring, a more exciting one must be fashioned: Benjamin, the Nazi. Meanwhile, in the 
process, truly heterogenous elements that require strict attention and scrutiny (“messianism or 
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determinate messianic figures of the Jewish, Christian, or Islamic type, the idea in the Kantian 
sense, eschato-teleology of the neo-Hegelian type, Marxist or post-Marxist, etc.”532) are lazily 
and necessarily elided to make the impossible point possible.
533
 What is sad is that what begins 
in Taubes as a partially legitimate observation – that left and right were not quite as clearly 
defined in the early Frankfurt School as one might presuppose – descends into complete farce. 
Derrida’s rejection of Benjamin at the end of the essay is all too correct in many ways to let go; 
if ever there were a case-in-point of how Benjamin is in no way some kind of early manifestation 
of deconstruction or post-structuralism, it is here.  
 There is a certain irony here. If there is one clear intention that Derrida has in “Force of 
Law,” it is to warn of the catastrophic dangers of apocalyptic thinking in any form. And yet, in 
reading Benjamin as he does, he helps facilitate the legitimating of a specific kind of apocalyptic 
thinking that Benjamin himself – in other texts – help us think against.  
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Agamben and Beyond: the Reproduction of Mania 
 The problem does not end with Derrida and a gross misreading of Benjamin. What is 
most surprising is the way in which even the random associations and the most radically 
unjustified elisions ossify and are reproduced through what, for lack of a better phrase, I can only 
deem a kind of cult of personality. On the waves of ‘pure textuality,’ what begins as a project to 
overturn binary thinking and the ossification of thought itself, ends up reproducing the most 
arbitrary association and prejudices. Thus by The State of Exception (Agamben, 2005), three 
propositions would be true: Benjamin is both a Schmittian political theologian and an anarchist; 
the Jewish messianic and the Christian apocalyptic are one and the same; and Benjamin is 
primarily a legal theorist and his most important statement on law is the “Critique of Violence.” 
Indeed, Agamben
534
 now expands the “exoteric dossier” of Benjamin and Schmitt with an 
“esoteric one,” in which Agamben asserts that “the first document that must be included in the 
dossier is not Benjamin’s reading of Political Theology, but Schmitt’s reading of Benjamin’s 
essay ‘Critique of Violence.’”535 Adam Kotsko, in his examination of this question, points out 
the absurdity of this claim on the grounds of simple chronology.
536
 Like Taubes (whom 
Agamben cites, alongside Derrida), Agamben thinks Benjamin should be read as a kind of 
Pauline Christian apocalyptic thinker. But Agamben is interested in capturing both the messianic 
and the Marxist dimensions of Benjamin in terms of this Christian apocalyptic thinking.  Thus, 
Agamben extends Taubes’ arguments about Benjamin’s Pauline apocalypticism and Agamben’s 
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own imaginary Benjamin/Schmitt “dossier” all the way to Benjamin’s final known writing, the 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History.” He does so, of course, by seeing the “Critique of 
Violence” as the key connective tissue.   
Agamben is focused, in particular, on the eighth thesis and writes, 
The decisive document in the Benjamin-Schmitt dossier is certainly the eighth thesis on the 
concept of history, composed by Benjamin a few months before his death. Here we read that “the 
tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule. We 
must attain to a concept of history that accords with this fact. Then we will clearly see that it is 
our task to bring about the real state of exception, and this will improve our position in the 
struggle against fascism.”537 
The question which should be asked here is why this document should be read as part of a 
“Benjamin-Schmitt dossier.” As already discussed, the actual, non-imaginary texts which would 
comprise such a dossier consist of handful of citations in the Trauerpsiel and the letter. The 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History” was written sometime in early 1940. The Nazi “state of 
emergency,” which characterized the period in which Benjamin wrote the “Theses,” began on 
February 28, 1933.
538
 The most obvious reading of the “Ausnahmezustand” [state of emergency, 
state of exception] that Benjamin writes of here in conjunction with the “struggle against 
fascism” is that Benjamin is writing about this historical condition. Agamben is aware of this but 
still insists on the primacy of linking this “Ausnahmezustand” with the Ausnahmezustand of 
Schmitt’s Politische Theologie (which Benjamin read in the early 1920s), in which “the 
exception [Ausnahmezustand] in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle [Wunder] in 
theology.”539 Indeed, if one is looking for it, Ausnahmezustand appears in a handful of other 
Benjamin texts. Benjamin writes in “Marseilles,” (1929) “Outskirts are the state of emergency 
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[Ausnahmezustand] of a city, the terrain on which incessantly rages the great decisive battle 
between town and country.”540 But this passage is not about jurisprudence or, more simply, law 
at all; the Ausnahmezustand is in reference to structure of a city and the “battle between town 
and country,” is a recognizable motif from Marx: as Marx says, “The antagonism between town 
and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilization.”541 This Benjamin passage 
taken as a whole would be seeing a historical condition as expressed in material form; in other 
words, this is an instance of Benjamin describing the capacity to see (as in aesthetics) the 
historical. Indeed, this line from Marx is also recognizable in Benjamin’s famous line from thesis 
VII: “There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”542 
If Benjamin is talking about Schmitt at all in “Marseilles,” he has moved Schmitt’s 
Ausnahmezustand from jurisprudence to an aesthetic-historical domain. There is no mention of 
“law” or “violence” here at all, nor “jurisprudence” or “force.” Neither is there such a mention in 
the entirety of the Theses. Even the “weak messianic power” of thesis II is “eine schwache 
messianische Kraft,”543 not the infamous Gewalt of the “Critique of Violence.”  
Yet, Agamben insists that Benjamin’s prime concern is “a nexus between violence and 
law.”544 Agamben argues, “While Schmitt attempts to reinscribe violence within a juridical 
context, Benjamin responds to this gesture by seeking every time to assure it – as pure violence – 
as existence outside of the law.”545 This entire argument hinges on several of Agamben’s 
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assumptions which have no textual, historical, or philosophical justification: first, that there is a 
fundamental equivalence between the eschatological, the apocalyptic, and the messianic; second, 
that Benjamin’s primary philosophical interest is in jurisprudence and violence; third, that 
Benjamin’s notion of the messianic is centrally linked to the question of violence; and fourth, 
that the “Critique of Violence” exhausts Benjamin’s discussions of “law,” is the “key” to 
Benjamin’s work, and is the historical basis of supposed near two-decade-long “esoteric” 
dialogue between Benjamin and Schmitt.  As I have demonstrated throughout this chapter, not a 
single one of these assumptions is justifiable.  
The logic of the “Critique of Violence School” requires suppressing nearly the entirety of 
Benjamin’s corpus not only in the terms of the readings I have given here of Benjamin’s views 
on materialism, Marxism, Judaism, and Christianity but even of recognizing Benjamin’s clear 
primary interest in the relationship between aesthetics, history, and consciousness at all. It is in 
relation to these categories that Benjamin’s politics are to be found. Instead, the reader is 
encouraged to see illusory affinities instead of demystified ones. Beyond the unjustifiable 
readings of Benjamin, what is truly frustrating about the “Critique of Violence School” is that 
they cannot see what is quite literally in front of their noses: not only the material I addressed in 
the first half of this chapter but in particular Benjamin’s writings on Kafka. Agamben cites 
Benjamin on Kafka, but reads over Benjamin’s writings to find in them elements of the “Critique 
of Violence”. Derrida discusses Kafka in “Force of Law,” but again only in relation to law 
understood in the strictly legalistic definitions of the “Critique of Violence”.   
But Benjamin has an entirely different reading of the messianic than the one assumed by 
Taubes, Derrida, and Agamben. And Benjamin has an entirely different reading of law that does 





or jurisprudence. To address Benjamin’s particular formulation of the messianic and 
understanding of the halachah, I turn in the second half of my next chapter to Benjamin’s 
writings on Kafka. But to understand how his reading of the messianic and halachah converge 
and diverge with Al-e Ahmad’s understanding of the Mahdi and critical ritual action, I must first 
turn to Al-e Ahmad’s writing on “awaiting the Imam of the Age” and his theoretical reflections 























Chapter 4: Religions of Doubt 
 
Introduction 
Throughout this dissertation, I have been slowly performing the comparison of Al-e Ahmad and 
Benjamin. In this chapter, the final shape of this comparison takes shape. I begin by reading Al-e 
Ahmad’s account of a messianic index within the context of Shiism, historical and political 
paradoxes in Shiism, and political conditions in twentieth century Iran. I then turn to my reading 
of Khassi dar Miqat, focusing on Al-e Ahmad’s ‘vacillations’ in his description of his Hajj 
pilgrimage, and, in particular, on his concluding philosophical reflections at the end of the book. 
In these reflections, I explain what I call Al-e Ahmad’s theory of critical ritual action, which is 
crucial for understanding the philosophical framework of a “religion of doubt.”  In order to 
understand Benjamin’s own messianic theory and where it converges and diverges with Al-e 
Ahmad’s and this theory of critical ritual action, I examine Benjamin’s use of aggadah and 
halachah in the context of his writings on Kafka. During each of these steps, I attend to key 
junctures in the comparative philosophical analysis of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin such that at the 
end of this chapter I am able to present the staging ground for the synthetic philosophical 
framework I describe in my conclusion.    
Waiting for the Mahdi 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad writes in Gharbzadegi: 
And they’re all awaiting the Imam of the Age. Well, we’re all awaiting him, each in our own way; 
and we have a right to because none of our ephemeral governments has lived up to the least of its 
promises, because oppression, injustice, repression, and discrimination are pandemic.
546
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Al-e Ahmad was not always “awaiting the Imam of the Age.” By his own admission, he went a 
good two decades without uttering a prayer or giving much thought to Islam outside of a Marxist 
understanding of it as part of a cultural superstructure obfuscating and reproducing the material 
conditions that kept Iran exploited, undeveloped, and oppressed.
547
 As Ali Mirsepassi correctly 
observed in his earlier work on Iranian intellectual history, Al-e Ahmad often portrayed religion 
“in a class system… as an instrument of petty anger” in his early short stories.548 And yet at this 
moment, in his most celebrated text, he switches from a discussion of waiting for the Mahdi [the 
Hidden Imam] as the language of the poor and as the ‘opiate of the people’ to an active language 
that he and others can claim, that they have a right to. Existing conditions are mostajel: fleeting, 
hurried, contingent, “ephemeral,” as Campbell suggests in his translation.  Al-e Ahmad had just 
finished writing, concerning the peasants who were most passionate in their messianic beliefs, 
that “the poorer these people are, the more they must rely on religious beliefs as the sole means 
of making life bearable. Those enjoying no success in the present necessarily seek it in heaven, 
in religion, in the afterworld.”549 And yet in the span of a few sentences, Al-e Ahmad opens up a 
new space: not only the Marxist opiate but something that perhaps everyone can have a right to. 
It is the existing government which is now fleeting in contrast with the unseen Imam‘s literally 
ephemeral government. This contrast is illustrating the rapidly expanding gap in economic, 
political and social justice. How and why Al-e Ahmad opens this space constitutes the first task 
of this chapter.  
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The “we” in question is clearly not limited to the peasants described a few lines earlier. 
Al-e Ahmad had just finished listing a series of “contradictions” [tezad] in Iranian society that 
constitute the conditions of the modern economy, or what Al-e Ahmad calls the “machine 
economy.” These are contradictions of incomplete and artificial modernization but also 
contradictions that Al-e Ahmad sees in modernity itself. In terms of modernization, Al-e Ahmad 
recognizes that viewing this concept within national boundaries is absurd. Al-e Ahmad saw Iran, 
accurately, as already part of a global modernity that not only included Iran but necessitated that 
Iran and other places like it function as sources for raw materials, both cultural and ‘natural,’ as 
well as to be ‘free’ markets for the dissemination of modern industrial and consumer goods. As 
discussed in chapter 2, this is how he understood the import of the “machine” and the 
contradictions it provokes. Al-e Ahmad specifically names many of the contradictions: 
incomplete and inorganic urbanization that lacks the most basic, necessary economic and social 
foundations; uprooted, uneducated masses with, as Al-e Ahmad puts it, a village mentality, 
suddenly becoming the primary workers of this machine economy; the displacement and 
dismemberment of local forms of production without the development out of feudal conditions 
of property; all types and manners of emulated mores, promoting consumer desires for the sake 
of an unjust and imbalanced consumer economy; and the condition of women, whose 
advancement Al-e Ahmad argues should be the cornerstone of any just society (“material and 
spiritual equality,” “equally valued and paid,”  and certainly outside of family life and work 
which should be properly be a “function of both men and women”). 550 All of these conditions 
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have been granted a literally cosmetic transformation under the Shah. This last contradiction 
helps underline the question of agency in Al-e Ahmad’s analysis and reinforce Al-e Ahmad’s 
commitment to the anti-authoritarian possibilities in roshanfekri. The problem is not that, to use 
this last contradiction as the example, Iranian women are doffing the veil or that they are wearing 
cosmetics.
551
  It is they are doing the former under political diktat and the latter as part of global 
economic hegemony. And that furthermore, these images of “modernization” obfuscated the 
actual conditions in Iran, which in turn helped to reproduce the ahistorical national 
modernization narratives. These narratives, in turn, obscure the fact that actual conditions in Iran 
are an integral part of the modern condition.
552
 This section on contradictions is certainly Al-e 
Ahmad at his most Marxian – particularly Gramscian. And yet, it is also a place where his 
critique moves beyond the terms of Marx and Gramsci. 
All of these contradictions are between image and reality within ‘modernizing’ Iran, i.e. 
within gharbzadeh Iran, but they are also contradictions between a promised national utopia and 
the yardstick of a messianic yearning. “Awaiting the Imam of the Age,” understood as a 
quiescent, passive, transcendental condition, might be the opiate of the apolitical masses. But, 
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Al-e Ahmad suggests, within Shiism this messianic yearning can also be the paradoxical hope 
for the materialist aims of small-land owners, new urban workers, disaffected intellectuals and 
women in the workplace – not the usual constituency of the Hidden Imam. What is more, even 
though this idea relies on Shii understandings of history and conceptions of justice, Al-e Ahmad 
expresses it as a potentially universalizable concept. In this phrase, “awaiting the Imam of the 
Age,” Al-e Ahmad is drawing on one of the most recognizable Shii narratives and crafting a 
historiography from it. Discussions of Shiism often revolve around either the historical crisis of 
succession following the death of Muhammad or, alternatively, around the doctrinal openness of 
Shii philosophy and jurisprudence to ijtihad [interpretation] and aql [reason]. However, the 
central narrative that Al-e Ahmad is drawing from here in discussing “awaiting the Imam of the 
Age,” the “ephemeral governments,” and “oppression, injustice, repression, and discrimination,” 
is the battle of Karbala, the martyrdom of Hussein, and the events set into motion which resulted 
in the ‘occultation’ of the twelfth Shii Imam. This narrative certainly requires both the originary 
historical crisis, and there is an element of the ‘doctrinal openness’ that is a part of Al-e 
Ahmad’s seeming ease at reconfiguring, transforming, and reorienting aspects of Shiism while 
still viewing himself in some sense as Shii. But Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussein are what 
must be remembered, in much the sense that Benjamin describes in the “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History” as “the sign of a messianic cessation of happening or, put differently, a 
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past.”553 Al-e Ahmad, as a “historical 
materialist,” drawing on Shii narratives and practices, “grasps” Karbala as an element in a 
“constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.”  
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In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how Benjamin drew on Jewish hermeneutic 
practices and conceptions of history in addition to Marxian analyses in order to attempt to fulfill 
both; in Benjamin’s formulation, they required each other. Here, Al-e Ahmad performs a similar 
theoretical move with Shiism. The contradictions he describes and which I have listed here, even 
down to the language of historical contradictions themselves, are predicated in Gramscian terms 
and yet Al-e Ahmad also draws on the concept of “awaiting the Imam of the Age” in 
understanding them. In order to correct the flaws he saw in Marxism, but also to fulfill the 
promise of Marxism itself, Al-e Ahmad draws on Shii views of history, political order, and 
justice. Al-e Ahmad does not describe the same historiography that Benjamin does; rather, he 
inhabits it. Al-e Ahmad’s Shiism argues for a particular view of history which is certainly not 
“homogenous empty time”554 but is always reliving and recapitulating the failed “revolutionary 
chance” for a just political order. Al-e Ahmad’s Shiism is to live “history gone awry.”555  The 
‘occultation’ of the last Imam permanently removes the possibility for a truly just political order; 
political order is marked as always and necessarily corrupt. Utopianism is therefore beyond the 
pale. Yet, simultaneously, in reliving and re-inhabiting the narrative (through naqali [teahouse 
recitations], taziyeh [dramatic performances of the key events before and during Karbala], 
Ashura processions, and countless other practices) Shia, “wherever and whenever they are, see 
themselves accused of being like the people of Kufa and having abandoned their imam, their 
Prince of Martyrs, their beloved Imam Hossein… The guilt of having abandoned and in effect 
having killed their son has had a gripping effect on the rest of Shii history.”556  
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A powerful conceptual matrix of history and politics emerges out of this narrative, an 
alternative “secularization” of “significant concepts” for an alternative “modern theory of the 
state.” It is not that Shiism is inherently anarchic; Shia are not Kharijites. Recognizing that 
Hussein’s struggle was in history (even if its fulfillment would necessarily be beyond history), 
and that even if impossible it was towards the reform of a particular historical state, reinforces a 
notion of some kind of necessity of the state. An indissoluble tension is implied: the state is 
necessary, but simultaneously necessarily corrupt. This particular framing of the tension provides 
a unique way of approaching the classic political theory dilemma of “dirty hands.” In different 
ways, Machiavelli (through the ‘logic’ of power), Hobbes (through the counter-example of 
anarchy/civil war/the “State of Nature”), and Max Weber (through the “ethic of responsibility”) 
all advance some form of a consequentialist politics. In contrast, Shiism posits that the problem 
of “dirty hands” is one that, of course, states will have to engage with, much as Weber suggests, 
but simultaneously challenges Weber’s very conception of the state as having a “monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force,” via institutions, practices, and narratives of critical and ritual 
negation.  Thus, Shiism also needs the state as the object of negation. This unique approach 
should not be confused with some contemporary discourse on “civil society”: 
… that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively 
autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate value, create associations and solidarities, and 
advance their interests. Civil society can include manifold social movements (women’s groups, 
neighborhood associations, religious groupings, and intellectual organizations) and civic 
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This “idea of civil society” is “a normative aspiration” and “a style of organization.”558 But the 
institutions, practices, and narratives that I mentioned above, predicated on the Shii conception 
of history and politics), are not “relatively autonomous from the state.” They are both within the 
state in a literal sense, partially made possible through Hobbesian logic, and simultaneously 
beyond the state, in a meaningful way not described by the phrase “relatively autonomous.” 
Furthermore, these institutions, practices, and narratives are not merely oriented in regard to the 
state but to economics and other social systems as well. However, in terms of the state, as Al-e 
Ahmad states above, Shiism is always at the ready to challenge the sovereignty of the state, to 
remind it that it is merely an “ephemeral government,” and to do so in the terms of critical 
negation; Al-e Ahmad cites, in these terms, “oppression, injustice, repression, and 
discrimination.” The state can posit new “promises” and these can be better. The critical negation 
does not take the form of finally arriving at or crafting a perfect state, but rather of always 
addressing a materialist critique (do the “promises” and reality match?), as Al-e Ahmad does in 
most of Gharbzadegi, and simultaneously an interpretive theological critique (how do the reality 
and the “promises” even compare to an inarticulable index of the government of the Hidden 
Imam, of the non-ephemeral government). Because this index is inarticulable, it always takes the 
form of negation, in an Adornan rather than a Hegelian sense.
559
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 The interplay of a guilt that drives toward action (one is always a Kufan who could have 
saved Hussein) and yet is a purely negative critical mode produces several paradoxes. Dabashi 
describes one of the most glaring of these as follows: 
Shiism, in the end, is a paradox. It thrives and is triumphant when it is combative and wages an 
uphill battle; it loses its moral authority and defiant voice the instant it succeeds and is in power. 




It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to address the politics of the Islamic Republic in a 
comprehensive way. However, I would like to make a few notes pertinent to this discussion of 
paradoxes in Shiism. In Khomeini’s concept of valayat-e faqih [the Guardianship of the 
Jurisprudent], the clerical government assumes the role of a ‘caretaker’ government or, even 
more directly, an ‘expression’ of the government of the Hidden Imam. Thus, all of the logic 
discussed above is undermined. Suddenly the Shii state must attempt (as it has done) to 
discourage, regulate, or outright ban the many of the practices of critical narration and 
reenactment, as these practices reinforce a Shii view of political illegitimacy.  Additionally, since 
the Shii state views itself as now both the legitimate state and the legitimate expression of 
Shiism, it must do what previous Iranian governments (even nominally Shii ones) were never 
fully able to do: eliminate the system of precarious sovereignty or challenged sovereignty that is 
embodied, ironically, in the independent Shii clerical establishment itself. Thus while a great 
deal of attention is often paid to the Islamic Republic as a theocratic state, analysts often 
overlook that one of its most successful repressions is of the clergy itself. Khomeini was the last 
major Iranian politician to be a true marja-e taqlid  [object of emulation], his formal successor, 
Ayatollah Ali Khameini, being something of a ‘battlefield’ appointment because no qualified 
marja could be found who supported valayat-e faqih unreservedly. The state had to try and 
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refocus the illegitimacy of power and the critical apparati described above to exclusively naming 
enemies, both external and internal. The logic of state sovereignty – in Schmitt’s terms – 
trumped Shiism itself. Indeed, in the sense implied by Asad’s genealogy of religion and 
Schmitt’s theory of secularization, the Islamic Republic ironically succeeded, against great odds 
and resistance, in completely Christianizing the Iranian state.  
In many ways, Al-e Ahmad was quite prescient about this paradox. This is precisely why 
in Dar Khedmat va Khiyanat-e Roshanfekran he called for clerics to have no role in government 
and, both there, in Gharbzadegi, and in Khassi dar Miqat, he took a rather dim view of the 
overly juridical implementations of Shiism based on “medieval criteria”561 and of the 
preservation of tradition qua tradition as itself a gharbzadeh gesture. He also knew that, 
historically, there had been a wide variety of responses to the tensions described above and the 
resulting paradoxes if their resolution was attempted. Shiism could be a “religion of protest,” as 
it had been during the Tobacco Revolt or the Constitutional Revolution, or it could take its 
independence and its unique view of sovereignty and disengage, become largely quiescent and 
other-worldly. As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, Al-e Ahmad’s critique was also of Shiism, and 
specifically of those elements which promoted this other-worldly quiescence. Where Benjamin 
juxtaposed, for example, the Christian theodicy in the Trauerspiel with a Judaic hermeneutics of 
“loyalty” that was required both for and by materialism, Al-e Ahmad understood that Shiism 
contained both of these tendencies (and others) within itself: a personal, transcendent paradise 
and a this-worldly messianic state; an idea of injustice that requires materialist critique (and 
which is required for materialist critique) and also an ascetic impulse that was expressed through 
a juridical emphasis to restrict pleasure and happiness in this world for the sake of the next. Al-e 
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Ahmad, in his “return” to Shiism, had to make a choice. And the same interest in redressing 
injustice that had driven him to Marxism drove him also to Hussein and to this world. In Khassi 
dar Miqat, he approvingly quotes a joke from one of his fellow Hajjis, “Oh, Imam Hussein! 
Come and save me from the evils of God!”562  I will shortly examine Khassi dar Miqat to 
demonstrate just how wry this joke is for Al-e Ahmad. In that text, I will also show how Al-e 
Ahmad’s materialism was second nature to him, even at his most “religious.”  
Al-e Ahmad needed to negotiate a series of paradoxes. Theocracy was a particularly 
acute paradox, both for the structural reasons suggested by Dabashi but also because – and this 
proved historically very much the case – the move to “return” to Shiism would be read as an 
Islamic Ideology akin to other modern ideologies: a positive ideology with a utopian telos. But 
given both his concept of history and his experience of the failures of liberalism, nationalism, 
and Marxism within Iran, Al-e Ahmad simply did not believe in utopianism of any kind. As 
Simin Daneshvar would later note, Al-e Ahmad’s was “a partial return to religion and to the 
Hidden Imam.”563 Indeed, his Shiism was so “partial” that he had to defeat God or, more 
importantly, the concept of faith (as described in chapter 1) in order to remain within his own 
version of “loyalty” to the world of things.  And yet, while the index of “the Hidden Imam” and 
embracing the history of Karbala as a lived experience helped remove the utopian from the realm 
of the possible and promoted the practices of critical negation discussed above, it simultaneously 
promoted a view and theory of state sovereignty that is highly precarious. Furthermore, in 
arguing against the faithful and the juridical in Shiism, Al-e Ahmad was not only laying the 
foundation for his materialist “religious” philosophy, but also helping to collapse some of the 
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practices and concepts in Shiism that historically maintained the relative stability of that 
precarious sovereignty.  Al-e Ahmad’s challenge was to walk a tightrope between needing to 
challenge the theodical qualities in the quiescent interpretations of Shiism while at the same time 
not allowing the ‘activist’ mode of Shiism to become a self-defeating utopian project. In a word, 
his problem was politics.  
 While Benjamin critiqued theodicy and any sort of transcendental soteriology, as we 
have seen, as early as the Trauerspiel, his full break with actually-existing-Communism in the 
form of Soviet Bolshevism developed slowly over the course of the 1930s.
564
 Even in the 1920s, 
he was articulating radical critiques of utopianism that would certainly mark even his tendencies 
towards “vulgar” Marxism as peculiar565  – part of which turned on the notion that the perfect, 
utopian society is a messianic idea and thus, as both a concept and a practice, logically beyond 
the capacity of humans to bring into being. However, Benjamin’s politics were always indirect. 
But Al-e Ahmad’s disillusionment with Marxism as defined by the Tudeh, the Soviet-approved 
official Communist Party of Iran, grew out of his lived experience of the corruption of that 
party’s aims and of its internal structures. At the moment I have been examining in Gharbzadegi, 
Al-e Ahmad’s “return” to Shiism was also a realization that injustice was better understood 
through gesturing at the nonexistent government of the Hidden Imam that was beyond history 
than in the anticipated future utopias that were actually impossible. The messianic aspects of 
Benjamin’s thought drew on a political abstraction: the messianic age, the world redeemed. The 
messianic aspects of Al-e Ahmad’s thought drew on an actual historical moment of failed 
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political struggle; as Dabashi notes, “politics is Shii in its quintessence.”566 Al-e Ahmad also 
desired an indirect mode of politics. Like Benjamin, he saw one avenue for this mode in aesthetic 
practice and analysis, but unlike Benjamin, he saw another in a refashioned engagement with 
ritual practice. Benjamin also explored a similar question of ritual practice through halachah.
567
 
But it is in these two areas, direct politics and ritual action, where we see the starkest 
distinctions. And such distinctions are not merely predicated on the conceptual differences 
between Moshiach [messiah] and Mahdi.  They also turn on the difference in the position of both 
authors on the uneven geometry of modernity, in all its dimensions, that I proposed in chapter 1.  
But before I can complete my comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin, I must first turn 
to my reading of Khassi dar Miqat, where we encounter Al-e Ahmad’s attempt to walk this 
tightrope. I also want to acknowledge that up till now in this chapter I  have been, in some sense, 
speaking in two voices, one in terms of precise specificity (naqali, taziyeh, Moshiach, halachah, 
Hajj) and in terms of, perhaps, frustrating generality (“institutions, practices, and narratives of 
critical and ritual negation”). It is important to note that the seeming conceptual generality of the 
latter carry over meaningful form and content from their respective points of origin. However, I 
am doing so in order to facilitate what I see as an additional necessary discussion in my 
conclusion: a brief review of the possibilities in comparative philosophy as I have described and 
practiced it here beyond the comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin. I begin my reading of 
Khassi dar Miqat with an examination of active waiting, a notion I first discussed in Benjamin at 
the end of chapter 1. However, as I show, there are crucial differences between Al-e Ahmad’s 
and Benjamin’s formulations.   
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“Waiting, waiting, waiting,” writes Al-e Ahmad in the middle of his Hajj diaries, which he 
would publish in 1964 as Khassi dar Miqat.
568
  This intizar [waiting, anticipation, expectation, 
etc.] is the same “awaiting” Al-e Ahmad discussed in Gharbzadegi, as in “awaiting the Imam of 
the Age.” However, the same intizar can also be the mundane waiting that Benjamin discussed 
as “boredom,” the waiting of “homogenous, empty time.” This is how Al-e Ahmad describes it 
here: 
Waiting, waiting, waiting, for the road to open, for the commotion to die down, for the heat of the 
sun to subside, for there to be water in the faucets, for the privy to be empty, for food to be ready, 
and a thousand other “fors.” On this journey you continually go from this “Miqat” to that 
“Miqat”. But time is so meaningless that it has no structure.569 
But Al-e Ahmad does not let time as “meaningless” and without “structure” last for more than a 
moment. In the very next line he writes, “I’m not suggesting that with all this waiting to obtain 
the most minimal of daily necessities there is no room for the world of the unseen and its 
expectations.” This quick vacillation is characteristic of Khassi dar Miqat as a whole. One 
moment, Al-e Ahmad is describing the Hajj and his experience of it in the most specific, 
materialist, even scientific ways, and often indeed with Marxian commentary. Here, description 
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takes the form of complaint. But elsewhere, Al-e Ahmad gives us ethnographic-style ‘thick-
descriptions,’ poetic celebrations of sensual pleasure, or ironic juxtapositions of particularly 
religiously significant moments or actions in the Hajj with the most basic realities of the 
embodied experience in those moments: fatigue, claustrophobia, gastro-intestinal distress.   But 
he continually opens up more space by a mode of critical negation. In this opening, he is not 
posing paradoxical binary oppositions. Rather, through his vacillating, both expanding 
possibility for additional critique and suggesting a dialectical relation between the two. Here, in 
the context of Al-e Ahmad’s description of waiting-as-frustration, he contrasts “time” that “is so 
meaningless it has no structure” with “room for the world of the unseen and its expectations.” 
This might seem to imply a space for a theology of transcendent faith, for the ‘truth’ of the Hajj. 
But earlier, Al-e Ahmad reads the “world of the unseen” multiply and against this very 
interpretation. He writes: 
If you came and took the “world of the unseen” out of this multitude, what would be left? In our 
system, neither the individual nor society has priority. Priority goes to the world of the unseen, 
which is connected to the market, and has come under the control of companies. The individual 
and society are two transient phenomena contrasted with something that signifies eternity: but 
they are the two sides of the same coin. It is only in such a domain that “Sign of God” and 
“Shadow of God” have meaning.570 
This statement comes in the context of a discussion of Al-e Ahmad’s fear of the destruction of 
the individual within a mass ritual action (in this case the say of the Hajj) in a horrifying 
mindless mass and his realization that in the antithesis, “the ultimate individualism,” the 
individual “is sacrificed in isolation just as much as it ‘sacrifices itself’ in society.”571 Al-e 
Ahmad critiques the “world of the unseen” that would sacrifice the individual or society. He 
connects faith in a classic cosmological theology with the market; both are (falsely) mysterious 
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forces through which society and individual both come to be sacrificed. In critique, both of these 
illusions must be dispelled. Al-e Ahmad – and this is one of the most central tensions in his work 
and in particular in Khassi dar Miqat – sees a necessary dialectical tension between individual 
and society, that they are “two sides of the same coin,” but that both these sides must somehow 
negate each other and be preserved. So for Al-e Ahmad, the “world of the unseen” must take on 
yet another possible meaning: the meanings of, or in, this tension. “It is only in such a domain 
that “Sign of God” [Ayatollah] and “Shadow of God” [zil Allah] have meaning.” In a critique of 
the “world of the unseen” that is also connected to the market, an analysis must take place in 
which the material relations of objects in the world (Al-e Ahmad frames this entire reflection 
around his “quenching his thirds with one of these ‘colas’”572) is fully expressed. And yet, in that 
critique the tension described here must be preserved. Al-e Ahmad presents us with a very 
different possibility in the “world of the unseen”: it is only in the “world of the unseen” as the 
meaning of this tension that we can understand “Sign of God” and “Shadow of God.” In terms of 
the former, Al-e Ahmad is both taking a bit of critical swipe at the clergy (i.e. the Ayatollah, 
literally the Sign of God), saying that they should not conceive of themselves as representing an 
order of transcendent truth, but as representations of “the domain” of this dynamic tension. He is 
also playing with the literal Arabic: the Ayat Allah [Signs of God]. Signs of God are the meaning 
that emerges from this tension and, as we shall soon see, in concert with so many other tensions. 
In terms of the “Shadow of God” [zil Allah], he is, to use the same terminology, taking a bit of a 
critical swipe at the Pahlavis and, in general, at the legitimacy of the theory of sovereignty itself. 
It is only in relation to “the domain” of this dynamic tension that the zil Allah (or the farr in pre-
Islamic Persian), the transient “Shadow of God” that confers temporary legitimacy on 
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“ephemeral governments,” can be understood. Transient legitimacy is conferred on a state that 
(at best, in many ways) allows the possibility for the creative exploration and fruition of this 
tension between individual and society. He is also, of course, refashioning the very possibility of 
what might be meant by God. In this there is finally some sense of understanding what Al-e 
Ahmad means when he writes that there is “room for the world of the unseen and its 
expectations” at the same time as the most mundane intizar. Indeed, those are intizaresh [its 
expectations], literally the “waiting” of the “world of the unseen,” the “awaiting” of the Imam of 
the Age understood in the world. Understood this way, the boredom-waiting, which is part of the 
material reality of the experience of the Hajj, is brought together with a different conception of 
time altogether, one that is pregnant with possibility.  
 Yet there is at least one more dimension of intizar for Al-e Ahmad. He writes, “A person 
learns the meaning of religious expressions here. Waiting, waiting, waiting, as in the past. The 
saving grace is that in such a situation I immerse myself in this little notebook, sequestering 
myself behind its paper doors – no matter what happens.”573 Here, “intizar, intizar, intizar” is a 
bit of a joke; everything is taking so long in his journey that it is like the historical experience of 
people waiting (for over a thousand years) for the Mahdi. 
 But waiting for the Mahdi, as a reference for a joke or as a reference for reality, is not the 
only “saving grace”; Al-e Ahmad’s retreat into his writing is as well. This is not just a 
momentary fact in Al-e Ahmad’s diary. It is part and parcel of his Weltanschauung. As discussed 
in chapter 2, part of Al-e Ahmad’s critique of gharbzadegi was the way in which it ‘hardened’ 
human beings, necessarily desensitized them to sensory experience, particularly aesthetic 
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experience. In Khassi dar Miqat, Al-e Ahmad is also recounting this act of writing, or rather the 
critical reflection required therein, as a necessary component of the strange way he is going 
about the Hajj. Towards the end of Khassi dar Miqat, Al-e Ahmad asks himself whether it would 
not “have been better if I had done the same thing a million other people did this year who came 
to the Hajj?”574 That is, would it not have been better to just believe and do the ritual out of faith 
or obedience? He answers, “Obviously, with this notebook I have given a negative answer to this 
sincere question.”575 
“Khassi dar Miqat” 
What is “this notebook”? Or put differently, what is Khassi dar Miqat? Most basically, 
Khassi dar Miqat is a safarnameh, a Persian travelogue. Indeed, at several points in the text, Al-e 
Ahmad compares what he is doing with the work of Nasir Khusrow in his epic Safarnameh of 
the 11
th
 century CE. It is also a diary of Al-e Ahmad’s personal experiences and reflections on 
the Hajj and on going on the Hajj. A complete treatment of Khassi dar Miqat would have to 
address these features and the rich variety of references and observations that Al-e Ahmad 
makes. However, for my present purposes, I am reading Khassi dar Miqat as the fruition of a 
philosophical argument that begins in Gharbzadegi, and focusing on those aspects of Khassi dar 
Miqat which are pertinent to what I demonstrate to be its philosophically coherent conclusion. 
This may concern some for whom philosophy is itself a discrete genre and I also consider it 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully address that question. However, I will point out that 
(a) I am aware that in some sense I am further ‘translating’ a political essay and a travelogue into 
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a philosophy in my own words and (b) even excluding the classical Hellenistic form of the 
dialogue, even in the modern era and within the European world, conducting philosophy in the 
form of letters, notes, diaries, dialogues, novels, and indeed, travelogues
576
 has a long respected 
tradition. Khassi dar Miqat produces by its end a set of arguments and, while I do rephrase them 
in more recognizably philosophical language towards the end of this chapter, I do so only for the 
clarity of my own comparison and philosophical arguments.
577
 In many ways, the style of Khassi 
dar Miqat strengthens its final positions; it is an extraordinarily honest inquiry. Al-e Ahmad 
gives a series of reflections which lead to questions which lead to further reflections, and so on. 
Furthermore, he does this not from some mythical ‘view from nowhere’ but rather in a grounded, 
specific, embodied place and way. We understand the circumstances and the experiences that 
inform each question and each idea. We are privy not only to understanding how the final 
arguments unfold but to how the questions themselves are formulated. 
One of the other unique characteristics of Khassi dar Miqat is that it only figures out 
what it is at its end. Al-e Ahmad does not begin by stating, for example, why he is going on the 
Hajj, or why he is writing a text of it. Nor does he begin with a question to be answered. Al-e 
Ahmad here tests many of the tensions explored in Gharbzadegi, as I discussed in chapter 2. And 
what begins as a kernel of an idea in Gharbzadegi – that Shiism could provide something of a 
missing element in Marxian analysis – is explored more fully here as well in looking at how 
what Benjamin would call “historical materialism” was also necessary for Shiism. For Al-e 
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Ahmad, importantly, this was not limited to analysis but extended to another form of practice – 
ritual action – which he saw as vitally necessary for his materialism. Many of these tensions and 
ambiguities are expressed in the title itself, Khassi dar Miqat, and it is worth noting that this title 
was written after the composition of the text. John Green translates Khassi dar Miqat as “Lost in 
the Crowd.” As Green notes: 
No English word has the connotations of the term Miqat, designating the area containing the 
shrines at Mecca which are a goal of the Muslim pilgrimage. The term Khassi means “a chip of 
wood” or “a piece of straw.” A literal rendition might be “A Chip of Wood Among the Muslim 
Shrines,” but explanation would still be needed for many readers.578 
Even this ambiguity does fully express the possibilities in understanding the title. In addition to 
“a chip of wood” or “a piece of straw,” Khassi could be read as a ‘mote’ or a ‘speck.’ Miqat, as 
Green records in a footnote, “can designate either the area containing the Muslim shrines in 
Mecca, or the entry stations surrounding the shrines where the purification rites are performed.” 
With his choice of “Lost in the Crowd,” Green has clearly entertained the thought that the 
character of Khassi might affect how we understand Miqat: like ‘a chip in a woodpile,’ ‘a straw 
in a pile of straw.’ I am not rehearsing these meanings to quibble with Green’s translation. 
Rather, I believe this title expresses many but not all possible tensions within the text itself. ‘A 
straw in a pile of straw’ can give us some sense of the tension between individual and society 
discussed above, the latter threatening to swallow the former and yet being defined by the 
former. There is also the tension of meaning, meaninglessness, and reduction in terms of 
humans; should Al-e Ahmad or an individual be considered simply a straw, a chip, or some other 
insignificant inanimate object? Similarly, there is the critique of religion: should the “holy 
precincts” be considered nothing but a pile of wood? Or the alternative critique of religion: 
should the a pile of wood be considered as meaningful in the same sense as the “holy” precincts? 
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As I have argued, Al-e Ahmad proposes that these positions be held in an irresolvable dialectic 
relationship with one another, an indissoluble tension; to see either the Kaaba or to understand 
the materiality of it, and of the Hajj itself, requires seeing the “holy precincts” and the 
“woodpile” at the same time.  
Vacillation 
 In Khassi dar Miqat, these indissoluble tensions take the form of constant inconclusive 
vacillations between extreme positions. I offer, for example, this extended description of 
witnessing the circumambulation of the Kabaa itself: 
I went up on the Eastern roof and kneeled to pray in a place at the roof’s edge overlooking the 
entire House [i.e. the Masjid al-haram]  and surrounding area…The last circumambulations lined 
up instantly, but there was still a flurry of activity in that corner where the Black Stone sits in one 
of the Kaaba’s walls as I began my prostrations. By the time I raised my head again the entire 
mosque population was lined up, from one end of the porticos to the rooftops to the other. 
The first thing to notice is that Al-e Ahmad’s descriptions of prayer is straightforward and 
untroubled; he seems to be almost comfortable, if still distanced, in the activity.
579
 This is in 
rather stark contrast to a near constant refrain in Khassi dar Miqat regarding prayer, as Al-e 
Ahmad writes entries like, “Frankly, it isn’t the same anymore. I feel like a hypocrite. It just isn’t 
right. If it isn’t hypocrisy, neither is it faith. You do it just to blend in with the crowd.”580 This 
non-genuine (as opposed to inauthentic) performance is, of course, a deep concern of Al-e 
Ahmad’s. But here, not only is Al-e Ahmad comfortable with conducting prayer, he continues as 
follows: 
 The greatest number of human beings anywhere who are gathering in one place in response to a 
command. This assembly must have some meaning! A meaning higher than this dealing, 
marketing, tourism, discharge of obligation and ritual enactment, economy, government and a 
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thousand other inevitable things! When the prayer reached the second salam, from the corner in 
front of the Stone there was a sudden explosion of people rushing to kiss it. Then the prayer ranks 
broke and the circumambulating began anew. At first the ranks near the Kabaa arose and began 
circling, then those behind them followed in a stately ripple motion moving away from the center. 
It is worth noting that this entire passage comes right after Al-e Ahmad’s reflections on the 
dangers of the individual being subsumed in the mass, in society. There Al-e Ahmad writes of 
this same mass that “one is utterly helpless in the midst of such a multitude,” of its “loud 
mumbling,” “being jostled by others,” “the self abandon of people,” “the glazed stares of the 
crowd, chained together in little groups,” and so on. He asks: “Can you keep your wits in the 
midst of such self-abandon? Act as an individual? The pressure of the crowd drives you on. Have 
you ever been caught in the midst of a terrified crowd fleeing something?”581 But here, “this 
assembly must have some meaning!” And not just any meaning, it must have a “meaning higher 
than this dealing, marketing, tourism, discharge of obligation and ritual enactment, economy, 
government.” Al-e Ahmad spends a good part of Khassi dar Miqat in his most straightforward 
Marxian ‘social science’ and critique mode: the ratio of Arab to American workers in Saudi 
Aramco, daily Saudi oil production at the time (“2,000,000 barrels”, apparently), the relationship 
between the pilgrimage population swell on local prices of, say, yoghurt (“1/2 rial”) or a barrel of 
water (also “1/2 rial”),  a rough estimation of the amount of meat “wasted” in sacrifice as part of 
the Hajj (“this would be about 20,000 tons of meat, apart from skin and entrails”)582 and several 
proposals for what can be done with that meat (an example, obtain “ten refrigerator trucks and 
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take all these carcasses to Jedda in an hour… put them all in a 2- or 3-thousand ton ship for 
cooking and preserving, freezing and salting, and send them as gifts to the poor people of the 
world”).583 He even tries to explain at one point to another Hajji that “the dangerous heart in the 
East is foreign capital, and Aramco and the other oil companies are its hands,” and in reflecting 
on the globalized market for food production that is on display at the Hajj (“The compote I had 
for lunch was from Japan, something like peaches and apricots. The mango juice was from India. 
Everything is from somewhere… All these people, such a market! Perhaps one should say that 
the Hajj rites provide an occasion to liquidate surplus for all the factories in the world?”)584 But, 
in this description of the moment of Al-e Ahmad’s witnessing circumambulation, the meaning is 
“higher” than symbolic or economic capital, the crowd is “stately,” its motions beautiful, 
described in an almost mesmerizing manner. From his comfort in prayer to his assertion of a 
“higher” meaning, this would seem to be the moment for Al-e Ahmad to ‘give in,’ following 
Green’s translation, to get “Lost in the Crowd,” to embrace faith and the aspects of Shiism that 
eschew the material world for a “higher” one. However, Al-e Ahmad continues: 
The gentlemen who built these new arched porticos were aware of the grandeur of their task, but 
it’s a pity. And God save us from all these molded reinforced concrete structures. Despite this, 
when finished it will be the largest uncovered temple on earth, with two new monstrous minarets 
competing for height. 
It is as if with the sudden memory that humans in fact built the entrances (another translation of 
Miqat), the temptation to faith comes crashing back to earth like so many “molded concrete 
reinforced structures.” Green is a bit loose with his translation here. Al-e Ahmad does not say 
“And God…” He says “And Imam…[va Imam].” God is nowhere to be seen here. It is helpful to 
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recall the joke Al-e Ahmad finds so amusingly correct, “Oh, Imam Hussein! Come and save me 
from the evils of God!” 
 As I descended the steps I suddenly realized my foot was burning painfully. I withdrew into a 
corner and bent over to find the cause of the burning, and saw that there were new blisters. Then I 
looked at my shins and saw they were covered with red blemishes, which continued higher up. I 
hiked up my ihram. It was on my chest and belly too, as well as my arms. Because of my bad liver 




And as Al-e Ahmad “descended the steps” both physically and metaphorically (that is, back to 
where meaning belongs) even this momentary lapse into dissolution in the mass and into 
transcendental thinking proves Al-e Ahmad’s critique of theodicy: he suddenly realizes he is 
actually in acute pain. What is more, he is in fact covered in “blisters,” and “red blemishes.” The 
pains of this world are not to be transcended; they are to be addressed, in the here and now. In 
the previous section, Green elides and diminishes Al-e Ahmad’s exclamation, Ama hif (. اما فیح ) 
It is a separate sentence from the line about the gentleman, and literally says, “But pity.” I do not 
point this out to quibble with Green, who has made a perfectly legitimate translation choice in 
smoothing Al-e Ahmad’s rhythmic form of writing and rendering a more grammatical “, but it’s 
a pity.” However, for my reading of Al-e Ahmad, it is important to note that as a noun, hif has 
the meanings of “injustice” and “oppression.” Al-e Ahmad, if we might recall Benjamin’s 
argument in the Trauerspiel from chapter 3, is exhibiting the fact that “Die Treue ist der 
Rhythmus der emanatistisch absteigenden Intentionsstufen,” that is, as explained, “faithfulness,” 
understood as loyalty to the material world, “is the rhythm of the emanatively descending levels 
of intention.” Al-e Ahmad offers up an explanation, nominally, for his ailments, “Because of my 
bad liver and this hot sun.” But throughout Khassi dar Miqat, this is a running motif. If there is 
ever a moment when transcendent faith approaches, when something like assured, uncritical, 
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“meaningfulness” is afoot, Al-e Ahmad suddenly starts to talk about indigestion, sores, food 
poisoning, heat stroke, etc. Finally, Al-e Ahmad’s alienation from the mass is pushed further as 
he realizes he is being watched, and possibly judged, by a woman nearby. The vacillation – so 
characteristic of Khassi dar Miqat – is complete. Al-e Ahmad has gone from near complete 
dissolution into the mass into near complete isolation from it. He has gone from prayer, assertion 
of higher meaning and purpose, from seeing what is not there, to seeing what is actually there: 
concrete blocks, sickness, injustice. It is not that meaning has vanished; it is back in the dialectic 
tension, where Al-e Ahmad states it belongs. It is not that “society” or “the mass” has been 
overcome for individuals, it is again that both are only possible in the other.  
 It would be easy from this extended reading of one complete ‘vacillation’ in Khassi dar 
Miqat to conclude that what Al-e Ahmad is doing invokes a classic Manichean dualism between 
the rank baseness and ultimate ‘evil’ of the physical and the beautiful, sublime and transcendent 
‘good’ of the spiritual, even as Al-e Ahmad sees it as necessary to dwell in the material. There is 
no question that for Al-e Ahmad an understanding of the “world of the unseen,” which is 
understood as the beautiful, transcendent, sublime good, is as much of an “illusion” as the “free 
market.” Another dimension of Khassi dar Miqat is that in addition to the way transcendence and 
annihilation in the mass are temptations away from loyalty to the material world and to human 
beings in it, asceticism is a lure towards a world of purely inner truth: “To give peace of mind 
over to asceticism, for if one is nothing in the manifest world of action outside the self, one can 
at least impose the design of one’s will on one’s body!” This interior move is a sacrifice of this 
same dialectic necessity.
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 Thus, a large portion of Al-e Ahmad’s text is devoted to friendly 
exploration of encounters with the physical. Al-e Ahmad spends quite a bit of time talking about 
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how proud he is of himself for remembering to bring along his favorite cigarettes; about really 
great fresh yoghurt and coffee; about the ugly gaudiness of Saudi architecture vs. historically 
more appealing styles; and a not inconsiderable amount of ink is spilled in describing how 
physically attractive he finds black women from Africa. 
 In examining this vacillation, we have seen many of the irresolvable dialectic tensions in 
Al-e Ahmad. Indeed, as I have argued, these are many of the best ways to understand the title 
phrase “Khassi dar Miqat.” However, there is at least one other key interpretation that is 
suggested by Al-e Ahmad himself: 
The sky and the stars overhead were very low, the sky was amazingly close, Scorpio was right in 
front of us, and the wind blew in our faces constantly (some 80-100 kilometers per hour). We were 
huddling all the time. Then there was the job of looking after my uncle, an old man who was 
continually nodding off and in danger of hitting his head on the back of the seat in front of him. 
Never have I spent a night so awake, and so conscious of nothing.
587
 Under the cover of that sky 
and that infinity, I recited every poem I’d ever memorized – mumbling to myself – and looking into 
myself as carefully as I could till dawn. I saw that I was only a “piece of straw” [khassi] that had 
come to the “Miqat” and not a “person” [kassi] coming to a “rendezvous”. I saw that “time” is 




First, of course, Al-e Ahmad sets the scene in poetic terms, approximately (probably ludicrous) 
scientific ones, and sociological ones, grounding his long inward gaze externally. Then there is 
the very specific play of words between khassi [piece of straw, etc.] and kassi [a person]. Al-e 
Ahmad is not giving a reductive reading of himself; he is seeing himself, to borrow the language 
of current debates in analytic philosophy, from both a first and third person point of view. As a 
mere reductively natural being, he has come to a material place. This is part of the truth. The key 
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is the “rendezvous” [meyadi].  If Al-e Ahmad sees himself as a fully meaningful person in terms 
of coming to the Miqat, then Miqat appears temporally in an elevated fashion, as a “rendezvous,” 
as the result of a kind of fate. That is to say, this would be the view that he was somehow meant 
to be at the Miqat. In the quotation with which I began my Intizar section, Al-e Ahmad plays 
with the assumed meaningfulness of Miqat, calling each of the frustrating stops a “Miqat.” There 
is an implicit, even blasphemous – and Al-e Ahmad is perfectly comfortable with blasphemy – 
question implied in this: what makes the actual Miqat, which can easily be regarded as a pile of 
woodchips, or some concrete blocks, necessarily more meaningful than waiting for food, the 
bathroom, or traffic to clear? There is another question implied in thinking about those events as 
“going from ‘Miqat’ to “Miqat’”: why assume that the order, in time, involved in the Hajj, in 
going to the Miqat, is meaningful?  
Al-e Ahmad (more or less) follows the order and observes the ritual of the Hajj, but he is 
careful not to attribute – or to actively prevent himself from attributing – more meaning to one 
moment or the next. This ordering is another reading of Miqat, not of space but of time; each 
step ordains the next. The spatial Miqat which is also a temporal “rendezvous” engenders a view 
of time that is neither “meaningless,” “without structure,”589 nor an “ocean of time” as is 
described here. Again, I do not read Al-e Ahmad as trying to reduce kassi into khassi. Rather, he 
is radically rethinking the possibility of time, in order to take the assumption of meaning at a 
particular time and place out of a future appointment and to put meaning instead as emergent 
only within the tension between time understood as “meaningless,” and “without structure” – in 
which the Miqat is a joke, meaningless step after meaningless step – and time understood as “an 
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ocean of time”590 which is pregnant with the possibility of meaning in Miqat but then “always,” 
“everywhere,” but also, “with the self alone.”591 Just as with the “individual” and “society,” these 
views of time are “two sides of the same coin.” The tension between these views turns the future-
orientation of Intizar, when it is understood as anticipation, into what Benjamin would call, 
Jetztzeit: Now-time. It strips “the future of its magic”592 and in doing so allows the “Miqat” or 
“the Imam of the Age,” or other transcendent and, indeed, other transcendental593 concepts 
drawn from Shiism to become possibilities in the material world.  Additionally, for Al-e Ahmad, 
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in the tension between an “ocean of time” – which is not necessarily “meaningless,” where 
“Miqat” is “always,” and “everywhere” – and a meaningless “time,” there is the possibility for a 
different kind of ‘reliving’ and ‘reinhabiting’ of these concepts as moments in time.  
A Ritual of Doubt 
Benjamin argues that in “historical materialism,” “to articulate the past,” “is to seize hold 
of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger… the danger affects both the content of the 
tradition and its receivers.”594  Al-e Ahmad recognizes that shifting from a view of time as 
“meaningless” and without “structure” to one in which the present is viewed as reliving or re-
inhabiting crucial moment(s) in the past “affects both the content of the tradition and its 
receivers.” Up till now, I have been describing the ways in which Al-e Ahmad’s Shiism and 
Marxism were, in his view, necessarily concomitant in terms of analysis. As discussed in chapter 
3, Benjamin’s “theology” should be understood as a Jewish hermeneutic practice and as 
informed by the specifically Jewish contours of some of his concepts. But that Jewish religious – 
that is, religious at least within the specific terms of this dissertation – practice still concerns 
analysis. Neither of these analytic moves should be undervalued – particularly Benjamin’s, 
which is vast, intricate, and nuanced and contains within it the possibility that it is in this 
analysis, or through it, that critical consciousnesses and practices might emerge. But what Al-e 
Ahmad develops in Khassi dar Miqat is a theory of critical ritual action. Al-e Ahmad formulates 
this theory of critical ritual action as something beyond argument, which reinforces the 
“historical materialism” in his Shiism, the Shiism in his “historical materialism,” and the critical 
consciousness necessary to sustain the entire structure of thought. To “seize hold of a memory,” 
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for Al-e Ahmad, is not only to gesture in theory but literally to gesture: this is to embody both 
the memory and the theory materially. In one of the most ironic arguments in the history of 
Marxian thought, Al-e Ahmad argues that a particular iteration of religious ritual is, in part, an 
externalized grounding of materialism. In Al-e Ahmad, this performance and its dialectical 
counterpart, critical reflection on the performance, help preserve the location of the 
theory/theorist within the dialectic tensions discussed here. Alongside his analyses, this 
performance also stabilizes some of the inherent instabilities within Shiism discussed at the 
opening of this chapter via its reinforcement of materialism; this is how Al-e Ahmad critiques 
the theodical qualities in modernity and within Shiism itself without spiraling into a self-
defeating utopianism. Although safarnameh itself, at least the act of writing, comprises part of 
the process of critical reflection in the theory of critical ritual action, one can see within the 
‘vacillations’ just described from Khassi dar Miqat the way in which this ritual performance – 
emptied out of assumed meaning – and subjected to materialist critique, prevents Al-e Ahmad’s 
Shiism from becoming a transcendent or immanent theodicy, and simultaneously reinforces and 
expands the possibility for meaning to emerge in his Marxian materialism.  
 Al-e Ahmad begins the penultimate entry in Khassi dar Miqat from back in an airplane, 
this time returning from Saudi Arabia to Iran. It is a long description, full of absurdities and 
details like so much of the book. But then Al-e Ahmad shifts in tone entirely and he announces 
this shift, writing, “Now, I’ve turned to my notebook, to see whether I can write something worth 
reading.”595 The shift, in my reading of Al-e Ahmad, is to a philosophically speculative 
reflection on the ‘vacillations’ I have written about here. 
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The way I see it, I’ve come on this trip mostly out of curiosity, the same way I poke my nose into 
everything, to look without expectations. Now, I’ve seen it, and this notebook is the result. This 
was an experience too, in any case, or perhaps a very simple event. Every one of these experiences 
and events was simple and “uneventful.” Although it was quite ordinary, it was the basis of a kind 
of awakening, and if not an awakening – at least a skepticism.596 
Green’s translation is once again a bit loose here; this is another case where he has smoothed Al-
e Ahmad’s language from extremely terse, abrupt statements into single and (in Green’s mind) 
easily comprehensible sentences. Green translates the idiomatic sar mizanam [to head into, to 
visit] followed by ke be har surakhi as to “poke my nose into everything.” But Al-e Ahmad 
writes har surakhi, “every hole,” or “every place.”597 He follows this immediately with the 
phrase, “To see without hope.”598 These are intimately connected ideas, if we have been 
following Al-e Ahmad through Khassi dar Miqat. The various poles he vacillates between are 
dialectical in that they determine the understanding of each other and yet they do not and cannot 
resolve. In being a good materialist, in attending to the evidence at hand, Al-e Ahmad must 
“visit,” “poke his head into” or – bringing in idiomatic possibilities from surakhi as Green does – 
“poke his nose into” the surakh: literally, holes, but in this context, gaps, or empty spaces that 
would otherwise be overlooked, spaces that one could ‘stick one’s nose into.’ These surakh are 
the spaces produced within the dialectic tensions where, as Al-e Ahmad argued earlier in the 
text, phrases like Ayatollah and farr might have meaning, spaces where meaning may emerge. 
To attend to these surakh, Al-e Ahmad must “see without hope.” Without hope is not merely 
without the sense of expectation as preconceived notion – although that is certainly present – it 
must also be viewed specifically as the utopian hope within the structures of both Marxism and 
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Shiism. Assuming this utopian “hope” would both run the risk of collapsing one side of the 
tension or, in a move closer to classic dialectics, of filling in or overlooking those “holes.” 
Viewing the Hajj this way, Al-e Ahmad notes that “although it was quite ordinary, it was the 
basis of a kind of awakening,” or “at least a skepticism.” Al-e Ahmad proposes at most an 
“awakening,” but in the ordinary, “at least a skepticism,” within “awakening.” But what is the 
nature of this skepticism? He continues: 
In this way [tariq] I am smashing the steps of the world of certainty one by one with the pressure 
of experience [tejarbe], beneath my feet. And what is the result of a lifetime? That you come to 
doubt the truth, solidity, and reality of the primary axioms that bring certainty, provoke flights of 
fancy, or incite action, give them up one by one, and change each of them to a question mark.
599
 
Al-e Ahmad is playing with “way” as method and “way” as path (tariq can mean either) vis-à-vis 
the metaphor of “steps” and “feet.” He is also taking advantage of the word tejarbe, which means 
“experience” but can also indicate “experiment.” There is nothing supernatural or theological in 
Al-e Ahmad’s descriptions. Rather, he is reflecting on a methodology of “doubt” [shek] 
produced in conjunction with the performance of ritual. To put it another way, his ritual 
performance pulls him back from “the primary axioms” to the world of his “feet.” The critical 
ritual action tempers “certainty,” “flights of fancy,” and a certain understanding of inciting 
“action.” It keeps Al-e Ahmad vacillating between abstraction and empirical reality, but his 
epistemological position has shifted. He does not give these concepts up to reduce or to negate 
but rather to expand, to “change each one of them to a question mark.” This is “skepticism” as 
“awakening.” The “world of certainty” is both the world of transcendental faith but also the 
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world of scientistic and/or positivist truth. Yaqin [certainty] also carries the connotation of 
“positive knowledge”; Al-e Ahmad will be critically negating from his “question marks,” held 
within dialectic tension by both theory and ritual action. What is explicitly epistemologically 
rejected, then, is any Platonic notion of truth.  
This rejection does not make Al-e Ahmad a relativist, anti-science, or anti-modern; in his 
philosophy, to be a consistent materialist is to recognize the limitations of human cognition and 
existing human knowledge. Indeed, this epistemological shift, consistently materialist, is what in 
Al-e Ahmad’s view demands the critical ritual action, to keep the theory and theorist ‘grounded,’ 
as it were in the material world, embodied, skeptical. Al-e Ahmad’s materialism is consistent but 
in the name of it, of reckoning with local conditions, of seeing through illusory universalism and 
offering up different local fragments of potential universalism, he is also forced to abandon the 
epistemically complete picture that orthodox Marxism suggests, along with theological faith, and 
scientism.  As Al-e Ahmad continues, “At one time I thought my eyes saw through all the 
world’s illusions,” i.e. when he was an actual Marxist Communist. This “certainty” Al-e Ahmad 
had to give up, “Now that I belong to one corner of the world,” i.e. now that he recognizes the 
impossibility of the universal subject that Marxism depends on and thus that he is an embodied 
human being, with a history, a language, a literature (a literature of both text and ritual). But this 
localized, embodied, historical condition is not the end of universalism. It is a “historical 
materialist” beginning of it: “Now that I belong to one corner of the world, if I fill my eyes with 
images from all other corners of the world, I will become completely worldly.”600 “Worldly,” 
here, does not merely indicate “cosmopolitan” – although it absolutely also does mean that, “a 
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 Al-e Ahmad, Lost in the Crowd, 123; Khassi dar Miqat, 179, emphasis mine. I have changed Green’s translation 
of همه یویند  as “[a man] of the entire world” to “completely worldly”; I want to again thank my colleague Kamal 
Soleimani for emphasizing that  یویند directly connotes not only a cosmopolitanism but also a specific sense of “this-





man of the whole world,” as Green originally suggests – it also means “this-worldly.” Yet, what 
could Al-e Ahmad possibly mean by “images,” after several books devoted precisely to his 
variety of iconoclastic ‘illusion’ smashing? And it would be easy to take this phrase for the 
conclusion of the argument, or the argument completely explained: a sort of piece-meal, 
reconstruction of universalism from all the “corners of the world.” But to do so would be an 
error.  
For in fact, Al-e Ahmad immediately continues in the text to illuminate the question of 




 I think it was Paul Nizan who wrote in “Aden, Arabie” that “A man is not merely a 
pair of eyes. If, in your travels, you cannot change your historical situation just as you change 
your geographical situation, what you have done is futile.” Along the same lines, I realize that a 




The “images” that interest Al-e Ahmad are not simply appearances or even just analyses; they 
have to do with a new “situation” in historical relation just as one is resituated geographically in 
“travel.” This is a step toward full material embodiment.603 But the problem is that this 
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 Green omits the اما دعب  [But then, or, However] which helps explicate that the following statements on Nizan 
illustrate the former argument further.  
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 Al-e Ahmad, Lost in the Crowd, 123; Khassi dar Miqat, 179. I prefer the relational (and  literally, contextually, 
and logically justified) translation of  تیعقوم یخیرات   as “historical situation” as opposed to Green’s “position in 
history”; the latter, quite simply put, makes no sense in the sentence whereas situation implies position in relation, as 
in ‘being resituated.’ It is important to remember that Al-e Ahmad is not quoting from Nizan here. He is offhandedly 
summarizing what he remembers Nizan saying in the book. Similarly, I find Green’s rendering of  
و نیمه یروج هجوتم مدش هک كی مدآ كی ومجمهع یتسیز یگنهرفو مهاب تسا .اب تقایل یاه نیعم و تبسانم یاه دودحم  completely 
insufficient for expressing the full meaning (or range of meanings) in Al-e Ahmad’s text. He clearly writes 
“biological” and not the vaguer “life”, and “biological” strongly resonates with the naturalistic mere life 
connotations of the geographical.  
603
 I stress “material” to underline the distinction between what Al-e Ahmad means by ‘embodiment,’ i.e. 
recognition and reckoning with the historical, cultural, and even reductively natural “facts” of human embodiment. 
The existentialism in Al-e Ahmad (coming largely through French literary sources) is predicated on this view of 





resituating is not, of itself, entirely possible. There is no ‘vacillation’ here. Rather we are 
presented with facts: a “person is an aggregation of both the biological and the cultural, with 
specific capabilities and bounded relations.” There will be no easy ‘piece-meal’ universalism. As 
each individual is always bound both by biological and cultural limitations which prevent them 
from resituating themselves, at least “in travel,” historically. The comparative example that Al-e 
Ahmad chooses is telling: Nizan is a committed Marxist (leaving the Communist Party at the 
announcement of the Nazi-Soviet pact) who, in Aden, Arabie (1931) travels to Aden in pursuit of 
an exotic fantasy of the Muslim world and arrives only to find much of the bourgeois life of Paris 
which he thought he had left far behind, reproduced but in sad, recognizable, and yet 
simultaneously, decrepit and alien forms. Nizan writes: “The Orient reproduces the Occident and 
is a commentary upon it.”604 Nizan is a good enough materialist – at least by Al-e Ahmad’s 
standards – that he recognizes that there is no reality to the romantic fantasy of the Orient. But 
what he discovers in his journey is that he cannot change his historical relations as simply as he 
changes his “geographical situation,” in other words, just by traveling. Modernity, in one of its 
peaks or valleys, is already everywhere, and yet Nizan’s particular “capabilities and bounded 
relations” render his attempt “futile.” Nizan is culturally tied to his point of origin, in his 
reflections and in his orientation and yet lacks any means by which to transform or change this 
orientation – the only aspect that is changeable or negotiable, the origin and biological facts 
being immutable. Nizan here can be seen as something of a traditional Marxist foil: materialist 
enough to see past the illusion of Aden, not enough to take the Gramscian step towards local 
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language, and not enough to take Al-e Ahmad’s further move of critiquing qualities of the 
universal itself and offering up new ones to challenge them, to critique Marxism on materialist 
grounds that return the theorist to a living, breathing body, with location, history, language, and 
literature.  
As we have seen, Al-e Ahmad has already suggested by this point that there is a 
fundamental difference between travel and the kind of critical ritual practice that he is 
describing. Nizan’s case in Aden, Arabie is illustrative of this difference; he travels both with an 
imagined, “hoped” for destination and with the assumption that he can disentangle himself from 
his particular origin, not just in his “geographical situation” but in his “historical situation.” Of 
course, this is also implied in a different way by traditionalist understandings of the Hajj; Al-e 
Ahmad’s account of the Hajj, and the theory of critical ritual practice that he develops through it, 
is also a critique of the Hajj.  
 Travel for Nizan, like the Hajj traditionally understood, implies an imagined destination, 
or a foregone conclusion. However, Al-e Ahmad proposes to remove the element of faith from 
the performance of ritual, even ritualized travel such as pilgrimage. Critical ritual practice is a 
language of gestures consciously performed and dialectically addressed. It is a material 
grounding and reminder of the body, but also a critical evaluation and interpretation of 
movement in relation to “historical and geographical situation.” And yet simultaneously 
cognizant of moving both individually but also as a trajectory from the theorist’s historical and 
geographic point of origin to a critical engagement a new historical and geographical situation.
605
 
                                                          
605
 I must re-emphasize my argument from chapter 2 that Al-e Ahmad does not believe in anything like the ‘purity’ 
of the nation – even at his most nationalistic, he thinks of culture as fluid, contingent, and dialogic. I have not 
discussed Al-e Ahmad’s nationalism at great length, but it should be noted that his nationalism is far closer to the 
nationalism of nineteenth century utopian socialists like Lassalle than to an ethno-nationalist position. This is 





This new locale must be understood itself as involving both “facts” of nature and history that are 
outside the theorist’s mind (i.e. not solipsism) but which are necessarily mediated through both 
the origin and trajectory of that theorist. In this way, Al-e Ahmad proposes critical ritual practice 
as a way in which the theorist can change her historical and geographical situation, can be 
resituated.
606
 A traditional Marxist response to this notion of a language of gestures would be to 
see them as an irrational and epiphenomenal “expression” of real conditions but indexed to the 
“other-world of truth,” in opposition to the “truth of this world.”607 To a reductive naturalist this 
notion would be meaningless: arbitrary vestigial traces of memetics, cultural tail-bones. 
However, as we have seen, Al-e Ahmad sees them as potentially, if practiced according to the 
theory Khassi dar Miqat suggests, not irrational at all but rather a dialectical engagement with 
historical and geographical facts of origin and of natural facts of body, entirely of a piece with 
the “secular” “truth of this world.” This is neither irrational nor is it, of itself, rational: it is non-
rational. The performance of the non-rational, for Al-e Ahmad, has the additional, materially 
necessary purpose of reinscribing the epistemological shift described above. It is also not 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the limitations in terms of the actual practice of politics. I have already shown how in Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad 
explicitly rejects ethno-nationalist pretensions in the state as little more than mystification and sees ethno-nationalist 
and cultural purity as a ‘trap.’ Many have suggested that Al-e Ahmad encourages a religious nationalism in place of 
ethno-nationalism but, similarly, Al-e Ahmad argues in Dar Khedmat va Khiyanat-e Roshanfekran that when it 
comes to the actual practices of politics in the state or the constitution of the state, clergy in particular would have to 
“drop the idea of government based on revelation or else refrain from political activity altogether.” (Vadhat, God 
and Juggernaut, 66) Nations are more akin to changing bundles or interlaced threads of these “trajectories” for Al-e 
Ahmad. I discuss how this plays out in terms of his theory of cosmopolitanism in this section.  
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 Surprisingly, I have found Daniel Dennett’s notion of the “intentional stance” incredibly helpful in understanding 
what Al-e Ahmad is doing with this “resituation” and what Benjamin is doing with his assumption of meaning in the 
world. I will discuss this further later in my conclusion. But for now, it is useful to remember that in Dennett’s 
version of the “intentional stance” he is interested in prediction (since being an avowed “greedy reductionist” he 
views the models of the natural sciences as the best – if not perhaps only – mode of the production of knowledge) 
and within the thought experiment imbues objects – particularly objects that appear as an unthinkable or not-
understandable other – “as rational agents.”(Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 17) In doing so, Dennett argues, we 
can predict the behavior of the other (or object) “in many – if not all – instances.” The eventual goal is to arrive at 
fairly accurate prediction and to understand the distinction of subject and object as – counterintuitively from the 
starting point – object and object. In oddly similar structure but with incredibly different results, Al-e Ahmad and 
Benjamin (in particular) can be taken as proposing something like a “meaningful stance.” 
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arbitrary; to argue this would be, for Al-e Ahmad, to make an ahistorical, idealistic argument 
about human nature. One may have no wish to identify, participate, or continue any particular 
line of historical and cultural context that one is born into (and, as we have seen in Sangi bar 
Guri [A Stone on a Grave], this is an end that Al-e Ahmad himself embraces towards much 
cultural inheritance), but that does not change the fact the one is a historically and culturally 
contingent human being in addition to a “merely” organic one; one is an “aggregation of 
biological and cultural” facts.  
 Part of this view is deeply Gramscian. Al-e Ahmad wants us to recognize the material 
and historical facts that one is “from one corner of the world.” But for Gramsci, this “situation” 
implies a dialectic unfolding towards a universal subject, in line with both Hegel and Marx. As 
Gramsci writes: 
Even if one admits that other cultures have an importance and a significance in the process of 
“hierarchical” unification of world civilization (and this should certainly be admitted without 
question), they have had a universal value only insofar as they have become constituent elements 
of European culture, which is the only historically and concretely universal culture – in so far, 
that is, as they have contributed to the process of European thought and been assimilated by it. 
608
 
There can be little doubt that for Gramsci of both a substantive singularity of the eventual 
‘universal subject’ or of the fact that it is universalizing in the sense of ‘making the same.’ 
Gramsci critiques a lacuna in Marxist thought. Culture is not mere superstructure, he argues; it is 
itself the material condition that constitutes the lives and contexts of peoples. Gramsci observes 
that many of the mechanical postulates of especially the late Marx and Engels are crucially 
impoverished as a result of this misconception. Culture can, in a sense, arrest history. However, 
the role of the ‘organic’ in Gramsci’s “intellectual” is recognizing his place in the “people-
nation,” is “feeling the elementary passions of the people… connecting them dialectically to the 
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laws of history and to a superior conception of the world.”609 In his materialist critique, Gramsci 
deepens currents prevailing in Marxism at the time to look at culture as material facts. But he 
does not turn this same critique on the vestiges of Idealism in the progressive teleological project 
of Marxism; it is a closed system, and nothing of “knowledge” is contributed by culture’s 
“feelings.”610  
Al-e Ahmad finds even this iteration of Marxism insufficiently materialist. Al-e Ahmad 
(and Benjamin, in a different way) is not assimilated into “European thought.” He borrows a 
“process of European thought” and with it critiques both orthodox Marxism and Shiism. In doing 
so, however, he does not see himself as retreating from a universal space; to “become completely 
worldly” is to recognize that there is irreconcilable difference in universalistic space. Being a 
“cosmopolitan” is to be ‘rooted’ in precisely the way that Stalin would decry Jews as rootless, to 
understand one’s trajectory, one’s geographic and historical situation, even as one moves 
physically and in philosophy.
611
 This critique must be viewed as immanent vis-à-vis Marxian 
thought, as Al-e Ahmad critiquing Hegelian Idealism as a truly universal philosophy and its 
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 Ibid., 418. 
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 Ibid. I am not arguing that Al-e Ahmad wants to “emotionalize” “knowledge” but rather that he sees “culture” as 
a source of actual knowledge or possible knowledge.  
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 One of the episodes in Al-e Ahmad’s life that has most confounded scholars is his activities and statements as a 
Visiting Fellow at Harvard in 1965; most simply mention it and others just mark it as confusing or aberrant.  In The 
Mantle of the Prophet, Mottahedeh portrays the episode in quite vivid detail, from Al-e Ahmad’s initial concerns 
about the whole thing being funded by the CIA (it was, partially), to his excitement at meeting other American and 
Third World intellectuals, to even his leisure time activities (getting drinks at a local Boston bar in some kind of 
half-hearted ethnographic impulse to understand the American working class). (Mottahedeh,1985, 320-323) 
However, Mottahedeh is completely befuddled as to why at this conference Al-e Ahmad, in discussing gharbzadegi, 
argued that its critique was consonant with the notion of “world culture” or “a mixture of all cultures.” To explain 
this, Mottahedeh and several other scholars claim that Al-e Ahmad was simply playing to the crowd. This is 
unconvincing even within Mottahedeh’s own evidence; Al-e Ahmad was never someone to hide or mollify his 
opinions. He was most excited to meet and converse with Ralph Ellison who he admired both aesthetically and 
philosophically, but that did not stop his from speculating – in full knowledge of Ellison’s love of jazz – that jazz 
music might be an idealistic refuge for African-Americans, like “Christianity.” A much more plausible reading of 
Al-e Ahmad’s comments is that he took the Harvard opportunity to discuss – beyond the chapters in Gharbzadegi 






influence on Marxist thought, including Gramsci, on materialist grounds. This critique is not 
limited to the question of universalism but also to the question of teleology. Grasmci, in 
elaborating the thesis I quoted above, argues that even “European culture has undergone a 
process of unification,”612 and that “this has culminated in Hegel.” Gramsci’s theory is still 
predicated on a conception of a singular, universal, universalizing, teleological process of 
history.  
Al-e Ahmad, as I have already described, did not discuss utopian futures and his vision of 
cosmopolitanism-in-the-now is remarkably Habermasian: he imagines a kind of public sphere 
where these people as these trajectories would cross and, for lack of a better word, philosophize. 
In recognition of these “bounded” conditions, Al-e Ahmad was skeptical of a world government, 
but sanguine about “world culture.”613 In his dialectical view of Shiism and Marxism as 
necessarily co-determinant, Al-e Ahmad had also come to view such a world government as 
messianic in precisely Benjaminian terms, as beyond the realm of actual history and politics. 
Furthermore, his image of universalism as a space of the movement and resituation of specific 
bodies and ideas with specific historical and geographic origins and trajectories is of a piece with 
Benjamin’s argument in Thesis III of the “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Namely, that 
for the historical materialist, “nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for 
history,” but that methodological maxim should be understood as in Jetztzeit and it is “to be sure, 
only a redeemed mankind which receives the fullness of its past.”614 This did not make Al-e 
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 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 416. 
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 Mottahedeh, Mantle of the Prophet, 322. 
614
 Benjamin, Illuminations, 254. This point of Benjamin’s is more fully articulated by Adorno in Minima Moralia. 
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Ahmad a relativist; he clearly thought that certain concepts and practices (and theories of 
practice) were translatable and transmittable, and that some were better than others. Obviously, 
he found materialist ontology (in terms of both science and historical materialism) simply truer 
than transcendental idealism of any kind. Similarly, he clearly found his version of a Shii-
messianic view of history truer than either a quiescent view or any mechanical, teleological 
view. 
Yet there are limitations to how far this ‘reconciliation’ can go. That is to say, even a 
‘reconciliation in difference,’ at least within the scope of actual lived history. As Al-e Ahmad 
continues his conclusion: 
In any case, a man is not merely a mirror, but a mirror in which specific things are reflected, even 
that Hamadani pilgrim who’s still wearing his sheepskin vest. But then, a mirror has no language, 
and you only want to have a language. Is this not what separates the eye of the head from the eye 
of the heart? When I assess the matter I can see that with the eye of my heart I don’t even know 
myself and the familiar life of Tehran, Shemiran, and Pachinar.
615
 
The “Hamadani pilgrim” is a “thing” that is “reflected” in Al-e Ahmad’s “mirror,” but is also 
himself a “mirror,” and possibly more. This is image for Al-e Ahmad: a representation that is 
beyond language. In descriptive philosophical terms (i.e. not intellectual historical ones) there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
simple refutation of the senses, and the most compelling anthropological program proofs that the Jews are not a race 
will, in the event of a pogrom, scarcely alter the fact that the totalitarians know full well whom they do and whom 
they do not intend to murder. If the equality of all who have human shape were demanded as an ideal [i.e. Hegelian 
reconciliation] it would not greatly help. Abstract utopia is all too compatible with the most insidious tendencies of 
society. That all men are alike is exactly what society would like to hear. It considers actual or imagined differences 
as stigmas indication that not enough has yet been done; that something has still been left outside its machinery, not 
quite determined in its totality.” (Adorno, Minima Moralia, 66) However, there is another way to understand 
reconciliation: “An emancipated society, on the other hand, would not be unitary state, but the realization of 
universality in the reconciliation of differences. Politics that are still seriously concerned with such a society ought 
not, therefore, propound the abstract inequality of men even as an idea. Instead, they should point to the bad equality 
today… and conceive the better state as one in which people could be different without fear.” (Adorno, Minima 
Moralia, 67.)   
615
 Al-e Ahmad, Lost in the Crowd, 123; Khassi dar Miqat, 180. It may be tempting to view the “eye of the head” 
and the “eye of the heart” as mapping quite neatly onto Cartesian dualism and mirroring an understanding of Al-e 
Ahmad’s “awakening,” to “doubt” as mirroring Cartesian skepticism, but this would be to miss the vital fact that Al-
e Ahmad’s philosophy begins with aesthetics, i.e. with aesthetics as sensory experience and its extension as the only 





something Kantian here. The “Hamadani pilgrim” is, in one sense, a thing-in-itself, and this is 
inaccessible to language. But morally speaking, Al-e Ahmad also apprehends a gulf between a 
thing-in-itself and a human being.
616
 If it is reductive to view the Kabaa as merely a pile of 
stones, it is actually violent, Al-e Ahmad is telling us, to view this man only in terms of Al-e 
Ahmad’s own depiction of him. Unlike in Kant, however, for Al-e Ahmad, a priori principles 
are not apprehended through reason, apart from sensory experience (and unlike in Heidegger, 
there is no Sein before Dasein, human beings can only be understood contingently and 
relationally).  Again, as we have seen throughout Khassi dar Miqat and particularly in this 
section, there are facts at play, both scientific and historical. These constitute the sub-image that 
is seen through the “eye of the head” [ مشچ رس ]. But recall that Al-e Ahmad writes this passage 
mere lines after stating that his “awakening or at least skepticism” was “to doubt the truth, 
solidity, and reality of the primary axioms that bring certainty, provoke flights of fancy, or incite 
action, give them up one by one, and change each of them to a question mark.” His “doubt” as 
“awakening” is unlike Kant’s (or Descartes’, for that matter). Al-e Ahmad is extraordinarily 
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 Mirsepassi writes: “Al-e Ahmad’s two most important books are the best representatives of radical epistemic 
violence that prophetic intellectuals have inflicted in the Iranian intellectual and social context. Westoxication is a 
totalistic condemnation of modernization in the Iranian context, a radical intolerant attack on every facet of modern 
life in contemporary Iran. In its scathing account of an Iranian society gripped by inauthenticity and spiritual decline 
as if by disease, it raises the genre of the narrative of despair to new heights. His other book, On the Service and 
Treason of the Intellectuals, is an even harsher and more violent critique of modernist intellectuals in Iran.” 
(Mirsepassi, 2011, 33) In the context of the Hamadani pilgrim, I want to address Mirsepassi’s complete 
misrepresentation of Al-e Ahmad, particularly in the question of “epistemic violence” and “violence” of any kind. 
As when comparing Gharbzadegi with Jünger’s writings, it is patently clear that Al-e Ahmad has no love of 
violence. Here, with the Hamadani pilgrim, we can observe something of the Kantian means/ends distinction 
bubbling up at precisely the moment in Al-e Ahmad’s analysis where he might want to reduce a human being – even 
one he has described as engaging in patently silly behaviors a few pages earlier – to a mere thing (or perhaps even 
an emblem of traditionalist gharbzadegi). In this sense, Al-e Ahmad is remarkably weary about epistemic violence 
as well. Al-e Ahmad’s critiques are indeed “scathing.” But as I have demonstrated throughout this dissertation, these 
critiques are aimed most frequently at concepts like faith, conditions like inequality, and the effacement of 
difference, i.e. epistemic violence against human difference. Al-e Ahmad was not Gandhi, but neither was he Fanon; 






precise here: it is primary axioms [ تایهيدب هیلوا ]617 that he comes “to doubt the truth, solidity, and 
reality of,” not the world of sense perception. The “eye of the head,” in terms of materialist 
scientific and historical critique is ‘reliable’; indeed, scientific ontology is crucial for Al-e 
Ahmad’s project as I have described it here.618 However, for Al-e Ahmad, it is fundamentally 
epistemically limited.
619
 It does not account for the full “image” of anything. Indeed, its greatest 
strength arises from this limitation: scientific ontology provides a very good account of the 
empirical qualities of objects that exist in the world. Hence Al-e Ahmad’s easy dismissal of the 
supernatural and cosmological claims of Shiism. In this sense, Al-e Ahmad is a “naturalist” and 
he is a “realist” in that he both accepts the existence of a world independent in some measure of 
his mind and rejects the empirically (and additionally, in his thought, rationally) impossible. But 
this provides such a “thin”620 account of the world that in its easy verifiability, reproducibility, 
and transmissibility, it cannot account for the full range of reality, much less the full range of 
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 تایهیدب  could also be translated as “self-evident truths” by itself.  
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 And Al-e Ahmad is even more explicit in Gharbzadegi: “Thus do we study; thus do we gather statistics; thus do 
we conduct research. This makes sense insofar as science has universal methods: scientific methods bear the imprint 
of no nationality.”(Al-e Ahmad, Occidentosis, 44). This position, especially as Al-e Ahmad employs it in Khassi dar 
Miqat, is particularly confounding to Wells, who writes at one point in exasperation that Al-e Ahmad “sounds like 
an outraged public health inspector.” (Wells, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, 131) In some sense, Wells isn’t too far off the mark. 
As I address in the main text, Al-e Ahmad is aware that scientific methods aren’t quite this simple or neutral. But he 
is making the point to underline a.) the central importance of science and b.) the possibility of a universal sphere 
even in a world of bounded difference. Al-e Ahmad is also aware of the way in which scientific practice supposedly 
for one purpose can be repurposed by Capital. He expresses this most poignantly in Sangi bar Guri when he talks of 
being transformed from a patient into a “customer” of doctors and the increasingly pseudo- nature of the science he 
was experiencing.   
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 I give a further account of why I find this to be a philosophically justified position in my conclusion.  
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 I use “thin” here in both the sense implied by Geertz’s notion of “thick description” as well as in conjunction 
with Bilgrami’s notion of “thin” in terms of the reach of “scientific rationality.” Especially in terms of my 
comparison, I should note that Benjamin draws the same distinction between what he calls the “exact sciences” (i.e. 
the natural sciences) without which contemporary “critical thinking” would not be possible, and “positivism” 
(Benjamin, Selected Writings Vol. 4, 139)  Raymond Geuss provides an excellent summation of this view of 
“positivism”: “In Frankfurt usage a ‘positivist’ is a person who holds: (a) that an empiricist account of natural 
science is adequate, and (b) that all cognition must have essentially the same cognitive structure as natural science.” 
(Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 2) Thus empiricist and rationalist accounts are bundled in most Frankfurt 





human experience and knowledge in terms of norms, ethics, aesthetics (traditionally understood), 
and what I described before as the realm of the non-rational.
621
 
At the same time, “the eye of the heart” is epistemologically limited.  The range, scope, 
and depth of the knowledge it “sees” are unknown; as Al-e Ahmad writes, “with the eye of my 
heart I don’t even know myself and the familiar life of Tehran, Shemiran, and Pachinar.” The 
“eye of the heart” is where Al-e Ahmad “awakens” to “doubt,” “certainty.” Al-e Ahmad’s use of 
the metaphor of “eye” is not accidental. He is discussing the kind of knowledge that begins with 
perception, a first person point of view, and experience. This shares a great deal of common 
ground with a phenomenological approach. However, Al-e Ahmad discovers, from such a point 
of view, uncertainty and the realization that this kind of knowledge, even when applied to 
himself, is uncertain, is a “question mark.” Recall Al-e Ahmad’s discussion of individual and 
society earlier in Khassi dar Miqat. He recognizes the dialectical dependence (and, of course, 
tension) between autonomous individuals and society but he fully rejects inward retreat as a kind 
of mystification or delusion. It is not that Al-e Ahmad rejects the first person point of view or 
consciousness. Rather, he rejects, most fundamentally, that this point of view produces a 
knowledge similar to “the eye of the head” similar to science with its ironically powerful 
epistemic limitations. But as we have seen quite clearly, this does not lead Al-e Ahmad to reject 
scientific knowledge; within his broader materialist critique of materialism, Al-e Ahmad makes 
a scientific critique of scientism: there is no scientific reason to treat that which can be 
understood through the natural sciences as fully-descriptive of true reality.
622
  Thus, Al-e Ahmad 
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views intersubjectivity as fundamental for coming to know anything, even – perhaps especially – 
that “self” which “belongs to one corner of the world.” But even so, this is tentative, unsure 
knowledge that is further mitigated through the translation of “image” to “language.” Yet, Al-e 
Ahmad is insistent that “you want to have only a language.” Why does he phrase this in the 
imperative, especially if “language” here is an approximation of an already epistemologically 
limited sub-image of the world?  
One answer can be found in the phrase “eye of the heart” itself, which contains both the 
epistemological sense described above but also, indeed perhaps primarily, a conception that is 
driven by a perception of injustice.  After describing just how necessarily limited any reading in 
this realm will be,
623
 he asks why it is imperative that he write this limited sub-image: 
So what image have I given in the mirror of this notebook? Wouldn’t it have been better if I had 
done the same thing a million other people did this year who came on the Hajj? And those 
millions and millions of other people who’ve visited the Kaaba during these 1400 years or so and 
had things to say about it, but said nothing and took the results of the experience with them 
selfishly to the grave?... Isn’t it really better if we let the experience of every event rot like a seed 
in the center of its fruit? Instead of eating the fruit and planting the seed? Obviously, with this 
notebook I have given a negative answer to this sincere question.
624
 
Which “sincere question” is Al-e Ahmad giving a “negative answer to” by writing “this 
notebook”? Syntactically, it cannot be the last or the first (which are not yes or no questions.) Al-
e Ahmad is saying no to the second question, which has two implications that he explores over 
the course of the next several sentences. The first is quite simple and unsurprising: Al-e Ahmad 
does not think it would have been “better” to perform the Hajj in a fully-traditional manner as a 
‘believer.’  
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However, the second implication speaks to Al-e Ahmad’s perceived imperative to write 
the book. As we have seen earlier, writing itself is a component of Al-e Ahmad’s critical ritual 
action as both a practice to force critical condensed reflection and as a refuge for the as-
autonomous-as-possible individual. But that was writing as part of the critical ritual performance, 
whereas what Al-e Ahmad is now discussing is not simply writing but dissemination. In line with 
the theory he has been developing, Al-e Ahmad does not claim exclusive authority on the 
experience, not because he does not believe in the rigor of his own theory and practice but rather 
because part of that theory is that there is no authoritative “image” of this experience. Clearly 
part of this dissemination is that Al-e Ahmad thinks the way he has “eaten the fruit” of the event 
– its material reality and his uncertain, limited perspective of his experience of it – might plant a 
useful “seed” of this very theory which assumes within it multiplicity of uncertain, limited 
experiences. Al-e Ahmad is saying no to the traditional practice which, he argues, ends in 
silence. For ‘believers,’ this silence encourages the reproduction of transcendent, absolute faith, 
not only in the meaning of the “event” itself but in a cosmologically true and perfect order. I 
have shown how this kind of faith, in Al-e Ahmad’s philosophy taken as a whole, is critiqued on 
the grounds of a theodicy that reproduces injustice. However, here we see how justice itself 
enters the argument. Their faith-based practice effaces, indeed denies, the material truth of the 
Hajj and produces their “silence,” which facilitates the reproduction of the same “faith” – a 
vicious cycle of untruth which does not do justice to the possibility of meanings in reality.  
Put more strongly, the ‘believers’ are gharbzadeh not by the phantasmagoria of 
‘Western’ modernity but by the phantasmagoria of ‘traditionalism’ and ‘religion,’  the Christian-





“mundane.”625 But here, in Khassi dar Miqat, when discussing the “eye of the heart,” Al-e 
Ahmad does not condemn the “Hamadani pilgrim” for being gharbzadeh in either its 
‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ form; the “rhinoceros” hide from the end of Gharbzadegi has not fully 
hardened. Al-e Ahmad the ethnographer recognizes that this “Hamadani pilgrim” and “millions 
and millions” like him perceive some part or aspect of the uncertain and indeterminate aspects of 
the real phenomena all around them. Al-e Ahmad the philosopher understands that this is an 
important part of his theory that, even in their false consciousness, they are not yet completely 
incapable of critical consciousness. And thus he spits out the “seed” of his “notebook,” and he 
has done the organic intellectual task required such that they might be able to grasp hold of their 
own diverse experiences. This aspect of the task addresses the arguments against “faith” and 
traditionalism that are dismissed by Al-e Ahmad by stating with his “negative answer” that his 
approach, if necessarily incomplete, is better. However, Al-e Ahmad the polemicist, after 
writing, “with this notebook I have given a negative answer to this sincere question,” asks, “And 
why?” And he turns his gaze from phantasmagoric traditionalism to a very different audience: 
“Because Iranian intellectuals spurn these events, or walk among them gingerly and with 
distaste. ‘The Hajj?’ they say. ‘Don’t you have anywhere else to go?’”626 If we follow the 
arguments from Gharbzadegi, Al-e Ahmad does not even consider their dismissal even a 
reduction to the “eye of the head.” Rather, they have their gharbzadeh “faith” in 
phantasmagorical images of ‘Western’ modernity which looks at the Hajj as meaningless, trivial, 
or at best romantically archaic. Al-e Ahmad, now mixing his polemical with his philosophical, 
addresses them in terms of their insufficient materialism, their unworldliness, their 
                                                          
625
 Please see the end of Chapter 2 for my full discussion of gharbzadegi.  
626





transcendental faux-cosmopolitanism: “[They are] Ignoring the fact that this is a tradition that 
calls a million people to a single place each year and prevails upon them to engage in a single 
ritual.”627 This is a material and historical fact that he has just spent a good deal of his book 
describing. Al-e Ahmad is, at the most basic level, saying to these intellectuals: your disinterest 
does not demonstrate how modern you are, but either how anxious you are in your modern 
‘pose’ or how limited is your understanding of modernity; you are just faithfully repeating 
received truths on authority, just like the pilgrims you so seek to distinguish yourselves from. 
But unlike in Gharbzadegi, with this “notebook,” Khassi dar Miqat, Al-e Ahmad stages a 
theoretical intervention that says, look at this event: it could have meaning. This ‘could’ 
expresses an extraordinary range of possibilities produced through Al-e Ahmad’s theory: perhaps 
not the transcendent meaning even he momentarily entertains only to dismiss within the text, but 
at the very least it is a historical fact. Beyond that, a fact that, in Al-e Ahmad’s thoroughly 
materialist critique, entertains the possibility not only for meanings in reality but even something 
as seemingly transcendent as the index of the “Hidden Imam” in time, an index of political 
critique and possibility. Surely such an extraordinary historical fact should evoke more disdain or 
“distaste.” Thus, we finally come to understand just how thoroughly the critique begun with the 
concept of gharbzadegi is not a proposition for an authentic subject; it is an argument against 
unwarranted epistemic closure and (in line with the Marxian inheritance) the conditions which 
reproduce that epistemic closure.
628
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Despite the critical importance of a certain conception of scientific ontology for Al-e 
Ahmad, it is clear that the possibilities of history as something that can be seen materially 
animate more of Al-e Ahmad’s life and thought. These possibilities are what brings him to 
reexamine Shii views of history, the Mahdi as an index of justice, and to explore the Hajj ritual 
with reference both to these historiographies and this index, but also as an embodied 
performance of human epistemic and epistemological limitations, as a language of gestures to be 
interpreted, and a critical performative apparatus against the ahistorical, unscientific, and 
immaterial tendencies toward idealism, abstraction, and reduction. Critical ritual action is not to 
bring the mind into embodiment; it reinforces that the body and senses are an extension of the 
mind and vice versa. As a language of gestures derived from historical specificity, it is living and 
dynamic in terms of meaning and even, if we take some of Al-e Ahmad’s asides seriously, in 
form. As both historically “situated” but non-static, as performing ‘dialectic tension’ instead of 
declaring antinomies, it makes possible the ‘resituation’ that marks the beginning of the very 
different kind of universalism I have been described here. But it is always, in the words of Al-e 
Ahmad, “smashing the steps of the world of certainty,” “an awakening – or at least a 
skepticism.” It is a ritual of doubt.  
As I stated in the introduction to this chapter, in order to understand Benjamin’s 
philosophy and where it converges and diverges with Al-e Ahmad’s and this theory of critical 
ritual action, it is crucial to examine Benjamin’s use of aggadah and halachah in the context of 
his writings on Kafka and, in turn, the relationship of those concepts to Benjamin’s own 






Benjamin and Kafka 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the sense of “law” that goes unconsidered in the vast 
majority of the literature that has arisen in reflection upon Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence,” 
the very different kind of law suggested by the concept of halachah. Indeed, as Michael Mack 
has suggested, part of Benjamin’s “messianism” is “nowhere clearer to view than when he 
contrasted Kant’s secularization of Christian values with, in his view, the absent world of 
rabbinic law and messianic justice.”629 While Al-e Ahmad certainly viewed current conditions in 
discord with a sense of “messianic justice,” he took very seriously the possibility that in being 
attentive to the material conditions of history, a reconsideration of the world of ritual action was 
in order: this, too could and in fact should be ‘secularized.’ For all the resonances I have been 
discussing in terms of their projects, their different attitudes towards the possibility of something 
like a ‘theory of critical ritual action’ is, in terms of this study, one of the most important 
differences between the two thinkers. Susan Handelman, another scholar attentive to Benjamin’s 
discussion of halachah, suggests that “historical materialism supplied the concretion, the 
halakah, the ethic of action in the crude world, the directives of justice between humans.”630 But 
this, too, does not quite fully come to terms with how Benjamin addresses the question of 
halachah.
631
 To fully understand Benjamin and the question of the halachah, we must turn to 
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another of his incomplete projects, his several essays, letters, and the planned (but ultimately 
unwritten book) on Kafka which he also worked on, intermittently, during the 1930s, alongside 
the Passagenwerk. If the shape of the Passagenwerk provoked such alarm in Adorno (that it was 
at the “crossroads of magic and positivism”), the Kafka work – far from nudging Benjamin 
towards a fully, exclusively theological theory – seemed to Scholem’s dismay to confirm in 
some part what he called Benjamin’s “Communist credo.”632 Benjamin protested this 
interpretation both on the grounds of misunderstanding his materialism but also on his rejection 
of the very concept of “credo,” which he described as the one form in its extreme “unpractical, 
unproductive form” that should not be “affirmed.”633  
 In his most famous essay on Kafka, Benjamin describes Kafka’s “philosophical tales” as 
“unfolding,” like “a bud unfold[s] into a blossom.”634 This definition is in contrast to what 
Benjamin thinks of traditional parables which are akin to demonstrating how a piece of origami 
“unfolds into a flat sheet of paper… this second kind of ‘unfolding’ is really appropriate to 
parable; the reader takes pleasure in smoothing out so that he has the meaning on the palm of his 
hand. Kafka’s parables, however, unfold in the first sense, the way a bud turns into a 
blossom.”635 The differences between the two theories of parable are manifold. The ‘traditional’ 
form of parable is didactic in message and heuristic in process; the parable unfolds neatly into a 
“flat sheet of paper,” and “the reader takes pleasure,” in a sense learns, “in smoothing out.” 
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Kafka’s parable, in contrast, provokes “reflections that are endless.” What is more, these 
“reflections” on “Kafka’s parables” and provoked by “Kafka’s parables” do not themselves 
unfold the “bud” “into a blossom.” That unfolding, if we take the metaphor seriously, would 
seem to happen on its own. In Kafka’s parables capacity to provoke multiplicity in reflection 
Benjamin states, “That is why their effect is literary.” However he immediately clarifies how we 
should understand the word “literary” here and, in turn, the incompleteness of the metaphor of 
the blossom: 
This does not mean that his prose pieces belong entirely in the tradition of Western prose forms, 
they have, rather, a relationship to religious teachings similar to the one Haggadah has to 
Halachah. They are not parables, yet they do not want to be taken at their face value; they lend 
themselves to quotation and can be recounted for purposes of clarification. But do we have the 
teachings which Kafka’s parables accompany and which K.’s postures and the gestures of his 




Benjamin wants to introduce, indeed in a sense secularize, another set of concepts into the 
universalistic lexicon: aggadah and halachah. And, indeed, this clarifies both the significant 
distance he sees between these stories and the purely, or solely, or Western, “literary” and 
simultaneously the metaphor of the blossom; the bud may unfold into the blossom on its own but 
it is only through reflecting on the unfolding (reflecting on reflections, what could be more 
Talmudic?) that we can understand what the bud is and in an indirect, secondary way, assist in its 
unfolding.
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 Although the blossom emerges of its own accord, one could not even recognize it 
as such without these reflections. However, further away from the metaphor, Benjamin suggests: 
it may not unfold at all without them even though they do not cause its unfolding the way hands 
unfold the paper in the simpler understanding of parable. This is not only a question of literary 
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interpretation. Benjamin views Kafka’s parables not only as “philosophical tales.” But, much 
like Baudelaire’s poetry was for the nineteenth century, Kafka’s parables are also commentary 
and reflection on and of current conditions in the twentieth century. In fact, I argue that it is 
through the lens of Benjamin’s secularization of aggadah that we can better understand his 
engagement with Baudelaire and the Passagenwerk as a whole.  
Aggadah and Time 
 Benjamin writes in a later letter to Scholem: 
Kafka’s work is an ellipse with foci that lie far apart and are determined on the one hand by 
mystical experience (which is above all the experience of tradition) and on the other by the 
experience of the modern city dweller. When I speak of the experience of the modern city dweller, 
I subsume a variety of things under this notion. On the one hand, I speak of the modern citizen, 
who knows he is at the mercy of vast bureaucratic machinery, whose functioning is steered by 
authorities who remain nebulous even to executive organs themselves, let alone the people they 
deal with. (It is well known that this encompasses one level of meaning in the novels, especially in 
The Trial.) On the other hand, by modern city dwellers I am speaking of the contemporary of 
today’s physicist.638 
In the previous chapter I addressed how “mysticism” should be read quite broadly for Benjamin; 
here he helpfully expands this still further to “the experience of tradition.” To understand “the 
experience of the modern city dweller” is partially to take seriously the experience 
[Erfahrung]
639
 in its socio-historical dimensions vis-à-vis experience of “vast bureaucratic 
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machinery,” but also the empirico-naturalist account of today’s physicist. In both these directions 
Kafka’s work reaches out from text and story into historical experience and physical reality.  
After Benjamin gives a long quotation from the British astrophysicist and philosopher of science 
Arthur Eddington on self-description fully-informed by the knowledge of modern physics which 
expresses the sheer absurdity of trying to experience ordinary human motion with simultaneous 
full-knowledge of the physical implications in every aspect of the act, he writes, “I can think of 
no passage in literature which displays the characteristic Kafka-gestus to the same degree. One 
could easily juxtapose sentences from Kafka’s prose pieces with just about any point in this 
physical aporia; and it says not a little about Kafka’s work that many of his most 
‘incomprehensible’ sentences would be at home here.”640 He continues: 
So that if one states, as I have just done, that an enormous tension exists between such experiences 
in Kafka and his mystical experiences, one has stated only a half-truth. What is actually and in 
this precise sense crazy about Kafka is that this absolutely new world of experience comes to him 
by way of the mystical tradition… The long and the short of it is that an individual (here, Franz 
Kafka) who is confronted with the reality that presents itself as ours – theoretically in modern 
physics and in practice by military technology – would clearly have to fall back on nothing less 
than the powers of this tradition. I would say that this reality is now almost beyond the 
individual’s capacity, and that Kafka’s world, often so serene and pervaded by angels, is the exact 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
find some general a priori epistemological or ontological reality that was more readily available at some primal 
origin. It is in and though modernity that catastrophe is both continued and potentially overcome. When Benjamin 
talks about “ur-history,”  or primal history, he is discussing the origin point in time and place; this, of course, has a 
relation to the past, but does not indicate a more “true” experience in the past or a clearer way of addressing a 
question in the past. It is to see what concepts, what arrangements, what material histories, and so on, form the 
primal image of that moment in history. In a concept of history in which “progress has been annihilated,” each of 
these primal histories is distinct not only for individual and society but in different times. Benjamin helpfully 
clarifies this in Convolute N of the Passagenwerk when he writes, “It is not the economic origins of culture that will 
be presented, but the expression of the economy in culture. At issue, in other words, is the attempt to grasp an 
economic process as perceptible. Ur-phenomenon, from out of which proceed all manifestations of life in the 
Arcades (and, accordingly, in the nineteenth century).” (Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 460) The task is to perceive 
in the apparent the economic (but also cultural, philosophical, etc.) network of relations as being as real as the 
objects themselves, the history which Benjamin views as having gathered into these objects. Thus, “Ur-,” and 
“primal,” in Benjamin are not a priori ontological principles; they are a posteriori aesthetic and epistemological 
ones that change over time, that are utterly contingent.  
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I would be remiss were I not to again address question of “this reality,” “now almost beyond the 
individual’s capacity” to perceive (the “anaesthetics” discussed in chapter 3) which, as we have 
seen, was also one of the primary concerns for Al-e Ahmad, alongside a concomitant notion that 
this is simultaneously reflective of the potential for mass annihilation. Indeed, mirroring Al-e 
Ahmad’s critique of the Shah’s government as a lumpenproletariat regime, Benjamin notes that 
Kafka correctly surmises that even the “authorities” seem “nebulous to the executive organs 
themselves.” Furthermore, it almost goes without saying that Benjamin endorses the world as 
presented in “modern physics,” as at least partially correct.  What is extraordinary, “crazy,” is 
that Kafka has been so attentive to the contemporary world in his storytelling that he has 
managed to produce an “exact complement of his age,” both here in the furthest reaches of 
contemporary physics and earlier in the historical reality.  
Eiland and Jennings provide a very important footnote to Benjamin’s use of the word 
“complement.” It may seem to imply a reflection or a negative image, but it is actually a 
reference to Niels Bohr’s theory of complementarity in quantum mechanics, the view that, 
“confronted by the contradictions resulting from the attempt to describe atomic events in the 
terms of classical physics, this theory states that the interpretation of matter as particles is 
complementary to its interpretation as waves, just as knowledge of an electron’s position is 
complimentary to knowledge of its velocity or momentum; both views are necessary for 
                                                          
641
 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 3, 326, emphasis in original. I have switched to the Eiland and Jennings 
translation because in places they are a little more attentive to nuances of Benjamin’s German. For example, here in 
the translation of the German Toll, they give “crazy,” and add a footnote that it could also be read as “mad” or 
“great.” The earlier translation gives here “folly,” which does not really convey the sense of crazy-great that 





understanding atomic phenomena, though they are mutually exclusive.”642 I want to be clear that 
I do not think Benjamin’s use of this theory is intended to be ‘proving’ his philosophy through 
Bohr’s theory. Indeed while Bohr’s theory (in Eiland and Jennings’ gloss and in the original I 
include before) discusses mutually exclusive truths that must be viewed as both true in 
complementary “totality,” Benjamin is more interested in the idea of seeing a single “object,” 
through two different lenses, as two completely different phenomena at once. Thus, 
metaphorically, he is saying that Kafka’s stories are an unreal “complement” to the realities of 
“his age.” When Benjamin writes that Kafka’s world is “serene and pervaded by angels,” he of 
course does not mean this as literal truth. Indeed, on the same page he writes that Kafka “gives 
up on truth.” Rather, instead we get a glimpse at a “state of the world” in which such questions 
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The Problematic Status of Halachah 
  To be able to perceive all of this, Kafka (or any individual) would have to rely, 
according to Benjamin, on “this tradition,” the broadly understood tradition of Jewish religious 
hermeneutics as discussed in chapter 3. Benjamin is furthering the case I described before as the 
“secularization” of certain concepts out of Jewish tradition as universalizable.  This is also 
visible in Benjamin’s untroubled connection between the work of Kafka and the painter Paul 
Klee, whose painting Angelus Novus (1930) plays such a pivotal role in Benjamin’s “Theses on 
the Philosophy of History” in this same letter. But why is aggadah conceptually ‘secularizable’ 
in Benjamin, but halachah is not? This is the question which must limit my focus in reading 
Benjamin on Kafka because it is in answering this question that we come to see how and why 
Benjamin rejected much of what I described as so unique in Al-e Ahmad above: an engagement 
with critical ritual practice as part of critical theoretical practice itself.  Although Benjamin 
viewed his own method as a practice of “theological interpretation,” he concludes in regard to 
Kafka and aggadah:  
Kafka’s genius lay in the fact that he tried something new altogether: he gave up truth so that he 
could hold on to its transmissibility, the haggadic element [sic.] His works by nature are parables. 
But their poverty and their beauty consist in their need to be more than parables. They don’t 
simply lie down at the feet of doctrine, the way Haggadah [sic] lies down at the feet of Halakhah. 
Having crouched down, they unexpectedly cuff doctrine with a weighty paw.
644
  
Between 1934 and 1938, it is clear, at the very least, that Benjamin primarily, unequivocally, and 
relatively comfortably deploys the category of aggadah for understanding what Kafka is doing 
and, by similarity, for understanding several of the authors and artists he interested in, especially 
Klee and Baudelaire. Kafka’s aggadot, as discussed before, reach out “beyond” their text and 
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into historical experience and physical reality, but not with “truth.” It is hard to read this “truth” 
in isolation; what Benjamin means is “positive,” verifiable truth.  
Indeed, in terms of reflective truth, Benjamin has already told us that Kafka’s work 
shows that he uncannily apprehended multiple levels in the experience of “the modern city-
dweller.” What Benjamin has in mind about negativity and untruth he expresses a few lines 
earlier, “there is no doctrine to be learned, no knowledge to be preserved. What are caught 
flitting by are snatches of things not meant for any ear. This points to the rigorously negative 
aspects of Kafka’s work.”645 Benjamin wrote earlier that the aggadic nature of Kafka’s work 
lends it the possibility of philosophical “quotation,” and that they can be “recounted for purposes 
of clarification.” But quotation for what and clarification of what? For the negation of doctrine, 
or to show the distance between existing conditions and the “complementary” “state of the 
world” in which questions of doctrine no longer make sense. In these ways, for Benjamin, 
aggadah can be advanced as a concept independent of cosmological-theological truth, a concept 
absent doctrine. Aggadah can be commentary on absence or “distortion” just as much as it is on 
presence. We can also see several fundamental ways in which Benjamin viewed halachah as 
fundamentally different. First, he views halachah fundamentally as inextricable, indeed, even 
synonymous with doctrine/dogma; second, he views that doctrine as forgotten; and third, given 
the first two points, he views the remembering of halachah like the remembering the messiah. It 
is not something one can do positively or actively, it must emerge, and by Benjamin’s logic, in 
the messianic world.  
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 In terms of the first view of halachah, it is clear that Benjamin does not consider it 
possible, as Al-e Ahmad does, to think about ritual outside a purely doctrinal context. Several 
times in his correspondence with Scholem, when Benjamin was first writing about Kafka, 
Benjamin asks Scholem for a copy of Haim Bialik’s essay “Aggadah and Halakhah” to clarify 
Benjamin’s own understandings of the subject. Scholem recounts in his memoir that he sent it. 
Perhaps Benjamin took either its Zionist message of a “new” aggadic literature implying the 
need for a “new” halachic law in a “new” Zionist world to heart or its argument that halachah 
was in some sense a different kind of aggadah but the one which was not illustrative 
commentary but expressive (doctrinal) life.
646
 What is strange in this first view, however is how 
out of place it is in the long history of Jewish thought which had often entertained the notion of 
ritual as disconnected from cosmology or specific doctrine. This disconnection can be seen, for 
example, in the famous aggadah of the Oven of Aknai in the Talmud’s Baba Metzia where 
miracles and the voice of God are ruled irrelevant to the interpretation of a ritual action or in 
Moses Mendelssohn’s arguments in the sometimes neglected second half of Jerusalem (1783) 
that “the ceremonial law” was a “kind of script” for continuous interpretation and re-imagination, 
“to connect action with contemplation, life, and theory.”647 Instead, Benjamin seems to have 
internalized the notion that halachah is the reification of a doctrine which is wholly alien in the 
modern world. For all his critical reengagement with Judaism, this aspect maintained the modern 
image of “religion” as static.  
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 The second view, that ‘doctrine is forgotten,’ is far easier to come to terms with; in fact, it 
involves one of the ways in which Kafka succeeds as aggadah, in illustrating the idea of 
“forgetting.” As Benjamin writes: 
Whenever figures in the novels have anything to say to K., no matter how important or surprising 
it may be, they do so casually and with the implication that he must really have known it all along. 
It is as though nothing new was being imparted, as though the hero were just subtly invited to 
recall to mind something he has forgotten. This is how Willy Haas has interpreted the course of 
events in Der Prozess [The Trial], and justifiably so: “The object of the trial – indeed, the real 
hero of this incredible book – is forgetting, whose main characteristic is the forgetting of itself… 
Here it has actually become a mute figure in the shape of the accused man a figure of the most 
striking intensity.” It probably denied that “this mysterious center… derives from the Jewish 
religion.” “Memory plays a very mysterious role as piousness. It is not an ordinary quality but… 
the most profound quality of Jehovah that He remembers, that He retains, an infallible memory ‘to 
the third, fourth, even to the hundredth, generation.’ The most sacred… act of the… ritual is the 
erasing of sins from the book of memory.”648 
 There are a few preliminary observations that must be made about this passage. For one, 
although Benjamin calls Haas’ analysis “justifiable,” he clearly wants to distance himself from 
Haas’ focus on God; as we have seen, God is not really the question for Benjamin. Additionally, 
clearly for Haas, ‘mysteriousness’ plays a role as aporia whereas for Benjamin it is a sign of 
absence or possibility; in good Marxian fashion he wants to dispel the “mysterious.” But within 
his own method, he simultaneously wants to engage with what it was standing in for or the 
possibilities it expresses in, to use a popular word from his Kafka studies, “distorted” form. 
However, that said, one can see how this reading of Kafka gestures in several productive 
directions for Benjamin:  toward “forgetting” as commentary on the absence of consciousness of 
material relations and simultaneously toward disconnection from what Benjamin would later 
describe as “the weak messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.”649 There is also 
simultaneously the draw towards an aggadic exhortation towards remembrance and memory – 
part and parcel of Benjamin’s own method – but it is pushed back by the ending commentary on 
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“ritual,” as “erasing of sins from the book of memory.”  In another letter to Scholem (August 11, 
1934), Benjamin writes, “For the work of the Torah – if we abide by Kafka’s account – has been 
thwarted.” Scholem adds that in Benjamin’s notes he included the sentence, “And everything 
that Moses accomplished long ago would have to be reaccomplished in our world’s age.”650  
Benjamin’s own methodology, as I examined in the previous chapter, moves the question 
of memory and remembrance into his messianic philosophy of history and aesthetics of the 
present. But these movements neither “erase sins from the book of memory,” nor “reaccomplish” 
the work of Moses in history. The former can only happen in the sense of the redemption of the 
past and present from continuous catastrophe and the latter is the literal work of the messiah. 
Benjamin views both of these concepts as logically outside or beyond actual history.  This 
quotation from Haas is the only time the word “ritual” appears in the essay apart from the 
implication of ritual within the Hebrew “Halachah,” and it is associated with “erasing sins from 
the book of memory,” which, understood in Benjaminian historiography, would be precisely the 
definition of historicism and theodicy. In his indirect remembrance of the past via pregnant 
constellations in Jetztzeit, Benjamin seeks to allow memories of the past, which are precisely 
indexed to the present, to burst forth into the present. But in his messianic view (which, as I have 
shown in chapter 3, is also simultaneously an immanent critique of Marxism for its catastrophic 
utopianism) the most one can do is do this history or produce “distorted” ‘profane illuminations’ 
of the world as Kafka, Klee, Baudelaire, and, of course, the Surrealists do.
651
 It turns out that 
Benjamin was interested in precisely everything that Taubes said he was not.   
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 It is these observations which lead to the third view of Benjamin’s necessarily disengaged 
attitude towards halachah. If halachah is just forgotten doctrine, then, at the very least, it can 
only reappear in historical constellation (or possibly in profane illumination) and even then, only 
as a “distortion” or, at best, a glimpse at mere shards of messianic redemption. If halachah is in 
fact inextricably linked with doctrine as the positive expression of true principles, in totality, in 
the world, then it describes the “law” of the messianic age itself. Thus, halachah, at least 
systemically – which is the only way Benjamin addresses it here – can only be emergent, and 
then only concomitantly with the messianic age, i.e. beyond the end of history. It is important 
here to recall that Benjamin’s concept of messianism is both derived in reaction to a perceived 
fundamental flaw in Marxian thought and, through the recognition of the (Christian) theological 
dimensions of that flaw, an attempt to advance alternative conceptions that Benjamin draws from 
Judaism in a non-identitarian fashion. Thus, ironically, to understand this rejection of halachah, 
in messianic terms, it is helpful to recall the materialist claims that are part of the dialectical 
critique of Marxism. To make this clearer, I would like to address Benjamin in his more 
recognizably materialist mode both to understand why he thinks his (Judaic) messianic view of 
history is materially more apt and, in doing so, to bring the contours of that messianic thought 
more clearly into view.  How does Benjamin specifically address the question of “forgetting,” in 
terms of remembering and memory, outside the mode of his new historiography? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2.1, 209) Benjamin’s use of “religious” here is in reference to Lenin adopting the view of “religion as the opiate of 
the people” from Marx. Benjamin is countering that theodical, other-worldly religion (i.e. Christianity) with a 
profane, materialistic, anthropological “illumination,” which I have been arguing should be understood as part of his 
Judeo-Marxian synthesis. In Benjamin’s 1938 letter to Scholem on Kafka, Benjamin notes that the “Surrealists’ 
interest in Kafka” “was by no means foolish,” and among many other things should not have been dismissed by Max 





Materialism, Time, and Action in Benjamin’s Messianism 
  Benjamin addresses the idea of a memory coming to the fore in an emergent fashion in 
“On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” (another of Benjamin’s final writings) at first through Proust’s 
mémoire involontaire. As Benjamin writes: 
One afternoon, the taste of a kind of pastry called a Madeleine… transported him back to the past, 
whereas before then he had been limited to the promptings of a memory which obeyed the call of 
conscious attention. This he calls mémoire involontaire. Its signal characteristic is that the 
information it gives about the past retains no trace of that past. “It is the same with our own past. 
In vain, we try to conjure it up again; the efforts of our intellect are futile.” In sum, Proust says 
that the past is situated “somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect and its field of operations, in 
some material object…, though we have no idea which one it is, And whether we come upon this 
object before we die, or whether we never encounter it, depends entirely on chance.”652 
“But,” as Benjamin adds, “there is nothing inevitable about the dependence on chance in this 
matter.” Benjamin has already dismissed – via Proust – Bergson’s notion that these memories 
can be called up by specific concentration of cognition, as a “matter of free choice.” So what 
then can Benjamin mean when he says that “there is nothing inevitable about the dependence on 
chance”? He continues, “A person’s inner concerns are not by nature of an inescapably private 
character. They attain this character only after the likelihood decreases that one’s external 
concerns will be assimilated to one’s experience.”  Or, put differently, given different social 
conditions in the now, the ‘chances’ of this mémoire involontaire could change quite 
dramatically. Benjamin would like to bring the social and the historical into the question of 
“memory”; both Proust and Bergson think of these as isolated affairs and Benjamin believes that 
this is then reflected in their fully internalized theories of memory. Benjamin gives the example 
of journalism as one such social practice which hinders this process which, through its principles 
of “newness, brevity, clarity, and above all, lack of connection between individual news 
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items,”653 “decreases the likelihood” of a social condition in which memoire involontaire might 
occur. It is not that these conditions directly cause the memories to return; it is that the 
receptivity of the social conditions increases the chance that they will. As I will explore further 
in a moment, the actual content of these memories – which is what is most crucial for Benjamin 
– has no relationship to these changed social conditions beyond this question of probability and 
receptivity.  
In order to further clarify this, Benjamin continues shortly thereafter: 
In seeking a more substantial definition of what appears in Proust’s memoire de l’intelligence as 
a by-product of Bergson’s theory, we would do well to go back to Freud. In 1921 Freud published 
his essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which hypothesizes a correlation between memory (in the 
sense of memoire involontaire) and consciousness… Freud’s fundamental thought, on which these 
remarks are based, is the assumption that “emerging consciousness takes the place of a memory 
trace.” Therefore, “it would be the special characteristic of consciousness that, unlike what 
happens in all other systems of the psyche, the excitatory process does not leave behind a 
permanent change in its elements, but expires, as it were, in the phenomenon of becoming 
conscious.”654 
There are several focal points to Benjamin’s interest in Freud’s “more substantial definition” of 
what Proust intuited with his mémoire involontaire. The most basic is that the memory is 
involuntary; the kind of memory Freud is interested in here (and I will return to this shortly) is 
the kind which arises in “the sort of dream that may afflict accident survivors – those who 
develop neuroses which cause them to relive the catastrophe in which they were involved.”655 
But Freud raises an extraordinary proposition about consciousness. These involuntary memories 
arise into “dream”; if they were to emerge into consciousness (indeed, an “emerging 
consciousness”) they would, in Benjamin’s understanding, be integrated into that “emerging 
consciousness,” which “takes the place of a memory trace.” However, as Benjamin helpfully 
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interprets, this is not where Freud’s theory leads for thinking about “consciousness as such.” 
Benjamin writes that the “basic formula,” of Freud’s “hypothesis is that ‘becoming conscious 
and leaving behind a memory trace are incompatible within one and the same system.’”656 
Benjamin – and we can begin to see more of the relationship to his messianic concept here – is 
interested in the idea that involuntary memory can be integrated as itself, not as a “memory 
trace” (not as a ‘distorted image’) into “emerging consciousness,” that it ceases to be a memory 
and becomes part of conscious reality. Benjamin is aware he is moving away from Freud’s intent 
and theory
657
 (and he cites work by Freud’s student Theodor Riek as, for example, closer to his 
own regarding this question of memory) but he is interested in another of Freud’s insights here as 
well. “In Freud’s view, consciousness as such receives no memory traces [of a very particular 
kind] whatever, but has another important function: protection against stimuli.”658 Benjamin 
notes that the particular kind of “memory traces,” that Freud is discussing are those which appear 
in dreams of “accident survivors – which cause them to relive the catastrophe in which they were 
involved.”659 This is not surprising: as Freud notes, memory traces, “are often most powerful and 
enduring when the incident which left them behind was one that never entered consciousness.”660 
In other words, what interests Benjamin is that “consciousness as such” reacts to such stimuli by 
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Benjamin is interested in these two questions which he is reading through Proust and 
Freud on the one hand (involuntary memory) and, on the other, just Freud (existing 
consciousness as a “shield,” against stimuli) in a social and historical understanding. Freud was 
drawing on not just “accident survivors” but indeed war survivors.662 But for Benjamin, 
modernity more and more is characterized by the “shock experience”663 itself, and the “shield” of 
(false) “consciousness” narcotizes or desensitizes subjective individual consciousnesses.664 This 
is the principle explored under Buck-Morss’ rubric of “anaesthetics” in chapter 3. It is also one 
of the key marks of Baudelaire’s genius for Benjamin: “Baudelaire envisaged readers to whom 
lyric poetry would present difficulties… Willpower and the ability to concentrate are not their 
strong points. What they prefer is sensual pleasure; they are familiar with the ‘spleen’ which kills 
interest and receptiveness.”665 That is to say, Baudelaire correctly addresses the actually-existing 
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audience of his current historical conditions and the characteristics of his historical moment. 
Furthermore, Baudelaire seems to have internalized – just as Kafka has – that this must be done 
indirectly. In Baudelaire, this takes the form of “lyric poetry,” which as a poetic “experience” 
“sterilizes this incident for poetic experience.”666 Baudelaire wants to “parry” the shocks but not 
to restore the individual “shield,” rather to soften it so that there can be some kind of reception 
and integration of the experiences in their fullness, in consciousness. Of course, Benjamin sees 
Baudelaire, like Kafka, as ultimately a failure. This is both an internal criticism of these authors 
on their own terms but also, Benjamin thinks, the nature of all such works, historical-aesthetic or 
aesthetic-historical. Their genius lies in their failure. They aim at a social condition in which 
individual memory and memory in “tradition” and, following Proust, even the material objects, 
which are indexed to these memories, must be available to consciousness and in reality in the 
material world. Of course, such a state of things is impossible and therefore the projects are 
impossible.  To this impossible state of things, Benjamin gives the name ‘messianic,’ not only 
because of the way in which these ideas can be encompassed in such a concept but also in 
recognition of the (Christian) theological ordering of the social conditions he is describing, 
which, to bring us back to Proust, makes the memoire involontaire appear purely subject to 
“fate.” 
Despite the deep Freudian debt here, it is important to situate these observations within 
both a Marxian framework and a critique of Hegelian idealism and Marxist utopianism. In 
Hegel’s history, grossly simplified, the past is overcome and whatever was of necessary 
substance in it is preserved in each “overcoming” (although in ever decreasing quantity and 
quality) until the perfect state is achieved. Marxism correctly, at least in part, grounds or 
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”inverts” Hegelian idealism by insisting on the primacy of modes of economic production and 
class conflict as the ‘engine’ that drives history. But, from the Benjaminian point of view, 
Marxism did not go far enough in its materialism insofar as it maintains the Hegelian view of 
historical progress and conception of historical utopia.
667
 These are both secularized Christian 
concepts for Benjamin.
668
 Benjamin proposes a very specific version of a Jewish messianic 
concept. He does so not on grounds of revelation (as we have already seen numerous times), nor 
of identity; one could hardly claim a Jewish identitarian exclusivity on behalf of a thinker who 
places a Catholic anti-Semite (Baudelaire) at the center of his magnum opus. Rather, Benjamin 
sees that in “secularizing” his version of Jewish messianism (which is dialectically co-
determined alongside his Marxism) that he can advance a concept that contains the insights into 
memory, emergence, and indirect action described above and the critiques of idealism and 
utopianism briefly sketched here.
669
 Alongside these insights and critiques, it provided what 
Benjamin saw as the necessary theological underpinnings of historical materialism. These 
underpinnings are theological not in the sense of faith or a cosmological order but rather a Jewish 
hermeneutic theological practice which does not conflict with materialism in its naturalist 
accounts and indeed is necessary, in Benjamin’s view, for historical materialism to understand 
itself.  
Thus, in Benjamin’s messianic conception, the questions are of the emergence of the past 
not through direct action or cognitive insight, but rather indirectly, through changing the social 
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conditions via aesthetic-historical or historical-aesthetic interventions which, themselves, only 
negatively gesture at the messianic age and even in so doing merely serve to make “emergent 
consciousness” possible.  As Benjamin describes in both the “Theologico-Political Fragment” 
and “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” even Marxist politics itself should be seen, or 
perhaps should be refashioned, to reflect that even these politics do not bring about the messianic 
age. They merely serve to increase the possibility of social ‘receptivity’ for individual experience 
and experience of the past to be integrated (heterogeneously) into the experience of the now. 
Finally, although Benjamin’s theory remains “revolutionary,” (both in self-description and 
actuality) its revolutionary qualities are eschatologically distinct from the Christian apocalypse. 
This is one of the most crucial aspects of Benjamin’s thought that is missed in current 
discussions of Benjamin where he is read out of his specifically Jewish context, and read into 
specifically Christian contexts (particularly vis-à-vis Schmitt and contemporary left political 
theology), either openly, or through the invisibility of the Christian conceptual order that 
masquerades as the secular order. As Benjamin writes towards the end of his 1934 Kafka essay: 
They are distorted. The “cares of a family man,” which no one can identify, are distorted; the bug, 
which we know all too well represents Gregor Samsa, is distorted, the big animal, half-lamb, half-
kitten, for which “the butcher’s knife,” might be “release,” is distorted… The same symbol occurs 
in the folksong, “The Little Hunchback.” This little man is at home in distorted life; he will 
disappear with the coming of the Messiah, who (a great rabbi once said) will not wish to change 
the world by force but merely make a slight adjustment in it.
670
   
This “Little Hunchback,” “this little man,” is not the Zwerg [dwarf] whose figure Benjamin uses 
to describes theology in the present day in the “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Here 
instead of Zwerg, we have “Männlein,” literally “little man.”  While we have a slightly different 
fairy tale creature, they share, along with the rest of these creatures and situations, a “distortion.” 
Kafka’s aggadot do not reveal how the object will appear in the messianic age, but rather 
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describe the distortion that is not currently visible which marks the distinction between the 
messianic age and the present.
671
 Benjamin writes that this “little man” will “disappear.” This 
seems strange until we consider the song Benjamin is referencing in which the Männlein acts as 
an agent of injustice.
672
 Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that in some sense it is merely as 
distortion that this “little man” will “disappear.” But most importantly, here we receive, in 
Benjamin’s reading of Kafka, an image of what messianic revolution, messianic transformation, 
can be for Benjamin: “a slight adjustment” in the world. This slight adjustment (of which, even if 
slight, we still have no certain knowledge) removes the “distortions” which Kafka so intuitively 
expressed, simultaneously, as two foci on an ellipse, expressing the horizons of socio-historical 
injustice and naturalistic physical reduction.   
 Not only does this analysis provide a clearer understanding of Benjamin’s messianism 
and its specific Jewish and historical materialist dimensions but it also further grounds a textual 
explanation for Benjamin’s view of halachah as fundamentally different from aggadah in terms 
of potential for philosophical secularization. Halachah, for Benjamin, is the positive expression 
of a lost “Holy Writ,”673 and, as he approvingly notes of Kafka, “Kafka doesn’t dare attach to 
this study the promises which tradition has attached to the study of the Torah.”674 And yet, “the 
law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to justice,” and “the gate to justice is 
study.” 675 If there is halachah in Benjamin, it is emergent, perhaps only in the distant way that 
the messiah too is emergent, but in the aesthetic-historical and historical-aesthetic practices, we 
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may see its “distorted” image. This does not, however, change the fact that Benjamin’s 
“theology” was one of practice. As he wrote to Scholem on August 11, 1934, “Kafka’s messianic 
category is the ‘reversal’ or the ‘studying.’ You guess correctly that I do not want to shift the 
path taken by theological interpretation itself – I practice it myself…”676 
Secularizations 
Earlier I quoted Benjamin’s notion that “the danger” in seizing “hold of a memory” 
“affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers.” In Al-e Ahmad’s seizing of the Hajj 
or of Karbala, the “content of the tradition” is radically affected. The cosmological, supernatural 
truth claims, if you will, are transformed into critical conceptual categories. This is yet another 
form of the “secularization” of “theological concepts” that does not directly conform to 
Schmitt’s.677 But what is also crucial is that this “secularization,” unlike “secularization” in 
Schmitt’s sense or in the sense of most modernization theories, does not necessarily imply a 
sense of loss.
678
 This is an important overlapping dimension of Al-e Ahmad’s and Benjamin’s 
projects. In their respective dialectical theories of demystifying the material conditions of reality, 
both view the possibility that the material world grows richer in possible meaning even as they 
simultaneously acknowledge how the capacity for understanding transforms. Al-e Ahmad argues 
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in Dar Khedmat va Khiyanat-e Roshanfekran for a theory of secularization that is an almost 
point-for-point challenge to the singularity of Schmitt’s theory and also to the notion of loss that 
it conjures. First he argues that, “Shiism, in the beginning was a kind of intellectual movement in 
the time of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates which had emerged as imitators of Empire and 
Monarchy.”679 Al-e Ahmad defines the true intellectual in that text as “a questioner, a rejecter,” 
“a non-acceptor,”680 someone “with the intention of reform or change in the conditions of the 
time, and a view of his contemporary society, with the influence of the word.”681 Thus Al-e 
Ahmad argues, echoing yet simultaneously undermining Schmitt, that the originary “concept” is 
not the sovereignty of God but rather zandiq [heresy or atheism], accompanied by ertedad 
[apostasy].
682
 These remain in the transformation into modernity. But mojezeh [miracle], which 
never was real in the first place, is supplanted by kalam [the word], which for Al-e Ahmad is the 
creative interplay of language, literature, and hermeneutic theology all at once.
683
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In carrying out Al-e Ahmad’s propositions, cosmological or supernatural theology is a 
mystification, an illusion, that once dispelled, far from leaving the world bereft of meaning, 
leaves it open for a vast proliferation of meaning within dialectical tension. This is Benjamin’s 
Talmudic “forty nine levels of meaning,” or, Al-e Ahmad’s “skepticism,” that is also an 
“awakening.”684 Furthermore, the contrast between Al-e Ahmad and Schmitt helps illustrate 
Benjamin’s remarks that “the ‘state of emergency’” in which we live is not the exception but the 
rule… the current amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the 
twentieth century is not philosophical.”685 For Benjamin, history is a continuous “state of 
emergency,” and this is a flawed status. “Sovereign is he who decides the exception,” Schmitt 
famously argues.
686
 This is a descriptive statement in Schmitt but also a normative one; what is 
at stake in not recognizing the essential theological analogies is also capitulation to the 
“onslaught” that threatens to mar, disfigure, or dissipate this ultimately true and proper nature of 
things.
687
 In contrast, for Benjamin a “philosophical” understanding leads to the conclusion that 
justice demands that this order be challenged, but not on its own terms.  That is to say, not with a 
new, ahistorical, theological sovereignty (Christian quietism) or a new, ahistorical, theological 
anti-sovereignty (Christian apocalypticism) but with a new hermeneutically theological 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ahmad that he views as simple contradictions but which actually mark the sites of Al-e Ahmad’s most creative 
philosophical work. Wells assumes that good theoretical and philosophical work “dissipates tensions” and thus, that 
Al-e Ahmad’s approach is “theoretically dubious.” (Wells, 134) However, I still find this reading – both in its 
recognition and engagement with the facts on the page and in Al-e Ahmad’s life – Marxism, religious ambiguity, 
etc. far more interesting and productive than Boroujerdi’s one-note reduction and dismissal. 
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“conception of history” (Benjamin’s Judeo-Marxian “historical materialism”). It turns out that 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte [On the Concept of History] is actually about history.
688
 
Schmitt’s “political theology” views the transcendent cosmological order, even if its time 
has passed in terms of political reality, as fundamentally salutary. He wants an “omnipotent law 
giver,” who is “analogous” to “the omnipotent God.” In losing the transcendent medieval image 
of God, Schmitt thinks modern Europe has lost its way in terms of the proper order of “the 
political.” In contrast, Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad do not view this as a “loss” at all; it is, rather, 
emancipation. Thus, their versions of ‘secularization’ are relevant to “secularization” in Schmitt 
only in recognizing the possibility of the movement of “theological” “concepts.” Benjamin’s 
critique of theodicy in The Origins of German Tragic Drama and Al-e Ahmad’s critique of the 
concept of faith in Islam in Khassi dar Miqat, “historical materialism” frees both thinkers from 
theodical faith in a transcendent God and faith against the evidence of the senses; i.e. it frees 
them theoretically from Christianity.  
“God” can appear negatively, in kaleidoscopic ways: for example, in the reframing of the 
farr in terms of the illegitimacy and incomplete nature of sovereignty or of the Ayatollah as as 
the “Signs of God,”instead of a cleric, i.e. the possible meaning produced in dialectic tension.689 
In Benjamin, we have observed this tension in the principle that, in the face of the limitations of 
human epistemology, we are obligated to be “loyal” to the world of objects; that through that 
“loyalty”  “we are endowed with a weak messianic power”; and that “the past carries with a 
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temporal index by which it is referred to redemption.”690 These concepts do not fall within 
Schmitt’s debate with Blumenberg; they are not about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of “the 
Modern Age.” This is about the illegitimacy of a social order691 within modernity. This is about 
recognizing, through modernist critique, that there are indeed “secularized theological concepts” 
that constitute unexamined aspects of the modern condition (which is, as I argued in chapter 1, 
an uneven shifting geometry) and, specifically, which undergird the Hegelian (both of Hegel and 
Hegel-like) assumption that modernity is quintessentially fixed as a justification of the present 
status quo either in terms of the present order (as Schmitt does) or in terms of a necessary future 
(as Hegel and Marx do). This is about recognizing that other “secularized theological concepts” 
should be advanced as part of the project of modernity, not simply to make it more ‘complete’ 
but to make it more ‘true’ to its own theoretical underpinnings, to be better materialists, to be 
better moderns. Both Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad want to further modernize modernity while 
recognizing that there can never be a fully modern modernity without elements of something 
which modernity would cast as “religious.” For Schmitt, the true Christian cosmology is 
reflected in a realizable (and, in his works from 1933-1936, in some sense realized) true, 
legitimate, and justified juridico-political order. He reads “miracle” as analogous to an 
“exception in jurisprudence.”692 On the contrary, emancipated from such a cosmology, Al-e 
Ahmad and Benjamin read “miracle”693 as a different kind of exception to that very order. This 
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difference is not only that instead of proving the order, it challenges its legitimacy and necessity, 
but also in that in both thinkers the challenge is expressed as and in the expansion of the 
possibilities of meaning in aesthetics and epistemology.  
Comparative Philosophy and the Uneven, Shifting Geometry of Modernity 
Throughout this dissertation, I have presented analyses of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin which 
demonstrate that a comparative reading of their philosophies helps us better understand 
underexplored or underemphasized aspects of each thinker, as well as providing a foundation for 
new philosophical perspectives apart from many prevailing contemporary schools. This 
comparison has certainly not been exhaustive and has focused on particular questions and issues 
in their respective Shia-Marxian and Judeo-Marxian projects; the questions of aesthetic 
perception and consciousness; the question of materialism and epistemological limitation; the 
question of memory and history; the question of messianism and anti-utopianism, and so forth. 
However, as we have seen, there are key areas of shared interests, nuanced differences in their 
positions, areas of mere overlap, and views of nearly diametric opposition. As I have indicated, I 
do not view the projects as ‘the same,’ nor do I claim that if pushed in certain directions they 
would eventually converge on a single vanishing point. My point is not to collapse the thinkers 
into each other or to draw a false equivalence. While both authors have a large corpus of work – 
particularly if you take into account Al-e Ahmad’s fictional works, which I have left largely 
unaddressed here – Benjamin’s is far more staggering not only in size but in its more nuanced, 
sophisticated, and expansive engagement, especially, with materialist aesthetics and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rhyme, supple and resistant enough to adapt to the lyrical stirrings of the soul, the undulations of reverie, and the 
sudden leaps of consciousness. This obsessive ideal is born, above all, from the experience of giant cities, from their 
intersecting myriad relations.” (Benjamin, Selected Writings Vol.4, 320) “Miracle” also appears – directly, not by 





epistemology. Additionally, Benjamin, despite his many idiosyncrasies that have plagued his 
commentators, translators, and interpreters over the years, wrote in a language steeped in the 
concepts and traditions of classical and early modern philosophy in general and German 
Idealism, Romanticism, and Marxism in particular. While Al-e Ahmad certainly demonstrates 
familiarity with many branches of ‘Western’ philosophy, it requires, as I have noted, a certain 
form of disciplinary ‘translation’ to present his ideas in a recognizable philosophical idiom. 
That said, Al-e Ahmad has several philosophical intuitions and insights of which 
Benjamin seems to have been incapable; furthermore, as I will now demonstrate, there are some 
aspects of the overall structure of Al-e Ahmad’s philosophical system that I find more inherently 
justifiable or perhaps simply reasonable than the equivalent aspects in Benjamin. This, I think, is 
particularly visible in four areas: (1) Al-e Ahmad’s concept of the Mahdi as a historical index of 
possible meaning and Benjamin’s insistence that the messianic must be present in some 
“distorted” form in every object; (2) ironically for the prevailing readings of Benjamin today, Al-
e Ahmad not only has a more novel and practicable theory of sovereignty than does Benjamin 
but he also has a more thorough engagement with and critique of actual politics and the state; (3) 
the concept, properly understood, of gharbzadegi itself;
694
 and (4) what I have described here as 
Al-e Ahmad’s theory of critical ritual practice which I regard as potentially Al-e Ahmad’s most 
important contribution to universalistic philosophy. I have presented this comparison through 
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textual analysis and intellectual history while attending simultaneously to issues in philosophical 
inquiry – both in the authors’ eras and our own – and to socio-historical and occasionally even 
biographical context for trying both to understand the authors’ positions in terms of themselves 
and in terms of resonances, overlaps, differences, and disagreements between the two. However, 
I would like to introduce now, in a necessarily abbreviated fashion, socio-historical conditions 
which I did not already address in chapter 1 or in my readings of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin that 
are nonetheless crucial for understanding their divergences.  
 The central issue is that of distance and closeness, both in a literal geographic sense and 
also in figurative imagination.  Benjamin can view the Arcades, even in their ruined form, as 
something he can experience firsthand, pass through, identify with (even through such an 
alienating figure as Baudelaire), and still critique in terms of the “ur-phenomena” of consumer 
culture. Al-e Ahmad reiterates again and again that the sources of the “image” of modernity are 
particularly to be found in public advertising and the press (magazines, newspapers), “like the 
display cases of large shops selling fancy goods, and like every other simulation with which in 
the name of western civilization we give a transient and false varnish to our lives.”695 Al-e 
Ahmad understands that these images are not modernity; Iran and its current condition are 
necessitated as part of modernity. Benjamin can critique the Arcades as a “dream house,” but Al-
e Ahmad critiques the magazine as “dreams” from someone else’s “house.” Indeed, even the 
concept and image of the traditional is sent back from a distance. That the “images” of modernity 
can be so obviously external and yet the condition so obviously global is  central to the 
simultaneity of the universalistic and particular in gharbzadegi (even responsibility is bifurcated, 
as in the quotation above) and even in Al-e Ahmad’s realization that even the local and 
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seemingly familiar can be utterly ‘foreign’ in the sense of being unknown as he discusses at the 
end of Khassi dar Miqat; and that, in turn, the question of center and periphery while an 
economic reality, need not be a philosophical one.  
At the same time, this understanding of ‘distance’ almost certainly contributed to some of 
Al-e Ahmad’s propensities to slip away from his own nuances and reify, even fetishize both 
West and Difference from West. In contrast, Benjamin’s closeness may have made it difficult to 
think beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe, but it also made his insights into the 
European experience of modernity – and the role of the non-European within it – far more 
probing into the self-imagination of the supposedly universal modern. As he would once write to 
Scholem, “Something else must be expressed just as conditionally: the question of surroundings. 
Where is my productive base? It is – and I have not the slightest illusions about this – in Berlin 
W. WW, if you will. The most advanced civilization and the most ‘modern’ culture not only are 
part of my private comforts but are in part simply the means of my production.”696 Benjamin 
may hold to the imaginative geography of the center, but he understands that his entire critique 
of modernity is tied to this very position. More specifically, writing in response to yet another of 
Scholem’s attempts to get Benjamin to join the Zionist project in Palestine, Benjamin 
understands that his critical project is tied to the question of being a Jew in Berlin, to being, as he 
would write elsewhere of Kafka (who was actually of course Czech) “both German and Jewish.” 
Benjamin is also recognizing that the other resources – intellectual and simply monetary – 
necessary for his project were in Europe. 
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In this comparative reading of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin, I have also maintained the goal of 
presenting at least the broad contours of a synthetic move. This synthesis does not negate the 
independence of trajectories of the thinkers on their own; the two thinkers are, addressed 
immanently, quite possibly incommensurable. But I would like to indicate the philosophy they 
can be seen to suggest. It would require another volume to fully argue this “image,” to use a 
popular word in the Al-e Ahmad’s and Benjamin’s shared lexicon, in terms of systematic 
philosophy. Having examined the intellectual historical foundations, socio-cultural conditions, 
and specific textual arguments that underlie the comparison, I believe I have established the 
justification for a discussion of the “family resemblance” of the two philosophies beyond the 
grounds of mere semblance.
697
  Indeed, the question at hand in the synthetic move is not that of 
semblance, as I have already established the grounds for meaningful comparison through 
philosophical interpolation at the key points I have identified.  The synthetic move instead 
provokes the question: what is this “family”? What are its characteristics?   
In addressing this question, I present a short argument that appears narratological; this 
should be understood as a limitation of the systematic philosophical presentation itself. Much of 
what I describe here should be understood in terms of simultaneity and furthermore – especially 
considering the authors in question – as in and having history. It is a trick of the presentation that 
history appears to enter in the middle and that there appears a transcendent subject only to be 
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done away with. I also want to underscore the fact that this sketch is not necessarily “true,” but 
rather the kind of philosophical arguments we would have to take seriously if we address some 





















A Generalized Presentation of the Philosophical Conception of a “Religion of Doubt” 
I am addressing a broadly Marxian
698
 discourse that views orthodox Marxism as a failed 
project. This failure is examined by both Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad in several key areas, nearly 
all of which are predicated on the problem of universalism and particularity within a Marxian 
framework. First, a critical under-examination, mischaracterization, or ignorance of the primacy 
of aesthetic thought and experience. This should be understood, as Buck-Morss suggests (via 
Eagleton) when discussing Benjamin, as closer to the original Greek αἰσθητικός  [aisthetikos, 
aesthetics], which already contains within it a connection between sense perception, 
embodiment, and consciousness. Marxism (and other modernist discourses) has inherited a 
Christian-Platonic transcendent subject and a Christian-Platonic epistemology. In turn, what I 
propose through the synthesis of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin’s thought (as comparatively 
discussed in this dissertation) is a theory of immanent, culturally, historically, and even 
biologically limited embodied subjects and a concomitant recognition of universalistic human 
epistemological limitations. This theory already presupposes within it two seemingly 
contradictory impulses: (1) the necessity of counter-posing alternatives from within subjectively 
limited positions and (2) the continued necessity of universalism as the connective discourse that 
is dialectically interdependent on the already global condition of modernity.  There should be a 
contingent, fluid, but ultimately insurmountable dialectical tension between the universalistic 
(understood as a discursive space where unmoored subjective concepts might be disputed, 
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exchanged, or tested) and the indissoluble particular, although neither should be viewed as fixed 
points. The instantiation of the universal as a socio-historical condition must be viewed in one of 
two ways: (a) indirectly emergent or (b) impossible. In the case of (a), unlike in Hegel or Marx, 
the reconciliation would have to account for a somehow genuinely heterogeneous condition, in 
which, however, contradictions that would result in continued history would be resolved, i.e. in 
fact, it would be transhistorical, outside or beyond history.
699
 In the case of (b), the impossibility 
is recognized because of the inconceivable nature of the conditions required to achieve (a).  
Perhaps even more centrally, given the primacy of aesthetic experience and thought and the 
recognized fact of human epistemological limitation, a very peculiar view of the phenomenal 
world is suggested: there is a mere physicalist (or biological) image of the world which is a 
reliable, powerful, but necessarily limited account. Though there are these epistemic limits in the 
physicalist image of the world (the scientifically verifiable
700
 and the completely irrational), 
given human epistemological limitations, there is a potentially infinite variety of meaning 
interpretable from or even in the phenomena themselves. This derives not only from the 
multiplicity of subjectivities discussed above but recognizing that, for example, potentially 
contradictory propositions arrived at through deductive and inductive reason can only be 
adjudicated positively, that is they can only be adjudicated when they make claims immediately 
in contradiction to verifiable, scientific claims or in contradiction to a series of conditions 
described below. But ultimately the irreducibility of potential description and meaning in 
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phenomena produces a model for justice: that which preserves the multiple possibilities of 
meaning is just. This epistemic definition of justice can be amplified into a moral-political 
definition of justice (individual practices and the establishment of political-social institutions that 
encourage the flourishing of multiple subjectivities, i.e. multiple sense-perceiving-bodies). It 
should be noted that in the potentially infinite range of meaning between these limits exists a 
wide-variety of claims of minimal moral realism, notions of inherent meaning, and even 
messianic possibility amongst many others. This sub-range should be understood as the range of 
the non-rational.
701
 Within such a system, without adjudicating for the singularity of any of these 
possibilities, to merely observe their possibility is to command respect for that possibility. This 
provokes a loyalty or meaningful stance towards objects (and in particular sense-perceiving-
bodies).  
However, as important to this sense of justice is the critique of illusory phenomena; this 
must be understood both in the traditional scientific sense of demonstrating that the initially 
apparent can be deceptively untrue, as well as the Marxian sense that exposes obfuscated 
historical socio-economic relations that connect objects in the modern world as well as the 
discursive language in which subjects can speak about those relations. Hence, the particular 
interest in the problem of phantasmagoria, commodity fetishism, and false consciousness. But, 
echoing where I began this synthetic description, the necessity of a rigorous iconoclasm towards 
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mystified conditions and of traditional Marxian economic critique is predicated on the 
proposition that as part of alienation from self, or perhaps more boldly, as a better understanding 
of alienation from self, is bodily alienation, the numbing, blunting, dismemberment, or 
narcotizing of the senses and therein the possibility for consciousness. Indeed, especially without 
the mechanically deterministic version of Marxist history which I will come to shortly, this 
concern becomes the prime mover of the project itself.  
Neither the critique of the historically and culturally specific characteristics of Marxist 
discourse specifically and all modernist discourse more broadly nor the presentation of 
alternative particularistic concepts, viewpoints, and practices is predicated on identitarian 
grounds. Here, even while being so purposefully general, I can be quite specific. The critique of 
Christianity is not because it is particularistic but because those aspects of it which have been 
taken into Marxism through Hegel – and which are readily apparent in most modern systems of 
thought – are adjudicated as limiting potential meaning without good cause. Furthermore, the 
particular concepts generally in question (faith, theodicy, the transcendental subject, the 
existence of a contemporaneous other-world, and telelogical progress) are viewed as (a) 
instrumental in the actual failure of the Marxist project and other modernist projects and (b) as 
purely obfuscating concepts. The dialectical relationship between the universal and the particular 
is most evident here in that qualities of concepts thus critiqued are reflexively critiqued within 
the particular Weltanschauung on the basis of those qualities, so that truly alternative 
propositions from particularistic spaces may be proposed for universalistic discourse. However, 
this is not merely the globalization of Hegelian reconciliation; there are a wide variety of 
differences that are irreconcilable in the Hegelian sense. They are only reconcilable in the 





historically bound universalistic discourse (not the instantiation of the universal), new 
particularistic concepts are advanced without ontological exclusivity, i.e. not as mystified 
imperceptible concepts dependent on a particular internal set of unknowable qualities, but as 
subject to the same dialectical process.  
Before I list all of the key ways in which this alters Marxian theory, it must be noted that 
even this irreconcilable dialectical process is not considered as directly contributing to the 
instantiation (if possible) of the universal as a socio-transhistorical condition.
702
 In a “religion of 
doubt,” the positive proposition of definite qualities of the instantiation of the universal as a 
socio-transhistorical condition (the “messianic condition” from here on) would be to propose the 
very kind of transcendent principle that prevents the emergence (if possible) of just such a 
condition. At best the activities associated with the irreconcilable dialectic process must be 
understood as perpendicular to the undefined emergent vector of the “messianic condition”; that 
is, these activities all operate to transform socio-historical conditions in present time that 
facilitate greater aesthetic perception and consciousness, in addition to promoting conditions in 
present time that expand possibility for meaningful speculation, scientific inquiry, and aesthetic-
historical/historical-aesthetic production. On grounds of the critique of utopianism, the critique 
of theodicy, and, above all, the critique of faith (against the evidence of the senses), the qualities 
and conditions of the “messianic condition” are not even inarticulable but the questions 
concerning it are necessarily completely unknown, as all sense-perceiving-bodies are historically 
circumscribed agents and the “messianic condition” is a transhistorical condition (if possible at 
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all). Marxist thought is critiqued on the following additional grounds: it takes over from 
Hegelian Idealism the theory of historical progress and, even while claiming anti-utopianism on 
its scientific basis, posits a historical utopia based on a transcendental subject actualizing itself 
universally in history. Furthermore, all of these factors produce, in different ways, theodicy, 
which is rejected in the loyalty discussed earlier. Thus, Marxist historiography is challenged with 
different potential ways of understanding time and history (as the representation of time). 
Additionally, its theory of politics (and understanding of the bourgeois state) are also challenged. 
The vector of Marxian politics must be understood as described above: perpendicular to the 
emergent “messianic condition,” not as leading toward it. Further, the content of that politics 
must be defined in relation to the present needs of sense-perceiving-bodies, in concrete economic 
terms, and in relation to the conditions for expanded possibility of consciousness discussed 
above.  
What, then, remains in a “religion of doubt” that is distinctly Marxian? First, “historical 
materialism,” which always allowed for a dimension beyond the reductively naturalistic within a 
still materialist framework, is preserved. In the critique of Christianity – as described above – the 
necessarily supernatural is explicitly rejected. In this sense, the philosophy is naturalist; it 
simply insists, in embracing its more modest epistemology, that there is more to the natural 
world than that which can be described by the natural sciences. Furthermore, despite challenging 
the Marxist concept of the progress of history, the philosophy embraces the Marxian notion that 
economic and social conditions as well as the concepts that describe them are historically 
conditioned; indeed, it wants to view phenomena themselves as having both mere natural and 
historical accretion in addition to potential speculative meaning. The critique of the unexamined 





thorough historical materialist critique. Similarly, its subsequent turn to the re-evaluation of 
previously conceived peripheral or minor cultural practices and concepts, particularly those 
dismissed on grounds of an ahistorical and unexamined concept of “religion,” is predicated on 
the reexamination of potentialities in said practices and concepts and, especially, in consideration 
of the possibility for further materialist commitment in exploring practices that reinforce the a 
non-dualistic, fully embodied account of subjects.  Finally, in the dialectical engagement with 
existing material conditions – including and especially considered in light of the discussion of 
αἰσθητικός – there remains the necessity of understanding the project as one of emancipation 
which must contend with, in addition to historical-material conditions as elaborated here,  
discordance between ontologically exclusive but inaccurate conceptions of reality, i.e. some 
notion of false consciousness. However, this emancipation must be reconsidered within the 
strictly indirect (in telos and in technique) conditions discussed above and this false 
consciousness must contend not with adherence to the stricture of the necessarily incomplete 
system of the “religion of doubt” as a pseudo-totality, but rather with synthetic conscious 
frameworks which are either (a) dependent on the inflating the truth value of a merely physicalist 
account, i.e. a scientistic account;
703
 (b) adhere to an explicitly irrational account, e.g. faith (as 
defined as belief against the evidence of the senses); (c) or the privileging of a specific non-
rational account which acts against the perpendicular conditions for the possibilities of 
perpendicular emancipation (on the aesthetic or socio-historical level discussed above), e.g. 
subjectivism, radical skepticism, anti-realism, etc.  
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The last quality I wish to elaborate in a generalized presentation of a “religion of doubt” 
is this necessary embrace of some set of practices – that are externally conditioned704 – and have 
no rational or irrational premise to (a) reinforce the historically, organically, and culturally 
embodied situation of a theorist within the philosophical system; (b) to perform, via the non-
rational, the general limitations of human epistemology and therein, through performance, 
reproduce that understanding; and (c) in doing so, engender the elusive capacity for dialectical 
self-critique.   
Hermeneutic Capture and Some Interventions Identified 
The preceding description does not fully capture either Al-e Ahmad or Benjamin’s thought, nor 
is it intended to do so. In fact, many of their most provocative insights, propositions, and 
concepts – as I have been describing them throughout this dissertation – seem only partially 
represented or, in some cases, potentially omitted. But this is a potential and not a necessary 
omission, which is a function of the attempt at presenting this theory as a generalized synthetic 
description. What justifies even this potential hermeneutic violence? Firstly, I do not intend for  
the reader to ignore the specific positions argued by Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin or raised in 
critical comparison between Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin that I have been discussing hereto; any 
number of positions (Benjamin’s messianic conception of history, Al-e Ahmad’s gharbzadegi, 
Benjamin’s hermeneutic stance towards objects, what I have called Al-e Ahmad’s ‘theory of 
critical ritual action’, etc.) are worthy of philosophical consideration beyond such a 
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 Secondly, the framework is deliberately noted as incomplete. This 
“incompleteness”706 is a necessary property of the ‘system’ in its own terms: it allows for a 
potentially infinite range of speculative philosophy and the broadest possible range of 
‘variables,’ if you will, that can radically alter or shift the framework without losing (or without 
losing for good reason) the basic focal precepts of the framework as described above. Thus, I am 
not merely making the case that Benjamin and Al-e Ahmad offer challenging arguments which 
philosophers should contend with but that they suggest, at least as broadly and rudimentarily 
sketched here, a new framework for thinking about philosophy.  
Obviously, having drawn the framework from my comparison of Al-e Ahmad and 
Benjamin I find a “religion of doubt” a particularly suitable framework for capturing what I 
propose are many of their most salient contributions to philosophy. Indeed, I believe there are 
several necessary interventions that can be drawn from the “religion of doubt” framework that 
arises from my comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin’s respective projects. Put into terms of 
contemporary philosophical debates, several of these interventions can be described as 
suggesting the possibility for: (a) providing a framework for where post-structuralist speculation 
and hermeneutics can be understood as complimentary and synergistic with rigorous scientific 
inquiry; (b) demonstrating the error in both materialist and moral terms of strict philosophical 
naturalism; (c) providing a cautious and rational framework for the reevaluation of concepts and 
practices that have been dismissed on spurious theoretical or ontological grounds without 
reverting into extolling the irrational; (d) demanding an engagement with philosophy as 
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embodied practice by individuals or groups that have circumscribed cultural, biological, and 
historical frames; (e) demonstrating how a de-centered and de-centering philosophy without any 
notion of a fixed or singular subject at its center can still speak in a universal register; and (f) 
suggesting how all the activities discussed in (a)-(e) can be performed within a broadly moral 
framework while retaining self-guided autonomy.
707
 
Epilogue: Is this Religion? 
It is helpful to recall Edward Said’s definition of “theological criticism” and “religion” as 
“shutting off human investigation,” “deference to the authority of the more-than-human, the 
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(A&H, DoE, 146) Christianity is the religion which creates the category of religion, specifically as “a special sphere 
of culture” that must be overturned. This move in many ways – at least in this part of the book – is the crucial 
foundation for the victory of Reason’s Myth over reason itself. However, even with all that said, Adorno and 
Horkheimer propose on the very next page that Christian thinkers like Pascal, Lessing, Kierkegaard, and Barth had 
all come to some level of realization of this and were thus “not only the radical Christians but the tolerant ones.” 
However, as I noted, Adorno and Horkheimer never themselves come to a proposition about how to dialectically 
reexamine what has been overcome as myth. If we use the framework of the “religion of doubt,” however, we can 
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even look like, although it is worthwhile to note how much of Judaism and even more so of Shiism is explicitly 





supernatural, the other-worldly.”708 If this is the definition of religion, then what I have 
demonstrated in my readings of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin, their comparison, and my 
subsequent theorization of a unique philosophical framework and trajectory that emerges from 
that comparison is emphatically not religion. Both authors’ theories are about opening up human 
investigation and removing deference to supernatural, other-worldly (and perhaps more 
primarily, illegitimate worldly) authority. In such light, by calling their projects “religions of 
doubt,” I have fundamentally misidentified their projects, individually, comparatively, and 
synthetically; they are forms of philosophy, plain and simple.  
Furthermore, as I argued at the end of chapter 1, the current theoretical critiques of 
“religion” as a category suggest the dissolution of this category altogether, alongside the 
rejection of the universal in general. In this sense, then, I have also fundamentally misidentified 
the projects of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin as “religious” when I should have rather reasserted 
their incommensurate particularity as resistance to discursive universalism. And yet, this critique 
of “religion”709 is inadequate to the project at hand in several ways. While it successfully 
identifies the Christian identity that is obfuscated, historically and theoretically, in theories of 
“secularism,” it does not adequately address the Christianity of the category of “religion” itself. 
It is, put bluntly, a half-critique. In suggesting the dissolution of the category of “religion,” I 
have argued that this critique of “religion” not only reproduces an even more obfuscated 
Christianity as the static, ahistorical norm for understanding those discourses that have come to 
be called “religions” but furthermore, in trying to ‘provincialize’ Christianity, it actually forever 
‘provincializes’ “religions.” This, to me, seems to simply reproduce the original problem in an 
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even more exacerbated form. Furthermore, it fails to account for precisely the kind of 
philosophies that Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin propose.  
As I have demonstrated, these philosophies clearly recognize that part of the failure of the 
utopian projects of modernity (particularly Marxism) is their obfuscated Christian dimensions. 
However, Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin produce philosophies that not only identify the hidden 
Christian dimensions in supposedly universalistic thought but, in actually critiquing these 
dimensions, they critically negate those particular elements of Christianity in universalistic 
thought that they view as philosophically untenable and historically catastrophic. In these 
critiques, Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin advance specific elements from within Shiism and Judaism, 
respectively, which they view as possible correctives to these particular philosophically 
untenable and historically catastrophic dimensions. They do so not on grounds of ontological 
exclusivity but on grounds of epistemological proposition. To understand these critiques requires 
philosophically addressing a wide array of concepts and practices that are dismissed, on 
ontological grounds, as religion, but may have nothing to do with the Christian category of 
religion that justifies that dismissal. Here, then, we see the first ground of what I call religion as 
polemic: both Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin draw on traditions which do not comport themselves to 
the definition of “religion” as conjured by Christian-modernity and furthermore are not based on 
concepts and practices that are marked, as Adorno suggests, as ‘intellectually suspicious’ on 
grounds of association not argumentation. The entire discursive sets of practices, concepts, 
stances, etc. that have been deemed irrelevant by the category of “religion” can only be 
recovered for reconsideration through dialectical engagement with that category. Indeed, carried 
out to its logical conclusion the post-structuralist dissolution impulse (both towards “religion” 





discussed here – as philosophically irrelevant on the grounds of their dialectical modernism. 
Religion as polemic in this sense is another critique of religion.     
But this is not the only failure of the post-structuralist critique of “religion”; it also fails 
to account for changing historical conditions, particularly in relation to philosophy.
710
 That is to 
say, it fails to take into account the rise of what I have been calling strict philosophical 
naturalism throughout this dissertation.
711
 Akeel Bilgrami provides a helpfully succinct 
definition: “My talk of naturalism and naturalist here and throughout the book is intended only to 
mark out a doctrine and a philosopher who thinks that all the facts or properties there are, are the 
facts that are countenanced by the natural sciences.”712 In his preface, Bilgrami provides both an 
expansion of the stakes and an acknowledgment of the prevalence of the position: 
These are the themes of agency and the first person point of view, the irreducible nature of value, 
the irreducible nature of intentionality, and the special character of self-knowledge. All of these 
themes might and often have been presented as problems in philosophy; sometimes, if one is given 
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The list of “problems” to be either “solved” through the natural sciences (i.e. decided or reduced) 
or “removed” extends to norms, qualia, minds, and even consciousness itself.  Even to affirm the 
potential irreducibility of aspects of phenomena, is, in some sense for the strict philosophical 
naturalist, to acknowledge the supernatural. There is no question then, in a philosophy which is 
strictly naturalistic in this sense, that if I ask again whether or not the philosophies of Al-e 
Ahmad and Benjamin should be presented as religions, the answer would be: yes. It is here that 
we can begin to understand religion as polemic as a historical intervention.
714
 
If, in its seemingly unexamined circularity, the conception of strict philosophical 
naturalism seems to beg the question, that is because it does. Openly so. As Daniel Dennett, one 
of the most prominent proponents of strict philosophical naturalism puts it: 
I begin, then, with a tactical choice. I declare my starting point to be the objective, materialistic, 
third-person world of the physical sciences. This is the orthodox choice today in the English-
speaking philosophical world, but it has its detractors, most notably Nagel who has devoted a 
book, The View from Nowhere (1986), to deploring the effects of this tactical choice… Nagel is 
the most eloquent contemporary defender of the mysteries.
715
 
As Dennett continues, “Since Nagel and I start from different perspectives, his arguments begs 
the question against a position like mine, what counts for him as flat obvious, and in no need of 
further support often fails to impress me… the feeling then is mutual, we beg the question 
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against each other.”716 Indeed, Dennett even helpfully identifies (although unhelpfully truncates) 
a passage in Nagel’s The View from Nowhere that presents Nagel’s opposing view: 
The limit of objectivity with which I shall be concerned is one that follows directly from the 
process of gradual detachment by which objectivity is achieved. An objective standpoint is created 
by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human perspective behind; but there are 
things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from a 
maximally objective standpoint, however much it may extend our understanding beyond the point 
from which we started. A great deal is essentially connected to a particular point of view, of type 
of point of view, and the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms 
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright denial that 
certain patently real phenomena exist at all.
717
 
These positions clearly do “beg the question against each other.” Nagel presupposes that as “an 
objective standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human 
perspective behind,” there will be, “things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be 
adequately understood.” And, unsurprisingly, his philosophy encourages this position. Precisely 
in reverse, Dennett presupposes that, “the best way to come to understand the situation,” is to 
start “from the third-person, materialistic perspective of contemporary science”718 and, equally 
unsurprisingly, his philosophy ends up encouraging this very position.  
 My point is certainly not to endorse Nagel’s position over Dennett’s. It fails on many of 
the grounds that I identified as salutary in my comparison of Al-e Ahmad and Benjamin.
719
 But, 
rather, it is to see how Dennett, even though he knows he is question-begging, justifies this 
approach as so absolutely and exclusively “best.” In The Intentional Stance, Dennett’s key claim 
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towards this justification is a “certain predictive strategy,”720 that is to say, he wishes for his 
philosophy to produce outcomes that will be measured by how well they predict future behavior. 
In order to achieve this kind of outcome he suggests one adopt a series of “stances.” The most 
obvious, to Dennett, is the “physical stance; if you want to predict the behavior of a system 
down, determine its physical constitution (perhaps all the way down to the microphysical level) 
and the physical nature of the impingements upon it, and use your knowledge of the laws of 
physic to predict the outcome for any input.”721 Dennett notes, however, that this “strategy is not 
always practically available,” and that sometimes “it is more effective to switch from the 
physical stance to what I call the design stance.”722 The “design stance” is appropriate for an 
object where “the assumption that it has a certain design” can be made and “predicts that,” this 
object “will behave as it is designed to behave under various circumstances.”723 Dennett has in 
mind “not just artifacts but also many biological objects (plants and animals, kidneys and hearts, 
stamens and pistils),” because they “behave in ways that can be predicted from the design 
stance.”724 Of course, sometimes, as with the physical stance, “even the design stance is 
practically inaccessible, and then there is yet another stance of strategy one can adopt: the 
intentional stance.” This is how Dennett describes the “intentional stance”: 
                                                          
720
 Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 15. 
721
 Ibid., 16. 
722
 Ibid. In this same section, Dennett adds parenthetically, “I ignore the minor complications raised by the 
subatomic indeterminacies of quantum mechanics.” Dennett does not ignore these “minor complications” because of 
Heisenberg and Bohr’s so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” which holds that quantum mechanics, for Bohr, at the 
very least poses a serious limitation on theories of causality in physics or, for Heisenberg, more poetically, “it 
[quantum mechanics] introduced something in between possibility and reality.”(Selleri, Quantum Paradoxes and 
Physical Reality, 20-21) While this would seem to be a challenge to some versions of strict philosophical naturalism, 
it actually aids Dennett’s particular iteration which is based primarily on evolutionary biology. (Dennett, Freedom 
Evolves, 38-39) There can be sectarianism even in strict philosophical naturalism.  
723
 Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 17. 
724





Here is how it [the intentional stance] works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is 
to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, 
given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on 
the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals 
in the light of its beliefs. 
725
 
One of the reasons this presentation of Dennett’s view is so fascinating is that the “intentional 
stance,” at first glance, appears remarkably similar to Al-e Ahmad’s vacillations in Khassi dar 
Miqat and Benjamin’s “stance of the materialist,” which “seems scientifically and humanely 
more productive in everything that moves us.”726 Indeed, the entirety of Khassi dar Miqat could, 
in some sense, read as this kind of thought experiment. Benjamin writes in “On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire”: “Experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response characteristic of 
human relationships is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate objects… 
To experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at 
us.”727  
However, in Khassi dar Miqat, this notion of an “intentional stance”  would have to be 
called a “meaningful stance” or, closer to Al-e Ahmad’s terminology, a meaningful “situation” 
[تیعقوم] describing the fullest range of meanings that are possible between an exclamation like 
“this assembly must have some [higher] meaning!”728 and the mere physicality of “molded 
reinforced concrete structures.”729 In Benjamin’s 1931 letter to Rychner this notion of an 
“intentional stance” would have to be understood as the “stance of the materialist” which not 
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only “seems scientifically and humanely more productive in everything that moves us,”730 but 
also understands a methodology in “research,” which is “in accord with the Talmudic teaching 
about the forty-nine levels of meaning in every passage of Torah.”731 This too would be, for lack 
of a better phrase, a “meaningful stance.” As I have argued, neither Al-e Ahmad nor Benjamin 
viewed these positions as necessarily supernatural. However, the question raised by apparent 
similarity between the view I have synthetically described as a “religion of doubt” and Dennett’s 
“intentional stance” is whether Dennett’s theoretical imbuing of “intentionality” is truly any 
more justifiably naturalistic than the theoretical imbuing of possible “meaningfulness” in a 
“religion of doubt.” In answering this question, I can explain how Dennett justifies his question 
begging vis-à-vis Nagel and identify the final grounds for my argument of religion as polemic. 
The crucial distinction is to be found between Dennett’s premises and arguments for the 
“intentional stance” and Benjamin’s premises and arguments for his claim in “On Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire,” quoted above, as, even more so than the vacillation in Khassi dar Miqat and 
Benjamin’s 1931 letter to Rychner, this passage seems to mirror Dennett’s in proposing “to 
invest” both “humans and inanimate objects” with a capacity like intentionality.  
The Intentional Stance and the Astrological Stance 
 In Dennett’s argument, there is a prior “strategy” before the physical, design, and 
intentional stances in Dennett’s argument. Dennett proposes it as a negative example but it 
actually provides him with crucial insight. He calls this strategy “the astrological strategy,” 
which he explains as follows: 
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Here is a strategy for instance, for predicting the future behavior of a person: determine the date 
and hour of the person’s birth and then feed this modest datum into one or another astrological 
algorithm for generating predictions of the person’s prospects. This strategy is deplorably 
popular. Its popularity is deplorable because we have such good reasons for believing that it does 
not work (pace Feyerabend 1978.)
732
 
The “astrological strategy” fails because it does not accurately and consistently predict “the 
future behavior of a person.”733  As Dennett points out, “when astrological predictions come true 
this is sheer luck, or the result of such vagueness or ambiguity in the prophecy that almost any 
eventuality can be constructed to confirm it.”734 One would expect from this vaguely Popperian 
argument that Dennett would, like Popper, reject astrology wholesale.
735
 However, Popper’s 
philosophy of science is much too narrow for the argument Dennett is making.
736
 While 
Dennett’s original criterion of prediction is drawn from the natural sciences, he needs a much 
stronger philosophical instrument to make the case that the natural sciences should define the 
limits of philosophical inquiry. He finds this, I argue, in astrology: 
But suppose the astrological strategy did in fact work well on some people. We would call those 
people astrological systems – systems whose behavior was, as a matter of fact, predictable by the 
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astrological strategy. If there were such people, such astrological systems, we would be more 
interested than most of us in fact are in how the astrological strategy works – that is, we would be 
interested in the rules, principles, or methods of astrology.
737
  
Dennett contends that “the astrological strategy is interesting only as a social curiosity.”738 But 
he is neglecting the serious work that his section on astrology does and what he gains from it.  
 First, it confirms the “predictive strategy” as the measure of success in any given strategy 
or stance. Indeed, through his descriptions of the “not always practically available” predictive 
capacities in the physical and design stances, Dennett acknowledges how controversial it would 
be to claim predictive capacity as the sole measure of success in any one of these stances.
739
 Yet, 
the “astrological strategy” allows Dennett to smuggle the “predictive strategy” as the “only 
assessment of success of that strategy” from his assumptions into the “intentional stance” itself.  
The “astrological strategy” also introduces the precept that the strategies or stances will be 
“algorithmic” in this capacity. Again, Dennett knows that this is not self-evident, particularly at 
the “intentional stance” level. But most importantly of all, the “astrological strategy” introduces 
Dennett’s peculiar concept of systems: not as human systems of phenomenal description, 
explanation, understanding, or even prediction but as systems oriented towards or, indeed, 
constitutive of, “people.” The “astrological strategy” is not simply the conduit for controversial 
claims. Here is it is the conceptual structure of astrology itself that is crucial. Dennett may view 
astrology’s substance as “pure hokum,”740 but it is the very idea that the stars actively determine 
and define human beings – and that those human beings can only reactively address the 
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 In other places Dennett acknowledges how radical a claim this is in physics (see my footnote on quantum 
mechanics above) and in “design.” (please see Dennett’s discussion of Skinner’s Behaviorism in Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea, 402-403)  
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predicative capacity in the stars – that provides the structure of Dennett’s “objective”, third-
person, strictly naturalistic philosophy. Ironically, it is not the natural sciences but a recognizable 




 As I demonstrated in chapter 3, Benjamin had little patience for theosophical, 
anthroposophical, neoplatonic, or other transcendental supernatural obscurantism. He associated 
them, in their positive formulations, with the Christian notion of faith, “betrayal” of the world, 
theodicy, mystified social conditions, and commodity fetishism. However, in the dialectical 
negation of such systems, he found one of the elements on which he could hang his Judeo-
Marxian hermeneutic practice and his commitment to the messianic possibility. Here is how 
Benjamin presents the critique of astrology in “On Astrology” (1932): 
An attempt to procure a view of astrology from which the doctrine of magical “influences,” of 
“radiant energies,” and so on has been excluded. Such an attempt may be provisional, if you like. 
It is important because it would purify the aura surrounding these investigations. And we 




Both Dennett and Benjamin begin their respective critiques of astrology by stripping away its 
supernatural “doctrines.” But the critiques turn in radically different directions from there. 
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Dennett, as I have shown, reproduces a systematic, transcendental structure that reduces human 
subjects to objects from the transcendent, deterministic cosmology of astrological systems. 
Benjamin, instead, in presenting this “complete prolegomenon of every rational astrology,”743 
dissolves that transcendent cosmology altogether and presents an immanent aesthetic-historical 
structure of how human subjects viewed the relationship of the stars to each other (through 
“similarity,” then “resemblances,” and, finally, “constellations”) and reflexively back on human 
subjects (as understanding these “resemblances” as “imported into things by chance comparisons 
on our part,” but simultaneously as “the effects of an active, mimetic force working expressly 
inside things.”)744  
Although this is just one text among many in which Benjamin performs the “reversal” 
discussed in chapter 4, it is not difficult to see how these reflections on astrology fit into 
Benjamin’s overall Judeo-Marxian philosophy as I have described it in this dissertation. 
Additionally, concepts here help provide partial foundations for the quotation above from “On 
Some Motifs in Baudelaire.”  Astrological “resemblances” – in their dimension as “the effects of 
an active mimetic force working expressly inside people” – contribute to the understanding of 
“correspondences” as “the common property of mystics.”745 A ‘purified’ “aura,” one “from 
which magical ‘influences,’ of ‘radiant energies,’” have been “excluded,” becomes the 
naturalized “aura” we find in the quotation, now with materialist socio-economic ramifications 
and concomitant dimensions of historical memory. The “conception of nascent promises that lay 
in constellations of the stars,” becomes “a hidden constellation” within “which the poet, in the 
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deserted streets, wrests poetic beauty.”746 Indeed, as Benjamin wrote in the Passagenwerk: “That 
the stars do not appear in Baudelaire is the surest indicator of that tendency of his poetry to 
dissolve illusory appearances.”747  
Reading the original quotation from “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” again then, 
“experience of the aura thus arises from the fact that a response characteristic of human 
relationships is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate objects…To 
experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at 
us,”748 the radical difference with Dennett can be immediately perceived.  Benjamin is 
‘investing’ objects “with the ability to look back us” in order to “experience” [Erfahrung] the 
now naturalized sense of “aura.” The “ability” that Benjamin actively invests in objects creates 
the possibility for a wide array of meanings. These “meanings” reflect back upon human beings 
in order that illusory conditions are demystified and hidden, real affinities, of socio-economic 
conditions and historical memory, are revealed into integrative, conscious experience 
[Erfahrung].
749
 Broadly put in terms of the questions at hand, as part of a philosophical system 
that fully captures at least the Popperian and Kuhnian accounts of science discussed here, 
Benjamin imbues objects with meaning in order to explore a wide range of aesthetic, historical, 
and philosophical possibilities which do not conflict with those scientific accounts.  
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In fairly radical opposition, Dennett imbues objects with intentionality in order that 
people might recognize their fundamental third-person, “objective” nature. As Dennett writes in 
Freedom Evolves: 
The key to understanding the patterns these transformations follow is to treat all these robotic 
cells as tiny individual agents, as intentional systems, each with a smidgen of “rational” decision-
power. Adopting the intentional stance, leaping up from the physical stance of component atoms, 
via the design stance of simple machines, to the intentional stance of simple agenthood, is a tactic 
that pays off handsomely but must be used with caution. It is all too easy to miss the fact that there 
are crucial moments in the careers of these various agents and semi-agents and hemi-semi-agents 
when opportunities to “decide” arise, and then pass.750  
This reads, even granted its ahistorical frame, like a framework for a scientifically plausible, if 
philosophically simplistic, account for an idea of emergent systems that eventually produce 
consciousness.  Indeed, one of its cardinal virtues, according to Dennett, is that “it makes life 
blessedly easier.”751 But it is also easy to miss that when Dennett puts scare quotes around 
“rational” and “decide” he does not actually mean these concepts in any recognizable way but 
rather as reformulated through the “intentional stance.” When Dennett writes “treat all these 
robotic cells as tiny individual agents, as intentional systems” he is reflexively also talking about 
human beings who should also be thought of as “intentional systems.” And the key word is 
robotic. Earlier in Freedom Evolves, Dennett writes, “We are each made of mindless robots and 
nothing else, no non-physical, non-robotic ingredients at all.”752 What is the difference between 
this “non-physical” and the mere biological or the mere physical in Al-e Ahmad? Or for that 
matter the powerful but epistemically limited account of science captured in the “religion of 
doubt” framework?  
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It turns out to be not only the entire range of possible meanings in the world discussed in 
those philosophical systems but replacing recognizable concepts, like “consciousness,” with 
radically reduced counterparts. So when Dennett writes, for example, that “Each trillion-robot 
team is gathered in a breathtakingly efficient regime that has no dictator but manages to keep 
itself organized, to repel outsiders, banish the weak, enforce the iron rules of discipline – and 
serve as the headquarters of one conscious self, one mind,”753 these notions of “conscious,” 
“self,” and “mind” should not be misunderstood as any familiar versions of the concepts 
conscious, self, or mind. Nor should these new concepts be understood as recognizable critiques 
of mind/body dualism, the intersubjectivity or multiplicity of self, the connection or expansion of 
a theory of mind beyond the body, or questions of subjective, critical, or false consciousness. 
Rather they all comport themselves perfectly to the system of the “intentional stance.” Take, for 
example, what I will call, just for a moment, Dennett’s conscious1. It is not in any form, at any 
level of complexity, a first-person, agential point of view; remember, there is no dictator among 
the robots. Rather it is precisely what can be explained from the view of third-person, 
“objective,” strict philosophical naturalism plus the tiny remainder left over at the end of the 
“intentional stance” argument. In that remainder is gathered everything of the subjective, first-
person “you” and thus accounts for “your” persistence in protesting of “your” “conscious” 
existence. But that remainder is understood as theoretically inconsequential. “You” are 
“autonomous,” for example, in the same sense as “the Viking spacecraft” is under “a new 
program which removed it from their [NASA’s] remote control and put it under self-control.” 754 
This leads to a quick blending of what one could try to indentify as the new conceptual 
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formulations: “What you are is that agent whose life you can tell about.”755 It is helpful to 
rephrase this by way of the “intentional stance”: You are those predicted actions of a plausibly 
agential object which can be viewed from a third-person perspective. As for the remainder, this 
is one of Dennett’s most generous formulations of it: “A person has to be able to keep in contact 
with past and anticipated intentions, and one of the main roles of the brain’s user-illusion of 
itself, which I call the self as a center of narrative gravity, is to provide me with a means of 
interfacing with myself at other times.”756   Parts of this seem frankly compelling: “the self as a 
center of narrative gravity,” maintaining a fictive stability to mediate with new situations “at 
other times.” But that interesting, contingent, potentially multiple self is completely effaced in 
recognizing that Dennett’s algorithmic input-output model is in effect. There are only objects in 
Dennett’s philosophy and “user-illusions.”  Furthermore, this remainder, the “brain’s user-
illusion,” is folded back into the complete philosophical system itself. It accounts for a tiny 
spectrum of random, unpredictable, and ultimately, meaningless knowledge within Dennett’s 
philosophy.  
I am not trying to be injudicious to Dennett’s thought. In fact, I find it one of the most 
compelling and consistent accounts of strict philosophical naturalism, outside of the potential 
misunderstanding of the transcendental role astrology played in its formation discussed before. 
In addition to the productively provocative but ultimately illusory similarity between the gesture 
of the “intentional stance” and the gesture of meaning within the “religion of doubt” framework, 
Dennett is especially useful in understanding the final dimensions of religion as polemic as 
historical intervention. This usefulness is the result of Dennett understanding the philosophical 
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complexities engendered by any system of strict philosophical naturalism. Dennett knows that 
quite often this perspective will lead to question-beginning problems in what he calls “greedy 
reductionism” which run the gamut between “bland” (and philosophically untenable) unified 
field theories to “preposterous readings” where English literature is explained, for example, only 
through the movement of molecules and so on.
757
 But also, at least to a degree, the moral 
implications: thus his particularly intensive drive to build what he calls “cranes” that would “lift” 
a firm, morally recognizable concept of “responsibility,” for example, that is commensurate with 
his notions of “self-control.” It is in adjudicating the difference between these “cranes” and what 
Dennett calls “skyhooks” that Dennett answers the very first question I posed about how he 
justifies what he admits is a question-begging position.  
It is the transcendental mechanism of the “intentional stance” that differentiates the 
empirically possible and rationally necessary “cranes” of Dennett’s philosophy and the irrational, 
impossible, or even rationally possible but empirically unverifiable “skyhooks.” Although, I 
identified this transcendental mechanism through Dennett’s (self-denied) dialectical negation of 
astrology, it is formally apparent to others as well. Patrick Frierson, for example, describes 
Dennett’s transcendental anthropology in contradistinction to Kant’s transcendental subjectivity: 
“While Dennett explains transcendental anthropology with an empirical account of its evolution, 
Kant explains empirical anthropology with a transcendental account of its justificatory basis.”758 
This description maps neatly onto the negation of the “astrological strategy.” What it means, in 
effect though, is that Dennett gets out of his question-begging assumption of “the third-person, 
materialistic perspective of contemporary science” by utilizing a transcendentally rational third-
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person perspective. However, his transcendental mechanism is very specifically designed to 
allow the least possible meaningful space between the ‘miraculous’ “skyhooks” and the properly 
reductionist “cranes” that can still describe a complete, strict philosophical naturalist description 
of the world while giving an adequate – but still radically reductionist – account of seemingly 
incommensurate but necessary conditions like “subjectivity” and “moral realism.”  The category 
of “skyhooks” is so capacious that it includes such everyday phenomena as colors and such 
complex theoretical scientific propositions as quantum gravity.  The category of “cranes” is so 
reductionist as to produce accounts of “consciousness” and “autonomy” as limited and, 
essentially, meaningless as the ones I just examined. Indeed, as Dennett writes, “the difference, 
in the context of Darwin’s theory, is simple: greedy reductionists think that everything can be 
explained without cranes; good reductionists think that everything can be explained without 
skyhooks.”759  
Of course, there is a common quality here which is the insistence that “everything can be 
explained.” Dennett brushes off any objection to this aspect of his project by positing that “it is 
simply the commitment to non-question-begging science without any cheating by embracing 
mysteries or miracles at the outset.”760 Which is to say, specifically, that everything can or will 
be explained eventually through the natural sciences. This is a commitment shared amongst all 
schools of strict philosophical naturalism and it clearly constitutes the grounds on which Dennett 
thinks his philosophical system is justified as “best.”  
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Naturalism and “Religions of Doubt” 
It is here that Nagel’s intuition about philosophical naturalism is so crucial. Nagel calls 
this intuition the “fear of religion” and writes: 
In speaking of the fear of religion, I don’t mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward 
certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral 
doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many 
religious beliefs with superstitions and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am 
talking about something much deeper – namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, 
being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the 
fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It 
isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I 
hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that.761 
Nagel finishes the thought in the next paragraph, “my guess is that this cosmic authority problem 
is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism in our 
time.”762 There is much to quibble with in Nagel’s intuition as he spells it out here but the points 
relevant to my discussion are (a) the idea of “the fear of religion,” beyond the question of 
“superstitions and the acceptance of evident falsehoods”; (b) the “much deeper” “fear of religion 
itself” that stems from not wanting “there to be a God,” and not wanting “the universe to be like 
that”; and (c) the “guess,” “that this cosmic authority problem… is responsible for much of the 
scientism and reductionism in our time.” Among these points, my guess is that Nagel’s intuition 
is largely right, but he has misidentified the “cosmic authority problem” and not understood the 
connections between (a) and religions and (b) and religion. Nagel seems to have a much more 
significant “cosmic authority problem” than the scientistic thinkers that he is discussing. That is 
to say, Nagel clearly (as understood in light of any of the critiques of religion discussed in this 
dissertation) thinks of “atheism,” secularism, and “religion” in terms of Christianity without 
understanding why this is the case historically. But he is also a committed unbeliever. As such he 
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sees that there is no necessary reason for a scientistic philosophy in which “everything can be 
explained.” But because his “much deeper” “fear of religion itself” is actually a crisis of faith 
within Christianity he misses that there is no similar crisis of faith in “blessedly easy” strict 
philosophical naturalism.  
As Dennett explains:  
If the scientists' summum bonum or highest good is truth, if scientists make truth their God, as 
some have claimed, is this not just as parochial an attitude as the worship of Jahweh, or 
Mohammed, or the Angel Moroni? No, our faith in the truth is, truly, our faith in the truth--a faith 
that is shared by all members of our species, even if there is great divergence in approved 
methods for obtaining it. The asymmetry noted above is real: faith in the truth has a priority claim 
that sets it apart from all other faiths.
763
 
First a rather major, if obvious point: Dennett is rhetorically eliding methodological naturalism, 
perfectly appropriate to the natural sciences, with philosophical naturalism. But, even if Dennett 
does not accept a Nietzschean critique of ‘faith in truth,’ it is here that we can begin to 
disentangle Nagel’s argument about “the fear of religion.” Indeed, it is not a lack of “cosmic 
authority” that undergirds “much of the scientism and reductionism in our time,” but an 
abundance of the one true faith, ahistorical and universal, the faith that is not “parochial,” that 
has a “prior claim that sets it apart from all other faiths.” Dennett formally (if almost certainly 
not consciously) distills Christianity down to precisely its purest component part. It is not actual 
scientific truths that prove the limits of Dennett’s philosophical system, but a reconciliation of 
those truths with faith. Thus, the “scientism and reductionism in our time” is not based on “the 
fear of religion”; it is based on the fear of religions, the persistence of which disturb the one true 
faith in ways that have nothing to do with “superstitions and the acceptance of evident 
falsehoods.” These “religions” are not limited, of course, to the discourses historically 
understood as “religions” but are now spread to any discourses or even phenomena which disturb 
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the prior supremacy of the one true faith, even when those discourses or phenomena accord with 
the evidence of the sense.  
 It is here that the final dimension of religion as polemic becomes clear, because this faith, 
fully naturalized, is the perfect theodicy.
764
 And if the critique of religion is, as I suggested in my 
first chapter, predicated on a critique of injustice in the confluence of Empire and Capital, then 
there is no better ideology for that confluence than strict philosophical naturalism’s theodicy. 
And furthermore, if this critique wants to be worldly and historically attentive, it must attend to 
this philosophy’s ascendance in the literal spatial and temporal centers of Empire and Capital.  
One of the most crucial components in Al-e Ahmad’s and Benjamin’s philosophy is this critique 
of the way this faith and its theodicy turn attention, indeed consciousness, away from 
understanding injustice. As I have argued, there is nothing supernatural per se in Al-e Ahmad’s 
and Benjamin’s philosophies, nor in the “religion of doubt” synthetic philosophical framework. 
Furthermore, these philosophies and this framework not only capture the scientific image of the 
world, they require it. They are, then, naturalistic. However, in addressing real historical 
injustice and doubt in fully realizable truth, they foreground the widest possible range of 
speculative meaning and possibility in their philosophies. In contrast, in the name of “faith in the 
truth,” in there being one true faith, Dennett foregrounds scientific inquiry as the only true 
inquiry, as the last line of defense against even rational and non-rational but scientifically 
inaccessible elements, one might say foreign elements, both internal and external, that disturb the 
supreme comfort of this faith. Which is the better naturalism? Perhaps, a better question is: is 
strict philosophical naturalism a bit gharbzadeh?  
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